Zumbado v

Lincoln Property Co., 209 Ga. App. 163, 433 S.E.2d 301 (1993). Fire detection and alarm system. — Whether a landlord provided an adequate fire detection and alarm system in a rented house was an issue of fact for the jury. Denise v. Cannon, 219 Ga. App. 765, 466 S.E.2d 885 (1995). Apartment complex liability not foreseeable despite not installing a guardrail along a lake. — In a premises liability action involving the drowning death of a child following a car being driven into an apartment complex lake, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the apartment complex because it could not be negligent as a matter of law for failing to foresee the events at issue, notwithstanding the complex’s failure to install a guardrail along the lake. Allan v. Jefferson Lakeside, L.P., 333 Ga. App. 222, 775 S.E.2d 763 (2015). Jury instructions. — When, in an action by the tenant’s business invitee to 51-3-1 recover damages from the landlord, the judge charged O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, and then immediately charged O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, the court charged what might be termed the qualifying section first, and then immediately charged the section which it was intended to qualify. The court thus went from the particular to the general rather than from the general to the particular, and this assembling in the charge of the language of the two sections if error, was not harmful to the plaintiff. Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 35 S.E.2d 364 (1945). Master’s Liability to Servant This section applies to a master-servant relationship, and it is not error to give a charge verbatim from this section in a negligence action by a servant against the master. Smith v. Ammons, 228 Ga. 855, 188 S.E.2d 866 (1972). Duty of the master to use ordinary care to keep the master’s premises safe so that the master’s servants may perform their duties in safety is but a phrase of the ancient organized doctrine of the common law codified in this section which provides that when the owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads the others to come upon the master’s premises for any lawful purpose, the master is liable in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned by the master’s failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and the approaches safe. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hilderbrand, 48 Ga. App. 140, 172 S.E. 87 (1933); Elrod v. Ogles, 78 Ga. App. 376, 50 S.E.2d 791 (1948). General rule of law declaring duty of master in regard to furnishing servant safe place to work is usually applied to permanent place, or one which is quasi permanent. It does not apply to such places as are constantly shifting and being transformed as a direct result of the servant’s labor, and when the work in its progress necessarily changes the character for safety of the place in which it is performed as it progresses. Powell v. Shurling, 51 Ga. App. 67, 179 S.E. 653 (1935). 406 51-3-1 LIABILITY OF OWNERS/OCCUPIERS OF LAND No cause of action when master had no knowledge of defective condition. — When in an action by an injured invitee (servant) for damages the petition failed to allege that the owner (master) had knowledge of the decayed condition of the underside of the outside stairway, but did allege this defect and rotten condition did not exist and was not apparent at the time of previous repairs to those steps and at the time of the invitee’s fall the condition ‘‘could not be seen by ordinary observation,’’ and in effect based the invitee’s petition on the theory that it was the absolute duty of the owner (master) to make an inspection of the premises, for the purpose of keeping them in repair, irrespective of any apparent fact or circumstance which might, to a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary diligence, indicate the necessity of any such inspection, the judge did not err in sustaining the demurrer (now motion to dismiss) and in dismissing the petition. Williamson v. Kidd, 65 Ga. App. 285, 15 S.E.2d 801 (1941). Neither in master and servant cases nor in invitee cases has a master or owner been held liable when one did not know of the danger and when one was not lacking in the exercise of ordinary diligence in discovering the danger; however, the master or owner need not have either actual knowledge or implied notice of the result of the danger. Elrod v. Ogles, 78 Ga. App. 376, 50 S.E.2d 791 (1948). No specific allegations of knowledge necessary when pleadings show constructive knowledge. — It was not necessary in order for the petition seeking damages for the death of the plaintiff ’s husband, an employee of the defendant, to state a cause of action that it allege that the master or owner had either actual knowledge or implied notice that butane gas was in the well in which the servant or invitee was working; since the petition alleged that the master or owner knew that butane gas was installed on the master or owner’s premises, knew that the tank and the pipeline were of secondhand material, knew that the gas line was buried at a point on the master or owner’s property within four feet of the well where the servant or invitee would be at work, 51-3-1 and knew that the men whom the master or owner procured to install the tank and pipe were unskilled in this type of work, the master or owner was chargeable with the knowledge that the pipeline was defective in that through rust and decay it had become weakened and was unfit for the transmission of butane gas and dangerous. Elrod v. Ogles, 78 Ga. App. 376, 50 S.E.2d 791 (1948). Petition defective if facts show no knowledge on part of master. — Petition alleging that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, and that the plaintiff was bitten by a dog on entering the premises, and that a defendant did not furnish the plaintiff with a safe place to work, in that keeping the dog endangered the plaintiff ’s life and safety while the plaintiff was in the performance of duties incident to the plaintiff ’s employment since no facts were alleged to show that the defendant had knowledge that the dog was vicious, or that it would be unsafe for the plaintiff to work in the house with the dog present, failed to set out a cause of action because of the failure to allege facts showing the defendant knew, or should have known of the danger. Hays v. Anchors, 71 Ga. App. 280, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944). Employee’s knowledge of dangerous condition. — When the peanut market plant contracted with the employee’s employer to remove and replace a motor from the top of a grain elevator at the plant, where the employee’s injury was received from a danger that would ordinarily and naturally exist in doing the work which the employee was employed to perform, and since the employee could not have engaged in the work without knowing and seeing the identical condition which, as grounds of negligence, it was alleged that the master allowed to exist, the general rule of a master providing a safe work place to a servant or employee pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 did not apply. Howell v. Farmers Peanut Mkt. of Sowega, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 610, 442 S.E.2d 904 (1994). Construction or demolition sites. — Construction or demolition sites by their inherent nature are naturally temporary and in a state of continuous alteration. 407 Master’s Liability to Servant (Cont’d) Since removal of asphalt shingles to reveal wooden shingles below perforce would have altered a roof ’s condition and affected the footing of persons working on the roof, an injury while doing this work was an exception to the general rule of a master providing a safe work place to a servant or employee pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Elsberry v.