Liberty Ins

Corp. v. Ferguson, 263 Ga. App. 714, 589 S.E.2d 290 (2003). Strict adherence to this section, in regard to automobile insurance policies, is required to accomplish cancellation. American Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Hartsfield, 147 Ga. App. 213, 248 S.E.2d 518 (1978). This section provides for automatic renewal of automobile liability coverage unless the company meets notice requirements therein set forth. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fox, 142 Ga. App. 706, 236 S.E.2d 851 (1977). 1988 amendment not applied retroactively. — The 1988 amendment, which added division (e)(3)(C)(i) so as to prevent nonrenewal except under stated conditions, is not applied retroactively. Banks v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 189 Ga. App. 758, 377 S.E.2d 685 (1989). Written notice required to effect cancellation of policy which protects interest of lienholder. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Employers’ Fire Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 655, 165 S.E.2d 309 (1968). O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7 does not apply to insurance policies covered by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45. Sentry Indem. Co. v. Sharif, 248 Ga. 395, 282 S.E.2d 907 (1981); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 251 Ga. 244, 304 S.E.2d 725 (1983). ‘‘Renewal’’ means renewal of the terms of the original policy; when the original policy is for six months, the renewal period must be the same. Wisener v. American S. Ins. Co., 150 Ga. App. 795, 258 S.E.2d 908 (1979). Mandatory minimum and optional amounts of coverage. — Paragraph (b)(1) (formerly paragraph (b)(2)) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45 does not distinguish 271 General Consideration (Cont’d) between mandatory minimum and optional amounts of coverage. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 251 Ga. 244, 304 S.E.2d 725 (1983). Applicability of subsection (g). — Under the terms of the insured’s homeowners’ policy and consistent with subsection (g) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45, an insured effected a termination of the auto insurance endorsement to the insured’s homeowners’ policy when the insured procured an auto insurance policy from another company. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 222 Ga. App. 190, 474 S.E.2d 78 (1996). Applicability of subsection (i). — While it would appear that subsection (i) (formerly subsection (j)) of this section was intended to apply when the policy was either canceled or not renewed because the insurance company felt that the insured was a poor risk, this section does not so provide but in fact makes subsection (i) (formerly subsection (j)) apply in all cases when the policy is canceled or not renewed. Concord Group Ins. Co. v. Terry, 130 Ga. App. 13, 202 S.E.2d 471 (1973). Subsection (i) (formerly subsection (j)) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45, which provides for the notification of the insured of the insured’s possible eligibility for insurance in the Georgia Automobile Assigned Risk Plan (now Georgia Automobile Insurance plan), only comes into play when a notice of intention not to renew under subsection (e) must be given. Notice need not be given when ‘‘the insurer . . . manifested its willingness to renew . . .’’ under paragraph (f )(3). Wheeler v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 565, 309 S.E.2d 805 (1983). Failure to follow statutory requirements resulting in noncancellation and renewal of policy. — Insurer’s notice which failed to provide 30 days’ notice of cancellation and failed to state a valid reason for cancellation resulted in noncancellation of a policy and, because no notice of nonrenewal was given, the policy was extended under the policy’s terms for another six months. Bank of Toccoa v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 211 Ga. App. 389, 439 S.E.2d 60 (1993). Notice of willingness to renew may be given simultaneously with issuance 33-24-45 of policy. Wheeler v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 168 Ga. App. 565, 309 S.E.2d 805 (1983). Notice required for cancellation of policy for nonpayment of premiums. — Automobile insurance policy as to bodily injury and property damage liability, medical payments, physical damage, and uninsured motorists coverage is controlled by this section, specifically as to cancellations, and notice is required to cancel for nonpayment of premiums, or any installment thereof. American Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Hartsfield, 147 Ga. App. 213, 248 S.E.2d 518 (1978). Policy automatically renewed absent compliance with section. — Policy is automatically renewed in the event of failure on the part of the insurer to mail the required notice of intention not to renew, or to comply with subsections (e) through (h) of this section. Garner v. GEICO, 129 Ga. App. 235, 199 S.E.2d 350 (1973). Mailing alone of notice of willingness or intent to renew, if unreceived, does not constitute an offer to the insured to renew so as to prevent the automatic renewal of the policy. Garner v. GEICO, 129 Ga. App. 235, 199 S.E.2d 350 (1973). If the insurer does not properly comply with the notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45, then the insured’s policy is automatically renewed. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mims, 187 Ga. App. 783, 371 S.E.2d 426, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 371 S.E.2d 426 (1988). Insured’s automobile liability policy automatically renewed under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45(e) when the insurer did not send the insurer’s renewal declaration statement until three days after the date on which the policy expired and, thus, the insured had coverage on the insured’s automobile at the time of the accident one month after the expiration and automatic renewal occurred. Stedman v. Cotton States Ins. Co., 254 Ga. App. 325, 562 S.E.2d 256 (2002). Renewal versus new policy. — Because an insurance policy was issued by the same insurer to supersede an existing policy and to extend the term of the existing policy beyond its policy period conditioned upon payment of a continuation 272 premium, the fact that the policy bore a slightly different number and that there were changes in the premium amounts and the vehicles insured did not mean that the policy was a new policy rather than a renewal under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45(b)(2) (now paragraph (b)(3)). Thus, uninsured motorist coverage was not the $1,000,000 liability limit under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a), but the $25,000 per person limit that the insureds had previously selected. Roberson v. Leone, 315 Ga. App. 459, 726 S.E.2d 565 (2012). Effect of lapse between expiration of existing policy and issuance of new policy. — Lapse of two days between the expiration of the existing policy and the issuance of another policy does not preclude the second policy from being a renewal contract. A renewal policy can begin on another date by agreement of the parties to the contract. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Brown, 261 Ga. 837, 413 S.E.2d 430 (1992). Effect of insurer’s practice of renewing policy ‘‘without interruption.’’ — When the custom and practice between an insurer and an insured was that the insurer would renew the policy ‘‘without interruption’’ upon receipt of late premiums, an issue arose as to whether, as a result of a quasi-new agreement created by the past conduct of the parties, the policy was reinstated following such cancellation. Holland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 200 Ga. App. 668, 409 S.E.2d 79 (1991). Effect of redepositing dishonored check. — Insurance company does not accept a premium check as absolute payment when the company promptly presents a dishonored check a second time for collection. Accordingly, the insurer did not waive the insurer’s right to treat the insured’s check as a conditional payment by redepositing the check after the check’s initial dishonor. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Brown, 261 Ga. 837, 413 S.E.2d 430 (1992). Mailed cancellation proper for DUI violation. — Information that the driver’s license of a driver recently added to the policy had recently been suspended because of a DUI violation was clearly necessary for a proper risk evaluation, according to subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. 33-24-45 § 33-24-45, sufficient to cancel via mailed notice. Ramsdell v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 206 Ga. App. 357, 425 S.E.2d 661 (1992). Caveat providing for no grace period not against public policy. — Caveat in month to month insurance plan stating ‘‘No grace period! If premium is not received by due date your coverage expires’’ is governed by the exceptions enumerated in subsections (e) through (g) of O.C.G.A § 33-24-45 and is not offensive to the general welfare of the public. Whitlock v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 160 Ga. App. 113, 286 S.E.2d 343 (1981). Payment of renewal premium must be to insurer’s agent. — When there was a payment by the plaintiff, as evidenced by a receipt to the plaintiff from an insurance broker, for the minimum payment requested in the notice after the expiration date, the policy had expired and there was no coverage unless one of the insurance brokers was acting as agent for the insurer so that the payment to one of the agents would constitute payment to insurer. National Property Owners Ins. Co. v. Wells, 166 Ga. App. 281, 304 S.E.2d 458 (1983). Effect of payment made after cancellation. — While insureds made a payment after sustaining auto damage and after allegedly learning for the first time that the insureds’ coverage had been cancelled for non-payment, the insurer’s receipt of this payment resulted in the reinstatement of the policy the following day. Thus, the insureds’ intent in making payment after the fact was irrelevant to whether the insureds’ policy was cancelled at the time of the accident. Burnside v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 309 Ga. App. 897, 714 S.E.2d 606 (2011). Cited in Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 116 Ga. App. 433, 157 S.E.2d 807 (1967); International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Underwriters, 125 Ga. App. 786, 189 S.E.2d 123 (1972); Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Williams, 135 Ga. App. 562, 218 S.E.2d 282 (1975); Roberts v. American S. Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 232, 235 S.E.2d 660 (1977); Peek v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 498, 241 S.E.2d 210 (1978); Howard v. American S. Ins. Co., 148 Ga. App. 273 General Consideration (Cont’d) 25, 251 S.E.2d 7 (1978); Pearce v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 33, 268 S.E.2d 623 (1980); Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Lyles v. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 179 Ga. App. 425, 346 S.E.2d 585 (1986); Stegall v. Leader Nat’l Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 765, 353 S.E.2d 484 (1987); Leader Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Gaydon, 185 Ga. App. 322, 363 S.E.2d 859 (1987); Borders v. Global Ins. Co., 208 Ga. App. 480, 430 S.E.2d 854 (1993); Infinity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Litton, 308 Ga. App. 497, 707 S.E.2d 885 (2011); McGraw v. IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 323 Ga. App. 408, 744 S.E.2d 891 (2013). 33-24-45 Fid. Ins. Co., 171 Ga. App. 26, 318 S.E.2d 708 (1984). Cancellation for nonpayment of premiums is within the purview of subsection (f ) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45 and without the purview of subsection (e) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Gailey, 168 Ga. App. 102, 308 S.E.2d 219 (1983). Cancellation is allowed for any reason of policy ‘‘which has been in effect less than 60 days at the time notice of cancellation is mailed or delivered by the insurer unless it is a renewal of a policy.’’ Georgia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ragan, 122 Ga. App. 56, 176 S.E.2d 230 (1970). Effectiveness of Notice Exceptions Cancellation provisions apply only to natural persons and did not apply to a policy covering corporate insureds. Capital City Ins. Co. v. Rick Taylor Timber Co., 918 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D. Ga. 1995), aff ’d, 106 F.3d 417 (11th Cir. 1997). Subsection (k) (formerly subsection (i)) eliminates the requirement of notice to the insured if the policy has been in effect for less than 60 days. Sentry Indem. Co. v. Sharif, 248 Ga. 395, 282 S.E.2d 907 (1981). Notice of intention not to renew requirement when corporate insured. — Justification for imposing the additional burden of a written notice of intention not to renew upon the insurer under subsection (e) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45 may not be present when the insured is a corporation rather than an individual. Disparate treatment of an individual and corporate insureds is not a violation of equal protection in that it bears a real relation to the object of the legislation, which is to protect unsophisticated and more likely unwary insureds by assuring that insurance remains in effect. Home Materials, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 599, 300 S.E.2d 139 (1983). No notice required when premium not paid. — When an insured failed to pay a premium for renewal coverage following the insurer’s manifestation of the insurer’s willingness to renew, no written notice of nonrenewal was required to terminate coverage. Smith v. Southeastern Insurer’s intent not to renew cannot act to bar automatic renewal of the policy unless that intent to renew is communicated to and received by the insured prior to the expiration date of the policy. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pritchett, 169 Ga. App. 564, 313 S.E.2d 706 (1983). Notice ineffective as notice of cancellation. — Notice of cancellation which states that a policy will be cancelled on a specified date unless premiums due are paid prior to that date is merely a demand for payment and ineffective as a notice of cancellation. Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Person, 164 Ga. App. 488, 297 S.E.2d 80 (1982). When notice of cancellation was not given to the insured upon the insured’s failure to pay the premium when due, but rather, was given before the premium was due, there was a failure to adhere to statutory requirements resulting in noncancellation of the policy. Pennsylvania Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Person, 164 Ga. App. 755, 297 S.E.2d 337 (1982). Regardless of when it was generated, under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45(d), an auto insurer’s cancellation notice could not take effect until the date of mailing, at which point the insurer had received payment satisfying the insured’s past-due balance. Therefore, cancellation for non-payment was improper under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 293 Ga. App. 459, 667 S.E.2d 628 (2008). 274 Written notice ineffective prior to loss. — When written notice of cancellation of a policy would not have been effective prior to the occurrence of the property loss, any actual notice could not have accomplished a prior cancellation and the policy was still in effect at the time of the loss. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Employers’ Fire Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 655, 165 S.E.2d 309 (1968). No cancellation when evidence failed to show mail contained notice to insured. — When the evidence adduced failed to show that the mail addressed to the insured and receipted for by the United States Post Office contained the notice of cancellation of the policy as required under O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-44 and 33-24-45, no cancellation was effected in the absence of a showing of actual receipt of the cancellation notice by the insured. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cody, 123 Ga. App. 265, 180 S.E.2d 596 (1971). Notice effective. — In response to a certified question, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a cancellation notice, given after an insurance premium was past due, which clearly stated that cancellation was occurring, was not ineffective under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45(c)(1) simply because it also provided the insured with an opportunity to reinstate coverage. Reynolds v. Infinity Gen. Ins. Co., 287 Ga. 86, 694 S.E.2d 337 (2010). Insurer’s evidence establishing that on the same date of the mailing receipt, the insureds were sent a cancellation notice, and that it was the insurer’s practice to have cancellation notices inserted into envelopes manually or by machine before being matched to the appropriate mailing receipt, was sufficient to establish that the mailing contained a notice of cancellation sent to the insureds. Burnside v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 309 Ga. App. 897, 714 S.E.2d 606 (2011). Because the mailing receipt and other uncontradicted evidence showed that the requisites of O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-44 and 33-24-45(c) were satisfied, whether the insureds actually received notice of cancellation of the insureds auto insurance 33-24-45 policy was irrelevant and did not preclude the insurer from cancelling the insureds’ policy due to non-payment. Burnside v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 309 Ga. App. 897, 714 S.E.2d 606 (2011). Insurance Agents Standing lies in policyholders. — Insurance agent had no claim for negligence against an insurer based on the insurer’s cancellation of policies since such a claim could be asserted only by the policyholders. Keith v. Alexander Underwriters Gen. Agency, Inc., 226 Ga. App. 838, 487 S.E.2d 673 (1997). Insurance brokers not normally insurer’s agents. — While insurance agents or brokers may be considered as ‘‘dual’’ agents, or agents for both the insurer and the insured, normally such insurance representatives are independent insurance brokers and are the insured’s agents, not those of the insurer. National Property Owners Ins. Co. v. Wells, 166 Ga. App. 281, 304 S.E.2d 458 (1983). Denial of agency sufficient to support insurer’s motion for judgment. — Since an assertion or denial of the existence of an agency relationship is a statement of fact when made by one of the purported parties, such a statement may not be disregarded by the trial court and is sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment; and an affidavit of insurer’s officer categorically denying that insurance brokers were its agents effectively pierces the insured’s pleadings and places on the insured the burden of showing the fact of agency. National Property Owners Ins. Co. v. Wells, 166 Ga. App. 281, 304 S.E.2d 458 (1983). Insurance agent has right to bring action in agent’s own name for unpaid premium when, on behalf of the insured, the agent has paid the premium to the insurer or, although the agent has not paid the premium, the agent has become personally liable for the premium’s payment. Spalding Ins. & Realty Co. v. Morris, 154 Ga. App. 869, 270 S.E.2d 78 (1980). 275 33-24-45