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Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 630 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 121 Insurance coverage is void ab initio when insured neither signed application nor consented in writing to the issuance of the coverage. Wood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 631 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1984). When a parent brought suit to recover the benefits under a policy of life insurance insuring the life of the parent’s adult child, the trial court erred in only partially denying the insurer’s motion for summary judgment by holding that the insurer had waived the statutory requirement prohibiting the issuance of a valid life insurance policy without the written consent of the insured. Under circumstances not qualifying for an exception pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6(a)(1)-(4), the policy was void ab initio, and unenforceable by the courts; written consent of the insured may not be waived. Time Ins. Co. v. Lamar, 195 Ga. App. 452, 393 S.E.2d 734 (1990). Issuance of void policy. — Plaintiff ’s complaint stated a viable fraud claim based on alleged misrepresentation by the defendant in knowingly issuing a void insurance policy with the purpose of deceiving the plaintiff, on the plaintiff ’s reasonable reliance on the appearance that the policy issued was valid and enforceable, and on the resulting harm to the plaintiff, including the loss of use of funds paid as premiums for the void policy. Loney v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 815, 499 S.E.2d 385 (1998). Insurer is not barred by incontestability clauses from arguing that policies are void ab initio because the proposed insured, who was then an adult, neither signed the applications nor consented in writing to the issuance of the coverage as required by subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6. Guarantee Trust Life 33-24-6 Ins. Co. v. Wood, 631 F. Supp. 15 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Running of the incontestability clause is not a bar to an action under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 33-24-6. Wood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 631 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Contracts of insurance written on the franchise plan bear the same legal consequences as any individually written policy, and, therefore, require the signature of the individual insured, exactly the same as under an individual policy. Wood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 300, 336 S.E.2d 806 (1985); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood, 631 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Insurer is entitled to rely on the statements of an applicant as true under subsection (b) (now subsection (c)), and incurs no legal liability except as set forth in the policy by virtue of any untrue statements, declarations, or representations relied on by the insurer. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Renew, 121 Ga. App. 883, 176 S.E.2d 103 (1970). Ambiguous questions in application. — Questions as to applicant’s status as smoker calling for ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ answers were ambiguous and answers thereto were construed favorably to the insured. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Snead, 231 Ga. App. 406, 499 S.E.2d 173 (1998). Conflicting and disputed evidence on the issue of the falsity of the insured’s representation on an application created issues of fact that were properly presented to the jury. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Snead, 231 Ga. App. 406, 499 S.E.2d 173 (1998). Cited in Hairston v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Ga. 1970); National Indem. Co. v. Berry, 136 Ga. App. 545, 221 S.E.2d 624 (1975).