Cottrell v

Atlanta Dev. Auth., 297 Ga. 1, 770 S.E.2d 616 (2015). No right to jury trial. — Bond validation proceeding is not one of class of cases, either in terms or by analogy, in which jury trials have ever existed as a matter of right; and it does not fall within Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VI, Sec. XVI, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XI). Steadham v. State, 224 Ga. 78, 159 S.E.2d 397, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825, 89 S. Ct. 87, 21 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1968). Sufficiency of information in engineering report. — Information con- 1281 tained in engineering report introduced in evidence met the statutory requirements as to certainty and definiteness, in that it showed with reasonable certainty the nature, kind, and location of the improvements and described and defined with reasonable fullness and definiteness the undertaking including the estimated costs thereof. Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955). Burden of making out case on intervenors when stipulations make prima facie case. — When citizens as intervenors file an intervention objecting to the validation of revenue anticipation bonds, the burden is on the plaintiff in the proceeding to make out a prima facie case, but when the parties to such a proceeding by stipulation and other admissions admit sufficient material allegations to make out a prima facie case it is not error for the judge to rule that the burden is upon intervenors to introduce evidence in support of their intervention. Dade County v. State, 77 Ga. App. 139, 48 S.E.2d 144 (1948). Intervention seeking validation denial for nonconformity with law not subject to dismissal. — Intervention filed by a resident and taxpayer of the municipality proposing to issue revenue bonds which seeks to have the validation denied and the proceedings dismissed because such petition was not filed in conformity with such laws is not subject to demurrer (now motion to dismiss). State v. Smallwood, 103 Ga. App. 400, 119 S.E.2d 297 (1961). Intervention in bond validation proceeding. — Challenger in an action validating and confirming taxable revenue bonds lacked standing to intervene in the action as a result of failing to comply with the intervention procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(c); and, because the challenger lacked standing to become a party in the trial court, the challenger also lacked standing to appeal the trial court’s judgment, therefore, the appeal was dismissed. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 324 Ga. App. 23, 749 S.E.2d 29 (2013). Exception must be taken to judgment validating revenue anticipation bonds within 20 days from such judgment, and, when the superior court of a 36-82-77 county enters an order validating water revenue certificates of a city on February 16, and exception is not taken to such judgment until March 16, (a period of 28 days), the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review that judgment. Drury v. City of Woodbine, 96 Ga. App. 158, 99 S.E.2d 550 (1957). State a necessary party in intervention in validation proceeding. — On appeal by intervening taxpayers and citizens from a judgment of the superior court overruling their objections and validating the bonds, the state is a necessary and indispensable party, and, it appearing that the state had not been made a party to the bill of exceptions or served with a copy of the bill of exception, the writ of error is properly dismissed. Darby v. City of Vidalia, 75 Ga. App. 804, 44 S.E.2d 454 (1947). Notice and a hearing required before dismissal of intervention complaints. — Trial court erred in dismissing a complaint by intervenors objecting to a bond validation proceeding without notice and a hearing on the dismissal issue, although the trial court found that the intervenors had intervened for the improper purpose of seeking $ 1.3 million from developers to avoid the litigation. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t, LLC v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 303 Ga. App. 724, 694 S.E.2d 680 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1350, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 722 (Ga. 2010). When proper issue of fact is raised as to feasibility of plan to validate refunding bonds, it is for the trial court to determine, under the evidence, such issue. Dade County v. State, 75 Ga. App. 330, 43 S.E.2d 434 (1947); Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955). Bond approval not proper. — Trial court erred by validating taxable revenue bonds for a county development authority as the order validating the bonds failed to set forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the court’s holdings and, thus, failed to satisfy the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a). Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 320 Ga. App. 689, 740 S.E.2d 663 (2013). Standard of review. — When the trial court has concluded the project promoted 1282 the statutory objectives and there is evidence to support the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court will find no error. Alexander v. Macon-Bibb County Urban Dev. Auth. & Urban Properties #47, 257 Ga. 181, 357 S.E.2d 62 (1987). Remand to trial court for preparation of findings and conclusions. — Judgment granting the state’s petition to validate revenue bonds under the Revenue Bond Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-82-60 et seq., was remanded to the trial court because the trial court failed to mention in the judgment the citizen who intervened in the proceedings and to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to various grounds pursued by the citizen as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a); prior to the judgment, the citizen requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 314 Ga. App. 237, 723 S.E.2d 528 (2012). Validation upheld. — After a trial court required two intervenors to post a bond of $625,000 with regard to the intervenors’ challenge to the public improvement bond approved by a city’s building authority for a sewer project, the trial court properly validated the bond by following all necessary procedural requirements and the bond did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I(a) 36-82-78 since the city’s payment for the use of the sewer project was a debt specifically authorized under the constitution pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I(a). Berry v. City of E. Point, 277 Ga. App. 649, 627 S.E.2d 391 (2006). Memorandum of agreement establishing valuation method part of lease agreement. — Because a memorandum of agreement establishing the valuation methodology to be used in assessing ad valorem taxes on a leasehold estate was referenced by the lease and dictated the methodology to be used to value a corporation’s leasehold estate for ad valorem tax purposes, it constituted an integral part of the lease agreement and was properly before the trial court; in a transaction in which revenue bonds will be paid through lease proceeds, all agreements relating to the lease are properly within the trial court’s jurisdiction. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 317 Ga. App. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2012). Cited in Gibbs v. City of Social Circle, 191 Ga. 422, 12 S.E.2d 335 (1940); Mays v. State, 110 Ga. App. 881, 140 S.E.2d 223 (1965); Peagler v. State, 223 Ga. 886, 159 S.E.2d 72 (1968); Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 255 Ga. 324, 338 S.E.2d 240 (1985); Youngblood v. State, 259 Ga. 864, 388 S.E.2d 671 (1990).