State, 275 Ga. App. 881, 622 S.E.2d 89 (2005). In a DUI per se case, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a chemical testing of the defendant’s blood because the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the test as the defendant gave an affirmative response to the officer’s question pursuant to the implied consent notice; the officer did not employ shows of force; and, at the fire station, the defendant reaffirmed the defendant’s assent before the medic drew the defendant’s blood. Jacobs v. State, 338 Ga. App. 743, 791 S.E.2d 844 (2016). Inadmissibility of blood test. — When an officer failed to read appropriate warnings to the defendant, it was error to admit results of the defendant’s breath 40-6-391 tests, even though the defendant had stipulated to the facts that would be demonstrated by the results of the tests, i.e., that the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .207. Richards v. State, 269 Ga. 483, 500 S.E.2d 581 (1998), reversing Richards v. State, 225 Ga. App. 777, 484 S.E.2d 683 (1997). Horizontal gaze nystagmus test was a valid indication of the presence of alcohol, the results of which were admissible. Manley v. State, 206 Ga. App. 281, 424 S.E.2d 818 (1992). Officer was properly permitted to testify that, in the officer’s opinion, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for the defendant to drive based on the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test the officer administered. Sieveking v. State, 220 Ga. App. 218, 469 S.E.2d 235 (1996). Evidence regarding the officer’s training and experience in administering field sobriety tests and the procedures the officer followed in administering horizontal gaze nystagmus tests justified admission of the results of the defendant’s tests. Tuttle v. State, 232 Ga. App. 530, 502 S.E.2d 355 (1998). There was no merit to a defendant’s argument that the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus test should not have been admitted because an officer did not perform the test properly. The officer substantially performed the test in accordance with the guidelines, and the defendant showed six clues of impairment. Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 665 S.E.2d 731 (2008). Defendant, who had cerebral palsy, failed to show that the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus test performed on the defendant were unreliable and therefore inadmissible due to the defendant’s medical condition. Moreover, the officers had sufficient other evidence to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence, including erratic driving, an odor of alcohol, the defendant’s admission that the defendant had been drinking, and the results of an alco-sensor test. Harris v. State, 301 Ga. App. 775, 689 S.E.2d 91 (2009). Arresting officer’s performing one of the three evaluative components of the hori- 310 zontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test (the smooth pursuit component) ‘‘a little quickly’’ did not render the entire test inadmissible, given evidence of the officer’s experience at giving the test, that the defendant was a proper subject, and that the other components were correctly performed. Parker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 61, 704 S.E.2d 438 (2010). In the defendant’s DUI trial, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test was properly admitted, although the defendant stated the defendant had taken Prozac, which would influence the results, because the evidence was relevant as to whether the defendant showed signs of impairment, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401, and the defendant remained free to attempt to persuade the factfinder that the testimony be afforded little weight under the circumstances. Cherry v. State, No. A17A2085, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 116 (Feb. 21, 2018). Passive alcohol sensor. — Trial court properly convicted the defendant of driving under the influence and related charges after a bench trial, and no error occurred with regard to the trial court failing to suppress the evidence gathered by the arresting officer’s use of a passive alcohol sensor; the defendant was not harmed by any alleged error since the state never offered any of the evidence directly gathered by the sensor for admission during trial. Sultan v. State, 289 Ga. App. 405, 657 S.E.2d 311 (2008). Although a trial court should have suppressed the results of an improperly performed horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, with regard to defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence offenses, such error was harmless since the trial court specifically stated on the record that the trial court did not consider the HGN test; therefore, the test did not contribute to the verdict in the case. Sultan v. State, 289 Ga. App. 405, 657 S.E.2d 311 (2008). Injuries’ impact on field sobriety test admissibility. — Admissibility of field sobriety tests was not affected by the defendant’s injuries at the time the tests were given. Morrissette v. State, 229 Ga. App. 420, 494 S.E.2d 8 (1997). Error in excluding HGN test results. — Officer’s comment to the defen- 40-6-391 dant that ‘‘I’m just going to shut your car door so some other drunk doesn’t take it off,’’ was insufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that the person’s detention would not have been temporary, and a trial court erred in excluding on the basis of a Miranda violation evidence of the results of roadside sobriety tests performed on the defendant thereafter; evidence concerning the officer’s improper administration of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test did not mandate the exclusion of the test results, and the trial court erred in excluding the results of the HGN evaluation. State v. Pierce, 266 Ga. App. 233, 596 S.E.2d 725 (2004). Miranda warnings before administering field sobriety tests. — Defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied as an officer was not required to give the defendant Miranda warnings before administering field sobriety tests as the officer did not make any statement that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the defendant was under arrest and not temporarily detained during an investigation. Moody v. State, 273 Ga. App. 670, 615 S.E.2d 803 (2005). Because the Miranda requirements were not triggered until the defendant’s arrest, and after performance of the field sobriety tests, suppression of the test results was not required. Doyle v. State, 281 Ga. App. 592, 636 S.E.2d 751 (2006). Trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress or motion for new trial with regard to the defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence because it was not necessary for the stopping officer to advise the defendant of the Miranda rights prior to administering the field sobriety tests since the defendant was not under arrest. Officers are not required to provide warnings under Miranda prior to administering field sobriety tests during a traffic stop unless the suspect is in custody. Appling v. State, 320 Ga. App. 379, 739 S.E.2d 816 (2013). Evidence of the defendant’s refusal to submit to voluntary field sobriety tests was admissible, and was not testimonial in nature and thus subject to the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination as a refusal to submit to the tests was not testimonial in nature, 311 Testing (Cont’d) and the mere fact that the defendant refused to submit to a blood test was not subject to the privilege against self-incrimination since no impermissible coercion was involved, regardless of the form of refusal. Ferega v. State, 286 Ga. App. 808, 650 S.E.2d 286 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 195, 172 L.Ed.2d 140 (2008). Probable cause for arrest existed. — Trial court properly convicted the defendant of driving under the influence and related charges after a bench trial because probable cause existed to arrest the defendant based on the officer’s observations of: (1) the defendant having slurred speech and red, watery eyes; (2) having a positive breath test result; (3) having the smell of alcohol coming from the defendant’s vehicle; and (4) the defendant admitting to drinking. Sultan v. State, 289 Ga. App. 405, 657 S.E.2d 311 (2008). Based on the totality of the circumstances, an officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence; the evidence showed that the officer, while investigating a one-vehicle accident in which the defendant’s truck ran off the road, detected the odor of alcohol when talking with the defendant, and observed that the defendant’s speech was mumbled and slow, and that the defendant’s eyes were bloodshot. The defendant also initially gave the officer a credit card instead of a license, and admitted to having one or more drinks. Cash v. State, 299 Ga. App. 303, 682 S.E.2d 607 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1984, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 50 (Ga. 2010). Probable cause for testing found. — Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer had probable cause to have a defendant submit to an alco-sensor test. The officer had validly stopped the defendant’s car after a passenger littered, and the officer saw open beer bottles in the car and smelled alcohol in the car even after the bottles and the passenger had been removed. Hinton v. State, 289 Ga. App. 309, 656 S.E.2d 918 (2008). There was probable cause under the Fourth Amendment for an officer to request a blood test under O.C.G.A. 40-6-391 § 40-5-55 from a defendant suspected of driving under the influence when the defendant showed four out of six signs of impairment on a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, admitted to drinking, smelled of alcohol, had a positive alco-sensor result, and had bloodshot eyes. The fact that an officer did not believe that there was probable cause to request the blood test did not require a different finding as the scope of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights was determined objectively. State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 666 S.E.2d 417 (2008). Because plaintiff arrestee’s initial blood alcohol level had been high enough for the initial O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5) per se driving under the influence charge, but tests a year later by defendant crime lab employees resulted in lower levels, the lab employees were entitled to qualified immunity on the arrestee’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process claim, which alleged the lab employees failed to disclose the lower results. The test of materiality had to be applied post-trial with the arrestee having to show that the suppression of the evidence undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial, and since the state judge and jury had found the arrestee’s evidence and arguments convincing enough that the arrestee was not convicted of even the lesser DUI charge under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), any additional testimony in the arrestee’s favor would not have achieved a better result; thus, the materiality test had not been satisfied and the Sixth Amendment claim failed. Kjellsen v. Mills, 517 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). Denying defendant crime lab employees qualified immunity on plaintiff arrestee’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim for nondisclosure of later blood alcohol level test results was reversed because: (1) the arrestee’s blood alcohol level had been high enough for the initial O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5) per se driving under the influence charge; and (2) it was undisputed that blood alcohol levels often decreased over time; thus, the lower level test results a year later did not negate probable cause. Kjellsen v. Mills, 517 F.3d 312 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). Challenging test given by expert. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by sequestering the defendant’s expert witness with regard to challenging the officer’s method of administering the horizontal gaze nystagmus test because the expert did not observe the actual test, thus, any opinion would have been based on the officer’s testimony or on hypothetical questions posed by counsel and the defendant had previously challenged the officer’s method of administering the test in a motion to suppress and had the benefit of that testimony prior to trial. Puckett v. State, 321 Ga. App. 785, 743 S.E.2d 466 (2013). Request for an independent test. — After the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence-per se, the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a state-designated breath test was properly denied because, after placing the defendant under arrest and reading the defendant the Georgia implied consent notice, the trooper asked the defendant if the defendant was willing to submit to a chemical test of the defendant’s breath, but the defendant responded by saying that the defendant would take a urine test; the trooper then explained that the trooper was asking the defendant to submit to a breath test and the defendant agreed to submit to that test; and the defendant never requested an independent test of the defendant’s urine, blood, or breath. Farmer v. State, 335 Ga. App. 679, 782 S.E.2d 786 (2016). Evidence Construed with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-394. — State was not required to prove that a defendant was committing any traffic violation or unsafe act, in addition to a violation of paragraph (a)(4) (now (a)(5)) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391; it is sufficient that the evidence showed that the defendant’s violation of that section caused an injury such as described in O.C.G.A. § 40-6-394, which specifies various types of serious injuries. Jones v. State, 195 Ga. App. 569, 394 S.E.2d 387 (1990). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of serious injury by vehicle because the defendant told a police officer 40-6-391 and a nurse that the defendant had been driving the vehicle; although the defendant later recanted that admission, the jury was authorized to believe the defendant’s earlier statements; the victim testified about the injuries to the victim’s leg, that it was essentially useless for months, and that the victim still used leg braces; and the state met the state’s burden of establishing a causal connection between the defendant’s violation of the driving under the influence statute and the serious injury by vehicle statute as the defendant admitted to driving the car and to drinking in the car. Fitzpatrick v. State, 339 Ga. App. 135, 793 S.E.2d 446 (2016). Blood-alcohol content deemed direct evidence. — When the defendant contended the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s request to charge the definitions of ‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘circumstantial evidence,’’ arguing that the evidence relating to the percentage of alcohol in the defendant’s blood at the time the defendant was driving is circumstantial because the percentage of alcohol in a person’s breath, rather than the percentage of alcohol in the blood, is specified in paragraph (a)(4) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, it was held that O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a) makes it clear that a breath test is used to determine the amount of alcohol in a person’s blood, and since there was direct evidence that the defendant was driving an automobile on a public highway at 1:52 a.m., and direct evidence that 32 minutes later the intoximeter test registered a blood-alcohol content of .15, whether or not the evidence that the defendant was driving with .15 percent alcohol in the defendant’s blood was circumstantial was immaterial, because, when there is some direct evidence involved in the case, it is not error to fail to charge on circumstantial evidence. Herndon v. State, 187 Ga. App. 313, 370 S.E.2d 164 (1988) (decided prior to 1988 amendment). Breath testing instrument inspection certificate admissible. — In a defendant’s prosecution for driving under the influence under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, the inspection certificate for the instrument used to conduct the defendant’s breath test under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(f ) was properly admitted because it was not 313 Evidence (Cont’d) testimonial hearsay and did not violate the defendant’s rights of confrontation; it was a business record that was not made in an investigatory or adversarial setting or generated in anticipation of the prosecution of a particular defendant. Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E.2d 706 (2006). Manner of driving may be considered when there is evidence that the defendant has been drinking. Turner v. State, 95 Ga. App. 157, 97 S.E.2d 348 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556). Statement by witness that automobile ‘‘operated’’ by defendant. — Answer by state trooper that automobile was ‘‘operated’’ by the defendant accused of drunken driving was not subject to objection as a conclusion when the answer was in reference to facts observed by the witness when the trooper arrived at the scene. Echols v. State, 104 Ga. App. 695, 122 S.E.2d 473 (1961) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556). Blood alcohol evidence irrelevant. — Evidence of defendant’s blood alcohol content was irrelevant to defendant’s prosecution under the ‘‘less safe’’ provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1). Evans v. State, 253 Ga. App. 71, 558 S.E.2d 51 (2001). Any error in the admission of the defendant’s hospital test results was harmless after the officer testified that, based on the accident, speaking with the defendant, and the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the defendant’s breath, the officer felt that the defendant was a less-safe driver when an accident occurred; even without the hospital’s tests, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming in light of the manner of the crash, the defendant’s admission to driving the car, and the officer’s observations of the defendant’s demeanor. King v. State, 272 Ga. App. 8, 611 S.E.2d 692 (2005). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in excluding the evidence of the defendant’s blood test obtained after being released from jail, which was negative for marijuana, because the state tried the defendant only for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 by driving under the influence 40-6-391 of alcohol, and the blood test shed no light on the defendant’s alcohol impairment; thus, it was properly determined irrelevant by the trial court. Smith v. State, 324 Ga. App. 100, 749 S.E.2d 395 (2013). Denial of motion in limine not error. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude a failure to take a breath test and other evidence in a criminal trial on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the defendant was a less safe driver, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, as there was probable cause to arrest the defendant without such tests based on the defendant’s conduct and the officer’s observations; the defendant was weaving in and out of lanes, fumbled with the bus controls when asked to turn off the vehicle, the defendant exited the vehicle in an unsteady manner, and the officer observed that the defendant spoke in a slow and confused way, and that the defendant smelled of alcohol. Lewis v. State, 276 Ga. App. 248, 622 S.E.2d 912 (2005). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion in limine to suppress the results of a state-administered breath test as an officer’s implied consent warning was substantively accurate so as to allow the defendant to make an informed decision about whether to consent to the test, and solely referred to the defendant’s privilege to drive within the state of Georgia with a Georgia driver’s license, and not the defendant’s Pennsylvania license; further, the officer’s initial statement was nothing more than an attention-grabbing preface, and as such did not constitute a substantive change that altered the meaning of the implied consent notice thereafter recited to the defendant. McHugh v. State, 285 Ga. App. 131, 645 S.E.2d 619 (2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in limine and upheld defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence as the traffic stop of his vehicle was justified since the evidence showed that he committed a traffic offense by making an abrupt turning maneuver in his vehicle to evade a roadblock, which was a sufficiently suspicious and deliberately furtive response to the road check so as to give 314 the officer at least a reasonable suspicion of defendant’s criminal activity and to warrant further investigation. Stinson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 351, 733 S.E.2d 390 (2012). Evidence sufficient to justify brief investigatory stop. — Merely observing a can of beer in the hand of one who is otherwise driving a car or operating a boat in a safe manner does, in and of itself, constitute an articulable suspicion that a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 or O.C.G.A. § 52-7-12 may be occurring so as to authorize a brief investigatory stop. State v. Baker, 197 Ga. App. 1, 397 S.E.2d 554 (1990). Denial of a motion to suppress was not error because the police officer who pulled the defendant over had probable cause to believe that the defendant was a less safe driver because the defendant was all over the road, smelled of alcohol, and threw up all over the place and the officer could have arrested the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, rather than wait for a DUI officer. Abrahamson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 584, 623 S.E.2d 764 (2005). Because the defendant’s apparent violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-16(a) gave the investigating officer a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant and inquire further, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress a refusal to take a breath test in connection with DUI charges; moreover, the trial court erroneously concluded that the defendant could have had an innocent explanation for a last-minute swerve to avoid hitting the officer’s patrol car as the issue went to the question of guilt or innocence and was not the dispositive question on a motion to suppress. State v. Rheinlander, 286 Ga. App. 625, 649 S.E.2d 828 (2007). Trial court erred by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of a DUI violation obtained during the traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle by committing clear error in finding that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the defendant’s car as the officer had received a radio dispatch and had obtained information from a fast-food restaurant employee that suspicious persons in a vehicle were banging on the windows 40-6-391 and cursing at the fast-food restaurant. Such actions involved engaging in disorderly conduct, which was an allegation of a crime that gave the officer grounds for conducting a brief traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle for investigatory purposes. State v. Melanson, 291 Ga. App. 853, 663 S.E.2d 280 (2008). Defendant’s conviction for DUI per se in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5) was upheld. The traffic stop of the defendant was proper because the officer observed the defendant driving erratically, including sudden braking and weaving within the lane, even though the defendant was acquitted of failure to operate the vehicle within a single lane, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1). Ivey v. State, 301 Ga. App. 796, 689 S.E.2d 100 (2009). Trial court did not err by denying a motion to suppress because the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that a police officer, who responded to a report of a fight in a parking lot, had an articulable suspicion to stop the defendant when the officer saw the defendant driving fast from the parking lot, and investigate further the defendant’s connection to the reported fight. Hines v. State, 308 Ga. App. 299, 707 S.E.2d 534 (2011). With regard to the defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain the defendant upon finding the defendant asleep behind the wheel of a vehicle with the engine running, and the defendant was unresponsive when the officer initially shined the officer’s flashlight inside the vehicle. Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. App. 721, 738 S.E.2d 307 (2013). After the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence per se, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop that resulted in the defendant’s arrest as the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the investigatory stop based on a traffic violation because some evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the officer’s testimony was credible and 315 Evidence (Cont’d) that the defendant crossed the fog line. Phillips v. State, 338 Ga. App. 231, 789 S.E.2d 421 (2016). Opportunity to take independent test. — Because the trial court found that the arresting officer made a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant’s request for an independent blood test pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a)(3), the court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test. Whittle v. State, 282 Ga. App. 64, 637 S.E.2d 800 (2006). Defendant’s right to an independent blood alcohol content test under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a)(3) was not invoked by asking the officer if the defendant could blow again because the defendant admitted that, at the time, the defendant did not know there was a difference between an independent test and the state’s test and that the defendant was satisfied when the officer said that the defendant could blow again down at the station. Waterman v. State, 299 Ga. App. 630, 683 S.E.2d 164 (2009). Request for an independent test. — Allegedly impaired driver’s statement that the driver wanted ‘‘more tests’’ could not reasonably be construed as a request for an independent chemical test of the driver’s own choosing because the driver made the request to the officer immediately after being given field sobriety tests. Therefore, the results of the state-administered test were properly admitted at trial. Avery v. State, 311 Ga. App. 595, 716 S.E.2d 729 (2011). Breath test admissible despite refusal to permit defendant to consult with counsel. — Motion filed by a defendant to exclude the results of a breath test under the Georgia implied consent law in the defendant’s prosecution for driving under the influence under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 was properly denied because the defendant was not entitled to the advice of counsel before deciding whether to submit to the test; the right to counsel under U.S. Const., amend. 6 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV did not come into play until the proceedings had reached a critical stage, and the 40-6-391 breath test was not such a stage because it did not signal the beginning of a formal adversary hearing and because a lawyer could add little to the warnings required from the officer administering the test by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a)(4). Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E.2d 706 (2006). Delay in releasing state administered blood test results. — State’s failure to immediately inform a defendant of the results of the state administered test does not create a situation where the defendant is left with no, or so little, information that he or she is denied any meaningful choice in violation of due process; driving under the influence defendants must determine, often under difficult and stressful circumstances, whether to request an independent test, and that the choice may be difficult does not render it fundamentally unfair and this fact alone does not support a due process claim. Padidham v. State, 291 Ga. 99, 728 S.E.2d 175 (2012). Suppressed breath test results remained admissible for impeachment purposes. — Despite an order suppressing the defendant’s breath test results, the results remained admissible for impeachment purposes once the defendant testified that the limited alcohol consumed did not affect or impair the defendant’s ability to drive. Moreover, absent bad faith or an order requiring production, the state did not fail to fully disclose all information regarding the breath test. Rosandich v. State, 289 Ga. App. 170, 657 S.E.2d 255 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0861, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 380 (Ga. 2008). Obtaining breathalyzer information from out-of-state manufacturer. — Trial court did not err by requiring defendant to proceed to trial without the source code and other requested information as it had granted a certificate under O.C.G.A. § 24-13-94 to permit the defense an opportunity to obtain the information from the breathalyzer manufacturer located in Kentucky, set the case with enough time to do so, and, after the Kentucky court issued an order denying the request, which order was entitled to full faith and credit, required defendant to proceed to trial. Phillips v. State, 324 Ga. App. 728, 751 S.E.2d 526 (2013). 316 Use of roadblock. — Driving under the influence of alcohol conviction was upheld as the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress breath test results taken from an officer posted at a secondary roadblock, since the evidence supported the fact that the officer was part of the primary roadblock, and thus had a legitimate authority to stop the defendant; the fact that the officer may have served as the chase car was irrelevant as the chase car was also part of the primary roadblock. Fischer v. State, 261 Ga. App. 44, 581 S.E.2d 680 (2003). In a trial for driving under the influence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) and (5), the trial court properly suppressed results of the breath tests after determining that the arresting officer’s testimony was not credible; although the defendant had bloodshot, red, and watery eyes and an odor of alcohol during a routine roadblock, those facts did not establish probable cause to arrest, and the defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests did not necessarily result in an inference that the defendant was unable to successfully perform the tests. State v. Ellison, 271 Ga. App. 898, 611 S.E.2d 129 (2005). Even assuming that the probate court erroneously failed to grant the defendant’s oral motion in limine concerning the constitutionality of a roadblock, the defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence to the extent that it was less safe to drive was affirmed on appeal as similar evidence concerning the roadblock was admitted, without objection, making any error related to the admission of the objected-to evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rigdon, 284 Ga. App. 785, 645 S.E.2d 17 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1211, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 541 (Ga. 2007). Because a form document, entitled the ‘‘Henry County Police Department Roadblock & Safety Checkpoint Record,’’ introduced at a motion to suppress hearing by the state was properly admitted as a business record under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803), and the testimonial evidence regarding the primary purpose of the roadblock passed constitutional muster, in that it 40-6-391 was legitimately conducted as part of a statewide ‘‘zero tolerance’’ campaign, the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result was properly denied. Yingst v. State, 287 Ga. App. 43, 650 S.E.2d 746 (2007). Trial court properly found that a roadblock leading to the defendant’s arrest was lawful, pretermitting whether the requesting sergeant was a supervisory officer, and the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an arrest for DUI. The record also supported the conclusions that all vehicles were stopped, that the delay to motorists was minimal, and that the roadblock was well identified, the stop was made within the constitutional confines of a routine motorist roadblock, and the defendant’s arrest was the result of a personal decision to operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated state. Velasquez v. State, 288 Ga. App. 109, 653 S.E.2d 518 (2007). In the defendant’s trial for driving under the influence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 7 and 13 and O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 and an open container violation under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-253, a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a Selective Traffic Enforcement Program roadblock was denied because the roadblock reasonably fit within the Fourth Amendment constraints. Implied consent protections did not apply to field sobriety tests because the defendant was not under arrest at the time such tests were performed. United States v. Howard, No. CR208-09, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72916 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2008). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a roadblock or in convicting the defendant of driving under the influence per se in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 because the evidence was sufficient to show that the decision to implement the roadblock was made by a supervisory officer, which prevented the field officers from exercising unfettered discretion in stopping the drivers since the lieutenant and corporal who implemented the roadblock testified that they were supervisors in the traffic unit of the county sheriff ’s office; the trial court was autho- 317 Evidence (Cont’d) rized to find that the purposes of the roadblock were as stated by the lieutenant and corporal, and each of the identified purposes set forth in the order for the roadblock was a legitimate primary purpose. Rappley v. State, 306 Ga. App. 531, 702 S.E.2d 763 (2010). Testimony from a sheriff ’s chief deputy authorized a trial court to find that a sergeant had authority to implement roadblocks and that the sergeant had a legitimate primary purpose for implementing a roadblock at which the defendant was stopped and arrested, which was highway safety and driver sobriety. Martin v. State, 313 Ga. App. 226, 721 S.E.2d 180 (2011). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized at a roadblock because the state met the state’s burden of establishing the legitimate purpose of the roadblock by introducing a certified copy of a department of public safety roadblock approval form; the programmatic purposes set out in the roadblock form were supported by the other evidence at the suppression hearing, and the police officers’ actions at the scene were in line with those purposes. Hite v. State, 315 Ga. App. 221, 726 S.E.2d 704 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1286, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1020 (Ga. 2012). Detention reasonable. — Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained at a roadblock after finding that the defendant’s detention by the officers was not excessive because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the brief detention of the defendant was neither unreasonable nor illegal; the trial court’s findings that the arresting officer detained the defendant for 20 minutes after the initial portable breath test to conduct an additional test and that the 20 minute delay was for the defendant’s benefit of to insure that the portable alcohol test was not affected by residual alcohol due to the defendant’s recent consumption of alcoholic beverages were supported by the evidence. Owens v. State, 308 Ga. App. 374, 707 S.E.2d 584 (2011), cert. denied, 40-6-391 No. S11C1036, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2011). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained at a roadblock because given the evidence presented, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the sergeant issued the order for the roadblock properly and initiated, authorized, and supervised the roadblock and that the sergeant’s decision to implement the roadblock was made at the programmatic level for a legitimate primary purpose; the evidence supported the trial court’s findings of fact that the information on the roadblock approval form, which stated the reasons for the roadblock, did not conflict with any evidence presented as to when the roadblock was to be conducted or by whom the roadblock was authorized. Owens v. State, 308 Ga. App. 374, 707 S.E.2d 584 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1036, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2011). No probable cause for arrest. — Officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence when the defendant displayed none of the telltale signs of inebriation and the defendant had an explanation for the wreck. State v. Burke, 230 Ga. App. 392, 496 S.E.2d 755 (1998). Under the Tate standard, the defendant’s breath test results, obtained while defendant was in custody, were properly suppressed as the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence since: (1) the defendant had a single-car accident; (2) the defendant had two clues for intoxication in the HGN test, while the other four clues were inconclusive or indicated no intoxication; (3) the defendant’s alco-sensor test results were positive for alcohol; (4) the trial court found that all of the alleged indicia of impairment were caused by the accident or lacked credibility; and (5) the defendant adequately explained the accident to the officer. State v. Gray, 267 Ga. App. 753, 600 S.E.2d 626 (2004), disapproved, Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015). Trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal on a charge of DUI to the extent that the defendant was less safe; the only evidence was the smell of alcohol 318 on the defendant’s breath, but there was no evidence that the defendant’s driving ability was impaired due to alcohol consumption. Ojemuyiwa v. State, 285 Ga. App. 617, 647 S.E.2d 598 (2007). Trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to suppress because the state did not establish sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence when the state offered no evidence showing that the defendant’s driving ability was impaired due to alcohol consumption; evidence that an officer smelled alcohol on the defendant’s breath, that an alco-sensor test revealed the presence of alcohol, and that the defendant admitted that the defendant had been drinking ‘‘earlier in the day’’ was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence. Handley v. State, 294 Ga. App. 236, 668 S.E.2d 855 (2008). Although the defendant had glassy and watery eyes, smelled of alcohol, and admitted to drinking a glass of wine, other testimony supported an inference that the defendant was not an impaired driver; accordingly, the defendant’s motion to suppress was properly granted based on a finding that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1). State v. Goode, 298 Ga. App. 749, 681 S.E.2d 199 (2009), disapproved, Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015). Trial court did not clearly err in granting a DUI defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on a lack of probable cause to arrest the defendant. The state failed to show that the defendant’s driving ability was impaired due to alcohol consumption, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), but only that the defendant tested positively for alcohol, that the defendant smelled of alcohol, and that the defendant admitted having drinks hours earlier. State v. Damato, 302 Ga. App. 181, 690 S.E.2d 478 (2010). Order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of arrest was reversed because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence since the officer testified that the stop was initiated not because of the defendant’s 40-6-391 driving, but because of an obstructed license plate, and the defendant indicated no signs of intoxication following certain tests and the only evidence was defendant’s admission the defendant had consumed a beer earlier. Bostic v. State, 332 Ga. App. 604, 774 S.E.2d 175 (2015). Weaving as providing probable cause. — It is well established that weaving, both out of one’s lane and within one’s own lane, particularly when combined with other factors, may give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion on the part of a trained law enforcement officer that the driver is violating the driving under the influence laws, and the conduct forming the basis of the reasonable suspicion need not be a violation of the law. Veal v. State, 273 Ga. App. 47, 614 S.E.2d 143 (2005). Stop authorized when officer witnesses driver weaving outside lane. — Police officer who witnessed a driver weaving from the driver lane to the curb lane had reasonable information to believe that a criminal offense was being committed, and therefore had probable cause to stop the automobile. State v. Bowen, 231 Ga. App. 95, 498 S.E.2d 570 (1998). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the officer was justified in stopping the defendant’s vehicle based on the videotaped evidence that established that the officer observed the defendant’s vehicle failing to maintain the vehicle’s lane in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-48(1). Acree v. State, 319 Ga. App. 854, 737 S.E.2d 103 (2013). Stop authorized when driver on wrong side of road. — Investigating officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle based on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-40 for driving on the wrong side of the road; hence, the defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied on this ground. Dunbar v. State, 283 Ga. App. 872, 643 S.E.2d 292 (2007). Stop held invalid. — Since a 9-1-1 call from an unidentified informant did not provide the police with reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle, the stop unreasonably intruded upon the de- 319 Evidence (Cont’d) fendant’s Fourth Amendment rights; as a result, the trial erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. Slocum v. State, 267 Ga. App. 337, 599 S.E.2d 299 (2004). In a prosecution for driving under the influence, the trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop made by an officer armed with only a ‘‘be on the lookout’’ warning as the officer lacked a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in any criminal activity, but admitted to possessing only scant information about the driver, the year and make of the vehicle being driven, and the vehicle’s direction of travel; moreover, the mere fact that the defendant’s gold Ford truck was located in the vicinity of the alleged crime did not necessarily give rise to articulable suspicion. Murray v. State, 282 Ga. App. 741, 639 S.E.2d 631 (2006). Trial court did not err in finding that an officer’s traffic stop was unreasonable and not based on the observation of an illegal right turn in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-120(1), given evidence that the defendant activated the turn signal and checked for traffic behind the vehicle prior to turning right from a lane adjacent to the right-hand-turn lane. Therefore, evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption taken after the officer’s stop was properly suppressed. State v. Mincher, 313 Ga. App. 875, 723 S.E.2d 300 (2012). Stop held valid. — Despite the defendant’s claim that a sheriff ’s deputy lacked a specific and articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to execute a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle, and thus that the evidence seized thereafter had to be suppressed, the appeals court found otherwise as sufficient facts had been conveyed to the deputy prior to the stop for the deputy to have a reasonable belief that the defendant had been involved in a domestic dispute, and might be under the influence of alcohol to justify a finding that the resulting stop was valid; hence, suppression was properly denied. Lacy v. State, 285 Ga. App. 647, 647 S.E.2d 350 (2007), cert. denied, No. 40-6-391 S07C1514, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 620 (Ga. 2007). In a driving under the influence case, there was no merit to the defendant’s argument that an officer lacked articulable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle. Testimony that the defendant was swerving showed that the defendant was not stopped because of mere inclination, caprice, or harassment, and the trial court accepted the officer’s testimony that the full extent of the defendant’s actions was not reflected on a video shown to the jury. Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 665 S.E.2d 731 (2008). Sufficient evidence to withstand motion for directed verdict. — Evidence was sufficient to deny a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict in a prosecution for reckless vehicular homicide, reckless driving, DUI, running a red light, and failure to exercise due care when, after smoking crack and arguing with the defendant’s former spouse, the defendant had struck a car from behind, struck a pedestrian, and collided with a burgundy car, killing the burgundy car’s two occupants; the defendant was found slumped over on the front driver’s side of the pickup truck the defendant was driving. Hill v. State, 285 Ga. App. 503, 646 S.E.2d 718 (2007). Because sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding that the defendant was intoxicated to the level that the intoxication caused both the defendant’s loss of consciousness and an accident resulting in the defendant’s truck straddling a ditch with the truck’s nose down at close to a 90-degree angle, and the responding deputies testified that the defendant appeared to be under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive, the defendant’s conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) was supported by sufficient direct evidence of guilt; thus, a directed verdict of acquittal as to that charge was properly denied. Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 655 S.E.2d 328 (2007). In a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent of being a less safe driver in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a di- 320 rected verdict, given a properly admitted 9-1-1 call describing the defendant’s erratic driving, the defendant’s admission to having had three drinks, the defendant’s refusal to submit to chemical testing, and a police officer’s testimony that it was the officer’s opinion that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to the extent of being a less safe driver. Key v. State, 289 Ga. App. 317, 657 S.E.2d 273 (2008). Prior consumption only circumstantial evidence of later being under influence. — While there was direct evidence that the defendant had consumed some alcoholic beverage prior to the collision, this was at most only circumstantial evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages at the time of the collision. Culver v. State, 80 Ga. App. 438, 56 S.E.2d 197 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-307). Use of circumstantial evidence. — Driving a vehicle while intoxicated may be shown by circumstantial evidence. State v. Hill, 178 Ga. App. 669, 344 S.E.2d 491 (1986); Wooten v. State, 234 Ga. App. 451, 507 S.E.2d 202 (1998). While circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s intoxication at the time of the defendant’s arrest would not be admissible in a case charging violation of paragraph (a)(4) (now (a)(5)) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 as proof that the defendant had violated paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, such evidence is admissible as evidence of the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s arrest for having violated paragraph (a)(4) (now (a)(5)). Sapp v. State, 184 Ga. App. 527, 362 S.E.2d 406 (1987). To be guilty of the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicants one must drive or be in actual physical control of a moving vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. However, it is well settled that the driving of an automobile while intoxicated may be shown by circumstantial evidence, such as a police officer finding the defendant in a parked car, intoxicated, with the motor running. Jones v. State, 187 Ga. App. 132, 369 S.E.2d 509 (1988). Although the evidence was circumstantial, the evidence justified a finding of 40-6-391 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt after the officer observed and testified to circumstances from which a jury could infer that the defendant was in actual physical control of the car when the car was moved to the location where the officer found the car, and that the defendant was intoxicated while moving it there. Johnson v. State, 194 Ga. App. 501, 391 S.E.2d 132 (1990). When the defendant smelled of marijuana, slurred the defendant’s speech, admitted smoking marijuana, and refused to submit to testing to confirm the presence of the drug, the trial court reasonably concluded that there was at least some marijuana present in the defendant’s system. Albert v. State, 236 Ga. App. 146, 511 S.E.2d 244 (1999). Although the officer never saw the defendant in control of the vehicle on the public highway and no evidence was presented that the defendant was observed under the influence of alcohol at the time the defendant was driving since the defendant admitted driving the car when the defendant lost control and that the defendant moved the car to the parking lot after the accident, the evidence of events was sufficient to allow the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was intoxicated at the time the defendant was in control of the defendant’s car. Goodson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 167, 529 S.E.2d 175 (2000). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of driving under the influence under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) since the evidence showed that the officer was almost struck by the defendant’s erratic driving, that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated shortly thereafter, and that the defendant fled from the would-be arresting officer, thereby providing enough circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant’s driving was less safe due to the use of alcohol. Shockley v. State, 256 Ga. App. 892, 570 S.E.2d 67 (2002). Driving under the influence was provable by circumstantial evidence; although an officer did not see the defendant’s car moving, the officer saw sufficient circumstances to support the defendant’s driving under the influence-less safe driver conviction because, inter alia, the officer 321 Evidence (Cont’d) found the defendant passed out behind the steering wheel of a car haphazardly parked in a lot with the car’s engine running and lights on, and the defendant admitted to driving after taking medicine. Stephens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 634, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005). Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the defendant was a less safe driver; a reasonable inference could be made from the circumstantial evidence when the defendant was found with alcohol on the defendant’s breath and the defendant’s truck in a ditch. Raby v. State, 274 Ga. App. 665, 618 S.E.2d 704 (2005). Evidence supported a conviction for driving under the influence as: (1) a trooper found the defendant sleeping behind the wheel with two young children in the car; (2) the defendant’s blood-alcohol content was well over the legal limit; and (3) the defendant had clearly driven off the road at some point before the trooper discovered the car. Furlow v. State, 276 Ga. App. 332, 623 S.E.2d 186 (2005). Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence to the extent that the defendant was a less safe driver was affirmed as a police officer opined that the defendant was impaired and the officer testified that: (1) the defendant smelled of alcohol; (2) the defendant was speeding; (3) the defendant’s eyes were red and glassy and the defendant’s speech was slurred; (4) the defendant refused to submit to any field sobriety tests; and (5) the defendant swayed while standing still. Lee v. State, 280 Ga. App. 706, 634 S.E.2d 837 (2006). Because sufficient evidence existed for the arresting officer to believe that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol, specifically, the defendant’s erratic driving; detecting the odor of alcohol on the defendant’s breath; observing that the defendant was very emotional, had been crying, and had a flushed face and watery eyes; and that the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, the trial court properly denied suppression of the evidence gathered. Slayton v. State, 281 Ga. App. 650, 637 S.E.2d 67 (2006). 40-6-391 Even without evidence of the failed field sobriety tests, because the experienced officer’s undisputed testimony sufficiently showed that the defendant: (1) traveled at a high rate of speed; (2) swerved in and out of the defendant’s lane of travel at least five times; (3) switched lanes by crossing over the gore area of the highway several times; (4) had bloodshot eyes and slow, uncoordinated movements; (5) smelled of alcohol, slurred words, and was unsteady on the defendant’s feet, both the arrest and conviction for driving under the influence were supported by sufficient evidence and sufficient probable cause. Gregoire v. State, 285 Ga. App. 111, 645 S.E.2d 611 (2007). Sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to support the defendant’s convictions given that: (1) the defendant admitted to drinking and driving the vehicle that an officer testified to as having a warm engine; (2) the defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and swaying movements; and (3) the surrounding circumstances helped to show that the defendant had been drinking and driving recently enough to satisfy the three-hour requirement under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5). O’Connell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 835, 648 S.E.2d 147 (2007). Defendant’s conviction of driving under the influence was proper, though based on circumstantial evidence only, because the fact finder was not required to accept as reasonable the hypothesis that the defendant became intoxicated only after the defendant arrived home or that someone else was driving the defendant’s car when a citizen saw the car running other cars off the road. Silvers v. State, 297 Ga. App. 362, 677 S.E.2d 410 (2009). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent the defendant was a less safe driver in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a) because the trial court could have found from the evidence that no other reasonable hypothesis existed for the defendant’s presence at the scene of an accident other than that the defendant wrecked a car while driving under the influence when: (1) a police officer found the defendant slumped over the wheel of a wrecked car, which was resting up against 322 a curb and blocking the road, with the ignition on; (2) there was no evidence of anyone else in the area who could have driven the vehicle; and (3) the defendant was passed out in the car, drooling, and smelling of alcohol; although the car was not running when the officer arrived, and the officer had not seen the car moving, the officer observed circumstances from which a fact-finder could infer that the defendant was in actual physical control of the car when the car was moved to the location where the officer found the car and that the defendant was intoxicated while moving the car there. Patterson v. State, 302 Ga. App. 27, 690 S.E.2d 625 (2010). Evidence that a defendant was found slumped over, asleep, in the driver’s seat of a car in a fast food restaurant, with the defendant’s hands on the steering wheel, the engine running, the headlights on, and two empty bottles of vodka, along with evidence that the defendant admitted drinking prior to driving to the restaurant, was sufficient to convict the defendant of driving under the influence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5). Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 722 S.E.2d 446 (2012). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of DUI less safe under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), given that the defendant admitted to driving home from a bar where the defendant stopped to urinate, the defendant was just outside the vehicle, the engine was running, and no one else was around. Although the officer did not see the defendant driving, a jury could infer that the defendant had driven the car there. Pough v. State, 325 Ga. App. 547, 754 S.E.2d 129 (2014). Appellant’s conviction for vehicular homicide was affirmed because the verdict led to the strong inference that the appellant, while driving under the influence, killed the victim with a vehicle that the appellant was driving at a high rate of speed, and there was no other evidence that another car or anything else struck the victim with such force as to kill. Taylor v. State, 337 Ga. App. 486, 788 S.E.2d 97 (2016). Stop based on erroneous facts. — It was not error to admit evidence and state- 40-6-391 ments showing intoxication, even though the stop of the defendant’s automobile was erroneous due to an error on the part of the officer or the dispatcher who ‘‘ran the tag’’ and erroneously determined that the automobile was stolen. Cunningham v. State, 231 Ga. App. 420, 498 S.E.2d 590 (1998). Delay in reading implied consent warnings. — Trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a chemical test of blood based on the undue delay between the arrest, after a traffic stop, and the reading of the implied consent warnings as: (1) the state trooper was presented with numerous opportunities to issue the warnings to the defendant, but did not; and (2) the trial court rejected the trooper’s rationale for not reading the defendant the implied consent warnings at any other earlier opportunity, implicitly determining that the trooper’s testimony was not credible. State v. Austell, 285 Ga. App. 18, 645 S.E.2d 550 (2007). Evidence of prior DUI convictions. — Trial court properly admitted evidence of two prior driving under the influence convictions when there were sufficient similarities between the incidents that the two prior incidents were admissible to show course of conduct and bent of mind. Simon v. State, 182 Ga. App. 210, 355 S.E.2d 120 (1987); Casoria v. State, 210 Ga. App. 269, 435 S.E.2d 678 (1993). In a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the defendant was a less safe driver, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior per se DUI conviction to establish the defendant’s bent of mind and course of conduct. Miller v. State, 250 Ga. App. 84, 550 S.E.2d 134 (2001). Regardless of any slight variance of circumstances, evidence of the defendant’s prior crime of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol content was properly admitted as similar transaction evidence to prove bent of mind or course of conduct in the defendant’s subsequent prosecution for driving under the influence to the extent that it was less safe to drive in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) and for driving with an unlawful blood alcohol 323 Evidence (Cont’d) content in violation of § 40-6-391(a)(4). Moran v. State, 257 Ga. App. 236, 570 S.E.2d 673 (2002). Because the defendant refused any testing of sobriety or blood alcohol content, an officer’s testimony was sufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence because the officer who arrested the defendant had stopped the defendant on a prior occasion as to which the defendant eventually admitted being less safe to drive so the officer was familiar with the defendant’s appearance and demeanor when intoxicated, and could provide evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction and to provide probable cause to arrest the defendant. Berry v. State, 274 Ga. App. 831, 619 S.E.2d 339 (2005). In a prosecution for vehicular homicide and driving under the influence (DUI), the trial court properly allowed evidence regarding the defendant’s prior DUI as the defendant had pled guilty to that offense, the blood test results appeared on the uniform traffic citation, a certified copy of the accusation and plea was entered into evidence, and an officer testified that the defendant was the person arrested on that charge. Hurston v. State, 278 Ga. App. 472, 629 S.E.2d 18 (2006). Defendant’s prior driving under the influence (DUI) convictions were properly admitted as similar transaction evidence; not only was the evidence relevant for the purpose of showing the defendant’s bent of mind and course of conduct on the night in question, but the prior DUI offenses were sufficiently similar to the defendant’s current offense to be admissible. The state’s evidence showed that all of the offenses occurred near midnight and at similar locations, that the defendant made similar statements to officers on each occasion, and that the indicia of intoxication were similar in each case including the strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes. Gamble v. State, 283 Ga. App. 326, 641 S.E.2d 556 (2007). In a less safe DUI case, the state made the required showing for similar transaction evidence under Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3(B) by stating the nature of the evidence and asking that the evidence be 40-6-391 admitted to show the defendant’s bent of mind and course of conduct, which were proper purposes for allowing similar transaction evidence in less safe DUI cases. Steele v. State, 306 Ga. App. 870, 703 S.E.2d 5 (2010). Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) and other crimes was affirmed because the defendant’s prior DUI conviction was properly admitted as the conviction was relevant to the issue of the defendant’s knowledge of the consequences of both consenting to and refusing the tests, and its probative value outweighed any prejudice. Kim v. State, 337 Ga. App. 155, 786 S.E.2d 532 (2016). In a driving under the influence (DUI) per se case, the defendant’s prior DUI conviction was improperly admitted to show intent as the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because the jury could infer intent from the defendant’s act of driving after admittedly consuming alcohol without considering the prior DUI, and there was a danger of interjecting unfair prejudice at trial; however, admission of that evidence was harmless as the direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt for the DUI-per se charge was overwhelming as the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, and the breath tests showed the defendant’s blood alcohol content was substantially in excess of 0.08 grams. Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544, 802 S.E.2d 234 (2017). After the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and refused to submit to a state administered breath test, the state’s motion to introduce evidence of other DUI violations was improperly denied as the danger of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence of other occasions when the defendant drove under the influence because the state demonstrated the state’s prosecutorial need for the extrinsic act evidence; the close proximity in time between the three prior DUI arrests and the charged offense; and the overall similarity between the three prior arrests and the current charge, especially with regard to the defendant’s experiences with the requested state administered tests. State v. Voyles, 324 No. A18A0771, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 251 (May 7, 2018). Evidence of defendant’s reputation for sobriety was irrelevant to the charge of driving under the influence. King v. State, 205 Ga. App. 825, 423 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 900, 423 S.E.2d 429 (1992). State need not prove defendant was drunk when driving. — It was not necessary that the state prove that the defendant was drunk when driving but rather that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol so as to make it less safe for the defendant to operate a motor vehicle. Anderson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 118, 416 S.E.2d 309, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 309 (1992). Evidence supporting citation. — Even though the citation charging the defendant with driving under the influence to the extent it was less safe to drive contained a reference to the defendant’s breath test result, the state was not required to prove the test result since it was not a part of the formal charge. Tomko v. State, 233 Ga. App. 20, 503 S.E.2d 300 (1998). True test of the basis of conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicants was when it was shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it was less safe for such person to operate a motor vehicle than it would be if the person were not so affected. Turner v. State, 95 Ga. App. 157, 97 S.E.2d 348 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556). When evidence supported a guilty verdict under either paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(4) (now (a)(5)) of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391, the state was not required to proceed under one paragraph or the other nor was the jury required to disclose the paragraph on which the jury based the jury’s verdict. Kuptz v. State, 179 Ga. App. 150, 345 S.E.2d 670 (1986). Photograph of defendant taken shortly after the defendant’s arrest was admissible when the defendant’s condition vis-a-vis alcohol influence was an issue and the defendant’s physical appearance was some evidence in the case. Farmer v. State, 180 Ga. App. 720, 350 S.E.2d 583 (1986). 40-6-391 Police officers’ opinion testimony that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the defendant was rendered a less safe driver was admissible. Chance v. State, 193 Ga. App. 242, 387 S.E.2d 437 (1989). Police officer who stopped defendant at a supervised roadblock was competent to give the officer’s opinion that the defendant’s condition rendered the defendant a less safe driver, even though the officer had not observed the defendant’s driving. Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 501 S.E.2d 870 (1998). Because an officer gave an opinion that the defendant was driving under the influence (DUI) after giving an extensive outline of the officer’s years of DUI training and experience and of the officer’s observations of the defendant, the opinion did not impermissibly invade the jury’s province. Karafiat v. State, 290 Ga. App. 15, 658 S.E.2d 801 (2008). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of DUI (less safe) in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(2) after the defendant ran a police officer off the road, did not maintain the defendant’s lane of travel, and exhibited impairment on sobriety tests; a blood test showed positive results for lorazepam, zolpidem, and mirtazapine. Rivera v. State, 309 Ga. App. 544, 710 S.E.2d 694 (2011). In the defendant’s DUI trial, the state trooper who stopped the defendant was permitted to give the trooper’s opinion regarding whether the defendant was impaired based on the trooper’s observations and field sobriety tests; moreover, the trial court cautioned the jury that although the trooper was permitted to give the trooper’s opinion, it was solely for the jury to determine whether the defendant was impaired to the extent the defendant was less safe to drive. Scott v. State, 332 Ga. App. 559, 774 S.E.2d 137 (2015). Officer’s testimony regarding authority to operate intoximeter. — Police officer’s testimony as to authority to operate an intoximeter was sufficient, notwithstanding the defendant’s assertion that a directed verdict should have been granted to the defendant on the charge of driving under the influence because the document offered by the state failed to 325 Evidence (Cont’d) reveal the officer was certified to operate the machine. Williamson v. State, 194 Ga. App. 439, 390 S.E.2d 658 (1990). Evidence of implied consent warning. — When the state’s only evidence concerning the implied consent warning was the deputy’s conclusory statement that the deputy read a warning contained on a card, the state failed to meet the state’s burden of proving compliance with the implied consent notice requirements. Miller v. State, 238 Ga. App. 61, 516 S.E.2d 838 (1999). Admissibility of properly-conducted breathalyzer test. — Admissibility of breathalyzer test results is controlled solely by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392 so that, as long as a test has been conducted in compliance with that statute, a defendant is precluded from attacking the admissibility of the test based on a challenge to the scientific reliability of the result. Brannan v. State, 261 Ga. 128, 401 S.E.2d 269 (1991). Sufficient evidence was offered to allow admission of the defendant’s breath test in order to prove the defendant’s violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5) since the oral testimony of the administering officer indicated the officer’s qualifications and compliance with the approved methods of the test as required by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a)(1)(A); thus, the court had an adequate foundation laid in order to admit the test results. Scara v. State, 259 Ga. App. 510, 577 S.E.2d 796 (2003). Trial court properly denied a defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the breath test administered with regard to the defendant’s conviction for driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration because the defendant’s statement that ‘‘I will take a blood test’’ was not a request for an independent test under the implied consent law but was an attempt to designate which test would be administered by the state, which was not an option for the defendant; further, the officer’s response to the defendant merely clarified the designation that the state-administered test would be a breath test and did not mislead the defendant regarding the defendant’s right to have an independent chemical 40-6-391 test. Anderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 642 S.E.2d 137 (2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the defendant’s breath test because the officer’s reading of the implied consent notice was accurate, the officer asked whether defendant consented, the officer told the defendant to answer yes or no, and the officer’s statement, that ‘‘as long as you continue to be cool and be cooperative, I’ll make the process go by real quick for you,’’ was not coercive or deceptively misleading and did not render the defendant incapable of making an informed decision about whether to submit to the breath test. Miller v. State, 317 Ga. App. 504, 731 S.E.2d 393 (2012). Admissibility of other evidence obtained at roadblocks. — In a prosecution for driving under the influence, evidence obtained at a roadblock set up to check for driver’s licenses and intoxicated drivers was admissible because the roadblock was legitimate and the defendant’s detention at the roadblock did not constitute an arbitrary, random stop or an unreasonable seizure. White v. State, 233 Ga. App. 276, 503 S.E.2d 891 (1998). Roadblock failed to satisfy Fourth Amendment standard. — Because the state failed to show that a police department’s checkpoint program had an appropriate primary purpose other than ordinary crime control when viewed at the programmatic level, the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment, and the defendant’s DUI convictions were reversed. Charales v. State, 329 Ga. App. 533, 765 S.E.2d 701 (2014). Suppression motion erroneously granted. — Because a police officer possessed sufficient information regarding both the defendants via a police dispatcher, who was relaying information from a 9-1-1 caller, and after signaling for the defendants to pull the vehicle over, the officer observed both the defendants switch places, the officer observed sufficient and particular facts to investigate both men for driving under the influence; hence, the trial court erroneously ordered suppression of the evidence obtained from the resulting traffic stop. State v. Bingham, 283 Ga. App. 468, 641 S.E.2d 663 (2007). 326 Order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence at the defendant’s trial for DUI-less safe driving, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), was error because, contrary to the trial court’s findings, the arresting officer’s observations of the defendant’s odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, unsteadiness, and the defendant’s positive alco-sensor test, were sufficient to support a finding of impairment; the officer also testified that, based on the officer’s observations and experience, the officer was of the opinion that the defendant was a less safe driver, which was evidence showing that the defendant was a less safe driver. The state was not required to prove that the defendant committed an unsafe act in order to show it was less safe for the defendant to drive. State v. Burke, 298 Ga. App. 621, 680 S.E.2d 658 (2009). Suppression motion properly granted. — Because the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant’s mental condition was clearly vulnerable, and that the defendant: (1) could not read; (2) had to be forcibly restrained while the consent form was initially being read; (3) was weeping while the remainder of the form was read; and (4) never actually signed the consent form, the trial court properly found that any consent to submit to blood and urine tests was not freely and voluntarily given. Moreover, the proper standard of review on appeal, based on the fact that credibility was an issue, was not a de novo standard, but a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Stephens, 289 Ga. App. 167, 657 S.E.2d 18 (2008). Suppression motion properly denied. — In a DUI prosecution, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a blood test as the notice given to the defendant by a state trooper under the implied consent law, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(a), was sufficiently accurate to permit the defendant to make an informed decision about whether to consent to testing, and the evidence failed to show that the defendant requested an independent test. Collins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 418, 659 S.E.2d 818 (2008). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence and other 40-6-391 related crimes, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress field sobriety test results, which the defendant based on being unreasonably detained without receiving the Miranda warnings, as the defendant was not under arrest and the defendant’s detainment while waiting for a second officer to arrive at the scene was not unreasonable nor unnecessary since the first officer who initiated the stop after observing the defendant driving erratically had a suspect in the patrol car. The court also found that the second officer timely gave the defendant the implied consent warnings after the defendant was arrested. Thomas v. State, 294 Ga. App. 108, 668 S.E.2d 540 (2008). With regard to a defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence and child endangerment, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the defendant’s intoxication as an officer’s insistence that the defendant return outside the defendant’s day care facility after bringing children back in after arriving with the children in a vehicle was justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the defendant’s failure to call the police regarding a domestic violence incident that occurred on the premises earlier, which indicated that the defendant may have engaged in reckless conduct. Upon talking to the defendant, the officer noticed that the defendant’s eyes were glassy and that the defendant was in an overly emotional state, which gave additional justification to the officer to suspect that the defendant was intoxicated. Johnson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 474, 682 S.E.2d 601 (2009). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and motion in limine to exclude the defendant’s field sobriety test results because the implied consent warning was timely given; a HEAT Unit officer gave the defendant the warning immediately after the defendant’s arrest. Waters v. State, 306 Ga. App. 114, 701 S.E.2d 550 (2010). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol-content test that was obtained via the seizure of the defendant’s blood samples and pursuant to a search 327 Evidence (Cont’d) warrant because the warrant was narrowly drafted to seek only the blood samples and medical records from the hospital where the defendant was treated on the night of the accident; even if the warrant could be construed as authorizing a broader seizure of all of the defendant’s medical records instead of only those relevant to the defendant’s treatment related to the accident, the defendant failed to show that any such broader seizure occurred and, thus, failed to show any harm. Jones v. State, 313 Ga. App. 590, 722 S.E.2d 202 (2012). In a DUI per se case, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements the defendant made to police because the defendant was not in custody when the defendant made the statements; thus the statements were not taken in violation of Miranda; there was no evidence of flashing police lights, guns drawn, or other officers present; and the defendant was standing in a parking lot. Jacobs v. State, 338 Ga. App. 743, 791 S.E.2d 844 (2016). Identification of driver. — Although a passenger in the defendant’s truck claimed that the passenger was the driver in a single vehicle accident, based on a positive identification of the defendant as the driver from a witness, the testimony from the arresting officer about the defendant’s injuries, which were consistent with a driver’s, and a taped conversation between the defendant and the passenger while they were in the officer’s cruiser, there was sufficient evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have based a verdict of guilty as to the charges; in the conversation in the officer’s cruiser, the defendant told the passenger that the passenger should say that the passenger was driving because the defendant would not spend another night in jail, and also said that the passenger should have been driving when the wreck occurred. Becker v. State, 280 Ga. App. 97, 633 S.E.2d 436 (2006). Failure to produce evidence of marijuana usage. — Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence was reversed since the state’s failure to produce 40-6-391 evidence of marijuana usage in a ‘‘written scientific report’’ left the defense counsel at a huge disadvantage in trying to cross-examine the state’s witness as to the implications of test results and the formation of the witness’s opinion based upon the results. Durden v. State, 187 Ga. App. 154, 369 S.E.2d 764, aff ’d, 258 Ga. 720, 375 S.E.2d 610 (1988). Combined alcohol and drugs conviction. — Defendant who was acquitted of driving under the influence of drugs, and as to whom the court directed a verdict of ‘‘not guilty’’ of driving under the influence of alcohol, could nonetheless be found guilty of driving under the combined influence of drugs and alcohol, arising from the same incident, since the arresting officer testified that the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test of defendant’s blood, defendant had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and that the defendant tested positive for alcohol on the alco-sensor and for drugs using two field sobriety eye tests. Mendoza v. State, 196 Ga. App. 627, 396 S.E.2d 576 (1990). Golf cart was a vehicle. — Because: (1) O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a), by the statute’s plain language, applied to any moving vehicle, and, a golf cart was a ‘‘vehicle’’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(75); (2) the defendant stipulated at trial to driving the golf cart in Fayette County, making such a ‘‘moving vehicle’’ within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a), and to being under the influence of alcohol while doing so; and (3) under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-3(a)(3), the provisions of § 40-6-391 applied anywhere in Georgia, whether on a street, highway, or private property, the defendant’s DUI conviction was upheld on appeal. Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 252, 635 S.E.2d 849 (2006). Presence of cocaine in blood supported conviction. — Evidence that while driving a truck the defendant was involved in an accident and that a blood test revealed a metabolite of cocaine in the defendant’s blood was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence. Holland v. State, 329 Ga. App. 103, 763 S.E.2d 894 (2014). Evidence sufficient to support conviction of driving under influence. — 328 See Lawrence v. State, 157 Ga. App. 264, 277 S.E.2d 60 (1981); Fuller v. State, 166 Ga. App. 734, 305 S.E.2d 463 (1983); Fuller v. State, 169 Ga. App. 468, 313 S.E.2d 745 (1984); Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758, 341 S.E.2d 288 (1986); Pryor v. State, 182 Ga. App. 79, 354 S.E.2d 690 (1987); Daugherty v. State, 182 Ga. App. 730, 356 S.E.2d 902 (1987); Schofill v. State, 183 Ga. App. 251, 358 S.E.2d 651 (1987); Flanders v. State, 188 Ga. App. 98, 371 S.E.2d 918 (1988); Grizzard v. State, 188 Ga. App. 303, 372 S.E.2d 683 (1988); Campbell v. State, 189 Ga. App. 303, 375 S.E.2d 654 (1988); Clark v. State, 192 Ga. App. 718, 386 S.E.2d 379 (1989); Rustin v. State, 192 Ga. App. 775, 386 S.E.2d 535 (1989); Ussery v. State, 195 Ga. App. 394, 393 S.E.2d 522 (1990); Stanley v. State, 195 Ga. App. 706, 394 S.E.2d 785 (1990); Mickey v. State, 196 Ga. App. 895, 397 S.E.2d 148 (1990); Hudson v. State, 261 Ga. 414, 405 S.E.2d 495 (1991); Austin v. State, 200 Ga. App. 91, 406 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 895, 406 S.E.2d 500 (1991); Mullis v. State, 201 Ga. App. 75, 410 S.E.2d 182 (1991); Laminack v. State, 201 Ga. App. 663, 411 S.E.2d 895 (1991); Gordon County Farms v. Edwards, 204 Ga. App. 770, 420 S.E.2d 607 (1992); Bryant v. State, 204 Ga. App. 856, 420 S.E.2d 801 (1992); Butts v. City of Peachtree City, 205 Ga. App. 492, 422 S.E.2d 909 (1992); Conner v. State, 205 Ga. App. 564, 422 S.E.2d 872 (1992); Lanier v. City of Manchester, 205 Ga. App. 597, 423 S.E.2d 30 (1992); King v. State, 205 Ga. App. 825, 423 S.E.2d 429 (1992); Rylee v. State, 210 Ga. App. 314, 436 S.E.2d 52 (1993); Harris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 366, 436 S.E.2d 231 (1993); Moon v. State, 211 Ga. App. 559, 439 S.E.2d 559 (1993); Schoicket v. State, 211 Ga. App. 636, 440 S.E.2d 65 (1994); Marsh v. State, 211 Ga. App. 751, 440 S.E.2d 478 (1994); Fouche v. State, 211 Ga. App. 875, 440 S.E.2d 758 (1994); Leigner v. State, 213 Ga. App. 871, 446 S.E.2d 770 (1994); Shelton v. State, 214 Ga. App. 166, 447 S.E.2d 115 (1994); Lewis v. State, 214 Ga. App. 830, 449 S.E.2d 535 (1994); Crawford v. City of Forest Park, 215 Ga. App. 234, 450 S.E.2d 237 (1994); Shelton v. State, 216 Ga. App. 634, 455 S.E.2d 304 (1995); Parrish v. State, 216 Ga. App. 832, 456 40-6-391 S.E.2d 283 (1995); Torrance v. State, 217 Ga. App. 562, 458 S.E.2d 495 (1995); Keef v. State, 220 Ga. App. 134, 469 S.E.2d 318 (1996); Lee v. State, 222 Ga. App. 389, 474 S.E.2d 281 (1996); Hill v. State, 223 Ga. App. 493, 478 S.E.2d 406 (1996); Burrell v. State, 225 Ga. App. 264, 483 S.E.2d 679 (1997); Tanner v. State, 225 Ga. App. 702, 484 S.E.2d 766 (1997); McClain v. State, 226 Ga. App. 714, 487 S.E.2d 471 (1997); Apperson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 804, 484 S.E.2d 739 (1997); Kovacs v. State, 227 Ga. App. 870, 490 S.E.2d 539 (1997); Piast v. State, 230 Ga. App. 222, 495 S.E.2d 875 (1998); Reynolds v. State, 230 Ga. App. 458, 496 S.E.2d 474 (1998); Horne v. State, 237 Ga. App. 844, 517 S.E.2d 74 (1999); Davidson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 580, 516 S.E.2d 90 (1999); Walker v. State, 239 Ga. App. 831, 521 S.E.2d 861 (1999); O’Brien v. State, 242 Ga. App. 344, 529 S.E.2d 657 (2000); Vaughn v. State, 243 Ga. App. 816, 534 S.E.2d 513 (2000); Duvall v. State, 250 Ga. App. 87, 550 S.E.2d 479 (2001); Slinkard v. State, 259 Ga. App. 755, 577 S.E.2d 825 (2003); In the Interest of A.A., 265 Ga. App. 369, 593 S.E.2d 891 (2004). Under the evidence, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant was operating the defendant’s motor truck on a public street while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. Langford v. State, 69 Ga. App. 619, 26 S.E.2d 385 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-307). Appeals court found the following facts indicated there was sufficient evidence to convict a defendant driver of driving under the influence (DUI) since the defendant: (1) after being stopped for going through a red light, told the officer the defendant was talking on a cell phone; (2) had a flushed face and smelled like beer; (3) could not say certain sequences of the alphabet according to instructions; (4) admitted to drinking beer; (5) refused to submit to field sobriety tests but had a slurred voice when telling the officer why; and (6) had a cup of beer in the car. Lanwehr v. State, 265 Ga. App. 359, 593 S.E.2d 897 (2004). Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of per se driving under the influence under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5) 329 Evidence (Cont’d) when, inter alia, an officer saw the defendant’s truck weaving and straddling two lanes, the defendant smelled of an alcoholic beverage, the defendant’s speech was slurred, the defendant’s eyes were red and bloodshot, when the defendant failed three field sobriety tests, and when the blood alcohol breath tests showed alcohol concentrations of .164 and .156; the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant of driving under the influence to the extent that it is less safe for a person to drive and improper lane change did not invalidate the verdict since Georgia did not recognize an inconsistent verdict rule. Smith v. State, 265 Ga. App. 756, 596 S.E.2d 13 (2004). Sufficient evidence supported convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol under the former version of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 to the extent that the defendant was less safe to drive and driving while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 grams or more when an officer stopped the defendant after seeing the defendant closely following another car on a highway and weaving, when the defendant had an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and admitted that the defendant had three alcoholic beverages that night, when an alco-sensor indicated positive for alcohol, and breath tests registered .114 and .101 grams of alcohol in the defendant’s blood; evidence supporting a per se charge was not insufficient simply because the machine’s margin of error brought a breathalyzer test result below the legal limit for blood alcohol content. Totino v. State, 266 Ga. App. 265, 596 S.E.2d 749 (2004). There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and obstructing a police officer as the police corporal observed the defendant staggering around the defendant’s vehicle, which was parked in the middle of a public street, and driving in violation of the traffic laws, and, after the defendant was stopped, the defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant’s breath, slurred speech, and gave a positive result for consumption of alcohol on the alco-sensor. Monas v. State, 270 Ga. App. 50, 606 S.E.2d 80 (2004). 40-6-391 Defendant’s conviction for violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) was supported by sufficient evidence as the state was not required to prove that the defendant committed an unsafe act, but rather, the state needed only to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to the degree that rendered the defendant a less safe driver; the trooper who observed the defendant testified that the trooper believed the defendant was a less than safe driver, based on the defendant’s condition, and there was also testimony as to the defendant’s blood alcohol level and how it affected the defendant’s reaction time. Overton v. State, 270 Ga. App. 285, 606 S.E.2d 306 (2004). Motion to dismiss ‘‘driving under the influence’’ charges was properly denied because the defendant was not charged with an offense under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(4), but was charged with violations under §§ 40-6-391(a)(1) and 40-6-391(a)(2); while the defendant’s drug test results were suppressed, there was evidence to support conviction under § 40-6-391(a)(1). Harris v. State, 272 Ga. App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (2005). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for DUI as a less safe driver, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), after a police officer observed the defendant’s vehicle traveling without the vehicle’s headlights on at night, the defendant failed to heed the officer’s hand motions, the defendant drove through a red light, and the defendant failed to yield to oncoming traffic, and upon being stopped, the officer smelled alcohol on the defendant, who refused to take voluntary field sobriety tests or the required state breath test. Drogan v. State, 272 Ga. App. 645, 613 S.E.2d 195 (2005). Evidence supported the defendant’s driving under the influence conviction because: (1) the defendant’s erratic, dangerous behavior more than showed an impaired state; (2) the defendant’s refusal to submit to field sobriety tests or to state-administered chemical tests was circumstantial evidence of intoxication; and (3) a police officer who observed the defendant testified that, in the officer’s opinion, the defendant was intoxicated such that it 330 was less safe to drive. Jones v. State, 273 Ga. App. 192, 614 S.E.2d 820 (2005). In a prosecution for vehicular homicide based on the defendant’s impaired driving, the fact that the defendant’s expert was unable to conclude from the state’s testing whether the defendant was impaired did not mean the state failed to prove the defendant’s impairment as the state’s expert testified that use of the drugs found in the defendant’s system after an accident would have made the defendant a less safe driver so a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired. McClure v. State, 273 Ga. App. 751, 615 S.E.2d 856 (2005). Evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol-less safe driver because the defendant drove erratically, had a strong odor of alcohol, had glassy eyes, had slurred speech, and repeatedly failed to respond to questions posed by the officer; the defendant also refused to submit to state-administered chemical testing after being read the implied consent warning. Alewine v. State, 273 Ga. App. 629, 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005). Observations by an officer that the defendant’s vehicle was weaving in traffic, that portions of the car actually crossed over into the adjacent lane of traffic, that there was an odor of an alcoholic beverage and that the defendant had red, watery eyes, and that the defendant failed three sobriety tests provided sufficient evidence to support a conviction of driving under the influence as a less safe driver. Kuehne v. State, 274 Ga. App. 668, 618 S.E.2d 702 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence, vehicular homicide, reckless driving, and other charges as the evidence showed that the defendant was caught trying to take merchandise from a store, and then struck and killed the victim as the defendant left the store parking lot and turned on to a highway at a time when the defendant admittedly was under the influence of drugs. Cromartie v. State, 275 Ga. App. 209, 620 S.E.2d 413 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of driving under the influence of 40-6-391 alcohol to the extent it was less safe for the defendant to drive in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) based on the defendant’s indicia of intoxication, the defendant’s driving, the defendant’s refusal to submit to sobriety tests, and the officer’s opinion that the defendant was intoxicated to the extent that the defendant was a less safe driver. Hoffman v. State, 275 Ga. App. 356, 620 S.E.2d 598 (2005). Sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of driving under the influence to the extent that the defendant was less safe in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1); the defendant was weaving down a street when the defendant struck a parked car and witnesses, including a police officer, testified that the defendant exhibited an indicia of intoxication. Dotson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 418, 623 S.E.2d 252 (2005). Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol despite the defendant’s contention that the defendant was not driving the car when the officer saw the car speeding; the jury was authorized to reject that testimony in favor of that offered by the state. Morgan v. State, 277 Ga. App. 670, 627 S.E.2d 413 (2006). Driving under the influence of marijuana conviction was upheld on appeal as: (1) the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the conviction had to be reversed merely because the state produced no evidence of marijuana in the defendant’s system, given that the refusal to submit to a test of urine or blood created an inference that these tests would have shown the presence of a prohibited substance; and (2) the evidence, when combined with the defendant’s poor performance on the field sobriety tests, bloodshot eyes, unsteadiness while exiting the car, and the odor of marijuana, adequately supported this conviction; moreover, the fact that the trial court found the defendant not guilty of a marijuana possession charge did not require a different result as Georgia abolished the inconsistent verdict rule. Graves v. State, 280 Ga. App. 420, 634 S.E.2d 186 (2006). Convictions against the defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for the 331 Evidence (Cont’d) defendant to drive and possession of an open container of alcohol in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-391(a)(1) and 40-6-253(b)(1)(B) were supported by sufficient evidence when police officers who responded to a call observed the defendant driving into a parking lot with a damaged car, the defendant screamed and cried when asked what had happened and if the defendant was okay, there was a strong odor of alcohol, the defendant had bloodshot and watery eyes, admitted to having had ‘‘too many,’’ and the defendant refused to take field sobriety tests or a chemical breath test; further, a search of the vehicle after the defendant’s arrest revealed open bottles of wine cooler. Crenshaw v. State, 280 Ga. App. 568, 634 S.E.2d 520 (2006). After a review of the evidence surrounding the auto accident which the defendant caused while under the influence of methamphetamine, with the defendant’s four-year-old son as a passenger, and in which the defendant rear-ended the driver in front of the defendant causing that driver to become paralyzed from the neck down, when coupled with the testimony of two law enforcement officers who were at the scene and described the defendant’s erratic behavior after the collision, the defendant’s serious injury by vehicle, driving under the influence of methamphetamine, and endangering a child by driving under the influence convictions were supported by the evidence. Duncan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 270, 635 S.E.2d 875 (2006). Even in the absence of forensic evidence as to a defendant’s blood alcohol concentration, the defendant’s convictions for reckless driving and driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive were supported by evidence of the defendant’s erratic driving, including following another vehicle too closely, and of the defendant’s slurred speech, staggering gait, and flight of irrational belligerence, combined with the detection of a strong order of alcohol emanating from the defendant; the witness testimony was certainly sufficient to authorize any rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 40-6-391 defendant was guilty of the charged offenses. Rutland v. State, 282 Ga. App. 728, 639 S.E.2d 628 (2006). There was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the defendant was a less safe driver; the officer who stopped the defendant at a roadblock testified that the defendant had a strong odor of alcohol about the defendant, that the defendant’s eyes were bloodshot, that the defendant was slack-jawed, and that the defendant’s speech was slurred; the defendant told the officer that the defendant had consumed two alcoholic drinks. Gamble v. State, 283 Ga. App. 326, 641 S.E.2d 556 (2007). Although defense counsel in a DUI case under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) was ineffective in tendering a report into evidence that contained the otherwise inadmissible numerical result of an alco-sensor test, the defendant was not prejudiced; evidence of guilt, including the fact that the defendant was passed out behind the wheel in a left turn lane with the car in gear, the fact that the defendant had to be roused from sleep and was disoriented, the defendant’s admission to drinking, and the defendant’s failing a field sobriety test was overwhelming. Hopkins v. State, 283 Ga. App. 654, 642 S.E.2d 356 (2007). Trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized by a state trooper who was lawfully investigating a serious injury accident the defendant was involved in as evidence the trooper found, specifically, some steel wool and prescription drugs, when coupled with other information the trooper possessed concerning the nature and cause of the crash, provided sufficient probable cause for the trooper to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence; further, the appeals court agreed that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. Cunningham v. State, 284 Ga. App. 739, 644 S.E.2d 878 (2007). Deputy had probable cause to arrest a defendant for DUI independent of field sobriety tests; when the deputy arrived on the scene and before the deputy conducted the tests, the deputy was told by another officer that the defendant had been driving on the wrong side of the road and had 332 been drinking, the deputy noticed that the defendant was unsteady, nervous, and smelled strongly of alcohol, and the defendant admitted to having been drinking two or three hours before. Tune v. State, 286 Ga. App. 32, 648 S.E.2d 423 (2007). Defendant’s DUI conviction was upheld on appeal based on the investigating officer’s testimony that the defendant: (1) sped through a residential area; (2) crossed the centerline in the roadway; (3) drove on the wrong side of the road; (4) drifted in and out of a marked lane of traffic; (5) smelled strongly of alcohol; (6) had a red face, bloodshot and watery eyes, and slurred speech; (7) was unsteady; and (8) failed three field sobriety tests. McDevitt v. State, 286 Ga. App. 120, 648 S.E.2d 481 (2007). Given the arresting officer’s observations, the defendant’s failure to maintain a lane of driving, the evidence presented surrounding the defendant’s arrest, and the defendant’s failed field sobriety and breath tests, sufficient evidence was presented to support the DUI convictions; thus, a new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence was properly denied. Trull v. State, 286 Ga. App. 441, 649 S.E.2d 571 (2007). Defendant’s DUI conviction was upheld on appeal as the evidence of guilt, specifically: smelling strongly of alcohol, having trouble walking and speaking, fumbling with a wallet, a half-empty can of beer in the defendant’s truck, hiding the truck’s keys and a license in the bathroom, the officer having just seen the defendant driving, despite the defendant’s claim to the contrary, and the multiple similar transactions, was overwhelming. Caraway v. State, 286 Ga. App. 592, 649 S.E.2d 758 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1736, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 686 (Ga. 2007). Sufficient evidence existed to support a defendant’s conviction for DUI when there was evidence that the defendant had been drinking via an officer’s observation of the defendant running a red light, speeding, and failing to maintain the lane, and the defendant refused to submit to an alco-sensor test; further, evidence that a strong smell of alcohol came from the defendant and that four field sobriety tests were conducted indicated that the 40-6-391 defendant was impaired. Horne v. State, 286 Ga. App. 712, 649 S.E.2d 889 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1912, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 744 (Ga. 2007). State’s evidence, both direct and circumstantial, was sufficient to uphold the defendant’s conviction of vehicular homicide and that the defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 by driving while under the influence of alcohol as the evidence established the following: testimony of eyewitnesses and of the trooper who investigated the accident established that the defendant was driving erratically and dangerously prior to the collision; the jury was entitled to consider the defendant’s admitted flight from the scene as evidence of the defendant’s guilt; the defendant admitted that there were two open bottles of liquor in the defendant’s car prior to the fatal crash and that the defendant had an alcohol problem on that day. Merritt v. State, 288 Ga. App. 89, 653 S.E.2d 368 (2007). Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive was supported by the defendant’s driving 70 miles per hour in a 45-miles-per-hour zone; an officer’s description of the defendant’s odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and lack of balance; the defendant’s performance on field sobriety and breath tests; the defendant’s testimony that the defendant drank six alcoholic drinks over the evening; and the officer’s opinion that the defendant was under the influence. Yglesia v. State, 288 Ga. App. 217, 653 S.E.2d 823 (2007). Trial court properly denied a motion to suppress the defendant’s breath test results as the officer that stopped the defendant had probable cause to arrest based on: (1) the defendant’s admission to consuming alcohol; (2) the arresting officer’s detection of alcohol on both the defendant’s breath and the defendant’s person; and (3) the fact that impaired driving ability was not an element under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(k)(1). Dodds v. State, 288 Ga. App. 231, 653 S.E.2d 828 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0518, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 335 (Ga. 2008). Defendant’s bloodshot, watery eyes, admission to drinking, the positive result from an alco-sensor test, and an officer’s 333 Evidence (Cont’d) smelling alcohol on the defendant’s breath provided probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence (DUI). Moreover, it appeared that the arrest had been not for DUI (less safe) but for DUI (underage per se) for which the officer had ample probable cause in light of the above factors as well as the low per se limit and the officer’s extensive experience in this area. Kellogg v. State, 288 Ga. App. 265, 653 S.E.2d 841 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0458, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 229 (Ga. 2008). Trial court properly convicted a defendant of driving under the influence, less safe, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), after a bench trial because the evidence showed that: (1) an officer saw the defendant drunk earlier in the evening while responding to a dispute between neighbors; (2) the defendant admitted to drinking; and (3) the defendant admitted to driving the defendant’s vehicle while drunk from the defendant’s home to a lake home. Any error in the charging instrument was deemed waived on appeal as the defendant should have addressed any purported error by a special demurrer and, likewise, the defendant failed to file a motion to suppress challenging the officers’ entry into the defendant’s dwelling without authority; thus, that issue was deemed waived. Pruitt v. State, 289 Ga. App. 307, 656 S.E.2d 920 (2008). Sufficient evidence supported convictions for driving under the influence of drugs to the extent of being a less safe driver under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(2) in that: (1) an officer saw the defendant’s vehicle weaving, tailgating, and going over 80 miles per hour; (2) the defendant spoke slowly, was unsteady, had bloodshot, glassy eyes, and performed poorly on field sobriety tests; and (3) the defendant’s urine tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and six prescription drugs. Cornwell v. State, 283 Ga. 247, 657 S.E.2d 195 (2008). There was sufficient evidence supporting convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive and of driving with an 40-6-391 unlawful blood-alcohol concentration. Although the defendant claimed that the defendant drank only while the defendant’s truck was parked, officers found no containers of alcohol in the truck, and the testimony as to the manner in which the truck was parked authorized a finding that the defendant had been driving the truck erratically; furthermore, a test showing the defendant’s blood alcohol level of 0.198 was administered within three hours of the time the defendant testified that the defendant began drinking. Dorris v. State, 291 Ga. App. 716, 662 S.E.2d 804 (2008). Evidence that a defendant’s vehicle left the road, traversed a drainage ditch, and became lodged between two trees, along with evidence that the defendant was unsteady on the defendant’s feet, had extremely dilated pupils, had a strong odor of alcohol about the defendant’s person, and admitted to having two beers was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for failure to maintain a lane and driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for the defendant to drive. Chancellor v. State, 284 Ga. 66, 663 S.E.2d 203 (2008). Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance since the evidence established that the defendant purchased two cans of an aerosol computer cleaning product and approximately nine minutes later drove a vehicle over a curb and a sidewalk, through the grass in a straight line, and across a street, striking a mailbox and a car before coming to rest in an open field. When an officer approached the defendant and a passenger, the officer immediately noticed symptoms that, based on the officer’s training and experience, were consistent with inhalant use. Castaneda v. State, 292 Ga. App. 390, 664 S.E.2d 803 (2008). Testimony from the driver of a van struck by a defendant’s vehicle, combined with the defendant’s admission regarding drinking, the defendant’s failed field sobriety tests, and a breath test that showed the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .146 was sufficient to support a jury’s conviction of the defendant for driving 334 under the influence of alcohol (less safe) under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1). Thrasher v. State, 292 Ga. App. 566, 666 S.E.2d 28 (2008). Because a police officer observed the defendant make a turn even though the arrows indicating that turn remained red, the valid traffic stop was not impermissibly prolonged pending the arrival of a second officer due to the first officer’s incapacity to smell; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence and failing to obey a traffic control device under O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-20 and 40-6-391. Peterson v.