O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58

Hardison, 247 Ga. 750, 279 S.E.2d 712, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 866 (1981). 604 40-5-58 DRIVERS’ LICENSES Neither state nor federal procedural due process bars the General Assembly from deﬁning “conviction” in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1 to include forfeiture of bail or collateral. Haley v. Hardison, 247 Ga. 750, 279 S.E.2d 712, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 866 (1981). Applicability of § 40-5-34(c). — Former Code 1933, § 68B-216 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-34(c)) applied only when a medical condition formed the basis for not issuing or reissuing a license, not where the action of the department in revoking a driver’s license was based on the driver’s repeated convictions of driving while under the inﬂuence of alcohol. Camp v. Department of Pub. Safety, 241 Ga. 419, 246 S.E.2d 296, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1004 (1978). Trial on accusation rather than indictment. — Felony charge of driving after having been declared a habitual violator may be tried on an accusation preferred by a district attorney rather than on an indictment returned by a grand jury. State v. Gilstrap, 230 Ga. App. 281, 495 S.E.2d 885, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 109 (1998). Notice Notice provisions of section constitutional. — Notice provisions in former Code 1933, § 68B-308 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58) meet the constitutional standards of due process. Hardison v. Shepard, 246 Ga. 196, 269 S.E.2d 458, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1043 (1980). Service of notice is not civil process service. — Service of notice of revocation of a driver’s license as a habitual violator under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58 was not service of a civil process under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-13-1). Hill v. State, 162 Ga. App. 637, 292 S.E.2d 512, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 3155 (1982). Ten-day notice requirements of § 40-5-53 inapplicable. — Department’s jurisdiction and authority to declare a driver a habitual offender does not depend on court’s compliance with ten-day notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-53(b) (relating to reports of convictions) but depends on the information contained within the department’s ﬁles as provided by O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(b). Hardison v. 40-5-58 Orndorff, 173 Ga. App. 630, 327 S.E.2d 497, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1645 (1985). Relevance of date upon which notice given. — Date upon which notice was given to a habitual violator is relevant to whether the subsequent act of driving is punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor; a nonlicensed habitual violator who drives within ﬁve years of notiﬁcation of that person’s status as such is punishable for a felony, whereas a violator who drives more than ﬁve years after the notiﬁcation is punishable for a misdemeanor. Hyde v. State, 205 Ga. App. 754, 424 S.E.2d 39, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1396 (1992). Date of notice on indictment. — Since the misdemeanor offense deﬁned in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c)(1) did not contain the element of operating a motor vehicle within ﬁve years of notice of revocation, any allegations regarding the time at which the defendant committed the offense of operating a motor vehicle after revocation of the defendant’s license and before issuance of a new license were unnecessary. Woody v. State, 212 Ga. App. 186, 441 S.E.2d 505, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 180 (1994). Notice by certiﬁed mail. — Provision for notice by certiﬁed mail affords due process in the administrative function of giving notice that a driver’s license is revoked as a habitual violator. Weaver v. State, 242 Ga. 8, 247 S.E.2d 749, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1070 (1978). Jury could ﬁnd that the Department of Public Safety had complied with all the statutory requirements of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58 when notice was sent by certiﬁed mail, return receipt requested, to the licensee at the licensee’s last known address, and the return receipt showed that someone at that location accepted delivery of the certiﬁed letter addressed to the licensee. King v. State, 179 Ga. App. 184, 345 S.E.2d 902, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1861 (1986). Defendant’s contention that there was no evidence that the defendant received notice of the defendant’s habitual violator status was without merit, since notice of the defendant’s habitual violator status was sent by certiﬁed mail to the defendant’s last known address and the return 605 40-5-58 MOTOR VEHICLES & TRAFFIC Notice (Cont’d) receipt indicates that the notice was signed for by the defendant. Johnson v. State, 194 Ga. App. 501, 391 S.E.2d 132, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 202 (1990). Because the state provided evidence that notice of habitual violator status was sent to the defendant at the defendant’s last known address and the return receipt clearly had the defendant’s printed name and signature under the “received by” section of the return receipt, and because the defendant failed to rebut this evidence, the jury was authorized to conclude that the Department of Public Service complied with the statutory notice requirements. West v. State, 300 Ga. App. 583, 685 S.E.2d 486, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1229 (2009). Personal service of notice by police officer sufficient. — Proper notice was effected after the defendant was personally served by a county police officer with the notice of revocation and declaration as a habitual offender, and personally signed that notice, and the document was returned and placed in the ﬁles of the Department of Public Safety. Stowe v. State, 176 Ga. App. 169, 335 S.E.2d 431, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2269 (1985). After a police officer read the notice to the defendant, who in turn refused to sign the notice, and this service and refusal was witnessed by another police officer, such personal service was sufficient to satisfy the intent and notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(b). Waits v. State, 194 Ga. App. 284, 390 S.E.2d 296, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 60 (1990). Attempted personal service followed by refusal to accept. — When a state trooper attempted to personally serve the defendant with an “Official Notice of Revocation” and the defendant refused to accept, the service comported with the notice requirements. Wellons v. State, 152 Ga. App. 523, 263 S.E.2d 212, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2980 (1979). Reading habitual violator declaration sufficient notice. — When a state patrol officer read the defendant the contents of a request which stated that the defendant had been declared a 40-5-58 habitual violator, told the defendant that the defendant would be unable to drive a vehicle, and that if the defendant did the defendant would be subject to imprisonment, there was sufficient compliance with the notice requirements of former Code 1933, § 68B-308 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58). Cooper v. State, 156 Ga. App. 108, 274 S.E.2d 112, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2898 (1980). Misleading notice held sufficient. — Notice relied on by the state to establish the “essential element” of notiﬁcation was actively misleading insofar as the notice speciﬁed that the defendant’s exposure to felony sanctions for operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license would last only ﬁve years; however, the notice was sufficient to support a conviction for the misdemeanor offense of driving without a license. Connelly v. State, 181 Ga. App. 261, 351 S.E.2d 702, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2822 (1986). Defendant did not receive sufficient notice. — Evidence was insufficient as to the habitually impaired driving charge because, as the state conceded, the defendant did not receive sufficient notice of the defendant’s status as a habitual violator. Clinton v. State, 340 Ga. App. 587, 798 S.E.2d 101, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 115 (2017). Sufficient evidence to convict. — There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of a habitual violator offense since a habitual violator notice revoking the defendant’s driver’s license was sent by registered mail to the address the defendant provided and was signed for in the defendant’s name at that address, and since the defendant admitted surrendering the defendant’s driver’s license, and admitted knowing the defendant was not supposed to be driving. Allain v. State, 202 Ga. App. 706, 415 S.E.2d 315, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 141 (1992). Failure to notify of rights deemed harmless. — Though the notice of revocation of licenses was materially defective in that the notice did not contain any information about the revoked licensee’s right to request a departmental hearing and the licensee’s subsequent appellate rights, this oversight was 606 40-5-58 DRIVERS’ LICENSES rendered harmless when the licensee was granted an out-of-time hearing and pursued the licensee’s appellate rights by bringing the adverse department decision to the superior court. Hardison v. Booker, 179 Ga. App. 693, 347 S.E.2d 681, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2011 (1986). Practice and Procedure Prosecutorial discretion. — Even if the defendant admits notice that the defendant had the legal status of habitual violator, the state is not bound to charge the defendant with a felony under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58 and is not precluded from charging the defendant with a O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121 misdemeanor. The decision of whether to prosecute and what charges to ﬁle are decisions that rest in the prosecutor’s discretion. Noeske v. State, 181 Ga. App. 778, 353 S.E.2d 635, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1555 (1987). Indictment not defective. — An indictment on November 18, 1986, for alleged offenses occurring on May 10 and August 22, 1986, based on the operation of a motor vehicle on those dates after being declared a habitual violator on February 7, 1986, is not defective and is not subject to a motion to quash since the offenses upon which the habitual violator status was based were set aside as “null and void” on September 18, 1986, since driving a motor vehicle after revocation of a license upon being declared a habitual violator is an offense separate and distinct from the offenses which led to the driver’s being declared a habitual violator. State v. Tart, 183 Ga. App. 737, 359 S.E.2d 722, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2080 (1987). Challenge to indictment. — Defendant waived the defendant’s claim that the defendant should have been sentenced for a misdemeanor rather than a felony on the basis that the language of the accusation did not specify felony because the defendant’s argument addressed a defect in the accusation and should have been raised by special demurrer. England v. State, 232 Ga. App. 842, 502 S.E.2d 770, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 852 (1998), cert. denied, No. S98C1584, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 1100 (Ga. Oct. 26, 1998). Location of operation of vehicle not required in indictment. — Elements required for the offense of operating a 40-5-58 motor vehicle after having been declared to be a habitual violator do not include any speciﬁc location in which the motor vehicle is operated; therefore, the state did not have to prove that the defendant operated a vehicle on the street named in the indictment since the location named in the indictment, with the exception of the county, is immaterial and pure surplusage. Stacey v. State, 214 Ga. App. 130, 447 S.E.2d 339, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 845 (1994). Failure to set out prior convictions in indictment. — Indictment under subsection (c) of former Code 1933, § 68B-308 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58) was not deﬁcient if the indictment failed to set out prior convictions, but stated that the defendant was a habitual violator because this gave notice that the defendant’s past record of traffic offenses will be used to prove the commission of the crime. Weaver v. State, 242 Ga. 8, 247 S.E.2d 749, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1070 (1978). No need to prove prior convictions. — State is not required to prove previous convictions which led to a party being declared a habitual violator. Bollen v. State, 155 Ga. App. 181, 270 S.E.2d 227, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2511 (1980); Hester v. State, 159 Ga. App. 642, 284 S.E.2d 659, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2784 (1981). Conviction under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58 need not be based upon proof of prior traffic offenses as such proof is immaterial in a prosecution under that section. Hester v. State, 159 Ga. App. 642, 284 S.E.2d 659, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2784 (1981). Consideration of drunk driving conviction in another state. — In determining whether appellee was a habitual violator, appellee’s conviction of the offense of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level in Florida constituted conviction of an offense “substantially conforming to an offense” in O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390 et seq. Hardison v. Haslam, 250 Ga. 59, 295 S.E.2d 830, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 993 (1982). Collateral attack of habitual violator status. — Driver who is declared a habitual violator and who has driver’s license revoked, based on three convictions for driving under the inﬂuence 607 40-5-58 MOTOR VEHICLES & TRAFFIC Practice and Procedure (Cont’d) within ﬁve years, is not permitted to collaterally attack one’s habitual violator status by attacking the validity of one of the driver’s prior convictions. Love v. Hardison, 166 Ga. App. 677, 305 S.E.2d 420, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2292 (1983). State must prove defendant operated vehicle after receiving revocation notice. — An essential element of the offense under subsection (c) of former Code 1933, § 68B-308 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58), was that the defendant operated a motor vehicle after receiving notice that the defendant’s license had been revoked. On the trial of the case, the state has the burden of proving this notice. Weaver v. State, 242 Ga. 8, 247 S.E.2d 749, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1070 (1978). In a prosecution under subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58, the state has the burden of proving that the defendant was given notice of revocation of the defendant’s driver’s license because of the defendant having been declared a habitual violator. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 828, 286 S.E.2d 709, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1095 (1982). Committing offense after revocation period expires but before new license secured. — When the defendant driver injured a pedestrian while under the inﬂuence of alcohol and lacked a license because of a previous revocation, the driver was correctly sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58 as a habitual violator notwithstanding that the ﬁve-year license revocation period expired prior to the moment of the offense. Cody v. State, 170 Ga. App. 712, 318 S.E.2d 503, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2005 (1984). Former jeopardy if charge known to prosecutor when other offenses adjudicated. — Plea of former jeopardy under former Code 1933, § 26-506 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7), based upon the fact that the habitual violator charge was known to the prosecuting officer to arise out of the same conduct as other offenses to which the defendant had previously pled guilty and which laid within the jurisdiction of a single court, required that 40-5-58 the state press these matters in a single prosecution, and prohibited belatedly bringing a habitual offender charge. Carnes v. State, 242 Ga. 286, 248 S.E.2d 660, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1173 (1978). Proof vehicle moving not required. — Conviction under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c) requires no proof that the vehicle was actually moving. Mazo v. State, 224 Ga. App. 744, 481 S.E.2d 831, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 105 (1997), cert. denied, No. S97C0889, 1997 Ga. LEXIS 439 (Ga. May 9, 1997). Proof of operation of a vehicle for a nonbusiness purpose was not required in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle under the inﬂuence of alcohol while having a probationary license. Williams v. State, 223 Ga. App. 209, 477 S.E.2d 367, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1100 (1996). Admission of evidence by certiﬁed document. — Trial court correctly denied the defendant’s motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of habitual violator since the state submitted evidence of all material allegations by means of a properly certiﬁed document which was admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding as proof of the document’s contents. Brown v. State, 201 Ga. App. 98, 410 S.E.2d 196, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1206 (1991). Introduction into evidence of irrelevant material in driving history. — Entry into evidence of the defendant’s entire driving history, which contains not only facts essential to the conviction but also irrelevant additional material, is not reversible error unless prejudice appears and it can be shown that the irrelevant material contributed to the conviction. Harper v. State, 175 Ga. App. 703, 334 S.E.2d 30, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2143 (1985). When the state introduced, over the defendant-appellant’s objection, the notice of revocation sent to the appellant, to which was attached appellant’s entire driving history (exhibit 1), and two prior habitual violator convictions (exhibits 2 and 3), and each exhibit contained evidence of prior driving under the inﬂuence (DUI) convictions, and exhibit 2 also included a conviction for public indecency, 608 40-5-58 DRIVERS’ LICENSES appellant did not testify at trial, and the prior convictions at issue were unrelated and irrelevant to the charged crime, there was no proper purpose for admission of the public indecency and DUI convictions, thereby necessitating a reversal of the judgment. Jarrad v. State, 195 Ga. App. 704, 394 S.E.2d 555, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 682 (1990). In a prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c), the admission of the defendant’s entire driving record when only a portion of the driving record is admissible is reversible error. Ragan v. State, 264 Ga. 190, 442 S.E.2d 750, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 420 (1994). Possession of valid license from another state. — Under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-65, possession of a valid license from another state was not a defense to a habitual violator charge and created no presumption that the defendant was authorized to drive in Georgia; since the defendant testiﬁed that the defendant never inquired about reinstating the defendant’s Georgia driving privileges, the evidence supported the defendant’s habitual violator conviction. Stripling v. State, 279 Ga. App. 856, 632 S.E.2d 747, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 708 (2006). Evidence sufficient for conviction. — Certiﬁed copies of records of the Department of Public Safety constituted sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of operating a motor vehicle after receiving notice that the defendant’s license was revoked as a habitual violator. Hill v. State, 223 Ga. App. 493, 478 S.E.2d 406, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1216 (1996). Evidence, including the fact that the defendant’s driving was unrelated to the limited lawful purposes of a habitual violator’s probationary driver’s license, was sufficient to sustain conviction. Kingree v. State, 228 Ga. App. 71, 491 S.E.2d 123, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1030 (1997). Defendant’s admissions that the defendant was at a bar with the defendant’s car and too drunk to remember how the defendant got home the evening before the defendant’s arrest and proof that the defendant’s car was wrecked within a block and a half of the defendant’s home, that the defendant had possession of the defendant’s car keys shortly after the collision, 40-5-58 and that the defendant’s driver’s license had been revoked based on the defendant’s status as a habitual violator at the time of the collision was sufficient to ﬁnd the defendant guilty of violating O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c)(1). Sams v. State, 239 Ga. App. 715, 521 S.E.2d 848, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1121 (1999). Evidence that the defendant’s license was revoked in 1989, that the license was never reinstated or renewed, and that the defendant drove an automobile on April 9, 1998, without a valid license, was sufficient for conviction. Brady v. State, 241 Ga. App. 387, 527 S.E.2d 214, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1640 (1999). Defendant was properly convicted of causing death while operating a vehicle after having been declared a habitual violator (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-393(c)) although the defendant was eligible to apply for a license under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-62(a)(1), the failure to apply for reinstatement of the license after ﬁve years elapsed meant that the revocation remained in effect. Greene v. State, 278 Ga. App. 848, 630 S.E.2d 123, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 419 (2006). Jury need not accept defendant’s explanation. — Jury is not required to accept the defendant’s explanation that an emergency required the defendant to drive on the occasion in question. Cape v. State, 165 Ga. App. 825, 303 S.E.2d 77, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2029 (1983). Testimony held sufficient to authorize guilty verdict. — Testimony that the defendant drove an automobile coupled with evidence that the defendant’s driver’s license had been revoked as a habitual offender is sufficient to authorize a rational jury to ﬁnd guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hester v. State, 159 Ga. App. 642, 284 S.E.2d 659, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2784 (1981). Instruction on offense authorized. — When the defendant was arrested for driving without a license after an earlier revocation of the defendant’s license for being a habitual violator, it was not error for the trial court to charge the jury upon the habitual offender offense alleged in the indictment. Kelly v. State, 182 Ga. App. 7, 354 S.E.2d 647, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2591 (1987). 609 40-5-58 MOTOR VEHICLES & TRAFFIC Practice and Procedure (Cont’d) Supersedeas does not stay delivery of the defendant’s driver’s license to Department of Public Safety following the defendant’s driving under the inﬂuence conviction. Arnold v. State, 163 Ga. App. 94, 292 S.E.2d 891, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2415 (1982). Sentence and Appeal Crime of moral turpitude. — Violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58 reﬂects a callous and repeated disregard for the safety and welfare of other people, conviction for which is a crime of moral turpitude within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. I, Para. III(a). Jarrard v. Clayton County Bd. of Registrars, 262 Ga. 759, 425 S.E.2d 874, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 248 (1993), overruled in part, Cook v. Board of Registrars, 291 Ga. 67, 727 S.E.2d 478, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 449 (2012). Former Code 1933, § 68B-308 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58) was not a recidivist statute. Bollen v. State, 155 Ga. App. 181, 270 S.E.2d 227, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2511 (1980). Subsection (c) of former Code 1933, § 68B-308 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58), was not a recidivist statute and in a prosecution under that section it was not necessary to prove the defendant’s prior convictions. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 828, 286 S.E.2d 709, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1095 (1982). Increased penalty imposed for new crime only. — Habitual violator statute allowing for the consideration of offenses which occurred before the enactment of the statute is not ex post facto. The repetition of the criminal conduct aggravates the offender’s guilt and justiﬁes heavier penalties when the offender is again convicted, and the penalty is imposed for a new crime only, but is heavier if the offender is a habitual violator. The increased penalty is for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because it is repetitive. Cofer v. Crowell, 146 Ga. App. 639, 247 S.E.2d 152, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2490 (1978). Use of prior convictions. — Appellate court erred in affirming the trial 40-5-58 court’s ruling that the trial court could consider the defendant’s prior convictions in sentencing the defendant as the state conceded at the sentencing hearing before the trial court that the prior convictions, based on guilty pleas, could not be used to enhance the defendant’s sentence because the convictions were uncounseled, and, thus, only offered the prior convictions for the trial court to consider how much of the defendant’s sentence should be probated. Thompson v. State, 276 Ga. 701, 583 S.E.2d 14, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 612 (2003). One-to-ﬁve-year sentence not excessive. — Mandatory one-to-ﬁve-year sentence for driving with revoked license is neither barbaric nor excessive under the federal Constitution. Cox v. State, 241 Ga. 154, 244 S.E.2d 1, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 901 (1978). Trial court properly upheld the decision of the Georgia Department of Driver Services (DDS) revoking a driver’s license as of September 11, 2007, based on the driver’s status as a habitual offender under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(b) due to the driver’s 2004 convictions for vehicular homicide, driving under the inﬂuence, racing, and failure to maintain lane and DDS’ determination that the ﬁve-year revocation period commenced from that date as the ﬁve-year period could not be reduced by the driver’s incarceration time. While the driver’s license may have been held by the Department of Corrections while the driver was incarcerated, the ﬁve-year revocation period was not subject to reduction by that time because the driver had not been declared a habitual violator by DDS until September 11, 2007. Eason v. Dozier, 298 Ga. App. 65, 679 S.E.2d 89, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 562 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1605, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 794 (Ga. Sept. 28, 2009). Allowable conditions of probation. — Court had authority to impose as a condition of probation the requirement that the defendant wear a ﬂuorescent pink plastic bracelet imprinted with the words “D.U.I. CONVICT.” Such requirement did not impose cruel and unusual punishment or deprive the defendant of equal protection and the condition was not an impermissibly indeterminate condition. Ballenger v. 610 40-5-58 DRIVERS’ LICENSES State, 210 Ga. App. 627, 436 S.E.2d 793, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1295 (1993). Constitutionality of administrative appeal and review scheme. — Georgia scheme of administrative appeal and de novo review in the superior court meets due process hearing requirements of the state and federal Constitutions. Hardison v. Shepard, 246 Ga. 196, 269 S.E.2d 458, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1043 (1980). Right to administrative review and de novo appeal. — Person whose driver’s license has been revoked under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58 by the Department of Public Safety has a right to obtain administrative review of the department decision followed by a de novo appeal to superior court. Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 828, 286 S.E.2d 709, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1095 (1982). Revocation not criminal sentence. — Revocation of a license pursuant to former Code 1933, § 68B-303 (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58) was clearly not a criminal sentence. Cofer v. Hawthorne, 154 Ga. App. 875, 270 S.E.2d 84, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2426 (1980). Failure to preserve objection at trial waived argument on appeal. — Defendant did not object at trial to the Georgia Department of Public Safety documents that were admitted to show the defendant’s receipt of notice that the defendant’s license had been suspended as a habitual violator nor did the defendant object to any failure of the Department to meet the relevant statutory requirements; 40-5-58 thus, the defendant waived argument on appeal concerning their admission into evidence. Keller v. State, 271 Ga. App. 79, 608 S.E.2d 697, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1593 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0712, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 322 (Ga. Apr. 26, 2005). Conviction of driving by habitual traffic violator predicate felony under recidivist statute. — As a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c)(1) (operating a vehicle by a habitual offender whose license has been revoked) is punishable by one to ﬁve years’ imprisonment, the offense is a felony. Since a defendant had four prior convictions for violations of § 40-5-58(c)(1), the defendant was properly sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c). Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 30 (2009). Sentence upheld. — When the driver was declared a habitual violator under provisions of former Code 1933, § 68B-308(a), then was convicted for operating a motor vehicle while the person’s license was still revoked pursuant to that action, after the Official Code of Georgia Annotated became effective on November 1, 1982, the revocation of the driver’s license was effected “under this Code section” within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c), and the driver could be sentenced to a ﬁve-year conﬁnement pursuant to that. Ketchum v. State, 167 Ga. App. 858, 307 S.E.2d 742, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2642 (1983).