City of Atlanta, 223 Ga. App. 144, 476 S.E.2d 892 (1996). Officer’s actions of slowing before going through a red light, exceeding the speed limit during light or nonexistent traffic, and disregarding regulations governing direction of traffic movement when oncoming traffic was light or nonexistent, as a matter of law, did not constitute a ‘‘reckless disregard’’ of law enforcement procedures, and were actions expressly authorized by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6. Pearson v. City of Atlanta, 231 Ga. App. 96, 499 S.E.2d 89 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Strength v. Lovett, 311 Ga. App. 35, 714 S.E.2d 723 (2011). Trial court erred in denying summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to a city and the city’s employees in a wrongful death action; a police officer’s actions were not the proximate cause of a decedent’s death during a crash with a vehicle which was fleeing from police at high speed, and therefore O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) did not apply. City of Pooler v. Edenfield, 263 Ga. App. 278, 587 S.E.2d 408 (2003). Deputy who was involved in a high-speed chase with a suspect was not liable for injuries a motorist sustained when the suspect’s vehicle hit the motorist’s vehicle because the deputy was performing a discretionary function when the deputy decided to pursue the suspect and the deputy did not act in reckless disregard of proper law enforcement procedures. Standard v. Hobbs, 263 Ga. App. 873, 589 S.E.2d 634 (2003). In an arrestee’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against a lead pursuit deputy and the supervisor for using excessive force to stop the arrestee’s car during a high-speed chase, the arrestee’s negligence claim against the county was not precluded by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) because the claim was not based on the officers’ decision to initiate and pursue a high-speed chase, but rather, was based on the officers’ decisions to ram the arrestee’s vehicle; the right to ram a vehicle was not one of the specific ‘‘exceptional rights’’ granted to pursuing officers under the statute. Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV148-WBH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003). 22 Because police officers followed procedures in pursuing an individual in a high-speed chase, the officers did not violate O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6; consequently, because O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6) provided the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) with immunity from liability for injuries resulting from the pursuit, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the DPS. Blackston v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 274 Ga. App. 373, 618 S.E.2d 78 (2005). Whether a police officer disregarded traffic rules, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2), while engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a fleeing suspect, did not change the fact that the decision to pursue the suspect was a discretionary one for which the officer was entitled to official immunity against a negligence action asserted by the individuals who were injured in a car that was involved in an accident as a result of the chase. Hanse v. Phillips, 276 Ga. App. 558, 623 S.E.2d 746 (2005). Arrestee’s negligence and battery claims against a deputy and other law enforcement officers failed because the arrestee was unable to show that the deputy acted with actual malice or actual intent to cause injury, which showing was required under Georgia case law discussing O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2), when the deputy bumped the arrestee’s car to stop the car after the arrestee led the deputy on a six-minute, 10-mile high-speed chase. Harris v. Coweta County, 261 Fed. Appx. 213 (2008) (Unpublished). Because the legislature enacted O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) to limit liability when a fleeing suspect injures an innocent person, the legislature did not intend simultaneously to expand liability to cover injuries to the fleeing suspect. The fleeing suspect may be able to recover for the suspect’s own injuries if an officer acts with an actual intent to cause injury as the phrase ‘‘actual intent to cause injury,’’ which contains aspects of malice, means an actual intent to cause harm to the plaintiff, not merely an intent to do the act purportedly resulting in the claimed injury. Harris v. Coweta County, 261 Fed. Appx. 213 (2008) (Unpublished). In a wrongful death action by a dece- 40-6-6 dent’s estate and her children against the county sheriff, the relevant conduct supporting a finding of proximate cause under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 was the decision of the sheriff ’s deputy to initiate or continue pursuing a fleeing suspect, not how the deputy drove the vehicle during the course of the pursuit. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment on proximate cause grounds when there was some evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the deputy chose to continue the pursuit with conscious indifference to whether continuing the pursuit violated proper law enforcement procedures. Strength v. Lovett, 311 Ga. App. 35, 714 S.E.2d 723 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1794, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 979 (Ga. 2011). Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the city because genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether, under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2), the officer acted with reckless disregard of proper law enforcement procedures and the officer’s actions were thus the proximate cause of the collision between the fleeing suspect and the driver. The driver’s and passenger’s affidavits were sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the officer acted with reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures in the officer’s pursuit, which may be found to constitute a proximate cause of the driver’s injuries. Ray v. City of Griffin, 318 Ga. App. 426, 736 S.E.2d 110 (2012). Discretion applies to driver of ambulance. — Public employee’s act of driving an ambulance was a discretionary act and, thus, the employee could not be held liable when the employee collided the ambulance with another vehicle while responding in the ambulance to an emergency call, even though the public employee may have been driving the ambulance negligently, as the law suspended the mechanical application of certain traffic rules and left the employee with the discretion to determine how to best respond to an emergency while driving the ambulance; accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the employee after a wrongful death action was filed against the employee aris- 23 Application (Cont’d) ing out of the collision. Smith v. Bulloch County Bd. of Comm’rs, 261 Ga. App. 667, 583 S.E.2d 475 (2003). Reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures in high speed pursuit. — After the plaintiff in a wrongful death action presented some evidence that the defendant, a deputy sheriff, acted with reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures at the time the officer engaged in a high speed pursuit, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant. Lang v. Becham, 243 Ga. App. 132, 530 S.E.2d 746 (2000). After the plaintiffs were injured when a speeding car driven by a suspect who was fleeing law enforcement crashed into the plaintiffs’ car, summary judgment was improperly granted to the Monroe County Sheriff as the Monroe deputies acted with reckless disregard of the Monroe County pursuit procedures in continuing a high speed chase of the fleeing driver because the pursuit of the fleeing driver was initiated based on a minor traffic violation; the Monroe deputies were informed by the police dispatcher that there were no warrants for the driver; and the fleeing driver reached speeds of 120 to 125 miles per hour, aggressively wove in and out of traffic, and drove through red lights at congested intersections. Wingler v. White, 344 Ga. App. 94, 808 S.E.2d 901 (2017). Police pursuing suspect did not waive sovereign immunity. — In a case arising from a police chase, the trial court properly granted the police department’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds because the trial court correctly found that the police department did not waive sovereign immunity since the pursuing officers faithfully implemented the police department’s policies and procedures and did not waive sovereign immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6). Loehle v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 334 Ga. App. 836, 780 S.E.2d 469 (2015). Issue of material fact as to fire truck’s operation. — A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the fire truck proceeded past the red signal only after slowing down as may be necessary 40-6-6 for safe operations and with due regard for the safety of all persons; thus, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Brown v. DeKalb County, No. A15A0267, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 351 ( June 17, 2015). No waiver of immunity. — Because O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 applies only when a defendant’s actions are not entitled to immunity, the statute had no application in an action arising from an accident occurring when the defendant officer was within the scope of the officer’s official authority while pursuing a suspected stolen vehicle. Williams v. Solomon, 242 Ga. App. 807, 531 S.E.2d 734 (2000). In a tort action for personal injuries and property damage arising from an auto collision filed against a city, because the facts did not involve an officer’s pursuit of a fleeing suspect, or damages caused by a fleeing suspect, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 did not apply to the action and, thus, the trial court erred in relying on the statute as a ground for granting summary judgment to the city on sovereign immunity grounds. Weaver v. City of Statesboro, 288 Ga. App. 32, 653 S.E.2d 765 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0421, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 221 (Ga. 2008). Jury Instructions and Issues Charge of violation against arresting officer. — In prosecution of a case involving traffic violations, since the arresting officer’s guilt or innocence of the offense of violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 was not an issue, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in curtailing the defendant’s cross-examination of the officer regarding such a violation. Horton v. State, 206 Ga. App. 242, 424 S.E.2d 882 (1992). Charge proper. — Trial court did not err in failing to give requested jury instructions by a driver whose vehicle was involved in a collision with a city fire rescue van as the trial court’s instructions under O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-6 and 40-6-20(a) properly allowed the jury to determine whether the rescue van was an authorized emergency vehicle that complied with § 40-6-6, and the instructions also adequately informed the jury that the city had the burden of proof on the issue. 24 Wynn v. City of Warner Robins, 279 Ga. App. 42, 630 S.E.2d 574 (2006). Arresting officers have broad authority. — Former Code 1933, § 68-301 was but a modern expression of the doctrine that arresting officers, ‘‘the ministers of justice,’’ have a broad scope of authority and freedom of action while in the performance of the officers very responsible functions. Archer v. Johnson, 90 Ga. App. 418, 83 S.E.2d 314 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-301). Jury question whether proper care exercised. — Neither proceeding past signal, nor exceeding speed limit by emergency vehicle, is of itself negligence. But whether the care required by law was exercised in doing either of these things will generally be a question for the jury as are other questions of negligence. Bynes v. Stafford, 106 Ga. App. 406, 127 S.E.2d 159 (1962) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556). 40-6-7 Jury question on whether passenger in stolen vehicle was innocent person. — Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to a county in a wrongful death action because there existed issues of fact as to whether the passenger in a stolen vehicle was an innocent person killed during the officer’s pursuit of a fleeing suspect. Clayton County v. Austin-Powell, 321 Ga. App. 12, 740 S.E.2d 831 (2013), overruled on other grounds, Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386, 774 S.E.2d 596 (2015). Error to instruct failure to stop negligence per se. — Trial judge erred in instructing the jury that it was negligence per se for an ambulance, even on an emergency call, to fail to stop at a traffic control light when the color was red. Royal Cab Co. v. Hendrix, 96 Ga. App. 44, 99 S.E.2d 355 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556).