Bacon County, No. CV 509-026, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7330 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2011), rev’d, 672 F.3d 972, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3899 (11th Cir. 2012). Although the third amended complaint asserted a per se violation of O.C.G.A. 252 42-5-2 STATE/COUNTY CORRECTIONAL INST. § 42-5-2, but to the extent that statute applied to the medical care provider by virtue of the provider’s contract with the sheriff’s office, the statute only created an obligation to provide detainees with access to medical care, but did not address the issue of proper medical care; because it was undisputed the deceased detainee was provided access to medical care, the trial court did not err in concluding that O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) provided no basis for a negligence per se claim against the medical care provider. Graham v. WellStar Health Sys., 338 Ga. App. 178, 789 S.E.2d 369, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 450 (2016). County was responsible for detainee’s medical care after the detainee was injured while being taken into custody by the county sheriff’s department and, but for the seriousness of the detainee’s injuries, would have been placed in the county’s detention facility. Cherokee County v. North Cobb Surgical Assocs., P.C., 221 Ga. App. 496, 471 S.E.2d 561. Violation of prisoner’s constitutional rights. — When medical policies were promulgated and carried out under the mandate of O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 and the seriously ill prisoner was seen only by undertrained LPNs, not by a physician, before the prisoner died, this was a violation of a constitutional right that was coupled with causation. Howard v. City of Columbus, 239 Ga. App. 399, 521 S.E.2d 51, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 981. Use of prisoners’ funds for medical expenses. — As it is the city’s responsibility to pay all medical and hospital expenses for a prisoner in the city’s custody, using a fund recovered from the prisoner after a shoot-out to pay these expenses, the city, in effect, appropriated the entire fund to itself. Johnson v. Mayor of Carrollton, 249 Ga. 173, 288 S.E.2d 565, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1122 (1982) (decided prior to 1982 amendment, which added last four sentences). Department’s right to recover from third-party tortfeasor. — Although plaintiff Department of Corrections had a duty under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) to provide medical care to the Department’s inmates, this duty did not absolve the defendant driver of the driver’s alleged 42-5-2 liability for causing the inmates’ injuries in an automobile accident; thus, the trial court erred in granting the driver summary judgment in the Department’s suit against the driver to recover the Department’s expenses incurred in treating the inmates’ injuries. Dep’t of Corr. v. Barkwell, 256 Ga. App. 877, 570 S.E.2d 13, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 988 (2002). Charged detainees are inmates. — Term “inmate” means not only a person who has been convicted of an offense, but also a person who has been detained by reason of being charged with a crime, such that the county was responsible for the medical expenses of an individual arrested and charged with theft, regardless of the person’s procedural status, and, additionally, of the self-inflicted nature of the person’s injuries. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Houston County, 207 Ga. App. 530, 428 S.E.2d 374, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 245 (1993). Handcuffing of persons taken to hospital. — In an action by a hospital seeking to recover the expenses of medical treatment provided to three men brought to the hospital by a county sheriff’s deputy, the fact that the three men had been handcuffed for transportation to the hospital was not determinative of their subsequent status, when the handcuffs were removed. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Reece, 236 Ga. App. 669, 513 S.E.2d 243. Fact issue on custody determination. — In an action by a hospital against the county seeking reimbursement for medical treatment provided detainees of the sheriff’s department, issues of fact as to whether the individuals were in custody of the county when the expenses were incurred and whether the individuals were “inmates” precluded summary judgment for either the county or sheriff. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Reece, 228 Ga. App. 532, 492 S.E.2d 292. Deputy sheriff in the deputy’s official capacity was entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to a former inmate’s claims arising from denial of a dietary request; the sheriff’s powers were derived from the state, and provision of food to county jail inmates was a state function. Lake v. Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334, 2016 U.S. 253 App. LEXIS 19774 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1549, 200 L. Ed. 2d 741, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 2492 (2018). Sovereign immunity. — Providing adequate medical attention for inmates under the defendant’s custody and control is a ministerial act by the sheriff and his or her deputies and does not involve the exercise of discretion; thus, such act is not subject to either sovereign immunity or official immunity. Cantrell v. Thurman, 231 Ga. App. 510, 499 S.E.2d 416. While subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 425-2 imposes the duty and the cost for medical care of inmates in the custody of a county upon the county, it does not waive sovereign immunity of the county or the county’s agents and employees. Howard v. City of Columbus, 239 Ga. App. 399, 521 S.E.2d 51, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 981. Without proof by the administrator of the decedent inmate’s estate that any actions undertaken by the county officers and employees sued for wrongful death amounted to wilfulness, malice, or corruption, they were entitled to official immunity as a matter of law; further, any failure to adopt other or additional requirements as to their policies of supervision and training in dealing with a suicidal inmate did not amount to wilfulness, malice, or corruption. Middlebrooks v. Bibb County, 261 Ga. App. 382, 582 S.E.2d 539, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 631 (2003), overruled in part, Tattnall County v. Armstrong, 333 Ga. App. 46, 775 S.E.2d 573, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 446 (2015). Trial court incorrectly denied a prison official’s motion for summary judgment on the estate administrators’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the official, following an inmate’s death from a Tylenol overdose, because, while the official was aware that the decedent faced a substantial risk of serious harm, the administrators did not show that the official displayed deliberate indifference to the decedent’s serious medical needs. Furthermore, the administrators failed to prove that the official was acting outside the scope of the person’s official duties or employment; consequently, even if the official acted with malice or intent to injure the decedent, the official was immune from liability on the administrators’ state law claims 42-5-2 against the official. Minor v. Barwick, 264 Ga. App. 327, 590 S.E.2d 754, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1478 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0680, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 303 (Ga. Mar. 29, 2004), cert. dismissed sub nom. Carter v. Barwick, No. S04C0641, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 286 (Ga. Mar. 29, 2004). County sheriff was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because, under Georgia law, the sheriff was not acting as an arm of the state when caring for the medical needs of an inmate; instead, the sheriff was carrying out a statutory duty assigned to the county under O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a). Dukes v. State, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18201 (N.D. Ga.), aff’d, 212 Fed. Appx. 916, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 32150 (11th Cir. 2006). In a parent’s wrongful death action, the trial court erred in denying a county’s motion for summary judgment because O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 did not waive the county’s sovereign immunity for claims based on failure to provide medical care; Code Section 42-5-2 does not provide an express waiver, and nothing in the statute can be read to imply a waiver. Gish v. Thomas, 302 Ga. App. 854, 691 S.E.2d 900, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 254 (2010). Trial court correctly determined that the state law claims made against a county and against a sheriff and medical contract compliance administrator in their official capacities were barred because although O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2(a) imposed upon the county the duty and cost of medical care for inmates in the county’s custody, the county did not waive sovereign immunity of the county or the county’s agents or employees. Graham v. Cobb County, 316 Ga. App. 738, 730 S.E.2d 439, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 643 (2012). Appellate court erred by affirming a trial court’s denial of a city’s motion to dismiss an inmate’s complaint because the care of inmates in the custody of a municipal corporation is a governmental function for which sovereign immunity has not been waived; therefore, the inmate was precluded from pursuing negligence claims. City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 296 Ga. 576, 769 S.E.2d 320, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 135 (2015). Georgia Supreme Court finds that the care of inmates in the custody of a munici- 254 42-5-2 STATE/COUNTY CORRECTIONAL INST. pal corporation is a governmental function for which sovereign immunity has not been waived. City of Atlanta v. Mitcham, 42-5-2 296 Ga. 576, 769 S.E.2d 320, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 135 (2015).