O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 — Rodriquez v

United States (In re Rodriquez), No. 09-93431-JB, No. 10-9006-JB, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2010). Health savings account does not constitute a right to receive a disability, illness, or unemployment beneﬁt for the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2)(C), nor does it constitute a right to receive a payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract for the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2)(E). Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 794 S.E.2d 31, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 775 (2016). Debtor’s health savings account did not constitute a right to receive a disability, illness, or unemployment beneﬁt nor a right to receive a payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract for the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 because it was not a substitute for wages, thus, the exemptions provided in § 44-13100(a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(E) did not apply. Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 794 S.E.2d 31, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 775 (2016). Exemption of health savings accounts. — Bankruptcy court did not err in sustaining the trustee’s objection to a Chapter 7 debtor’s exemption of a health savings account (HSA) because HSA funds were not speciﬁcally set out as exempt under the Georgia Code and were not clearly identiﬁed with or clearly analogous to exempted funds. Mooney v. Webster (In re Mooney), No., No. 1:14-CV-54, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22964 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2015), aff’d, 854 F.3d 1260, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1509 (11th Cir. 2017). Insurance proceeds from loss of exempt property. — Debtor could not use the Georgia motor vehicle exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(3) to exempt proceeds from a property damage settle- 377 Applicability of Exemption to Particular Property, Persons, and Situations (Cont’d) ment that resulted from a car accident in which her vehicle was destroyed; the proceeds that the debtor sought to exempt were compensation for the loss of a car and were not protected by the exemption statute either as a motor vehicle or as proceeds of a motor vehicle. In re Carelock, No. 05-51431-JDW, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3415 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2006). Income from exempted property. — Where the head of a family rented land set apart as an exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100, after having abandoned his wife and moved away from the exempted land, his wife was allowed to collect the rent, and neither the tenant nor the wife was liable to the husband therefor. Wood v. Wood, 171 Ga. 389, 155 S.E. 678, 1930 Ga. LEXIS 361 (1930). Exempt property turned over to debtors. — Debtors were entitled to have property exempted from their Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition turned over to them prior to the conclusion of the bankruptcy plan. Gamble v. Brown, 168 F.3d 442, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2769 (11th Cir. 1999). Farmer-debtor. — A farmer-debtor will be permitted to exempt and avoid the lien on large items of farm equipment and to combine the farmer’s $500.00 exemption for tools of the trade in O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7) with the “wild card” exemption in O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6) of $5,400.00. South Atl. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Jones, 87 B.R. 738, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 830 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988). The debtor, a farmer for 35 years, stated an intention to resume farming. Those items of equipment claimed exempt were essential to the debtor if the debtor was to resume farming. The debtor was a farmer for the purpose of claiming an exemption in farm implements and tools of the trade under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7) and for the purpose of avoiding a creditor’s lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(B). South Atl. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Jones, 87 B.R. 738, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 830 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988). Bankruptcy court sustained a trustee’s objection to a Chapter 7 debtor’s claim 44-13-100 that an interest in a tractor was exempt from creditors’ claims up to $3,500 under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(3) because the tractor was a motor vehicle. The tractor was not a “motor vehicle” under § 44-13100(a)(3) because the tractor was not designed to be used, nor ordinarily used, to transport people or property on roads. In re Matthews, No. JPS, 449 B.R. 833, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2070 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011). “Tools of the trade” deﬁned. — In Georgia, a tool of the trade is an implement used by a person in that person’s work. Curry v. Dial Fin. Corp., 18 B.R. 358, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4561 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982). The term “tool of the trade” contemplates that the person uses the tool with his hands, and that the person’s work requires some degree of manual skill. Curry v. Dial Fin. Corp., 18 B.R. 358, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4561 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982). Tools of tile setter. — The tools used by a debtor in work as a tile setter might well be classiﬁed as tools of the trade for bankruptcy purposes. Curry v. Dial Fin. Corp., 18 B.R. 358, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4561 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982). A pickup truck used for transportation to work is not a tool of the trade of the debtor and the lien may not be avoided. Curry v. Dial Fin. Corp., 18 B.R. 358, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4561 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982). Tractor as tool of trade of farmer. — Bankruptcy court allowed a Chapter 7 debtor’s claim that a tractor the debtor owned was exempt from creditors’ claims up to $1,500 under O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(7) because the debtor used the tractor to farm real property he owned with his wife, and it was a “tool of his trade.” However, the court sustained a trustee’s objection to the wife’s claim that she was also entitled to claim an exemption under § 44-13-100(a)(7) because she did not drive the tractor and had not used the tractor to conduct farming operations. In re Matthews, No. JPS, 449 B.R. 833, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2070 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011). Exemption of personal injury payments. — Exemption for bodily injury claim can be based only on the exemption 378 statute, not on the assignability of the claim, and therefore the maximum amount which a debtor can claim as exempt under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 is $7,500.00. In re Geis, 66 B.R. 563, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5048 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). Even though a debtor’s interest in a personal injury claim was considered exempt property pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 4413-100(a)(11)(D), it had to be included in her Chapter 13 plan as “disposable income” for use by the trustees to pay creditors, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325, because the debtor’s regular income was sufficient to cover her monthly expenses. In re Springer, 338 B.R. 515, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 760 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005). Court had authority under 11 U.S.C. § 329 over an attorney’s fees because the personal injury case in which the attorney represented the Chapter 13 debtor was connected to the bankruptcy case; the debtor ﬁled for bankruptcy due to lost wages following the accident, and any claim in excess of the debtor’s exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(11)(D) would be property of the estate. In re Thornton, No. 04-51703-JDW, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3145 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2005). Under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(11)(E), a debtor could exempt compensation for lost future wages, notwithstanding the fact that the claim for lost future wages arose from a personal bodily injury. This was analogous to permitting an exemption of a portion of a personal injury settlement or award under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D) and a portion under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E). In re Lowery, No. 05-13536-WHD, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3729 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2007). It was undisputed that debtor had suffered serious injuries due to a 1996 collision, including injuries to the neck, back, and shoulder, and the debtor testiﬁed that the debtor still required physical therapy, experienced back pain, and suffered from memory loss. In light of these circumstances, a portion of the $25,000 payment was intended to compensate debtor for the actual bodily injuries that were suffered in the collision. Wasden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (In re Weaver), No. 04- 44-13-100 4118, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4654 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 19, 2006). Due to injuries suffered in a 1996 collision, it was undisputed that the debtor could neither continue in the debtor’s job as a clerical assistant nor continue studies to become an x-ray technician, and the debtor testiﬁed that the debtor had not had full-time employment since the collision and that the debtor’s primary income had been in the form of payments from Social Security and pension. In light of debtor’s circumstances, a portion of the $25,000 payment was reasonably necessary to support the debtor and was intended to compensate the debtor for loss of future earnings due to the collision. Wasden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (In re Weaver), No. 04-4118, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4654 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 19, 2006). Allowance of $7,500.00 for debtor’s actual bodily injury was not unreasonable, where evidence showed debtor had a ﬁve percent permanent impairment to debtor’s shoulder. In re Howard, 169 B.R. 77, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 961 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994). $15,000.00 loss-of-future-earnings exemption unreasonable. — Where a debtor’s current family income exceeded current expenses by approximately $500.00 per month, and the debtor’s prospects for the future suggested debtor’s income was likely to increase, and there was no showing that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor was dependent on the exemption to provide for their support, an exemption of $15,000.00 was unreasonable and was disallowed. In re Howard, 169 B.R. 77, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 961 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994). Award in age-discrimination action. — An award in favor of a bankruptcy debtor in an action under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., was not “compensation of loss of future earnings” and was not exempt under O.C.G.A. § 4413-100. In re Williams, 197 B.R. 398, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 713 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996). Workers’ compensation beneﬁts are exempt in their entirety under the federal bankruptcy statute (11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (10)(C)), which provides for exemption, 379 Applicability of Exemption to Particular Property, Persons, and Situations (Cont’d) regardless of amount, of disability, illness or unemployment beneﬁts. In re Cain, 91 B.R. 182, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1824 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). Exempt status of workers’ compensation awards. — O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 did not need to address the exempt status of Workers’ Compensation awards again because there was a broad exemption already in place; the statute did carve out the cash surrender values of life insurance policies, which were not already exempt, but placed a cap on the policies. Debtor’s life insurance cash surrender value exemption here was limited to the $2,000 set by § 44-13-100(a)(9). Roach v. Ryan (In re Ryan), No. 11-40712, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 784 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2012). Denial of recoupment of disability beneﬁts would not beneﬁt other creditors because post-petition disability beneﬁts are exempt under O.C.G.A. § 4413-100(a)(2)(C); therefore, barring recoupment was not necessary to treat similarly situated creditors alike, because in no event would creditors have shared in the stream of beneﬁt payments. Anthem Life Ins. Co. v. Izaguirre, 166 B.R. 484, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994). Wrongful death annuity. — Annuity based upon a structured settlement for the wrongful death of debtor’s minor son qualiﬁed for exemption, where the annuity was created in consideration of debtor’s age and, under the terms of the annuity, debtor was not entitled to cash in the annuity and could not invade the principal in any manner. In re Wommack, 80 B.R. 578, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 1892 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987). Age as factor in annuity. — Supreme Court of Georgia holds that a debtor’s right to receive payments from an annuity is on account of age if there exists a causal connection between the right to payment and the debtor’s age; the requisite connection may be established in a myriad of ways, proof of which is limited only by the circumstances under which the annuity is created and the terms and conditions of the annuity itself. Silliman v. Cassell, 292 44-13-100 Ga. 464, 738 S.E.2d 606, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 157 (2013). For purposes of O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2)(E), when determining whether a right to receive payment is on account of age, courts should focus on whether the right to payment is causally connected to the payee’s age, not on the payee’s intent in purchasing the annuity. Silliman v. Cassell, 292 Ga. 464, 738 S.E.2d 606, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 157 (2013). Exemption of annuity contract. — Chapter 7 debtor’s interest in an annuity contract from a life insurance company was not exempt under O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2) as it was not a contract to provide beneﬁts in lieu of earnings after retirement or a plan created to ﬁll or supplement a wage or salary void and although the debtor had purchased the annuity in contemplation of retirement, the debtor had made only one contribution shortly before the ﬁling of the bankruptcy case, had discretion to withdraw from the corpus, and had the option to decide at a later time to receive a ﬁxed return on the investment. Goodman v. Bramlette (In re Bramlette), 333 B.R. 911, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2364 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005). Annuity purchased by the debtor was exemptible under O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2)(E) because: (i) the debtor intended the annuity to be a wage substitute and evidenced the debtor’s intent, not only in testimony, but by the payment option the debtor selected; (ii) the payment option reﬂected no real return on the debtor’s investment but instead an intent to obtain income for the debtor’s life; (iii) there was no persuasive evidence that the purchase of the annuity was part of prebankruptcy planning; and (iv) the debtor did not have inappropriate control over the annuity. Silliman v. Cassell (In re Cassell), 443 B.R. 200, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4568 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010), aff’d, 713 F.3d 81, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 5811 (11th Cir. 2013). Supreme Court of Georgia concludes that in deciding whether a particular annuity is of the type intended to come within the § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) exemption, the pertinent question is whether the annuity provides income as a substitute for wages and to make that determina- 380 tion, courts must consider the nature of the contract giving rise to the annuity, as well as the facts and circumstances surrounding the purchase of the annuity. Silliman v. Cassell, 292 Ga. 464, 738 S.E.2d 606, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 157 (2013). Debtor’s ability to choose among several different plans for investment at the time the debtor purchased the annuity is not signiﬁcant for exemption purposes under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), rather, what is relevant and legally signiﬁcant in that analysis is the nature of the plan actually selected and the level of control a payee retains over the funds and payments thereafter. Silliman v. Cassell, 292 Ga. 464, 738 S.E.2d 606, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 157 (2013). Annuity did not ﬁt within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 (a)(2)(E). The Annuity was not intended or designed to be a wage substitute; the nature of the annuity and the debtor’s control over the annuity aligned the annuity outside the scope of the Georgia exemptions. Wallace v. McFarland (In re McFarland), 500 B.R. 279, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4133 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013), aff’d, 516 B.R. 665, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126866 (S.D. Ga. 2014). While the debtor may have intended the annuity to provide security for the debtor’s wife upon the debtor’s death, O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) made clear that the exemption was limited to a debtor’s right to receive payment. Wallace v. McFarland (In re McFarland), 500 B.R. 279, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4133 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013), aff’d, 516 B.R. 665, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126866 (S.D. Ga. 2014). Annuity at issue fell outside the scope of “annuity” for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 4413-100(a)(2) because it did not provide income as a substitute for wages. In re Sheffield, 507 B.R. 400, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 900 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2014). Bankruptcy court did not clearly err in concluding that the bankruptcy debtor’s annuity was not an annuity within the meaning of the annuity exemption because the annuity more closely resembled a nonexempt investment rather than a substitute for wages. McFarland v. Wallace, 516 B.R. 665, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126866 (S.D. Ga. 2014), aff’d, 790 F.3d 1182, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10451 (11th Cir. 2015). 44-13-100 Debtor’s annuity did not qualify for exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2)(E) when the annuity was structured more like a future investment than a substitute for wages, and the debtor conceded as much. McFarland v. Wallace (In re McFarland), 790 F.3d 1182, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 10451 (11th Cir. 2015). Annuity payment reasonably necessary for living expenses. — Pension payments were found to be reasonably necessary for the support of the debtors and the debtors’ dependents in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E) under the following circumstances: (i) the debtors documented in the debtors’ schedules that the debtors current average monthly income was $4,376; (ii) the debtors’ total monthly income included the debtors half of the annuity proceeds in the amount of $1,621; (iii) the debtors listed $4,318 as the average monthly expenses, leaving $58 as the average monthly net income; and (iv) the debtors also had three dependent daughters, and the debtors’ schedules showed that the pension payments were relied upon in order to pay the debtors’ reasonable and necessary living expenses. Baker v. Penton (In re Penton), No. 12-12167-WHD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1079 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2013). Stock bonus and proﬁtsharing plans not exempt. — The Georgia legislature intended that stock bonus and profitsharing plans were not to be included as exempt under O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2)(E) and that the words “or similar plan” were not to be extended to cover such plans. In re Gillespie, 63 B.R. 124, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4964 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985). An unretired employee-debtor’s interest in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act-qualiﬁed pension plan is not entitled to exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E), which only exempts payments under such a plan. In re Craddock, 62 B.R. 583, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 5775 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986), rev’d, No. C86-1815A, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15816 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 30, 1986). Tax shelter annuity. — Debtor’s tax shelter annuity did not meet the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2.1), where the annuity plan was maintained 381 Applicability of Exemption to Particular Property, Persons, and Situations (Cont’d) by an insurance company which was not a nonproﬁt corporation, and not by the state, its political subdivision, or the debtor’s employer. In re Herndon, 102 B.R. 893, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1301 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989). Debtor’s tax shelter annuity failed to meet the exemption requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E), where the debtor was not receiving payments from the annuity which were necessary for debtors or debtor’s dependent’s support. In re Herndon, 102 B.R. 893, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1301 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989). Exemption of Roth IRAs. — Chapter 7 debtor was permitted to exempt the corpus of her Roth individual retirement account (IRA) under O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2)(E) because federal judicial precedent interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10) concluded that the corpus was exempt, that precedent was instructional in determining the Georgia General Assembly’s intent at the time the state statute was enacted, the amendments to the state statute regarding traditional IRAs did not preclude a conclusion of exemption as the Roth IRA was not in existence at the time the state statute was amended, and the Roth IRA was clearly a retirement vehicle. Goodman v. Bramlette (In re Bramlette), 333 B.R. 911, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2364 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005). Repayment of retirement loan. — While the retirement account balance on the loan date of ﬁling for bankruptcy is exempt, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2.1)(C), only the equity in the account is protected, not voluntary payments to augment that equity. In re Aliffi, 285 B.R. 550, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1528 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002). Exemption denied for Health Savings Account. — Debtor was not entitled to claim the debtor’s health savings account (HSA) as exempt because the debtor’s HSA was not a substitute for wages, and it was not the type of illness beneﬁt or right to receive payment on account of illness contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(2)(C) and (E). In re Mooney, 503 44-13-100 B.R. 916, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 29 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2014), aff’d, No. 1:14-CV-54, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22964 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2015). Exemption denied in former residence in which debtor retained a security interest. — Debtor was denied an exemption in the debtor’s former residence under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(1), since the debtor had sold the property and moved from it, retaining a security interest and receiving monthly payments, as it was no longer the debtor’s residence. In re Page, 289 B.R. 484, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 93 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003). Requirement of title ownership in bankruptcy. — Debtor was entitled to claim the $20,000.00 exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(1) where the debtor’s spouse did not have title to the home and did not ﬁle bankruptcy with the debtor; the statute imposed no requirement that the non-titled spouse also be in bankruptcy. In re Burnett, 303 B.R. 684, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1721 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003). Exemption limited where non-resident spouse made no claim to the property. — Trustee’s objection to a debtor spouse’s Georgia homestead exemption claim under O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(1) for $17,000.00 was granted because the spouse’s exemption was limited to $10,000.00 since: (1) the legislative intent was to protect the resident nondebtor spouse’s interest in property where only one spouse ﬁled for bankruptcy and property was titled only in the debtorspouse, which was not the case in the instant matter; (2) the interpretation urged by the spouse would have allowed each of two debtor spouses to claim a full $20,000.00 exemption in two separate residences so long as they ﬁled two separate bankruptcy cases; and (3) the nondebtor spouse made no claim on the residence. In re Neary, No. 03-97808, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 617 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2004). Bankruptcy debtor not entitled to exemption in note inherited by wife. — Chapter 7 debtor husband was not entitled to an exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6) in a promissory note that the debtor wife inherited from her 382 father because the debtor wife did not by her actions show an intent to convert the note into joint marital property. In re Malia, No. 09-42273-MGD, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1104 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2012). Wife without legal interest in inherited property. — Intention expressed by a husband who was joint debtor, with his wife, in a bankruptcy case under Chapter 13, to convert the proceeds to be received by him upon the sale of real estate in which he had inherited an interest, was an insufficient basis on which to ﬁnd that the wife was entitled to claim an exemption in those proceeds under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6) (Georgia) and 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) because the nature of the wife’s interest therein was ﬁxed as of the date of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy per 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1) and on that date, the wife had no legal interest in the inherited property. In re Garner, No. G12-20065-REB, No. G12-20065-REB, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4420 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. July 23, 2012). Payments to disabled adult in Chapter 13. — Trustee’s objection to a debtor’s exemption claim per 11 U.S.C. § 522 and O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(D) (2002) as to payments received from the debtor’s deceased father’s business interests was sustained because the trustee met the trustee’s burden of proof per Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003, to show that the payments, even if properly deemed, at their inception, to constitute “support” arising from a “domestic relations” order in effect when the debtor was 16 years old, such payments could no longer be considered “support” given that the debtor was 56 years old and the purported obligor was dead. Webster v. Aldrich, 403 B.R. 766, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 702 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2009). Household goods exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(4) limited by 11 U.S.C. § 544(f)(4)(A). — Although a debtor’s two televisions and two computers both were household goods that could be exempted under O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(a)(4), a creditor’s lien could be avoided only against one television and one computer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(f)(4)(A). A lawnmower qualiﬁed as a household good under state law and fed- 44-13-100 eral law, but a camera, while a household good under state law, did not qualify under § 544(f)(4)(A). First Franklin Fin. v. Yawn (In re Yawn), No. 09-21472, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 486 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2010). Exemptions exceeding cap. — Chapter 13 trustee’s objection to the claimed exemptions in the debtor’s checking account, savings account, and three future federal tax refunds was sustained where the amount exceeded the O.C.G.A. § 4413-100(a)(6) cap by $50.00. In re Myles, No. 05-92125-MHM, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2006). Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009, a Chapter 7 debtor was not permitted to amend her claim of exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(b)(6) after the Chapter 7 trustee had ﬁled an objection and after certain property the debtor claimed was destroyed because to do so would have been inequitable and would have hindered the diligent administration of the bankruptcy estate by the trustee. In re Price, No. 06-62721-MGD, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3247 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2006). When husband and wife debtors sought to exempt their income tax refunds, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6), the procedure set forth in In re Crowson, 431 B.R. 484, 489 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2010) was to be followed. Each debtor was treated separately under 11 U.S.C. § 522(m), and Georgia law had no presumption of equal ownership of property between spouses under O.C.G.A. § 19-3-9. In re Evans, 449 B.R. 827, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 5367 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010). Amendment of exemption. — Debtor was allowed to amend debtor’s schedules, after a delay of more than one year, to claim an exemption in a checking account pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6) and which would have resulted in avoiding a judicial lien where the initial error in reporting the correct balance in the checking account was the attorney’s fault, and thus there was no bad faith on the debtor’s part; the creditor would not have been prejudiced as the debtor would have reaped the same beneﬁt from amending the schedules that the debtor would have received had the debtor ﬁled the amend- 383 Applicability of Exemption to Particular Property, Persons, and Situations (Cont’d) ments a year ago. In re Spice, No. 0343255-JDW, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3144 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 11, 2005). Bankruptcy debtors entitled to exemption in property. — See Orsburn v. Diners Club, Inc., 35 B.R. 217, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5047 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983). After considering various dictionary deﬁnitions of the word “dependent” and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c), a court concluded that a Chapter 7 trustee failed to carry the burden of proving that the debtors’ 22 year-old daughter and grandson were not their “dependents” at the time of the bankruptcy ﬁling to qualify for a residential exemption under O.C.G.A. § 4413-100(a)(1); the debtors had the presumption of validity in their favor, and the limited evidence on dependency, including the fact that the debtors claimed them as dependents on their income tax return and that the daughter did not have steady employment, supported the conclusion that the daughter and grandson were dependents. In re Holt, 357 B.R. 917, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3512 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006). Chapter 7 debtor was entitled to claim that funds the debtor’s employer withheld from the debtor’s wages and remitted to a Georgia court were exempt from creditors’ claims under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6) because the debtor still had the right at the time the debtor declared bankruptcy to ﬁle a traverse under O.C.G.A. § 184-93 to an affidavit a creditor ﬁled when the creditor garnished the debtor’s wages. Because the debtor retained an interest in the funds, the funds became the property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and could be exempted from the creditors’ claims, and a lien the creditor held on the funds could be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). In re Williams, 460 B.R. 915, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5193 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011). Creditor failed to meet the creditor’s burden of proof with respect to the creditor’s objection to a debtor’s IRA exemptions as the debtor had funds in a pension 44-13-100 plan that were exemptible under the Bankruptcy Code and Georgia law before the debtor’s fraudulent acts that gave rise to a nondischargeable debt and, while the debtor subsequently converted the pension funds to IRA accounts, the debtor did not convert non-exempt assets to exempt assets. Santa Ana Uniﬁed Sch. Dist. v. Montgomery (In re Montgomery), No. 1182598-MGD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4295 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 18, 2013). Chapter 7 debtor’s cluster of cash withdrawals and checks written to cash immediately preceding the debtor’s bankruptcy ﬁling and the debtor’s evasive testimony about what the debtor did with the cash strongly implied that the debtor was emptying the debtor’s account and hiding cash in anticipation of ﬁling the debtor’s case and that the debtor was still in possession of the cash. Thus, the debtor was ordered to turn over the cash, less the debtor’s $300 Georgia exemption in money in the debtor’s checking account, to the trustee. Overstreet v. Ricks (In re Ricks), No. 1360100, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3355 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 15, 2013). Chapter 13 debtors who purchased a 7.5-acre tract of unimproved land and subsequently gave a creditor a security interest in part of the property were allowed under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 to claim both the portion of the property that was encumbered and the portion of the property that was unencumbered as their homestead because the debtors lived in a manufactured home the debtors installed on the property and treated the entire 7.5 acres as the debtors’ residence; Georgia bankruptcy courts that had discussed a method for determining whether adjoined parcels of land were part of a debtor’s residence had focused on how debtors used the property. Goodman v. Vaughn (In re Vaughn), No. 13-13062-WHD, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 2189 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2014). Bankruptcy debtors not entitled to exemption in property. — Court sustained a Chapter 7 trustee’s objection to an exemption in real and personal property for the debtors’ block house property after ﬁnding no authority in the language of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(1) or in case law that allowed them to exempt equity in 384 a property adjacent to their residence that was leased to a residential tenant; clearly, the block house property was not used by the debtors or their dependents as a residence as required by the statute. In re Holt, 357 B.R. 917, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3512 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006). Chapter 7 trustee and a junior lienholder’s carve-out agreement provided that the latter would receive some of the proceeds from the 11 U.S.C. § 363 sale of the debtors’ home and that the trustee would receive the remainder after paying the ﬁrst-priority lien; the debtors’ statelaw exemptions did not apply to the funds received by the estate under the carve-out agreement as the exemptions could not have attached to the property as of the petition date because it was wholly underwater, and the trustee’s carve-out represented the value added from the trustee’s efforts and powers, not the value of the property itself. In re Diener, No. 11-83085 44-13-101 - MHM, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2235 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. July 1, 2015). Although a proﬁt-sharing plan a Chapter 7 debtor established while the debtor owned a home-building company was not covered by ERISA because the debtor was the only trustee and beneﬁciary of the plan, money in the plan could still be exempted from creditors’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 541 if the plan was a qualiﬁed plan under 26 U.S.C. § 401; however, the evidence did not support the debtor’s claim that even assuming that money in the plan was property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the debtor could exempt plan funds from the creditors’ claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 and 11 U.S.C. § 522 because the debtor was not able to show the debtor had obtained a favorable opinion letter from the IRS. RES-GA Dawson, LLC v. Rogers (In re Rogers), 538 B.R. 158, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3228 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015).