Wilmington Trust Co

v. Glynn County, 265 Ga. App. 704, 595 S.E.2d 562, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 239 (2004). Trial court had jurisdiction of taxpayer’s action to find reassessments invalid for failure of the county board of tax assessors to follow provisions of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 requiring a response to the taxpayer’s assessment appeal. Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 228 Ga. App. 371, 491 S.E.2d 812. Denial of dismissal motion no ground for reversal when taxpayer attempting to overturn board’s decision. — When a taxpayer files a “motion to dismiss” in the superior court based on the failure of the board of equalization to set a hearing date on the taxpayer’s appeal within 15 days of receipt of the taxpayer’s notice of appeal from the decision of the board of tax assessors, which decision the taxpayer is attempting to overturn, the denial of the motion to dismiss is favorable to the taxpayer and establishes no ground for reversal of the trial court’s judgment. Williamson v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 168 Ga. App. 47, 308 S.E.2d 55, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2672 (1983). Right to appeal penalty assessment. — Assessment of a penalty for a breach of a conservation use covenant is an assessment for which a property owner has the right to appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Oconee County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Thomas, 282 Ga. 422, 651 S.E.2d 45, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 592 (2007). Costs and expenses on appeal. — Taxpayer was not entitled to costs and expenses for having to appear at the hearing of the county board of equalization on the taxpayer’s initial appeal and for having to appeal to the superior court in order to have the board rule on the taxpayer’s request. Hulse v. Joint City-County Bd. of Assessors, 219 Ga. App. 309, 464 S.E.2d 890, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1028 (1995). Trial court erred in awarding a property owner $7,515.00 in attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) against a county board of tax assessors after a jury 48-5-311 valued the property in question substantially lower than the board’s valuation; the record did not support the trial court’s conclusion that the property was returned for taxation by operation of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-20(a)(2), and the board did not waive the board’s objection to the fees, because the trial court did not hold a hearing on the issue of the attorney’s fees, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-46(a), and the board therefore did not have an opportunity to object to the award. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Butner, 258 Ga. App. 68, 573 S.E.2d 100, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1354 (2002). As a taxpayer did not pay the prior year’s taxes, the taxes paid by the taxpayer for the prior year were deemed the taxpayer’s tax return for the tax year under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-20(a)(2), so the taxpayer was not required to file a separate tax return on the taxpayer’s property, and the taxpayer’s late return was a nullity; therefore, upon the taxpayer’s successful appeal of an assessment of the taxpayer’s property, an award of costs and attorneys fees was mandatory under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). Simmons v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 268 Ga. App. 411, 602 S.E.2d 213, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 932 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1950, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 1071 (Ga. Nov. 22, 2004). Owner was entitled to attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) in an appeal of a property valuation because the final determination of value on appeal to the trial court was 85 percent or less of the valuation set by the board of tax assessors; it was irrelevant that the owner’s appeal to the trial court dealt with a “freeze” of the property value under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c) and not a new determination of value. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Lamb, 298 Ga. App. 618, 680 S.E.2d 656, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 759 (2009). Order awarding a city attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) in the city’s appeal of a county’s tax assessment of the city’s property was error because § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) only applied when there was a final determination of value on appeal, and the city’s appeal related 735 Appeals (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) not to value, but to taxability; valuation was not an issue, and, thus, the city did not satisfy the condition precedent to an award of fees under § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) did not permit an award of attorney fees or litigation costs when, as here, the sole issue was taxability. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 299 Ga. App. 233, 682 S.E.2d 328, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 863 (2009). Final property valuation that was set by operation of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c) based on a prior tax year appeal did not preclude an award of attorney’s fees and costs under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. LM Atlanta Airport, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 439, 721 S.E.2d 640, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1122 (2011). In a tax appeal, the trial court erred by denying the taxpayer’s request for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) because it was successful against the county board of tax assessors and the capped value met the statutory threshold mandating that the taxpayer shall recover costs of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the action. SPH Glynn, LLC v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 326 Ga. App. 196, 756 S.E.2d 282, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 142 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C1002, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 514 (Ga. June 16, 2014), cert. denied, No. S14C1003, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 512 (Ga. June 16, 2014). Applicability to challenge to multi-year audit. — Taxpayer was not required to file an appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 contesting the denial of the taxpayer’s reduction in the value of the taxpayer’s merchandise for one tax year as the taxpayer was no longer challenging the taxpayer’s property tax assessment for one tax year, but was seeking to avoid a multi-year audit that the taxpayer attributed to an improper motive. Parisian, Inc. v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 263 Ga. App. 332, 587 S.E.2d 771, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1117 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0238, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 75 (Ga. Jan. 20, 2004). 48-5-311 Trial court erred in awarding costs and attorney fees to the taxpayers after the jury valued their improved real property as the jury’s valuation figure was 85.8 percent and the applicable statute provided that the valuation figure had to be 85 percent or less of the equalization board’s figure in order for an award of costs and attorney fees to be permitted; the trial court erred because the court deducted the undisputed value of an improvement on the land from the jury’s verdict, but a proper valuation of the fair market value of the property dictated that the value of that improvement be included in determining whether the valuation was 85 percent or less of the equalization board’s valuation for the purpose of awarding fees and costs. Stephens County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Shirley, 263 Ga. App. 743, 589 S.E.2d 263, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1270 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0426, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 155 (Ga. Feb. 16, 2004). Value to be determined by arbitrator. — In a taxpayer’s appeal from a real estate tax valuation assessment, the trial court erred in holding that the value of a parcel of real property was the value set out in the taxpayer’s appraisal since within 45 days of receiving the taxpayer’s certified appraisal, the county board of tax assessors voted to reject the taxpayer’s appraisal value, and within another 45 days, the board certified the appeal in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(f)(3)(A). Thus, the value remained to be determined by an arbitrator in accordance with the procedures set out in § 48-5-311(f). Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Greenfield Inv. Group, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 195, 721 S.E.2d 128, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1026 (2011), cert. dismissed, No. S12C0711, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 706 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2012). 2. Notice of Appeal The 30 day limit in paragraph (g)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 applies to boards of assessors as well as to taxpayers. Stoddard v. Cone, 250 Ga. 852, 301 S.E.2d 641, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 660 (1983). Failure of the board of tax assessors to give 30-day notice of appeal to taxpayers 736 deprived the superior court of jurisdiction and such failure was not an amendable or curable defect. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. CPS Four Hundred, Ltd., 213 Ga. App. 1, 443 S.E.2d 645, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 447 (1994). Failure to file notice with board of tax assessors or to state grounds for appeal warrants dismissal. — When a landowner seeks to appeal the county tax assessor’s assessed valuation of the landowner’s property, but the notice of appeal is not filed with the board of tax assessors and does not state the grounds for appeal, the superior court does not err in dismissing the landowner’s complaint to enjoin the county tax commissioner from selling the landowner’s property because of unpaid taxes. Davis v. Holland, 251 Ga. 86, 303 S.E.2d 455, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 732 (1983). Tax assessors must certify notice of appeal. — O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 did not give a board of tax assessors the discretion to refuse to certify a notice of appeal based on the taxpayer’s failure to be present at the hearing. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Jones, 264 Ga. 828, 452 S.E.2d 99, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 9 (1995). Deadline for filing an appeal runs 30 days from date taxpayer receives decision.— Deadline of 30 days to file a property tax appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(2) was held to run from the date the taxpayer received the decision, not the date it was mailed; therefore, the trial court properly denied the county board of tax assessors’ motion to dismiss because the taxpayer’s appeal was timely. Chattooga County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Connelly, 370 Ga. App. 598, 898 S.E.2d 608, 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 59 (2024). Failure to notify taxpayers of right to appeal. — County’s recalculations of the taxpayers’ homestead exemptions involved the value of the exemptions, bringing the taxpayers within O.C.G.A. § 48-5-49, which permitted an appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Since the county had not given the taxpayers notice under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306 of the taxpayers’ right to appeal, the taxpayers were entitled to equitable relief requiring the county to: (1) provide taxpayers with proper notice of and the right to appeal 48-5-311 changes in the homestead exemptions; (2) stop collecting taxes referenced in bills sent without proper notice; and (3) refund any tax money collected based on bills issued without such notice. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Marani, 299 Ga. App. 580, 683 S.E.2d 136, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 909 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C2072, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 18 (Ga. Jan. 12, 2010). Sufficiency of notice. — Superior court erred in granting a county’s motion to dismiss a taxpayer’s appeal when, although the taxpayer had not offered an explanation as to the basis for the taxpayer’s appeal, the board of tax assessors thereafter certified the case to the superior court and, in connection with the docketing of the case in that court, the taxpayer filed a form in which the taxpayer stated that the taxpayer was filing the appeal “under Ga. Code No. 48-5-311. . . regarding taxability and value.” Vaughters v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 198 Ga. App. 589, 402 S.E.2d 340, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 188 (1991). Because the taxpayers’ notice of appeal of the valuation of their property was filed with the County Board of Tax Assessors (BTA) and the trial court on the same day, which was within the statutory time limitation of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(2), the BTA received the required notice initiating the taxpayers’ appeal; filing the notice in the trial court did not render the notice ineffective. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Love, 296 Ga. App. 613, 676 S.E.2d 256, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 288 (2009). Notice provisions to be strictly construed. — When a reassessment notice was properly mailed to a taxpayer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306 and the taxpayer’s request for a late appeal was denied by the board of tax assessors, the taxpayers were not entitled to declaratory relief or to mandamus because O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 prescribes a time limit for filing appeals, the appeal was not filed within that period, and the board was powerless to extend the period. Dillard v. Denson, 243 Ga. App. 458, 533 S.E.2d 101, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 428 (2000). Liberal reading of notice of appeal. — Trial court erred in dismissing the taxpayers’ appeal, when, although the 737 Appeals (Cont’d) 2. Notice of Appeal (Cont’d) taxpayers’ enumerated errors to the superior court were not clearly defined, a liberal reading of the notice of appeal indicated that the taxpayers were challenging the assessed value of their property based on an alleged error in computation. Andrew v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 194 Ga. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 115, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 104 (1990). 3. Appeals to Board of Equalization Judicial power to determine taxability is vested in the board of equalization. Bouy v. Kiley, 238 Ga. 47, 230 S.E.2d 861, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1085 (1976). Authority to remedy deficiencies in ad valorem tax digest. — General Assembly has invested county boards of tax equalization with ample authority to remedy deficiencies in an ad valorem tax digest. The board is authorized to order the entire digest recompiled if such action is necessary to obtain uniformity. Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 808 (1975). Scope of board’s authority to redress grievances as to tax assessments. — County board of equalization has full authority to fashion an adequate and appropriate legal remedy to redress grievances of taxpayers regarding the valuation of individual parcels of land and the uniformity of the county tax assessments. Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 808 (1975); Chilivis v. Kell, 236 Ga. 226, 223 S.E.2d 117, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 820 (1976). Time for appeal begins to run on the day notice is received by the taxpayer. Hamilton v. Edwards, 245 Ga. 810, 267 S.E.2d 246, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 944 (1980). Extension of time for appeal not within authority of board of tax assessors. — There is no power or authority given the board of tax assessors or any members thereof to extend the period in which an appeal may be filed by the taxpayer, and the attempted extension of the time for filing such an appeal is 48-5-311 void. Tift v. Tift County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 234 Ga. 155, 215 S.E.2d 3, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1072 (1975). Sufficiency of statement of grounds for appeal. — Letter expressing no more than dissatisfaction with an assessment does not specifically state the grounds for appeal. Ledbetter Trucks, Inc. v. Floyd County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 143 Ga. App. 323, 238 S.E.2d 440, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2304 (1977), rev’d, 240 Ga. 791, 242 S.E.2d 596, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 829 (1978). Excuse from filing notice of appeal. — Prior communications with a firm employed by the board of tax assessors to assist the board in making valuations do not excuse taxpayers from complying with the requirement for filing a notice of appeal from the official notice given by the board of tax assessors. Peagler v. Georgetown Assocs., 232 Ga. 848, 209 S.E.2d 186, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1109 (1974). Notice met requirements. — Board of Equalization sent notice according to the statutory requirements as Property Tax Advisers, LLC, while retained and authorized to act on behalf of the taxpayer, was not an attorney who could be served under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(o), and the taxpayer admitted receiving a copy of the notice that was sent via certified mail. Dickey v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 333 Ga. App. 346, 776 S.E.2d 480, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 313 (2015). Necessity for appellant to raise issue of nonuniformity. — County board of equalization may fashion a remedy in light of evidence that there is a lack of uniformity of property assessment within the county. Such nonuniformity within the county need not be raised by an appellant before the county board of equalization. The board need only find reason to believe that property is not uniformly assessed. Therefore, a taxpayer who in good faith returns the taxpayer’s property at the property’s fair market value and does not have the taxpayer’s return changed would seem to be entitled to present evidence to the county board of equalization that there is a lack of uniformity within the county. Adams v. Smith, 415 F. Supp. 787, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14487 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff’d, 568 738 F.2d 1232, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 12338 (5th Cir. 1978). Specification of reasons for uniformity determination. — After the taxpayer raised the issue of uniformity of taxation in the taxpayer’s appeal, the county board of equalization was required to specifically decide the issue and to specify the reasons for the board’s determination. Hulse v. Joint City-County Bd. of Assessors, 219 Ga. App. 309, 464 S.E.2d 890, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1028 (1995). Errors in the hearing before the board of equalization are waived if not objected to at the equalizers’ hearing. Murray v. Richardson, 134 Ga. App. 676, 215 S.E.2d 715, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2123 (1975). Challenge of procedure for carrying assessments forward from one year to the next. — When a taxpayer challenges the procedure used by the county tax officials in carrying forward assessments from one year to the next, rather than attacking the validity of the tax digest or the amount of the assessment, the taxpayer is not required to appeal to the county board of equalization. Smith v. Day, 237 Ga. 48, 226 S.E.2d 588, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1142 (1976). Board’s challenge to non taxable usufruct finding. — Trial court determined that the lease agreement conveyed a non taxable usufruct to the airport hotel owner because the 50 year agreement created a rebuttable presumption of an estate for years and that presumption was sufficiently rebutted in the specific terms of the agreement which when read together made clear that the hotel owner could not use the land in as absolute a manner as may be done with an estate for years. Chatham County Bd. of Assessors v. Jay Lalaji, Inc., 357 Ga. App. 34, 849 S.E.2d 768, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 557 (2020). Hearing must be timely scheduled. — Board of Equalization hearing officer was correct to find that Appeal Administrator did not timely act and, as a result, it was correct to find taxpayer’s asserted property valuation of $2,335,000 to be fair market value for property 48-5-311 pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e.1)(6)(A). Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Westside Atlanta Retail, 363 Ga. App. 839, 872 S.E.2d 886, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 226 (2022). 4. Appeals to Superior Court Applicability of Ch. 11, T. 9 to appeals to superior court. — An appeal brought under former Code 1933, § 92-6912 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311) to the superior court from a county tax assessment was a “complaint” pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 609 § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3), which was required to be answered by responsive pleading pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 12 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12). Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1699 (1977). Approval of appeal not required. — O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 does not require a county or city governing authority to vote to approve an appeal by the board of tax assessors; the plain meaning of the Code section is that the governing authority be notified of appeals by the board of tax assessors from assessment changes of 15 percent or less so that, within 10 days of receipt of such notice, the governing authority may choose to prohibit the appeal by majority vote. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 613, 448 S.E.2d 476, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 983 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0076, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 254 (Ga. Jan. 26, 1995). Appeals must be received, not merely mailed, within time limit. — Although mailed within 30 days of date on which decision of board of equalization was sent by registered mail, an appeal from the board’s decision was not timely because the appeal was not received until two days after expiration of the 30-day time limit imposed by statute. Camden County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Proctor, 155 Ga. App. 650, 271 S.E.2d 902, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2719 (1980). Amendment of notice of appeal to superior court. — Since the policy of the law is in favor of deciding tax appeals on the merits, even at the expense of procedural technicalities, Ga. L. 1972, p. 739 Appeals (Cont’d) 4. Appeals to Superior Court (Cont’d) 624, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48 (b)), which allowed amendments of notices of appeal from superior courts, also applied to notices of appeal to the superior courts from administrative boards. Mundy v. Clayton County Tax Assessors, 146 Ga. App. 473, 246 S.E.2d 479, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2414 (1978). While the notice of appeal that the board of tax assessors sent to the taxpayer was insufficient to perfect the appeal of the board of tax assessors to the superior court because it did not specifically state the grounds for the appeal, the superior court erred in dismissing the appeal; the superior court should have allowed the board of assessors to cure the defect by amending the notice of appeal since notices of appeal could be amended and a policy existed to decide tax appeals on their merits. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Layton, 261 Ga. App. 356, 582 S.E.2d 520, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 628 (2003). Jury trial required for questions of facts. — When questions of fact are presented by such an appeal, the law requires a de novo investigation by trial before a jury. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1699 (1977). Clerk’s duty to set appeal for first term. — When it is the express command of a statute that appeal cases be tried by a jury at the first term after the appeal has been entered, it would appear to be the duty of the clerk to place the appeal upon the trial calendar for the first term after docketing. McCauley v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 243 Ga. 844, 257 S.E.2d 266, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1112 (1979). Dismissal of appeals not heard during first term following filing. — Dismissal of appeal on the ground that the appeal was not brought to trial at the first term is proper when the appellant fails to request that the appeal be placed at the head of the calendar and given the preference to which it is entitled under the law. The provision of this statute, requiring the appeal from the board’s 48-5-311 decision to be heard before a jury at the first term following the filing of the appeal, concerns and affects both the public interest and the interest of the taxpayer since the public has an interest in the proper administration of the revenue laws and the solvency of its fisc, while the taxpayer is entitled to know promptly and precisely the extent of the taxpayer’s tax liability. Thus, dismissal will result from a failure to obtain a trial at the first term unless a reasonable excuse is shown. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Stone Mountain Indus. Park, 147 Ga. App. 503, 249 S.E.2d 318, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2737 (1978). Default judgment will not lie for failure to file defensive pleadings in a de novo hearing on appeal in the superior court from a property evaluation. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1699 (1977). Under Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 55 and Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 24 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55) in conjunction with former Code 1933, § 92-6912 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311) an appeal did not automatically become in default upon failure to timely file responses, when the statutory design contemplated that findings as to fair market value shall be made. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1699 (1977). No automatic default when unliquidated damages involved. — Under Ga. L. 1966, § 55 and Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 24 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55) a case did not automatically become in default upon the failure to timely file responses if the action involves unliquidated damages. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 1699 (1977). Having failed to appeal from the decision of the board of equalization, a party could not at a later date successfully institute an original action in the superior court to raise the issue of taxability. Bouy v. Kiley, 238 Ga. 47, 230 S.E.2d 861, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1085 (1976). Failure of limited liability companies (LLC) to satisfy the requirement of 740 O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e)(2)(A) barred any further right to appeal because the letters and returns the LLCs’ representative submitted months before the assessment notices were mailed did not excuse the LLCs from complying with the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e)(2)(A) that a taxpayer mail or file a notice of appeal within 30 days from the date of mailing the notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306; because the LLCs failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e) so as to effectuate an appeal to the county board of equalization, the LLCs’ appeals to the superior court should have been dismissed. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Avalon Hills Partners, LLC, 307 Ga. App. 520, 705 S.E.2d 674, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1151 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0703, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 602 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2011). Trial court properly dismissed a taxpayer group’s suit seeking a rollback of 2009 assessed values to the 2008 assessed values because whether the moratorium under O.C.G.A. § 48-5B-1 applied should have been raised in an administrative appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 and, by failing to pursue the taxpayers’ remedy, the taxpayers’ complaint was subject to dismissal. We, the Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 292 Ga. 31, 734 S.E.2d 373, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 944 (2012). Tax assessor proper party to appeal decision of Board of Equalization. — When the superior court granted the taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment and held that the taxpayer’s inventory was exempt from property tax, the trial court properly denied the school district’s motion to intervene as untimely because the school district moved to intervene after the final judgment and after the appeal period had run; the school district failed to make the required showing to justify intervention; it was the duty of the tax assessor to protect the interests of every recipient of taxes collected, including the school district; and the tax assessor was the appropriate party to appeal the decision of the board of equalization to the superior court. Henry County Sch. Dist. v. Home Depot U. S. A., Inc., 348 Ga. App. 723, 824 S.E.2d 622, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 72 (2019). Scope of superior court’s jurisdiction on appeal. — Only those 48-5-311 decisions of the board of equalization on questions presented to the board or incident thereto may be relitigated in the superior court. Camp v. Boggs, 240 Ga. 127, 239 S.E.2d 530, 1977 Ga. LEXIS 1421 (1977). Trial court properly dismissed a taxpayer’s appeal from a purported denial of a homestead exemption on grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case as the taxpayer failed to show both an application for and the denial of a homestead exemption, and failed to exhaust any and all of the applicable administrative remedies under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Carter v.