Willis, 313 Ga. App. 699, 722 S.E.2d 416 (2012). Summary judgment on issue of negligence was improper. — Trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment to an injured pedestrian as to negligence because, even if the dog owners violated the local ordinance, there was still a genuine issue of fact as to whether the owners were careless in the management of the owners’ dog under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, so it could not be said that the owners were negligent as a matter of law. Askew v. Rogers, 326 Ga. App. 24, 755 S.E.2d 836 (2014). After the plaintiffs’ children were bitten by the defendants’ dog, the trial court erred by removing the question of whether the defendants carelessly managed their dog from the jury’s consideration as the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment found only that the dog was not properly restrained and made no ruling as to whether the dog was carelessly managed; and the trial court’s instruction that the defendants were negligent based solely on the fact that the defendants did not properly restrain the dog was a misstatement of the law, which could not be considered harmless as the jury did not have an opportunity to consider the primary issue of whether the defendants carelessly managed the defendants’ dog. Cowan v. Carillo, 331 Ga. App. 387, 771 S.E.2d 86 (2015). Jury instructions. — When there was proof going to show that the plaintiff, at the time the plaintiff was injured by reason of the horse running over the plaintiff, was standing upon a sidewalk in a city, and one of the acts of negligence charged 337 Procedure (Cont’d) by the petition was the alleged driving of the horse upon the sidewalk, in violation of a city ordinance, and such ordinance was admitted in evidence without objection, it was not error for the court to charge upon the validity and legal effect of the ordinance, even though the evidence indicated that the driving of the horse on the sidewalk was unintentional on the part of the driver, since the court expressly instructed the jury that, if such act was unintentional, it would constitute no violation of the ordinance. Clackum v. Bagwell, 40 Ga. App. 831, 151 S.E. 689 (1930). Jury question. — In an action for injuries to the plaintiff by a bull of the defendant, the questions of the viciousness of the bull, and the negligence of the defendant are questions for the jury. Van Harlengen v. Bearse, 26 Ga. App. 473, 106 S.E. 306 (1921). When a private zoo owner opens a pri- 51-2-7 vate zoo for viewing without any charge to the public, it is a question for the jury whether the act of the defendant’s employee in removing a chimpanzee from the chimpanzee’s cage complied with that degree of care required by this section. Palmer Chem. & Equip. Co. v. Gantt, 123 Ga. App. 703, 182 S.E.2d 492 (1971). While a previous attack would not necessarily be required to say there is a jury issue on the question of knowledge that a dog had a propensity to attack human beings, at least some form of menacing behavior would be. Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557, 188 S.E.2d 275 (1972). Evidence that the dog’s owner knew that the dog had tried to attack another person and had scolded the dog for this behavior was behavior evidence such that the jury should have been allowed to determine whether the owner should have anticipated the subsequent successful attack on the plaintiff. Thurmond v. Saffo, 238 Ga. App. 687, 520 S.E.2d 43 (1999).