Rader, 299 Ga. App. 606, 683 S.E.2d 16 (2009). Person alleging child abuse held immune from liability for slander. — As a tenant admitted at a deposition that the tenant’s son was sometimes in their home, which the tenant knew was contaminated with toxic mold, without a mask, the landlord had reasonable cause to allege to authorities that the tenant was guilty of child abuse, and was thus entitled to immunity from the tenant’s slander claim under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(f ). Brown v. Rader, 299 Ga. App. 606, 683 S.E.2d 16 (2009). Physician’s statements about nurse-midwife. — Factual question, precluding summary judgment, was raised as to whether the physician’s allegedly slanderous statements about a nurse-midwife were made either in the ordinary course of 51-5-4 the business of a professional partnership or with the authority of the physician’s partners. Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Ctr., 709 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989). Defendant’s statements that plaintiff had removed defendant’s shelves and thrown their contents on the floor did not create a cause of action for slander, since such statements, the truth of which were acknowledged by the plaintiff, were made to a police officer and insurance agent inspecting the alleged damage. Tetrault v. Shelton, 179 Ga. App. 746, 347 S.E.2d 636 (1986). No evidence of oral defamation. See Mays v. Hospital Auth., 582 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ga. 1984). In an action against a church for slander based on statements made to the congregation, the trial court had jurisdiction concerning charges that members were guilty of crimes, but the court was not competent to adjudicate charges that members were witches and practiced witchcraft, since they related to religious faith, belief, and practice. First United Church v. Udofia, 223 Ga. App. 849, 479 S.E.2d 146 (1996). Comments broadcast by radio talk-show host on a restaurant review segment of the host’s listener call-in show broadcast were not actionable under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4, either because they were shown not to have been false or because they fell within the ambit of protected speech. S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broadcasting, 194 Ga. App. 233, 390 S.E.2d 228 (1990), cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 912, 390 S.E.2d 228 (1991). Allegation of criminal activity in a radio broadcast by anonymous caller. — Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a media company in a defamation action pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 51-5-1 and 51-5-4; the trial court erred in finding that a musician was a public figure as the musician was only known locally, and a false claim by an anonymous caller played on the air by a disc jockey was not a matter of public concern, and erred in finding that O.C.G.A. § 51-5-10(a) shielded the company, as there was an issue of fact as to whether the disc jockey made a defamatory state- 567 Applicability to Specific Cases (Cont’d) ment as well. Riddle v. Golden Isles Broad., LLC, 275 Ga. App. 701, 621 S.E.2d 822 (2005). Communications made in good faith in prosecution of crime were privileged. — Statements which were made in good faith, and in compliance with a criminal investigation, were not slanderous, and were privileged; therefore, the claim was properly dismissed on a summary judgment motion. Adams v. Carlisle, 278 Ga. App. 777, 630 S.E.2d 529 (2006). Speculation on laundering of money. — Looking at the broadcast as a whole, any defamatory implication that money flowed through the company to terrorists was presented as mere speculation. Any further implication that the company acted knowingly in laundering money to assist terrorists or terrorist groups remained so unspoken that it, too, could only be speculation and surmise. Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc. v. Katz, No. (RMC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33582 (DC Mar. 30, 2011). Publicity from broadcast. — When publicity from the defendant’s broadcast related solely to the operation of the plaintiff ’s business, the broadcast did not violate the plaintiff ’s right to be let alone and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the plaintiff ’s claim. Jaillett v. Georgia TV Co., 238 Ga. App. 885, 520 S.E.2d 721 (1999). Newspaper article and headline. — In an action by a contractor against a newspaper and the newspaper’s editor because: (1) the average reader would have interpreted a printed headline’s use of the term ‘‘rape’’ as an attempt to convey the severity of the damage to the land that the contractor inflicted rather than to characterize the contractor’s conduct that resulted in the damage as criminal; and (2) the article referred to by the headline did not constitute libel per se as the editor unquestionably did not intend, and readers did not interpret, the word ‘‘rape’’ as having any sexual connotation in the context used in the article, the editor and the newspaper were properly granted sum- 51-5-4 mary judgment as to the contractor’s libel and libel per se claims. Lucas v. Cranshaw, 289 Ga. App. 510, 659 S.E.2d 612 (2008). Although a healthcare worker argues that a newspaper headline libeled the healthcare worker by implying that the healthcare worker was, in fact, an accomplice in a prisoner escape from a hospital, a charge which was later dismissed, reading the headline in conjunction with the article, the average reader would have believed that the healthcare worker had been arrested and charged with aiding another to escape from custody, which was true at the time; the trial court’s denial of a summary judgment motion filed by the newspaper and the reporter was error. Cmty. Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King, 299 Ga. App. 267, 682 S.E.2d 346 (2009). Failure to investigate. — In an action by a high school football coach against the superintendent of schools and a television station news reporter, a television news report concerning allegations of the coach’s prior involvement in illegal gambling did not constitute ‘‘defamacast,’’ slander, or false light invasion of privacy, even if the reporter failed to investigate adequately. Brewer v. Rogers, 211 Ga. App. 343, 439 S.E.2d 77 (1993). False accusation that the owner of rental property failed to insure or pay property taxes on such property could reasonably be construed to refer to one’s ‘‘trade, profession, business’’; therefore, the accusation was actionable per se and proof of special damages was not required. Strange v. Henderson, 223 Ga. App. 218, 477 S.E.2d 330 (1996). Statements made were not malicious. — In an action in which the plaintiff, who was named by the parents of a murdered child on national television and in the parents’ book about their daughter’s murder as a potential suspect, filed suit against the parents, asserting both a libel and slander claim, the parents were granted summary judgment on the slander claim after the court found that: (1) even though a photograph of the plaintiff appeared on the screen when the parents made the statement, it was undisputed that the parents had no control over the editing decisions; and (2) even had the 568 parents intended to refer to the plaintiff, the statements were still not malicious. Wolf v. Ramsey, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2003). Calling plaintiff alcoholic and promiscuous in book. — With regard to a person’s defamation suit against a book author and a publisher, the trial court properly denied the motions for summary judgment filed by the author and the publisher, and properly found that the person did not need to plead nor present evidence of special damages in support of the claim as the published statements in the book that the person was a promiscuous alcoholic required no extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that the statements were injurious on their face. Smith v. Stewart, 291 Ga. App. 86, 660 S.E.2d 822 (2008). Opinion statements regarding America’s loss on Sept. 11, 2001 are not slanderous. — In a suit between feuding neighbors, the trial court properly held that the words spoken by one against the other, which the latter alleged were disparaging against America’s loss on September 11, 2001, were not slanderous, as they were an expression of pure opinion, which was neither provable as true nor as false; as a result, the neighbor who uttered the allegedly slanderous comments was entitled to summary judgment on the other’s claim of slander per se. Bullard v. Bouler, 286 Ga. App. 218, 649 S.E.2d 311 (2007). Natural gas marketer not a limited purpose public figure. — Trial court erred in finding that a natural gas marketer was a limited purpose public figure because there were no affidavits, depositions, or other evidence that could support such a conclusion; the complaint and the complaint’s attachments reflected that the marketer was an energy giant with at least 600 customers in Georgia who tried to maintain a class-action suit against the marketer for allegedly locking the customers into three-year contracts at inflated prices, and those statements did not show that the marketer was either a household word or that the marketer held a position of such persuasive power and influence that the marketer had to be deemed a public figure for all purposes. Infinite En- 51-5-4 ergy, Inc. v. Pardue, 310 Ga. App. 355, 713 S.E.2d 456 (2011). Alleging plaintiff misappropriated funds. — With regard to a slander count asserted by a former insurance agent against another agent, the trial court did not err by denying the other agent’s motion for a directed verdict with regard to statements made that the former insurance agent misappropriated an insurance company’s funds as the statements consisted of charges with regard to the former insurance agent’s trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure and, therefore, were properly considered by the jury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4(a)(3). Am. Southern Ins. Group, Inc. v. Goldstein, 291 Ga. App. 1, 660 S.E.2d 810 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1555, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 680 (Ga. 2008). Statements attributed to school officials. — District court correctly found that the claimant’s complaint alleging Georgia torts of slander, libel, and defamation of character failed to identify any specific written or verbal statements attributed to the school officials because the claimant conceded that the claimant did not know who made the statements which formed the basis of the tort claims, and Georgia tort law made it clear it had not waived its sovereign immunity for tort claims against state officers or employees. Sarver v. Jackson, No. 08-16903, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19735 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2009) (Unpublished). Neighbor was not liable for conspiracy to commit slander. — Judgment against a neighbor for the slander of a homeowner in the neighborhood was reversed because the neighbor was not present when another neighbor uttered slanderous remarks regarding the homeowner to a third party, and there was no evidence that the neighbor directed or acquiesced in the slander, although the two neighbors had conspired to have the homeowner arrested and to otherwise harass the homeowner. Turnage v. Kasper, 307 Ga. App. 172, 704 S.E.2d 842 (2010). Truthful social media postings not defamation. — Judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed verdicts in a defamation case were affirmed because the plaintiff was properly found to be a 569 Applicability to Specific Cases (Cont’d) public figure in the spheres of running and Christian evangelism and there was no evidence of actual malice as to the social media postings, which alleged that the plaintiff was having multiple affairs 51-5-5 with married women and had not completed all of the long distance runs, were true; there was no evidence of violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93 or O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93.1. Bickerstaff v.