Jastram v

Williams, 276 Ga. App. 475, 623 S.E.2d 686 (2005). Civil rights action. — In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which a pro se inmate appealed a district court’s 28 U.S.C. § 1915A dismissal of the inmate’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment as barred by the Heck decision, the district court’s dismissal was premature since the inmate had not been convicted of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 when the district court conducted the court’s frivolity review. Nonetheless, the error was harmless since the inmate failed to demonstrate that the inmate’s conviction under § 16-10-24 had been reversed or invalidated; the inmate’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment were now barred by the Heck decision. Taylor v. Freeman, No. 10-13573, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22997 (11th Cir. Nov. 16, 2011) (Unpublished). After an arrestee refused a deputy’s order to turn around and pushed away from the deputy, the arrestee’s excessive force claim failed because, inter alia, the arrestee was uncooperative, a video showed the close contact and the escalating nature of the incident, and the arrestee’s refusal to comply with the deputy’s instructions was, at least, misdemeanor obstruction. Anthony v. Coffee County, No. 13-15477, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16897 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2014) (Unpublished). Officer without probable cause to arrest. — Defendant officer was not enti- 16-10-24 tled to qualified immunity on plaintiff ’s Fourth Amendment claim because the officer had no arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) or disorderly conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(a)(3) as it was undisputed that the plaintiff uttered an epithet as the plaintiff was walking away, thus ending any face-to-face confrontation, and that the officer was the only one to hear the phrase. Further, there was no arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Merenda v. Tabor, No. 5:10-CV-493 (MTT), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63782 (M.D. Ga. May 7, 2012), aff ’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, No. 12-12562, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2351 (11th Cir. Ga. 2013). Not lesser included offense of interfering with government property. — Defendant failed to show that the charge against defendant for obstructing an officer by becoming verbally combative, refusing repeated orders, and resisting restraint under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, for which defendant was acquitted, was a lesser included offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6 of the charge against defendant of interfering with government property by kicking the sink off the wall and flooding defendant’s jail cell under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-24, for which defendant was convicted; a comparison of these two offenses shows that they have entirely different elements and require proof of entirely different facts. Carter v. State, 267 Ga. App. 520, 600 S.E.2d 637 (2004). Distinguished from offense of terroristic threats. — Defendant’s convictions and sentence for terroristic threats and obstruction of an officer did not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment. The crimes are mutually independent and each is aimed at prohibiting specific conduct. Lemarr v. State, 188 Ga. App. 352, 373 S.E.2d 58 (1988). Force or violence is not an element of misdemeanor obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a); lying with the intent of misdirecting an officer as to the performance of the officer’s official duties can certainly constitute a hindrance and authorize a conviction under that subsec- 635 General Consideration (Cont’d) tion. Duke v. State, 205 Ga. App. 689, 423 S.E.2d 427 (1992); Carter v. State, 222 Ga. App. 397, 474 S.E.2d 228 (1996). To consummate an offense of misdemeanor obstruction, some form of knowing and willful opposition to the officer sufficient to constitute obstruction or hindrance is required, but actual violence or threat is not. Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796, 476 S.E.2d 18 (1996). Woodward v. Gray, 241 Ga. App. 847, 527 S.E.2d 595 (2000); Ballew v. State, 245 Ga. App. 842, 538 S.E.2d 902) (2000); and Cooper v. State, 270 Ga. App. 346, 606 S.E.2d 869 (2004), are disapproved to the extent that these cases imply that misdemeanor obstruction still requires proof of forcible resistance or threats of violence. Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009). Injury to the officer is not an element of felony obstruction of an officer. Fricks v. State, 210 Ga. App. 562, 436 S.E.2d 752 (1993). Sufficiency of indictment. — Indictment charging defendant with misdemeanor obstruction was sufficient to apprise defendant of the acts of which defendant was accused because the indictment was substantially in the language of the statute. Turner v. State, 274 Ga. App. 731, 618 S.E.2d 607 (2005). Juvenile proceedings. — As a security officer was on school property when a fellow officer told the security officer that a truant juvenile was hiding behind a house, the juvenile could be pursued on suspicion of hindering an officer in the lawful discharge of duties in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, even if the officer left school grounds, as the officer did so in hot pursuit of a suspected offender. In the Interest of M.P., 279 Ga. App. 344, 631 S.E.2d 383 (2006). Civil rights actions. — On plaintiff arrestee’s claim that defendant deputy sheriff falsely arrested the plaintiff for obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b) after entering plaintiff ’s home without a warrant to search for the subject of a civil commitment order, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, while the deputy’s entry into the 16-10-24 arrestee’s home was unlawful, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity as the commitment order’s averments indicated the subject was a danger to oneself and others and a reasonable officer could have interpreted those averments as indicating an emergency situation. Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 419, 172 L.Ed.2d 289 (2008). New trial motion properly denied. — Upon convictions of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and obstructing a law enforcement officer, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial as: (1) a challenged juror affirmed the guilty verdict; (2) details about a government witness’s plea deal would not have changed the trial outcome; and (3) lab results confirming the purity of the contraband seized was sufficient to show that the substance defendant possessed was cocaine. Tate v. State, 278 Ga. App. 324, 628 S.E.2d 730 (2006). In the prosecution on charges of interference with government property and obstruction of a law enforcement officer, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant’s 1993 interference with government property conviction; a new trial was properly denied because the evidence was properly admitted, not as substantive evidence of the offense at issue, but only as to the issue of credibility, providing support for admission of the evidence. Tate v. State, 289 Ga. App. 479, 657 S.E.2d 531 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C0986, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 386 (Ga. 2008). Suppression motion improperly granted. — Trial court erroneously granted suppression of the evidence seized in a traffic stop involving two defendants in which an officer, after arresting the first defendant for obstruction, searched the car and found a substance which a field test showed to be cocaine, as the stopping officer was authorized to make the stop based on a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-202 and because the officer could search the passenger compartment of the car incident to the arrest of the first defendant. State v. Stafford, 288 Ga. App. 309, 653 S.E.2d 750 (2007), aff ’d, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484 (2008). 636 Recidivist sentence upheld. — Because state’s written notice sufficiently notified defendant of the state’s intent to seek a recidivist sentence under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 upon conviction of felony obstruction of an officer, and during plea negotiations the state again referenced defendant’s prior criminal history and reiterated the state would seek recidivist punishment, no error occurred in imposing the sentence based on lack of notice. Evans v. State, 290 Ga. App. 746, 660 S.E.2d 841 (2008). Sentence in violation of plea agreement. — Following the state agreeing to dismiss the RICO and theft charges against the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea to one misdemeanor count of hindering and obstructing a law enforcement officer conditioned upon the defendant testifying truthfully at the trial against the co-defendants, the trial court erred by imposing a sentence upon the defendant which differed from the understood terms of the negotiated plea. Lewis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 412, 767 S.E.2d 771 (2014). Written sentence controls when signed before oral sentence pronounced. — Trial court did not improperly increase the defendant’s sentence because, although the trial court orally declared that the defendant would serve two concurrent 12-month sentences for the battery and obstruction convictions, and the defendant was taken into custody immediately, on the same day, before the defendant was taken into custody and began to serve the defendant’s sentence, the trial court signed a written sentence stating that the defendant would serve two consecutive 12-month sentences for the two convictions. Green v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 793 S.E.2d 156 (2016). Conviction as grounds for revocation of supervised release. — Federal district court did not abuse the court’s discretion by imposing the highest possible sentence permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) after revoking defendant’s supervised release term because the defendant was arrested for the misdemeanor of obstruction of officers under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) during an undercover drug sting, the defendant possessed 16-10-24 crack cocaine and marijuana, the defendant violated the technical terms of the defendant’s supervised release by failing to report to the defendant’s probation officer, and the defendant associated with a known felon. United States v. Webb, No. 06-14755, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14986 (11th Cir. June 22, 2007) (Unpublished). Career offender implications from conviction. — Defendant was properly sentenced as an armed career criminal because the defendant’s 1998 Georgia felony conviction for obstructing or hindering a law enforcement officer was a violent felony and the defendant’s 1998 Georgia felony conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute fell squarely within the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a serious drug offense. United States v. Dixon, No. 14-11164, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1698 (11th Cir. Feb. 4, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 991, 194 L. Ed. 2d 12 (U.S. 2016), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1222, 194 L. Ed. 2d 222 (U.S. 2016) (Unpublished). Felony obstruction is predicate offense under Armed Career Criminal Act. — After the defendant was convicted for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, the federal district court did not err by applying sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the defendant had three qualifying predicate offenses; two convictions for felony obstruction and a conviction for selling cocaine. Defendant’s two Georgia convictions for felony obstruction of justice counted as predicate offenses for ACCA purposes because the offenses categorically meet the ‘‘use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force’’ requirement of the elements clause of ACCA; Georgia’s felony obstruction statute applies only to those who obstruct a law enforcement officer by offering or doing violence to the officer’s person. United States v. Brown, 805 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2015). No probable cause for arrest. — Defendant’s motion to suppress suspected cocaine was properly granted as: (1) police officers lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction of justice upon the defendant’s flight; (2) an initial uncoercive encounter with the police did 637 General Consideration (Cont’d) not constitute a seizure, and the defendant was free to leave at any time; and (3) the record was devoid of any evidence about the details of an anonymous tip that the defendant was seen selling drugs in the area of the encounter; moreover, given the tip’s lack of detail and failure to predict future behavior, observation of the defendant’s conduct might have warranted further investigation, but it did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion needed to briefly detain or even arrest. State v. Dukes, 279 Ga. App. 247, 630 S.E.2d 847 (2006). While the defendant police officer did not have to move the officer’s car, the officer could not arrest the plaintiff arrestee for reasonably and politely asking the officer to move a foot so that the arrestee could enter the arrestee’s driveway, and because the argument that the officer was impeded in the officer’s duty under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 lacked merit, granting the officer summary judgment on a false arrest claim was reversed; the idea that the request provided a basis for arrest collided with the First Amendment, whether or not the officer knew the officer was blocking the arrestee’s driveway. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2007). Issue waived on appeal regarding legitimacy of arrest. — Defendant waived the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding whether a police officer was in the lawful discharge of official duties for purposes of the defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), as defense counsel conceded at trial that the officer’s arrest was ‘‘legitimate,’’ and no action was taken to suggest otherwise. Jenkins v. State, 310 Ga. App. 811, 714 S.E.2d 410 (2011). Cited in Shaw v. Jones, 226 Ga. 291, 174 S.E.2d 444 (1970); Shaw v. State, 121 Ga. App. 726, 175 S.E.2d 150 (1970); Ratliff v. State, 133 Ga. App. 256, 211 S.E.2d 192 (1974); Wooten v. State, 135 Ga. App. 97, 217 S.E.2d 350 (1975); Logan v. State, 136 Ga. App. 567, 222 S.E.2d 124 (1975); Allen v. State, 137 Ga. App. 21, 222 16-10-24 S.E.2d 856 (1975); Pate v. State, 137 Ga. App. 677, 225 S.E.2d 95 (1976); United States v. Gidley, 527 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1976); Smith v. State, 144 Ga. App. 785, 242 S.E.2d 376 (1978); Edmonds v. City of Albany, 242 Ga. 648, 250 S.E.2d 458 (1978); Beard v. State, 151 Ga. App. 724, 261 S.E.2d 404 (1979); Rushing v. City of Plains, 152 Ga. App. 884, 264 S.E.2d 319 (1980); In re Long, 153 Ga. App. 883, 267 S.E.2d 481 (1980); Duffie v. State, 154 Ga. App. 61, 267 S.E.2d 501 (1980); Evans v. State, 154 Ga. App. 381, 268 S.E.2d 429 (1980); Latty v. State, 154 Ga. App. 751, 270 S.E.2d 38 (1980); Jenga v. State, 166 Ga. App. 26, 303 S.E.2d 170 (1983); Pugh v. State, 173 Ga. App. 670, 327 S.E.2d 745 (1985); Sapp v. State, 179 Ga. App. 614, 347 S.E.2d 354 (1986); In re M.E.H., 180 Ga. App. 591, 349 S.E.2d 814 (1986); Dickerson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 852, 350 S.E.2d 835 (1986); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 423, 356 S.E.2d 55 (1987); Banks v. State, 187 Ga. App. 280, 370 S.E.2d 38 (1988); Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 905, 392 S.E.2d 330 (1990); Westin v. McDaniel, 760 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1991); O’Neal v. State, 211 Ga. App. 741, 440 S.E.2d 513 (1994); Copeland v. State, 213 Ga. App. 39, 443 S.E.2d 869 (1994); Norman v. State, 214 Ga. App. 408, 448 S.E.2d 219 (1994); Williams v. State, 214 Ga. App. 834, 449 S.E.2d 532 (1994); Cline v. State, 221 Ga. App. 175, 471 S.E.2d 24 (1996); Williams v. State, 228 Ga. App. 289, 491 S.E.2d 500 (1997); Cook v. State, 235 Ga. App. 104, 508 S.E.2d 473 (1998); Askew v. State, 248 Ga. App. 230, 546 S.E.2d 15 (2001); Mathis v. State, 250 Ga. App. 500, 552 S.E.2d 97 (2001); Johnson v. State, 255 Ga. App. 537, 566 S.E.2d 349 (2002); Zachery v. State, 257 Ga. App. 539, 571 S.E.2d 529 (2002); Penland v. State, 258 Ga. App. 659, 574 S.E.2d 880 (2002); Grier v. State, 262 Ga. App. 777, 586 S.E.2d 448 (2003); Myers v. State, 268 Ga. App. 607, 602 S.E.2d 327 (2004); Monas v. State, 270 Ga. App. 50, 606 S.E.2d 80 (2004); Glanton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 232, 641 S.E.2d 234 (2007); State v. Ealum, 283 Ga. App. 799, 643 S.E.2d 262 (2007); Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008); Sillah v. State, 291 Ga. App. 848, 663 S.E.2d 274 (2008); Diaz v. State, 296 Ga. App. 589, 676 S.E.2d 252 638 (2009); Mathis v. State, No. A09A0215; No. A09A0308, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 586 (May 20, 2009); Myers v. State, 311 Ga. App. 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (2011); Foster v. State, 314 Ga. App. 642, 725 S.E.2d 777 (2012); Taylor v. State, 319 Ga. App. 850, 738 S.E.2d 679 (2013); Hyman v. State, 320 Ga. App. 106, 739 S.E.2d 395 (2013); Brooks v. State, 323 Ga. App. 681, 747 S.E.2d 688 (2013); Harper v. State, 337 Ga. App. 57, 785 S.E.2d 691 (2016); Johnson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 384, 801 S.E.2d 82 (2017). Lawful Discharge of Official Duties Essential element of offense is that officer be engaged in lawful discharge of official duties. Dixon v. State, 154 Ga. App. 828, 269 S.E.2d 909 (1980). Off-duty deputy sheriff moonlighting as a bouncer for a private establishment was engaged in performance of official duties within meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Duncan v. State, 163 Ga. App. 148, 294 S.E.2d 365 (1982). Police officers were in the ‘‘lawful discharge’’ of their duties when they responded to a disorderly person call on a police broadcast and were not required to be in possession of outstanding warrants for defendant’s arrest when they apprehended the defendant. Singleton v. State, 194 Ga. App. 423, 390 S.E.2d 648 (1990). Official duties lawfully discharged. — Officers who were summoned to the scene of a domestic disturbance and saw defendant forcibly march defendant’s family into their dwelling, quite possibly at gunpoint, had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest for a battery constituting a family violence and, thus, were engaged in the performance of official duties for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Duitsman v. State, 212 Ga. App. 348, 441 S.E.2d 888 (1994). When a police officer observed the defendant driving unsafely, the officer had an articulable suspicion sufficient to justify further questioning, and the defendant’s flight and subsequent struggle with the officer obstructed the investigation. Tuggle v. State, 236 Ga. App. 847, 512 S.E.2d 650 (1999). When the totality of the circumstances, including the location of the car and the 16-10-24 defendant’s position in the car, indicated that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle and in possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage, even though the defendant was not seen driving the car, there was sufficient evidence that the police officers’ act of questioning the defendant was more than a consensual inquiry and was within the scope of the officers’ official duties so that a jury could reasonably determine that the defendant’s use of a false name was a violation. Wynn v. State, 236 Ga. App. 98, 511 S.E.2d 201 (1999). Officers were lawfully discharging their official duties, despite their unlawful presence in the home with respect to the homeowner, because they had probable cause and a warrant to arrest defendant and defendant had no standing to object to the search of the house. Brown v. State, 240 Ga. App. 321, 523 S.E.2d 333 (1999). Dispatcher who reported a crime at a specified location gave police an articulable suspicion to investigate and detain individuals at the scene, particularly because police observations on arriving at the scene corroborated the report. Overand v. State, 240 Ga. App. 682, 523 S.E.2d 610 (1999). Evidence that the defendant repeatedly disobeyed the officer’s lawful directive to remain in the car for the officer’s safety, that the defendant jumped out of the car and confronted the officer, and that the defendant resisted the officer’s attempts to physically place the defendant in the car was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for obstruction of an officer as the evidence showed the defendant knowingly obstructed the officer in the officer’s lawful discharge of the officer’s duties. Arsenault v. State, 257 Ga. App. 456, 571 S.E.2d 456 (2002). Officer was not required to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to approach a vehicle parked in a neighborhood the officer was patrolling in the lawful discharge of the officer’s official duties; therefore, when the defendant exited the vehicle and attacked the officer, the evidence was sufficient to allow the trier of fact to convict defendant of interference with a law enforcement officer. English v. State, 257 Ga. App. 741, 572 S.E.2d 86 (2002). 639 Lawful Discharge of Official Duties (Cont’d) There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of obstruction of a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a), where defendant struck the officer after the officer grabbed defendant’s grandson’s hand; the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer’s official duties, as the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the grandson had a marijuana cigarette in the grandson’s hand. Smith v. State, 258 Ga. App. 225, 573 S.E.2d 472 (2002). Because a high school principal told a school security officer to be on the lookout for a juvenile who was skipping class and would be involved in an after-school fight, the officer was engaged in the lawful discharge of official duties when the officer sought to find and detain the juvenile. In the Interest of M.P., 279 Ga. App. 344, 631 S.E.2d 383 (2006). Although the evidence that the probationer made the probationer’s arrest warrant unavailable to the officers was circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the trial court’s finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer obstructed the officers. Carlson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 595, 634 S.E.2d 410 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C2099, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 215 (Ga. 2007). Defendant’s misdemeanor obstruction of an officer conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 was supported by sufficient evidence; although an officer was not lawfully discharging the officer’s duty when the officer attempted to detain a person without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the defendant failed to recognize that the defendant’s unprovoked flight, given other suspicious circumstances including the sudden departure of a truck into which the defendant had been leaning when the officer arrived on the scene, gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Copeland v. State, 281 Ga. App. 11, 635 S.E.2d 283 (2006). Juvenile’s interference with a juvenile probation officer’s attempt to take the juvenile into custody, after the juvenile 16-10-24 tested positive for illegal drug use, was sufficient to support an adjudication under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). In the Interest of M.M., 287 Ga. App. 233, 651 S.E.2d 155 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 95 (Ga. 2008). Because there was sufficient evidence that a road that the defendant was obstructing was a public passage, there was no merit to the defendant’s argument that an officer who ordered the defendant not to block the road was not lawfully discharging the officer’s official duties. Davis v. State, 288 Ga. App. 66, 653 S.E.2d 358 (2007). Defendant juvenile’s arrest was not defective because a law enforcement officer was engaged in the discharge of a juvenile court’s pick-up order, which the defendant resisted, thus providing probable cause for the defendant’s arrest for obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. In re C. R., 294 Ga. App. 164, 669 S.E.2d 193 (2008). Trial court did not err in denying a defendant juvenile’s motion for a directed verdict and in adjudicating the defendant delinquent on an obstruction charge because an officer working as a security guard at a restaurant was engaged in the lawful discharge of the officer’s official duties at the time of the officer’s encounter with the defendant as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. In the Interest of D.S., 295 Ga. App. 847, 673 S.E.2d 321 (2009). Defendant was lawfully detained and searched for weapons because the defendant matched a citizen’s specific description and location of a person who had been shooting a gun, and the defendant had threatened to kill the sheriff (who was physically present) on as many as six previous occasions. The jury could find that when the defendant elbowed the chief in the course of the pat-down, the defendant committed felony obstruction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). Meadows v. State, 303 Ga. App. 40, 692 S.E.2d 708 (2010). Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) because an investigator had ample specific and articulable facts to jus- 640 tify stopping the defendant, and the circumstances were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct; minutes after having heard a lookout bulletin, the investigator arrived at the scene to discover a person there matching the description provided in the lookout bulletin, including having a red bag in the person’s possession, the victim pointed to the person as the perpetrator, and gathered onlookers were shouting as the onlookers pointed the investigator to the defendant. Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011). Officer not engaged in official duties. — Officers who attempted forcibly to resolve a civil dispute were not engaged in the lawful discharge of their official duties and did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff for ‘‘obstruction’’ of their unauthorized actions. Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395 (11th Cir. 1998). Accusation must disclose official character of officer. Hunter v. State, 4 Ga. App. 579, 61 S.E. 1130 (1908); Paschal v. State, 16 Ga. App. 155, 84 S.E. 725 (1915). Sworn reserve officer with arrest powers was a ‘‘law enforcement officer’’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. Dennis v.