Baker, 194 Ga. App. 477, 390 S.E.2d 892 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2). Time period considered in determining standard of living. — Court did not err in weighing into the balance the standard of living which the surviving wife was able to maintain during her marriage to the testator before the life-altering, terminal disability which deprived them both of their accustomed lifestyle since: (1) the statute does not limit consideration to the year before the death or any particular time other than ‘‘prior to the death of the testator or intestate’’; (2) the right to year’s support is founded on status, and the surviving wife enjoyed the status of spouse from 1972 to 1996; and (3) the court was not required to blind itself to the fact that the greatly reduced stan- 53-3-1 dard of living was occasioned by the very circumstance which rendered the surviving wife urgently needy in the 12 months subsequent to her husband’s death. Driskell v. Crisler, 237 Ga. App. 408, 515 S.E.2d 416 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2). Since there was conflicting evidence as to the value of the widow’s separate estate, the value of the property she was awarded as year’s support, her needs, and her standard of living prior to her husband’s death, the court did not abuse the court’s discretion in making the award. McClure v. Mason, 228 Ga. App. 797, 493 S.E.2d 16 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2). Jury authorized to increase or decrease appraiser designated year’s support. — When authorized by the pleadings and evidence in a trial de novo, the court should charge that the jury may find that the applicant is entitled to more or less than the appraisers designated as a reasonable year’s support for the applicant. Hayes v. Hay, 92 Ga. App. 88, 88 S.E.2d 306 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). On the retrial of a case in the superior court, the return of the appraisers may be changed or modified as to the amount of property set apart. Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga. App. 642, 188 S.E.2d 800 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Jury’s duty is to determine from the evidence how much would be a sufficiency from the estate for the widow’s support and maintenance for the space of 12 months to be estimated according to the circumstances and standing of the family previous to the death and keeping in view also the solvency of the estate. Carter v. Carter, 139 Ga. App. 548, 228 S.E.2d 708 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Jury authorized to make general estimate as to value of property. — Since it is not required that the specific property set aside as a year’s support should be of any specific value, but only that it be a sufficiency, either in itself or when taken in connection with money, for the support of the applicants for one year, the jury, in setting aside specific property 278 53-3-1 YEAR’S SUPPORT for a year’s support, may, from the general nature and description of the property as it appears from the evidence, without any evidence otherwise as to its value, make a general estimate of the value of the property and determine its sufficiency as respects its value for a year’s support. Daniel v. First Nat’l Bank, 50 Ga. App. 632, 179 S.E. 152 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Valuation of property. — Verdict which sets aside as a year’s support specifically designated property, each item of which is in the verdict specifically valued by the jury, together with a designated sum of money, is not, insofar as it estimates the value of the property set aside in a sum in excess of the estimated value of the same property contained in the return of the appraisers, invalid or without evidence to support it, in the absence of any evidence as to the value of the property. Daniel v. First Nat’l Bank, 50 Ga. App. 632, 179 S.E. 152 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Court is not required in the court’s written order to assign a monetary value to any property awarded. McClure v. Mason, 228 Ga. App. 797, 493 S.E.2d 16 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2). Support of the family of a deceased person should be paid out of the general funds of the estate, without regard or reference to the solvency or insolvency of the estate. Matthews v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 55 Ga. App. 204, 189 S.E. 858 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Priority Year’s support is the highest claim against an estate, whether testate or intestate. Smith v. Sanders, 208 Ga. 405, 67 S.E.2d 229 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Among the necessary expenses of administration is the provision for the support of the family of the deceased, which can be accomplished only by an application for a year’s support and for each year thereafter that the estate is kept together. White v. Wright, 211 Ga. 556, 87 S.E.2d 394 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). 53-3-1 Year’s support is on the same footing as expenses of administration, and is not subject to the law of distribution of estates or to debts against an estate, or liens against the property, except where it is made so by law. Robson v. Harris, 82 Ga. 153, 7 S.E. 926 (1888) (decided under former Code 1882, § 2571); Tomlinson v. City of Adel, 169 Ga. 758, 151 S.E. 482 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 4041). Year’s allowance is upon the footing of expenses of administration; indeed, a part of them. Smith v. Sanders, 208 Ga. 405, 67 S.E.2d 229 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). A 12 months’ support is not a debt, but is an encumbrance higher than a debt. Barron v. Burney, 38 Ga. 264 (1868) (decided under former Code 1863, § 2531); Dougherty-Little-Redwine Co. v. Hatcher, 169 Ga. 858, 151 S.E. 796 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 4041). Year’s support is one of the necessary expenses of administration and is an encumbrance higher than any debt. Montgomery v. McCants, 49 Ga. App. 324, 175 S.E. 397 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Vesting of year’s support to exclusion of other debts. — Title to property set apart to a widow and child or children, in pursuance of the law, as a year’s support for the family of the decedent, vests in the family to the exclusion of all debts, ‘‘except as otherwise specially provided’’ by law. Bank of Hampton v. Smith, 177 Ga. 532, 170 S.E. 508 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Allowance of a year’s support from property belonging to the husband’s estate is to be taken as higher than any debt and is to be regarded as a part of expenses of administration. Tilley v. King, 193 Ga. 602, 19 S.E.2d 281 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Although the law provides that the year’s support is to be preferred above ‘‘all other debts,’’ the provision for a year’s support is not a debt at all, but is an encumbrance higher than any debt. Smith v. Sanders, 208 Ga. 405, 67 S.E.2d 229 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). 279 53-3-1 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES Priority (Cont’d) Provision for the support of the family of the decedent is classed as one of the necessary expenses of administration, and is made for a class as a whole, and not for the benefit of one or some of that class. Ennis v. Ennis, 207 Ga. 665, 63 S.E.2d 887 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). The year’s support takes precedence even of taxes due the state. Tomlinson v. City of Adel, 169 Ga. 758, 151 S.E. 482 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 4041). Claim of a widow for a year’s support is superior to legacies given by her husband in his will. Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga. App. 642, 188 S.E.2d 800 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Money set aside as a year’s support cannot be subjected to the claim of creditors of the wife, other than those creditors who have provided or furnished the family with support or the necessities of life. Rimes v. Graham, 199 Ga. 406, 34 S.E.2d 443 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Property received by the widow as a year’s support is exempt from levy for any but debts created for her actual maintenance and support. Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Property of a decedent may be sold free from a year’s support only under the provisions of Ga. L. 1955, p. 731, § 1 by a sale or conveyance made under court order or under power contained in a will by the representative prior to the setting apart of such year’s support. Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga. App. 642, 188 S.E.2d 800 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Year’s support superior to judgment for alimony. — While a judgment for alimony, payable in monthly installments of money, creating a special lien on land may not be classed as an ordinary debt, being more than such a debt, it is a debt within the meaning of the law, providing that a year’s support to the family of the deceased shall be ‘‘preferred over all other debts.’’ Wainwright v. Morrow, 180 53-3-1 Ga. 120, 178 S.E. 155 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Priority status of year’s support predicated on public policy. — Year’s support set apart to a widow and minor children takes precedence, not only over debts due by the decedent, but even of taxes which are due the state; and this is based upon a sound public policy looking to the protection of widows and children out of the estate of a decedent for the space of 12 months, and until such time as they may provide support for the future. Tomlinson v. City of Adel, 169 Ga. 758, 151 S.E. 482 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 4041). Title of widow subordinate to prior lien. — When the decedent husband, under a foreclosure of his security deed, acquired title to the property subsequently set apart to his widow as a year’s support, after the lien of a paving assessment had attached thereto, her title was subordinate to such lien of the city, and the court did not err in so holding. Paulk v. City of Ocilla, 188 Ga. 69, 2 S.E.2d 642 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Year’s support is superior to liens created by the decedent, or liens arising by operation of law during the decedent’s ownership, except for purchase money. Tomlinson v. City of Adel, 169 Ga. 758, 151 S.E. 482 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 4041). While it is true that, except as to conveyances of title to secure debt, a year’s support is superior to liens created by a decedent, or liens arising by operation of law during decedent’s ownership, and the widow thus takes the interest of the decedent stripped of all such inferior claims, the title of the widow to the property set apart as a year’s support is not superior to liens which had already adhered against the property before the decedent husband acquired the property. Paulk v. City of Ocilla, 188 Ga. 69, 2 S.E.2d 642 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). While a lien arising by operation of law after one’s death could hardly be a ‘‘debt’’ within the purview of former Code 1933, § 113-1002, it may be a ‘‘claim against the estate’’ within the meaning of former Code 280 53-3-1 YEAR’S SUPPORT 1933, § 113-1508. Johnson v. City of Blackshear, 196 Ga. 652, 27 S.E.2d 316 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Management and Control Widow, as the head of the family, is vested with the exclusive right to manage and control the property for the joint benefit of herself and minor children, and, after the marriage or majority of the children, for the benefit of herself alone for life, including the power to sell the entire interest in the property for such purpose. King v. King, 203 Ga. 811, 48 S.E.2d 465 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002); Tribble v. Knight, 238 Ga. 84, 231 S.E.2d 68 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). If necessary, the property awarded to a widow and minor child may be consumed or exhausted, and so long as it lasts it will be subject to exclusive use by the widow during her life, after the child marries or reaches majority. McCommons v. Reid, 201 Ga. 500, 40 S.E.2d 73 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). When realty is set aside as a year’s support to a widow and three minor children, and all the minors have since attained their majority, the title is vested in them jointly, subject to the right of the widow to sell the entire interest for her maintenance and support. King v. King, 203 Ga. 811, 48 S.E.2d 465 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). When a year’s support was set aside to the widow and three minor children jointly, the title thereto vested in them for their joint support and maintenance, and the other children had no interest therein. When the minor children married or attained their majority, the right of support and maintenance from the property set aside as a year’s support belonged to the widow alone as long as she lives or the property lasted, and she was entitled to the property’s use and control. She could sell the property for her maintenance and support. The children who have attained their majority have no right to participate in the property’s consumption or its control. King v. King, 203 Ga. 811, 48 S.E.2d 465 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). 53-3-1 Once the children attain their majority, title remains vested in them jointly, subject to the right of the widow to sell all or part of the property for her maintenance and support. Tribble v. Knight, 238 Ga. 84, 231 S.E.2d 68 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Widow may maintain suit to control property. — Although property set aside as a year’s support may have been set aside to the widow and minor children, the widow nevertheless has the right to control the property, and can, in her own name, maintain a suit in trover for the property’s conversion. Philpot v. Ramsey & Hogan, 47 Ga. App. 635, 171 S.E. 204 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Power of widow to encumber property restricted. — Although the Georgia cases have held that when there is a widow and no minor children, complete title vests in the widow, the cases nevertheless restrict her power to encumber her year’s support unless for actual need for her maintenance. Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Widow as quasi-trustee of minor children. — Under the right of the widow to dispose of property set apart for the support of herself and her minor children under her care, even without an order of court, she acts as the quasi-trustee of the minor children, who with herself are entitled to all of the support. She may thus not only lawfully sell, but lawfully execute a mortgage or security deed conveying the property to obtain funds for such support, or for the purpose of building or repairing a dwelling for herself and such children. Jones v. Federal Land Bank, 189 Ga. 419, 6 S.E.2d 52 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Award to widow and minor children made in gross. — When an application for a year’s support is made by a widow for herself and her minor child, the law contemplates that an award shall be made to such widow and minor child in gross, and not that awards shall be made to them separately; so that, although the legal title will vest in them share and share alike, the use of the entire property shall be a joint one for the support of both 281 53-3-1 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES Management and Control (Cont’d) the mother and the child, and of neither to the exclusion of the other, so long as the widow lives and until the child marries or reaches majority. McCommons v. Reid, 201 Ga. 500, 40 S.E.2d 73 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). When property is set aside in gross, the widow and minor children become owners in common, and share equally in the title. Walden v. Walden, 191 Ga. 182, 12 S.E.2d 345 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Georgia law without doubt permits, and in some cases requires, separate portions of the estate to be set aside as a year’s support to the widow and children of the deceased. Gale v. Stewart, 105 Ga. App. 767, 125 S.E.2d 694 (1962) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Child is not divested of the child’s interest upon reaching majority while the widow is alive or while any of the child’s siblings are still minors, even though the child is not entitled to the control or possession of the property or to any support therefrom. Tribble v. Knight, 53-3-1 238 Ga. 84, 231 S.E.2d 68 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Use and possession of a sui juris child’s undivided interest is merely postponed to the child until the death of the widow and the reaching of age of majority of all the children. Tribble v. Knight, 238 Ga. 84, 231 S.E.2d 68 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). When all of the beneficiaries of a year’s support cease to exist as such, — any of the property set aside which may be unconsumed belongs to them or their heirs in common. Walden v. Walden, 191 Ga. 182, 12 S.E.2d 345 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002). Testamentary disposition by widow of children’s share prohibited. — While the widow is entitled, after the child or children reach majority, to the possession of the entire property for her support and maintenance, and has the right to sell the property for such purpose, this does not include the power to give the children’s share of the property to another by will. Walden v. Walden, 191 Ga. 182, 12 S.E.2d 345 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-1002).