Cox v

GMC, 187 Ga. App. 176, 369 S.E.2d 525, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 545 (1988). Response to jury question as to elements. — Trial court’s statements to the jury did not give undue prominence to contentions of either party where the judge, in response to a question from the jury, told the jury that they had properly listed all the elements of fraud, as there was no evidence that the judge expressed an opinion as to whether those elements had been proved; further, there was no contention that either the original jury charge or the re-charge misstated the law, and the trial court made it clear that the re-charge was not intended to place added emphasis on the fraud claim. Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga. App. 164, 581 S.E.2d 558, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 360 (2003). Instruction was not expression of opinion that plaintiff’s injuries were permanent. — The instruction that if the plaintiff had proved the plaintiff’s case as 9-10-7 laid (such case being in part founded on permanent pain and suffering) the jury would bring in such sum as their enlightened conscience determines as to the pain and suffering the plaintiff had endured and will probably endure is not an expression of opinion that the plaintiff’s injuries are permanent. Redd v. Peters, 100 Ga. App. 316, 111 S.E.2d 132, 1959 Ga. App. LEXIS 608 (1959). Use of words “if you should believe” not expression of opinion. — The use, by the trial judge in charging the jury, of the words “if you should believe,” instead of “if the jury should find from the evidence,” is not an expression of an opinion by the trial judge. Steffner v. Cohen, 104 Ga. App. 634, 122 S.E.2d 530, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 757 (1961). “Not to exceed the sum sued for” not expression of opinion. — Where the court instructed the jury that in the event they found for the plaintiffs the form of their verdict would be, “We, the jury, find for the plaintiffs in the sum of so many dollars, not to exceed the sum sued for,” the latter portion of the charge is not an expression of opinion by the court as to the value of the life of the deceased in violation of this section. City of Macon v. Smith, 117 Ga. App. 363, 160 S.E.2d 622, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1090 (1968) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-7). For court correctly to denominate case as action in tort is not equivalent to expression of opinion that the defendant had committed a tort, but, properly construed, only informed the jury that the plaintiff so contended. Pollard v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408, 193 S.E. 102, 1937 Ga. App. LEXIS 385 (1937). Telling counsel not to make statements not violation of statute. — In telling defense counsel that counsel could not make statements when cross-examining a state’s witness, the trial court did not violate O.C.G.A. § 9-10-7. The remarks did not pertain to guilt or innocence and were not an expression of opinion as to what had been proven. Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 566 (2009). No error to state hypothesis where jury to establish it from evidence. — Where the evidence warrants, it is not error as an expression of opinion for the 702 court to state a particular hypothesis where the jury is left to establish the hypothesis from the evidence. Atlanta Laundries, Inc. v. Goldberg, 71 Ga. App. 130, 30 S.E.2d 349, 1944 Ga. App. LEXIS 296 (1944). Instruction requiring recognition of validity of contract option not opinion as to weight of evidence. — Instruction to the effect that the jury must recognize the validity of an option in a contract as a valid and binding obligation, which was obviously the purpose for introduction of the option in evidence, was not an expression or intimation of an opinion as to the weight of such evidence. Arrington v. Thompson, 211 Ga. 734, 88 S.E.2d 402, 1955 Ga. LEXIS 443 (1955). Instructions concerning verdict in former trial of same action not expression of opinion. — Whether the remarks of the court went further than was necessary to inform the jury that the verdict returned on a former trial should not be considered by them and to eradicate the effects of its introduction, they did not amount to an expression of an opinion as to which of the parties should prevail in the case then in progress; the jury could not have failed to know from the very explicit instructions given them by the court that neither the judge’s ruling in granting a new trial following the former trial, nor any thing connected therewith, carried with it any implication that the judge entertained an opinion as to who should prevail in the trial then in progress. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Peavy, 98 Ga. App. 268, 105 S.E.2d 465, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 565 (1958). Charge in wrongful death action placing fault on defendant reversible error. — In action for wrongful death of a person killed at a place where a railroad sidetrack was crossed by a city street, by reason of being crushed between train which was backing over the crossing and an automobile which was proceeding along the street, charge that “if the engineer saw it, then of course he would be required to stop his train and save the life of the deceased, although the deceased had not signaled him to stop,” was error in that it contained an expression of opinion 9-10-7 by the court, as a matter of law, that under the circumstances the duty was on the engineer to stop the train, whereas under the evidence it was a question of fact whether in this respect the engineer failed to exercise ordinary care by failing to stop the train. Southern Ry. v. Blanton, 59 Ga. App. 252, 200 S.E. 471, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 483 (1938). No expression of opinion made by trial judge. — In a customer’s slip and fall case against a dry cleaner establishment, the trial court did not err by denying the customer’s motion for a new trial and did not improperly express or intimate an opinion as to what had or had not been proved by making an inquiry concerning the relevancy of certain evidence nor by making two comments during the customer’s closing argument that were limited in scope and did not concern the merits of the case and were aimed at preventing misstatements and improper arguments from being made before the jury. Further, the trial judge charged the jury after the close of evidence that anything the court had said or done during the course of the trial was not intended to imply or suggest which of the parties should prevail in the case. Muskett v. Sketchley Cleaners, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 561, 677 S.E.2d 731, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 479 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1422, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 412 (Ga. June 29, 2009). In a medical malpractice case arising out of gastric bypass surgery, a trial judge’s comments regarding a medical study involving blood thinners while the judge ruled on whether the defending doctor could look at the study to refresh the doctor’s memory did not violate O.C.G.A. § 9-10-7 because they did not imply approval of any witness’s testimony. Sellers v. Burrowes, 302 Ga. App. 667, 691 S.E.2d 607, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 211 (2010). Trial court’s use of the phrase “a very simple document” when referring to a will did not express an opinion as to what had been proved or endorse the propounders’ view of the case, but rather was directed to instructing the jury regarding the formalities of a valid will. Ayers v. Cook, 298 Ga. 501, 783 S.E.2d 99, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 158 (2016). 703 9-10-8