Spelsberg v

Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12337 (S.D. Ga. 1981). Rule conferring jurisdiction over nonresident tort-feasors committing tortious acts or omissions outside the state which cause injury within the state exists judicially under paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 and legislatively under paragraph (3) of § 9-10-91. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12337 (S.D. Ga. 1981). Paragraph (3) superfluous in light of adoption of Illinois rule. — Liberal construction of paragraph (2) of this section and adoption of the Illinois rule, which indicates that since a tortious act involves both negligence and damage, if damage occurs within the state then subsection (b) of this section applies, has resulted in a broader exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction than would arguably be permissible under the plain language of paragraph (3) of this section; as a result, the courts have concluded that paragraph (3) is actually superfluous. Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14890 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff’d, 700 F.2d 1339, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 29536 (11th Cir. 1983) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Reason for adoption of Illinois rule. — The Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the Illinois rule, not as a stopgap measure to cover occurrences prior to the adoption of paragraph (3) of this section, but rather as a protective policy for Georgia’s citizens, so that such citizens could seek redress in Georgia courts limited only by the parameters of due process. Atlanta Coliseum, Inc. v. Carling Brewing Co., 411 F. Supp. 253, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15527 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 910-91). Jurisdiction may be obtained under this section even for tortious acts 9-10-91 outside the state if the injury produced by those acts occurred within the state. Grey v. Continental Mktg. Assocs., 315 F. Supp. 826, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11247 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). No jurisdiction existed when collision in North Carolina. — Trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for damages arising from an automobile collision based on lack of personal jurisdiction because the automobile collision in North Carolina giving rise to the litigation did not occur because the defendant owned, used, or possessed real property situated within Georgia and was not related to the defendant’s visit to the campground. Stanton v. Harris, 356 Ga. App. 554, 848 S.E.2d 186, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 489 (2020). Jurisdiction conferred by injury in state caused by conduct outside state. — Where defendant’s conduct in a state other than Georgia leads to an injury and a completed tort in Georgia, paragraph (3) of this section confers jurisdiction. H.K. Corp. v. Lauter, 336 F. Supp. 79, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11237 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Commission of negligent act outside state causing injury within state may constitute commission of tortious act within the state. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12147 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev’d, 694 F.2d 674, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 27928 (11th Cir. 1983). Implicit or explicit showing of contact between nonresident and forum required. — The mere allegation that as a result of an act or omission by a nonresident outside this state an injury has occurred to a Georgia plaintiff, does not establish a “contact” with this forum in the absence of an implicit or explicit showing of activity with or in Georgia by the nonresident. Cocklereece v. Moran, 500 F. Supp. 487, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16149 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Effect of advertising in Georgia newspaper. — The fact that nonresident owners of a lodge in North Carolina had a contract for advertising in a Georgia newspaper did not extend jurisdiction to Georgia over a tort action for personal 809 Tortious Acts Outside State (Cont’d) injuries suffered at the lodge. Allen v. Black, 214 Ga. App. 450, 447 S.E.2d 718, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 910 (1994). Paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 does not modify the extension of paragraph (2) of § 9-10-91 to provide a basis for securing jurisdiction over one who commits an act outside the state which causes injury within the state. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12337 (S.D. Ga. 1981). Where both the tortious act and the resulting injury occurred outside Georgia, paragraphs (2) and (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 are inapplicable. Whitaker v. Krestmark of Ala., Inc., 157 Ga. App. 536, 278 S.E.2d 116, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1899 (1981), overruled, Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat’l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 649 (2005). Paragraph (3) may be applied retroactively. — Paragraph (3) of this section does not change the right against a defendant, and thus may be applied retroactively. Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14056 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Prerequisites for applicability of paragraph (3). — For paragraph (3) of this section to apply as a matter of law, it is necessary that the defendant regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered in Georgia. H.K. Corp. v. Lauter, 336 F. Supp. 79, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11237 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 confers personal jurisdiction over a nonresident tortfeasor who causes injury within the state by an act or omission outside the state if the tortfeasor regularly does or solicits its business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state. Spelsberg v. 9-10-91 Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12337 (S.D. Ga. 1981). Jurisdiction conferred by placing products in stream of commerce of forum. — The forum state does not exceed its powers under the due process clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15640 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Copyright infringement. — By having licensed their song to a distributor, knowing that the distributor distributed or licensed the song nationally, including within the State of Georgia, defendants established sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia so that plaintiff’s copyright infringement action did not violate due process guarantees. Payne v. Kristofferson, 631 F. Supp. 39, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13273 (N.D. Ga. 1985), But see, Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 513, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 833 (1987). Georgia television network’s complaint alleging copyright infringement by New York video monitoring company was subject to dismissal, where the allegations were insufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendant could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court under paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 765, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12425 (N.D. Ga. 1989). Conspiracy between agent and principal. — Where plaintiff judgment creditor filed suit against defendants, a former Florida debtor in possession, its officers, and the debtor’s former Florida bankruptcy law firm, for conspiracy relating to representations that the debtor, under a settlement agreement in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, was to pay funds held in a segregated account to the creditor, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the law firm under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3) because there had been no attempt to distinguish the firm 810 from its client the debtor and an agent could not conspire with its principal. Clough Mktg. Servs. v. Main Line Corp., No. 1:07-CV-0173-RLV, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34425 (N.D. Ga. May 10, 2007). Shipment into this state satisfies the requirement of due process as to minimum contacts. Granite & Quartzite Centre, Inc. v. M/S Virma, 374 F. Supp. 1124, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8880 (S.D. Ga. 1974). Foreign corporation amenable to jurisdiction by placing allegedly defective article into stream of commerce. — If a party introduces an allegedly defective and dangerous article into the stream of commerce which allegedly causes injuries claimed to have been sustained in Georgia as a direct consequence of shipping the material by interstate carrier, then that party has sufficient contacts to be amenable to personal jurisdiction in this state to answer for those injuries. Value Eng’r Co. v. Gisell, 140 Ga. App. 44, 230 S.E.2d 29, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1344 (1976). Irrelevant that purchase was made from independent middleman or shipment not made by defendant. — Where alleged liability arises from the manufacture of products presumably sold in contemplation of use in Georgia, it should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into the state. Jet Am., Inc. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 145 Ga. App. 258, 243 S.E.2d 584, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1942, rev’d, 242 Ga. 307, 248 S.E.2d 676, 1978 Ga. LEXIS 1185 (1978). Foreseeability that product will cause injury in given state is not sufficient reason to hold the seller of the product subject to the jurisdiction of that state. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15640 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Sale of goods in another state, resold in Georgia. — The sale of goods in another state, when the seller knows that they will be resold in Georgia, is a purposeful activity sufficient to establish a “contact” with Georgia. Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 202 Ga. App. 245, 414 S.E.2d 658, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1751 9-10-91 (1991), cert. denied, No. S92C0420, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 188 (Ga. Feb. 10, 1992). Sales by independent contractors not to be considered acts of defendant. — Where the distributors of a product are independent contractors and are not acting on behalf of defendant, none of their sales can be considered acts of the defendant. Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9587 (5th Cir. 1970). Section inapplicable to defendant whose products are brought into state by independent distributors. — Where at no time did defendant manufacture any of the defendant’s aircraft in Georgia, does not do so now, nor does the defendant sell the completed aircraft in Georgia, but rather all aircraft are sold to independent distributors F.O.B. factory in Florida or Pennsylvania, and it is only when these distributors bring the aircraft into Georgia and sell them to Georgia customers that the defendant’s product comes into Georgia, this section does not apply. Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 9587 (5th Cir. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Defendant’s sale of allegedly infringing goods in state conferred jurisdiction. — In action for trademark infringement and unfair competition, where a nonresident defendant sold $19,000.00 of allegedly infringing goods in Georgia through an agent whose orders were only accepted at defendant’s manufacturing plant in another state, paragraph (3) of this section confers jurisdiction, since defendant’s actions constitute the regular solicitation of business and a persistent course of conduct in Georgia, leading to the defendant’s deriving substantial revenue from goods used in Georgia. H.K. Corp. v. Lauter, 336 F. Supp. 79, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11237 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Defamation with “minimum contacts.” — Under paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, Georgia courts have jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in defamation cases when there exists requisite minimum contacts other than commission of tort itself. Bradlee Mgt. Servs., Inc. v. Cassells, 249 Ga. 614, 292 S.E.2d 717, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 887 (1982). Foreign corporation’s activities through in-state subsidiaries. — Alle- 811 Tortious Acts Outside State (Cont’d) gations of tortious interference with a contract and of unfair competition were sufficient to invoke long-arm jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which exercised pervasive and tight control over its instate subsidiaries (accomplished primarily through interlocking directorates, commonality of officers, and necessity of parent review and approval of subsidiary actions), rendering these subsidiaries functionally equivalent to departments or divisions of the parent corporation. CocaCola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 595 F. Supp. 304, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20185 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Mailing of forged disinterment form. — Defendant’s placement of relative’s signature on a disinterment application, even if tortious, occurred in Alabama, and the mere mailing of the form into Georgia did not constitute a single event “in the forum” having its impact within the territory of the forum for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Metzler v. Love, 207 Ga. App. 447, 428 S.E.2d 384, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 217 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C0859, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 427 (Ga. Apr. 15, 1993). Daily phone calls. — Family Violence Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 et seq., gave Georgia courts jurisdiction over a nonresident only if the act with which the nonresident was charged met the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2), (3); further, the conduct giving rise to the offense occurred when the maker of the call spoke into the telephone; a father’s daily calls to Georgia from another state to speak to the father’s daughter or when the father made the calls that allegedly threatened and harassed the mother did not confer jurisdiction in Georgia. Anderson v. Deas, 279 Ga. App. 892, 632 S.E.2d 682, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 655 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1896, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 772 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2006). Intervention and transfer not required. — In decedent’s family members’ wrongful death action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a), personal jurisdiction over defendant under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3) and (4) comported with due process, but under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, 9-10-91 decedent’s estate administrator was not entitled to intervene and transfer was warranted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Hidalgo v. Ohio Sec. Ins. Co., No. 4:10-CV-0183-HLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46002 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2011). Because defendants, a New Hampshire resident and a Pennsylvania corporation, used computers outside of Georgia to access plaintiff Georgia corporation’s computer file, the defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2). LabMD, Inc. v. Tiversa, Inc., 509 Fed. Appx. 842, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2495 (11th Cir. 2013). 4. Real Property Within State Jurisdiction over one who owns, uses, or possesses realty in state. — O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 confers personal jurisdiction over any nonresident as to a cause of action if the nonresident owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within the state. Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 15629 (5th Cir. 1981). O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 requires that the cause of action arise from the ownership, use, or possession of real property situated within the state. Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 15629 (5th Cir. 1981). In an in rem action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of property, the court had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident grantee of the property and service on the nonresident as authorized by O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94 was proper. Forrister v. Manis Lumber Co., 232 Ga. App. 370, 501 S.E.2d 606. Record title holder without agents in Georgia is subject to paragraph (4) of this section. Cox v. Long, 143 Ga. App. 182, 237 S.E.2d 672, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2235 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Paragraph (4) of this section includes entering into transactions in connection with real property in this state. Cox v. Long, 143 Ga. App. 182, 237 S.E.2d 672, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2235 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Forum state has no “manifest interest” with respect to sale of personal property. — Georgia has a manifest interest in providing redress in a contro- 812 versy concerning the sale of real property situated in this state. The forum state does not share such an obvious “manifest interest” with respect to personal property. Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13807 (S.D. Ga. 1981). Under paragraph (4) of this section, jurisdictional requirements are satisfied when substantial connection or nexus exists between the basis of the controversy and the property within this state. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2918 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). This section does not require that ownership, use, or possession exist at time action is commenced; rather, this section merely requires that cause of action arise from the ownership, use, or possession of real property situated within this state. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2918 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Ownership of property. — Where the only connection between the property owned by defendant and the claim asserted by plaintiff is that it was once an asset in an estate for which plaintiff served as executor, such a tenuous connection would not give rise to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident owner of real estate because the claim does not satisfy the requirement that it arise out of the ownership of the property. Murray v. Reese, 210 Ga. App. 352, 436 S.E.2d 79, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1150 (1993). A nonresident debtor’s ownership of closely held corporations that owned Georgia real estate was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 910-91. International Capital Realty Inv. Co. v. West, 234 Ga. App. 725, 507 S.E.2d 545. Buyer failed to make an affirmative showing that the return of service was false because the complaint and summons were served upon the buyer at the buyer’s Oregon address, and that service was proper under the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 et seq., which applied to the buyer as the owner of real property 9-10-91 situated within Georgia; the sworn return of service found in the record, which showed that the buyer was served at the buyer’s Oregon address, constituted a prima facie showing of personal service, and the buyer submitted no evidence refuting the sworn return of service. Haamid v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 299 Ga. App. 828, 683 S.E.2d 891, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 980 (2009). Divestment of interest in property prior to filing action does not defeat jurisdiction. — In personam jurisdiction may be predicated on defendants’ ownership, use, or possession of property even though they are nonresident defendants and no longer own the property in question; the fact that defendants divested themselves of their interest in the property prior to the filing of plaintiff’s complaint will not defeat the exercise of jurisdiction. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2918 (1978). Jurisdiction must be predicated on ties among defendants, forum, and litigation. — Mere fact of title ownership of realty in Georgia will not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, which must be predicated on the existence of ties among the defendants, this state, and the litigation, so that the maintenance of the action does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2918 (1978). Note executed by nonresident land purchasers was sufficient connection for jurisdiction. — In action on a note executed by nonresident purchasers for the purpose of becoming record title owners in improved Georgia realty, since the note was executed by the nonresident purchasers with full knowledge that the note would be used in conjunction with, and as an integral part of, a Georgia real estate transaction, a substantial connection with the state existed so as to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants reasonable. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2918 (1978). Officers of corporation which purchased and operated real estate in state came under section. — Officers of 813 Real Property Within State (Cont’d) a corporation which purchased and operated real estate holdings in Georgia, who were personally within the State of Georgia when they endorsed the original promissory note, which was issued in connection with the real estate operations and expressly provided for future extensions, and where a security agreement pledging the real estate was duly recorded in Cobb County, Georgia, were within easy reach of this section. Trust Co. v. Italiano, 427 F.2d 1147, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8678 (5th Cir. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Jurisdiction conferred by defendant’s exercise of power of sale of its property in state. — Where plaintiffs’ cause of action arose from the nonresident defendant’s exercise of its power of sale of property within the state granted by security deed and the defendant had legal title to the property pursuant to former Code 1933, § 67-1301 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-1460), jurisdiction over the defendant was acquired pursuant to Ga. L. 1970, p. 443, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Porter v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 133 Ga. App. 706, 213 S.E.2d 10, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2247 (1975). Nonresident vendor. — O.C.G.A. § 910-91 confers jurisdiction over nonresident vendor of real property even though the nonresident owns no property in Georgia at time of service. Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 15629 (5th Cir. 1981). Jurisdiction may be affected over nonresident assignee of security deed to Georgia real property. Regante v. Reliable-Triple Cee of N.J., Inc., 251 Ga. 629, 308 S.E.2d 372, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 944 (1983). A devisee’s interest in real property is “ownership” for purposes of the longarm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Moore v. Moore, 255 Ga. 308, 336 S.E.2d 804, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 968 (1985). Lease containing Georgia choice of law clause. — The leasing of real property in Georgia for operation of a retail establishment and execution of a lease agreement that contained a Georgia choice of law clause created the “substantial connection,” between the controversy, 9-10-91 the lessee, and property within the state to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. Goodman v. Vilston, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 718, 399 S.E.2d 241, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1448 (1990), cert. denied, No. S91C0418, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 480 (Ga. Jan. 31, 1991). 5. Proceedings for Alimony, Child Support, Other Domestic Issues Legislative intent. — The legislature intended by enacting paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 to allow children and spouses to seek modification against nonresident defendants in the same manner as if the nonresident were a resident of the state. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 745 (1985). Trial court’s finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over a wife in a divorce case was error and was reversed where the husband and the wife had maintained a marital residence in Georgia for at least five years before the wife returned to Britain, where the wife had availed herself of the privilege of maintaining a matrimonial domicile in Georgia, where the husband continued to maintain his domicile in Georgia and intended to remain in Georgia, and where the husband, an Irish citizen, had obtained permanent resident alien status, had designated himself a year round Georgia resident on state tax returns, and had declared himself to be a non-resident of Britain for tax purposes. Cooke v. Cooke, 277 Ga. 731, 594 S.E.2d 370, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 279 (2004). Continuing jurisdiction. — Since the original decree was entered in Georgia and the ex-husband, who was seeking modification and enforcement, continued to reside in Georgia, under the plain terms of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(6), the exwife was amenable to the jurisdiction of Georgia courts and the Constitution did not forbid the exercise of such jurisdiction. Barker v. Barker, 294 Ga. 572, 757 S.E.2d 42, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 123 (2014). “Dependent” under paragraph (5). — One who is receiving or is supposed to receive alimony is a dependent under paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 745 (1985). 814 Residing in Georgia pursuant to military orders does not prevent a member of the military from electing to become a resident of the state. Kendrick v. Parker, 258 Ga. 210, 367 S.E.2d 544, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 201 (1988). Contempt actions. — O.C.G.A. § 910-91 is Georgia’s domestic relations longarm statute authorizing the courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party who has become a nonresident, and applies to a contempt action seeking enforcement of a Georgia alimony and childsupport judgment. Braden v. Braden, 260 Ga. 269, 392 S.E.2d 710, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 253 (1990). Exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident former husband in action for contempt and modification of Georgia divorce decree was consonant with due process notions of “fair play” and “substantial justice” because: (1) Georgia has a legitimate interest in protecting resident spouses and children; (2) the courts of Georgia remain open to appellant to enforce the appellant’s rights, and the appellant enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of Georgia; (3) the inconvenience to appellant is outweighed by the inconvenience to appellee who would be forced to sue in a foreign forum on a cause of action which arose from their Georgia matrimonial domicile and their Georgia divorce; and (4) the legislature gave the courts of Georgia through paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 the authority to entertain litigation against nonresidents who incur some form of family related obligation while maintaining a matrimonial domicile or while residing within this state. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 745 (1985). Where both parties were residents of Georgia at the time of their 1986 divorce, and the wife subsequently moved to Colorado, but in 1989 filed a motion in Georgia for contempt against the husband who had remained in Georgia, the exercise of jurisdiction over the wife comported with due process notions of fair play and substantial justice. To the extent that Medeiros v. Tarpley, 258 Ga. 372, 369 S.E.2d 482 (1988) and Boyce v. Boyce, 259 Ga. 831, 388 S.E.2d 524 (1990) hold that com- 9-10-91 pliance by a nonresident with a Georgia divorce decree insulates the nonresident from subjection to jurisdiction in Georgia court, they are overruled. Straus v. Straus, 260 Ga. 327, 393 S.E.2d 248, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 283 (1990). Paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 is applicable to contempt action to enforce alimony judgment. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 745 (1985). A modification action for custody and child support is an independent action within the contemplation of paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Lee v. Pace, 252 Ga. 546, 315 S.E.2d 417, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 763 (1984). Motion to decrease alimony. — Where a former wife had filed a divorce action in Georgia after moving out of state, and had twice filed garnishment during the three years that had passed since then, she was subject to the jurisdiction of Georgia courts for the purposes of a motion to decrease alimony. Fralix v. Cordle, 261 Ga. 224, 403 S.E.2d 793, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 219 (1991). No jurisdiction to modify child visitation rights where nonresident custodial parent not served. — Trial court lacked jurisdiction over a resident noncustodial father’s action against a nonresident custodial mother seeking to modify visitation rights and to hold the mother in contempt of the visitation provisions of a Georgia decree, where personal service had not been made on the mother in Georgia. Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507, 350 S.E.2d 437, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 950 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303, 680 S.E.2d 150, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 676 (2009). A nonresident parent alleged to be in contempt of the visitation provisions of a Georgia divorce judgment and who was served outside Georgia may divest the court of its power to enforce its judgment by timely asserting a defense of lack of jurisdiction. Dyer v. Surratt, 266 Ga. 220, 466 S.E.2d 584. Jurisdiction for modification of child custody matters, which include visitation, is in the home state of the child. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, the “domestic-rela- 815 Proceedings for Alimony, Child Support, Other Domestic Issues (Cont’d) tions long arm statute” applies by its own terms only to actions involving alimony, child support, and division of property. Kemp v. Sharp, 261 Ga. 600, 409 S.E.2d 204, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 814 (1991). Trial court was authorized to obtain personal jurisdiction over a child’s parent under Georgia’s long arm statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-90 and 9-10-91(6), because the child’s grandparents petitioned for visitation rights after the parent had moved to Arizona to attend college and reside there upon graduation. Oglesby v. Deal, 311 Ga. App. 622, 716 S.E.2d 749, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 805 (2011). Contempt for denial of visitation rights. — The trial court lacks jurisdiction under paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 910-91 over a nonresident parent on whom personal service was perfected out-ofstate, in a proceeding for contempt for denial of visitation rights. Paul v. Paul, 184 Ga. App. 217, 361 S.E.2d 221, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2229 (1987). Sufficient contacts found. — Fairness dictated that Georgia courts exercise jurisdiction over a wife’s divorce action against her husband, who resided in Saudi Arabia, where Georgia was the only state that had any contact with the parties and their marital relationship. Beasley v. Beasley, 260 Ga. 419, 396 S.E.2d 222, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 297 (1990). Where a husband did not present any evidence demonstrating a lack of personal jurisdiction, there was nothing to refute the wife’s showing that the parties’ only marital domicile in the United States was Georgia and that the husband had come back to Georgia several times in an attempt to reconcile; therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the divorce for lack of personal jurisdiction. Walters v. Walters, 277 Ga. 221, 586 S.E.2d 663, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 796 (2003). Insufficient contacts with state. — Where the only contact between defendant and the state after his marriage in Georgia in March 1970 occurred during the period between March 1970 and August 1971, when Georgia was the marital 9-10-91 domicile of the couple, plus several short visits after his wife moved back to the state, there was no indication that any of the events which led to the dissolution of the marriage occurred in Georgia, and the last domicile of the parties before their separation was Nashville, Tennessee, where they had been living for several years prior to the separation in 1977, there were insufficient contacts with the state for defendant to reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Georgia. Marbury v. Marbury, 256 Ga. 651, 352 S.E.2d 564, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 598 (1987). Where, although the husband maintained a marital residence in Georgia and the separation occurred in Georgia, the divorce decree was actually entered in Arkansas and the husband had not been a Georgia resident for nearly 20 years, his connection with the state was sufficiently attenuated under these facts that due process would be offended by the exercise of jurisdiction over his person to modify the domesticated Arkansas divorce decree. Popple v. Popple, 257 Ga. 98, 355 S.E.2d 657, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 749 (1987). A former husband’s connection with Georgia was sufficiently attenuated that due process would be offended by the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over his person to hold him in contempt of a Georgia divorce judgment, where the parties maintained no marital residence in Georgia since they separated upon moving into the state in 1975, the husband had not been a resident of Georgia for over 15 years, and the wife had not been a resident of Georgia for over four years. Paul v. Paul, 264 Ga. 434, 444 S.E.2d 770, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 471 (1994). Nonresident former husband’s phone call to his children in Georgia and to the court in regard to Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Proceedings were insufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction. Riersgard v. Morton, 267 Ga. 451, 479 S.E.2d 748. Wife’s motion to dismiss issues related to alimony, division of marital property, and attorney fees was wrongly denied as there were not sufficient minimum contacts under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(5). The wife had not lived in Georgia since 2003, she did not own any property in Georgia 816 and had not transacted any business in Georgia since 2003, the last marital domicile was in Virginia, the circumstances giving rise to the dissolution of the marriage occurred in Virginia, and the wife’s only connection with Georgia had been brief visits during which she had no contact with the husband. Ennis v. Ennis, 290 Ga. 890, 725 S.E.2d 311, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 355 (2012). Out of state husband not properly served. — Trial court erred by denying 9-10-91 the husband’s motion for a new trial in a divorce and child support action because the husband was not properly served with the summons and complaint as there was an absence of any evidence that service was made upon a resident of the husband’s dwelling or usual place of abode in California; therefore, the court had to conclude that service was improper. Guerrero v. Guerrero, 296 Ga. 432, 768 S.E.2d 451, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 12 (2015).