Georgia Laws 1972, p

510, entirely superseded the former version of this section, the purpose being to conform the discovery provisions of the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) to the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Georgia Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Boney, 139 Ga. App. 575, 228 S.E.2d 731 (1976). Purpose of discovery. — Purpose of deposition-discovery procedure is not only to ascertain facts, but also to determine what the adverse party contends they are and what purpose they will serve so that the issues may be narrowed, the trial simplified, and time and expense conserved. Setzers Super Stores of Ga., Inc. v. Higgins, 104 Ga. App. 116, 121 S.E.2d 305 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 21, T. 38); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daugherty, 111 Ga. App. 144, 141 S.E.2d 112 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2109). Discovery is specifically designed to fulfill a two-fold purpose: issue formulation and factual revelation. Travis Meat & Seafood Co. v. Ashworth, 127 Ga. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 166 (1972); International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 130 Ga. App. 140, 202 S.E.2d 540 (1973); Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). 9-11-26 Broad purpose of discovery rules is to enable parties to prepare for trial so that each party will know the issues and be fully prepared on the facts. Travis Meat & Seafood Co. v. Ashworth, 127 Ga. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 166 (1972); International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 130 Ga. App. 140, 202 S.E.2d 540 (1973); Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975). Rules of discovery under the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) are designed to narrow and clarify the issues and to remove the potential for secrecy and hiding of material that existed under the previous system; in particular, such rules are designed to provide parties with the opportunity to obtain material knowledge of all relevant facts thereby reducing the element of surprise at trial. Hanna Creative Enters., Inc. v. Alterman Foods, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 376, 274 S.E.2d 761 (1980). Broad construction of use of discovery. — Use of the discovery process has been held to be broadly construed. Travis Meat & Seafood Co. v. Ashworth, 127 Ga. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 166 (1972); International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 130 Ga. App. 140, 202 S.E.2d 540 (1973). Broad use of discovery favors supplying a party with the facts underlying the opponent’s case, without reference to whether the facts sought are admissible at trial. Setzers Super Stores of Ga., Inc. v. Higgins, 104 Ga. App. 116, 121 S.E.2d 305 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, Ch. 21, T. 38). In a hospital lien case, the trial court erred by granting a patient’s motion to compel seeking discovery from a medical center as to the center’s rate-setting agreements with insurers and the center’s revenue and other information because the patient was uninsured and such discovery was not relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowden, 327 Ga. App. 714, 761 S.E.2d 116 (2014). Discovery by driver in default. — Even though the issue of liability was resolved by a driver’s default, the question of damages remained; the driver was entitled to introduce evidence as to damages and the driver had the right to engage in 426 discovery. Russaw v. Burden, 272 Ga. App. 632, 612 S.E.2d 913 (2005). Failure to initiate discovery. — Trial court did not err in dismissing the shareholder’s derivative action filed by the shareholder as it was within the trial court’s discretion to dismiss the action once the shareholder failed to initiate discovery to determine whether the report filed by the special litigation committee that responded to the shareholder’s claims of corporate improprieties and which concluded that the shareholder’s claims were meritless was made in good faith and properly concluded that pursuing a lawsuit against the corporation was not in the corporation’s best interests. Thompson v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 275 Ga. App. 680, 621 S.E.2d 796 (2005). Denial of motion to compel proper. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by denying a motion to compel discovery before ruling on an investor’s motion for summary judgment because, although no express order was entered by the trial court denying the motion to compel discovery, it was not presumed that the trial court failed to consider the motion to compel before ruling on summary judgment, but rather, it was presumed that the trial court implicitly denied the motions to compel upon entering summary judgment; assuming the trial court properly exercised the court’s discretion to delay the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and extend the time allowing a financial advisor to take depositions, there is no evidence that the advisor made any effort to schedule the depositions before the trial court rescheduled the hearing. Tyler v. Thompson, 308 Ga. App. 221, 707 S.E.2d 137 (2011). Denial of motion to reopen discovery. — There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of a client’s motion to reopen discovery given the length of time the case had been pending and the client’s failure to specify the evidence the client hoped to obtain during discovery; the client did not detail any discovery the client needed to obtain. Quarterman v. Cullum, 311 Ga. App. 800, 717 S.E.2d 267 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0297, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 179 (Ga. 2012); cert. dismissed, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 388, 184 L. Ed. 2d 10 (2012). 9-11-26 There is no territorial limitation in the discovery statutes as to location of witnesses, documents, assets, etc. Thrift v. Vi-Vin Prods., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 717, 215 S.E.2d 709 (1975). Nonresident who files a lawsuit in Georgia may, in the court’s discretion, be compelled to give a deposition in Georgia. Warehouse Home Furn. Distrib., Inc. v. Davenport, 261 Ga. 853, 413 S.E.2d 195 (1992). Wide latitude is given to make complete discovery possible. Travis Meat & Seafood Co. v. Ashworth, 127 Ga. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 166 (1972). Powers of trial court as to depositions. — Trial court has the power under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 to control the details of time, place, scope, and financing of a deposition for the protection of the deponents and parties. Bicknell v. CBT Factors Corp., 171 Ga. App. 897, 321 S.E.2d 383 (1984). Attorney fees imposed. — Award of sanctions in the form of attorney fees against a heating system installer that failed to produce an officer for deposition, despite a court order, was proper under §§ 9-11-37(b)(2), as the sanctions were proper despite the fact that there was no order under § 9-11-37(a) or O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(c), the failure to appear was not substantially justified, and the amount awarded was not excessive. Carrier Corp. v. Rollins, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 630, 730 S.E.2d 103 (2012). Discretion of trial judge not interfered with. — Policy of the appellate courts of this state is not to interfere with trial judge’s broad discretion granted under the discovery provisions of this section. Vaughn & Co. v. Saul, 143 Ga. App. 74, 237 S.E.2d 622 (1977). Absent clear abuse. — Supreme Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision on discovery matters absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ambassador College v. Goetzke, 244 Ga. 322, 260 S.E.2d 27 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1029, 62 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1980). Availability of discovery in contempt case. — Discovery is available to the parties litigant in a contempt of court case. Hill v. Bartlett, 124 Ga. App. 56, 183 S.E.2d 80 (1971), overruled on other 427 General Consideration (Cont’d) grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985). Workers’ compensation claims. — Statute is not applicable to workers’ compensation claims unless made so by the statute pertaining specifically to workers’ compensation claims. National Biscuit Co. v. Martin, 225 Ga. 198, 167 S.E.2d 140 (1969). But see § 34-9-102(d)(1), now providing that discovery procedures in hearings of such claims be governed by this chapter. Surprise witness. — When testimony of purported ‘‘surprise’’ witness not named in discovery process was merely cumulative of other testimony adduced at trial, any error in allowing the witness to testify was harmless. Glennville Hatchery, Inc. v. Thompson, 164 Ga. App. 819, 298 S.E.2d 512 (1982). Privilege against self-incrimination. — When a party asserts the privilege against self-incrimination concerning matters sought to be discovered, the party must respond to each question asked, asserting the privilege to those questions the party deems necessary. Axson v. National Sur. Corp., 254 Ga. 248, 327 S.E.2d 732 (1985). Defendant was properly held in civil contempt for violating a consent interlocutory injunction by failing to answer questions under oath in discovery proceedings because the defendant could not, by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, prevent enforcement of the very order to which the defendant consented. In re Purohit, 213 Ga. App. 182, 444 S.E.2d 133 (1994). Production of tape of sexual assault in civil suit was not criminalized. — In a civil premises liability action arising from a sexual assault on a minor, in which a manager sought production of a videotape of the assault made by the assailants, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100(b)(5) did not criminalize the act of producing the tape in response to a court order or a request for discovery, and the trial court erred in holding otherwise. Alexander Props. Group, Inc. v. Doe, 280 Ga. 306, 626 S.E.2d 497 (2006). Waiver of work product protection. — Record supported the trial court’s judg- 9-11-26 ment that a corporation waived work product protection when the corporation shared documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the SEC’s investigation of allegations involving securities fraud, and the trial court did not err when the court granted a motion to compel discovery which was filed by parties who owned shares in the corporation, even though the corporation and the SEC had signed a confidentiality agreement. McKesson Corp. v. Green, 266 Ga. App. 157, 597 S.E.2d 447 (2004). Majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that the burden of proving a waiver of work-product protection lies on the party asserting the waiver; however, in an action by shareholders based on stock losses following corporate acquisition of another company, the trial court neither explicitly or implicitly placed the burden of showing non-waiver of the work-product protection on a buyer. McKesson Corp. v. Green, 279 Ga. 95, 610 S.E.2d 54 (2005). Personnel records not privileged. — Asserted need to protect the privacy of the internally generated personnel records and evaluations of allegedly negligent employees is not sufficient to render the material privileged from discovery as a matter of law. DeLoitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376, 370 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 370 S.E.2d 194 (1988). Claims file of liability insurer. — Order requiring a liability insurer to produce the insurer’s entire claims file was proper when privileged information was specifically excluded and the insurer did not contest the relevancy of the material. International Indem. Co. v. Saia Motor Freight Line, 223 Ga. App. 544, 478 S.E.2d 776 (1996). Out-of-state order prohibiting unprivileged testimony. — Michigan order, by facially prohibiting former corporate litigation consultant from testifying as to matters outside the scope of any privilege, violated Georgia public policy; therefore, the full faith and credit clause did not require the federal district court in Georgia to give full effect to the Michigan Court order. Williams v. GMC, 147 F.R.D. 270 (S.D. Ga. 1993). 428 Out-of-state confidential settlement statement. — Trial court erred in concluding that a confidential settlement agreement, even if incorporated as another court’s final order, can operate to preclude discovery by Georgia litigants of the parties to that confidential settlement agreement. Barger v. Garden Way, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 723, 499 S.E.2d 737 (1998). Parties not obliged to confer about discovery plan. — Motorist’s suit was properly dismissed under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(d), as the motorist failed to attend any of three scheduled depositions that were properly noticed under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-30(b)(1), defense counsel was not required to address the motorist’s proposed discovery plan, and counsel’s failure to do so did not excuse the motorist’s failure to attend the depositions. Pascal v. Prescod, 296 Ga. App. 359, 674 S.E.2d 623 (2009). Cited in Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Serv., Inc., 118 Ga. App. 498, 164 S.E.2d 246 (1968); Neal v. Smith, 226 Ga. 96, 172 S.E.2d 684 (1970); Herring v. R.L. Mathis Cert. Dairy Co., 121 Ga. App. 373, 173 S.E.2d 716 (1970); Royal Globe Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 123 Ga. App. 268, 180 S.E.2d 576 (1971); Johnson v. O’Donnell, 123 Ga. App. 375, 181 S.E.2d 291 (1971); Ward v. Smith, 228 Ga. 137, 184 S.E.2d 592 (1971); Terminal Transp. Co. v. Burger Chef Sys., 127 Ga. App. 535, 194 S.E.2d 333 (1972); Household Fin. Corp. v. Ensley, 127 Ga. App. 876, 195 S.E.2d 236 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Hanley, 128 Ga. App. 311, 196 S.E.2d 454 (1973); Rary v. Guess, 129 Ga. App. 102, 198 S.E.2d 879 (1973); Retail Credit Co. v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 524, 203 S.E.2d 760 (1974); Smith v. Bass, 131 Ga. App. 557, 206 S.E.2d 541 (1974); Thomas v. Home Credit Co., 133 Ga. App. 602, 211 S.E.2d 626 (1974); Reams v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Exmrs., 233 Ga. 742, 213 S.E.2d 640 (1975); Taylor v. Stapp, 134 Ga. App. 468, 215 S.E.2d 23 (1975); Kamensky v. Stacey, 134 Ga. App. 530, 215 S.E.2d 294 (1975); Marchman v. Head, 135 Ga. App. 475, 218 S.E.2d 151 (1975); Bell v. Fine Prods. Co., 139 Ga. App. 878, 229 S.E.2d 808 (1976); Dyna-Comp Corp. v. Selig Enters., Inc., 143 Ga. App. 462, 238 S.E.2d 571 (1977); 9-11-26 Kimble v. Kimble, 240 Ga. 100, 239 S.E.2d 676 (1977); Schneider v. Spivey, 240 Ga. 468, 241 S.E.2d 224 (1978); Woods v. Andersen, 145 Ga. App. 492, 243 S.E.2d 748 (1978); Harris v. Harris, 242 Ga. 576, 250 S.E.2d 407 (1978); Karp v. Friedman, Alpren & Green, 148 Ga. App. 204, 250 S.E.2d 819 (1978); Mayer v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 243 Ga. 436, 254 S.E.2d 825 (1979); Thornton v. Burson, 151 Ga. App. 456, 260 S.E.2d 388 (1979); Wetherington v. Koepenick & Horne, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 302, 265 S.E.2d 107 (1980); Massengale v. Georgia Power Co., 153 Ga. App. 476, 265 S.E.2d 830 (1980); Wilson v. State, 246 Ga. 62, 268 S.E.2d 895 (1980); Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386 (1981); Everson v. Franklin Disct. Co., 248 Ga. 811, 285 S.E.2d 530 (1982); Sherrill v. Martin, 161 Ga. App. 558, 288 S.E.2d 648 (1982); Warmack v. Mini-Skools, Ltd., 164 Ga. App. 737, 297 S.E.2d 365 (1982); Morgan v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 165 Ga. App. 254, 299 S.E.2d 750 (1983); Porter v. Eastern Air Lines, 165 Ga. App. 152, 300 S.E.2d 525 (1983); Portman v. Karsman, 166 Ga. App. 398, 304 S.E.2d 399 (1983); Osborne v. Bank of Delight, 173 Ga. App. 322, 326 S.E.2d 523 (1985); Anderberg v. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 175 Ga. App. 14, 332 S.E.2d 326 (1985); Hankinson v. Rackley, 177 Ga. App. 734, 341 S.E.2d 231 (1986); Howell v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 185 Ga. App. 154, 363 S.E.2d 560 (1987); Mag Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gatewood, 186 Ga. App. 169, 367 S.E.2d 63 (1988); Opatut v. Guest Pond Club, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 478, 373 S.E.2d 372 (1988); Haugabrook v. Waco Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. App. 815, 380 S.E.2d 347 (1989); Lightwerk Studios, Inc. v. Door Units of Ga., Inc., 191 Ga. App. 756, 382 S.E.2d 699 (1989); Singleton v. Eastern Carriers, Inc., 192 Ga. App. 227, 384 S.E.2d 202 (1989); Black v. Georgia DOT, 262 Ga. 342, 417 S.E.2d 655 (1992); Austin v. Kaufman, 203 Ga. App. 704, 417 S.E.2d 660 (1992); Jones v. Abel, 209 Ga. App. 889, 434 S.E.2d 822 (1993); Gilbert v. Montlick & Assocs., P.C., 248 Ga. App. 535, 546 S.E.2d 895 (2001); Thakkar v. St. Ives Country Club, 250 Ga. App. 893, 553 S.E.2d 181 (2001); Henry v. Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, L.L.P., 254 Ga. App. 817, 429 General Consideration (Cont’d) 563 S.E.2d 899 (2002); Ford Motor Co. v. Lawrence, 279 Ga. 284, 612 S.E.2d 301 (2005); Nanan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 286 Ga. App. 539, 650 S.E.2d 283 (2007); Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (2007); Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Miller & Billips, 293 Ga. App. 601, 667 S.E.2d 455 (2008); In the Interest of B.H., 295 Ga. App. 297, 671 S.E.2d 303 (2008); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Ambati, 299 Ga. App. 804, 685 S.E.2d 719 (2009); Patel v. Columbia Nat’l Ins. Co., 315 Ga. App. 877, 729 S.E.2d 35 (2012); St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 746 S.E.2d 98 (2013). Scope of Discovery Discovery is available under the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) to any party, in any court, regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. Morton v. Gardner, 242 Ga. 852, 252 S.E.2d 413 (1979). Discovery may be had from the opposite party in any case, legal or equitable, pending in any court; this is even more true today since the adoption of the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9). Morton v. Gardner, 242 Ga. 852, 252 S.E.2d 413 (1979). Liberal allowance of discovery. — Rule that discovery is not limited to matters that are admissible in evidence at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is to be given a liberal construction in favor of supplying a party with the facts underlying the opponent’s case, without reference to whether the facts sought are admissible upon trial of the action. Bridges v. 20th Century Travel, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 837, 256 S.E.2d 102 (1979). Discovery procedure is to be given a liberal construction in favor of supplying a party with the facts without reference to whether the facts sought are admissible upon the trial of the action. Bullard v. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287, 279 S.E.2d 737 (1981). 9-11-26 It is not ground for objection that information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Bullard v. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287, 279 S.E.2d 737 (1981). Matters sought to be discovered need not be incapable of proof otherwise in order to maintain a bill of discovery. Farmers Bank v. Harrison, 182 Ga. 623, 186 S.E. 687 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1101). Certain matters not discoverable. — Bill for discovery will not lie to determine matters not necessary, material, or relevant to the issue, or when it would seriously injure the party’s business and the chance of benefit to the other party is small. Farmers Bank v. Harrison, 182 Ga. 623, 186 S.E. 687 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1101). Overly broad requests not allowed. — Grant of requests for ‘‘all correspondence between the Internal Revenue Service and the defendant concerning the defendant’s recent audit, and a copy of the IRS’s audit result and/or report,’’ and a ‘‘copy of the defendant’s most current balance sheet with supporting schedules, ledgers, etc.,’’ was an abuse of discretion. Southern Outdoor Promotions, Inc. v. National Banner Co., 215 Ga. App. 133, 449 S.E.2d 684 (1994). Request for production of ‘‘all other documents’’ intended for use at trial. — Production of ‘‘all other documents’’ intended for use at trial is outside the scope of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34(a), delineated under paragraph (b)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 as ‘‘any matter . . . which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,’’ without regard to whether or not that ‘‘matter’’ will be used as evidence at the trial of the action. E.H. Siler Realty & Bus. Broker, Inc. v. Sanderlin, 158 Ga. App. 796, 282 S.E.2d 381 (1981). Scope of discovery under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-33 (interrogatories) is as broad as the scope of examination under subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26. Armstrong v. Strand, 167 Ga. App. 723, 307 S.E.2d 528 (1983). When information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to dis- 430 covery of admissible evidence, and does not fall within any of the guidelines for entry of protective orders, it is not error to compel its discovery and to grant sanction for noncompliance therewith, even if such evidence might be inadmissible at trial. Ambassador College v. Goetzke, 244 Ga. 322, 260 S.E.2d 27 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1029, 62 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1980). Any question calling for an answer may be asked any deponent regardless of the question being hearsay, immaterial, incompetent, or irrelevant, so long as the question is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Travis Meat & Seafood Co. v. Ashworth, 127 Ga. App. 284, 193 S.E.2d 166 (1972). Inquiring into the content of relevant documents is within the scope of discovery. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Discoverability of statements or reports obtained in regular course of business. — Discovery of statements or reports of objective facts obtained by a party during the course of an investigation conducted as a regular practice or as a normal part of the party’s business should be allowed. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daugherty, 111 Ga. App. 144, 141 S.E.2d 112 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2109). Spouse’s records. — There was some evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the wife’s records were relevant to the subject matter of the husband’s litigation or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In re Callaway, 212 Ga. App. 500, 442 S.E.2d 309 (1994). Attorney’s records. — Document an attorney creates is owned by the client and should be produced upon the client’s request unless the attorney can cite ‘‘good cause’’ that would justify the attorney’s refusal to turn over the document to the client, such as when the disclosure would violate an attorney’s duty to a third party, when the document assesses the client personally, or when the document includes tentative preliminary impressions 9-11-26 of the legal or factual issues presented in the representation recorded primarily for the purpose of giving internal direction to facilitate performance of legal services entailed in that representation. Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 276 Ga. 571, 581 S.E.2d 37 (2003). Names and addresses of clinic patients were discoverable in an action by a clinic against a rival alleging a scheme by the latter to divert current and potential patients. Gazelah v. Rome Gen. Practice, Inc., 232 Ga. App. 343, 502 S.E.2d 251 (1998). Identity of witnesses not generally privileged. — Identity of witnesses or probable witnesses in a case is not, with certain exceptions, considered privileged, even in the hands of an attorney, and particularly when the facts were obtained by someone other than the attorney. Jaynes v. Blake, 119 Ga. App. 748, 168 S.E.2d 832 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2101). Names and addresses of witnesses must be furnished. — Party must furnish information as to names and addresses of witnesses known to the party or to the party’s attorney; this information is not a part of the work product. Jaynes v. Blake, 119 Ga. App. 748, 168 S.E.2d 832 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2101). Designation of proposed witnesses not necessary. — While names of all witnesses as to matter to which interrogatory is addressed must be given, there is no requirement that the names of those who are to be called and sworn as witnesses be singled out; in answering it is simply required that the names, addresses, etc., of all having knowledge of any specific matters to which the interrogatory may be directed, be given, without designating which of them will be sworn as witnesses. Nathan v. Duncan, 113 Ga. App. 630, 149 S.E.2d 383 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108). While plaintiff is entitled to names and addresses of defendant’s witnesses who have knowledge of relevant facts, the defendant is not required to state the specific names of those persons whom the defendant proposes to call as witnesses. Grant v. Huff, 122 Ga. App. 431 Scope of Discovery (Cont’d) 783, 178 S.E.2d 734 (1970). Plaintiff was not entitled to discover information concerning defendant’s personal financial resources absent an evidentiary showing (by affidavit, discovery responses, or otherwise) that a factual basis existed for the plaintiff ’s punitive damage claim. Holman v. Burgess, 199 Ga. App. 61, 404 S.E.2d 144, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 404 S.E.2d 144 (1991). Income tax returns are not privileged and are subject to discovery. Bailey v. Bruce, 132 Ga. App. 782, 209 S.E.2d 135 (1974). Income tax returns require more than de minimis showing of relevancy. — While income tax returns are not privileged, more than a de minimis showing of relevancy is required for discovery thereof. Borenstein v. Blumenfield, 151 Ga. App. 420, 260 S.E.2d 377 (1979). Although income tax returns are not privileged, the returns are not automatically discoverable upon a de minimis showing of relevancy. Snellings v. Sheppard, 229 Ga. App. 753, 494 S.E.2d 583 (1998). Communications between psychiatrist and patient are privileged. Boggess v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 190, 196 S.E.2d 172 (1973). Trial court erred in requiring a passenger to produce any confidential communications made between the passenger and the passenger’s mental-health-care providers because the passenger’s handling of discovery, albeit troublesome, did not amount to a decisive and unequivocal waiver of the passenger’s mental-health privilege as the law required; the passenger’s arguably misleading responses to opposing counsel’s questions regarding a previous diagnosis of depression did not amount to a ‘‘decisive’’ and ‘‘unequivocal’’ waiver of the mental-health privilege, and the passenger’s decision to answer the deposition question posed to the passenger (whether the passenger suffered from a history of depression), rather than object to the question at the time the issue of depression was raised, did not constitute an explicit waiver of the privilege. Mincey 9-11-26 v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 308 Ga. App. 740, 708 S.E.2d 644 (2011). Names and addresses of similar patients. — Plaintiff ’s interrogatories seeking the names and addresses of patients upon whom the defendants had performed the same surgical procedure were not limited to those surgeries which had presented problems of any kind and the trial court, therefore, properly granted the defendants’ motion for an order protecting them. Reece v. Selmonosky, 179 Ga. App. 718, 347 S.E.2d 649 (1986). Deletion of privileged matter from document. — When any document sought to be produced contains a mixture of privileged and nonprivileged communication or information, ample remedy is provided to delete privileged matter, and this also would be within the inherent power of the court. Cranford v. Cranford, 120 Ga. App. 470, 170 S.E.2d 844 (1969). O.C.G.A. § 45-9-1(c) does not prohibit discovery by tort plaintiff of liability insurance policies purchased by a government agency for the agency’s employees. Pate v. Caballero, 253 Ga. 787, 325 S.E.2d 375 (1985). Disclosure of insurance contract in negligence case grounds for mistrial. — In an ordinary negligence case, not only is a liability insurance policy of a litigant not admissible in evidence, but disclosure to the jury of the mere existence of such contract is ground for mistrial. City Council v. Lee, 153 Ga. App. 94, 264 S.E.2d 683 (1980). Unless relevant for some acceptable reason. — While evidence of liability insurance for the benefit of one charged with negligence is usually refused on the rationale that it is irrelevant and prejudicial because it suggests to the jury that the wealth of the insurer is available to assuage the tort, nevertheless, when the existence of insurance becomes relevant for some other reason, evidence thereof should be admitted. Sasser v. Lester, 153 Ga. App. 220, 264 S.E.2d 728 (1980). Objection to interrogations regarding defendant’s ability to pay potential judgment properly sustained. — Interrogatories seeking information pertaining to gross pay, income, ownership of 432 property, limits of liability insurance policy, and financial ability of the defendant to pay a possible judgment against the defendant did not appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and sustaining of the defendant’s objections thereto was not error. Grant v. Huff, 122 Ga. App. 783, 178 S.E.2d 734 (1970). Inquiry whether foreign judgment paid or released. — Inquiry as to whether or not the plaintiff ’s judgment against the defendant had been paid, in part or in whole, or if one of the tort-feasors had been released, or if one of the defendants had concluded an agreement to pay the judgment in whole or in part was relevant to an action for execution of a foreign judgment attempted to be domesticated in Georgia. Armstrong v. Strand, 167 Ga. App. 723, 307 S.E.2d 528 (1983). Loan documents. — Trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ discovery request that sought the discovery of documents pertaining to a development loan in a lawsuit involving a dispute between joint venturers as the trial court should have applied the proper standard of relevancy set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26, as opposed to ruling that the plaintiffs simply had enough documents. Hampton Island Founders v. Liberty Capital, 283 Ga. 289, 658 S.E.2d 619 (2008). Confidential sources in defamation cases. — Trial court is obligated under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 to balance a defamation plaintiff ’s need for identities of confidential informants against the defendant newspaper’s interest in protecting the privacy of the confidential informants and the freedom of the press in general. The trial court must require the plaintiff to specifically identify each and every purported statement asserted as libelous, determine whether the plaintiff can prove the statements were untrue, taking into account all the other available evidentiary sources, including the plaintiff ’s own admissions, and determine whether the statements can be proven false through the use of other evidence, thus eliminating the plaintiff ’s necessity for the requested discovery. If a plaintiff cannot succeed on a specific allegation of libel as a 9-11-26 matter of law, or if the plaintiff is able to prove a specific allegation through the use of available alternative means, then the trial court’s balancing test should favor non-disclosure of confidential sources; however, if a specific allegation of libel is determined to be legally viable, or if it cannot be determined whether the allegation is legally viable given the current state of the record, and if the identity of the sources is either relevant and material in and of itself, or is the only available avenue to other admissible evidence, then the trial court’s balancing test should favor disclosure of the confidential sources. Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 251 Ga. App. 808, 555 S.E.2d 175 (2001). Workers’ compensation cases. — There was no error in denying a workers’ compensation claimant’s motion to compel production of certain documents and correspondence from an employer’s claims adjuster because the employer met the employer’s burden of showing that the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation and thus were not discoverable; the claimant failed to establish the claimant’s substantial need for the material. S&B Eng’rs & Constructors Ltd. v. Bolden, 304 Ga. App. 534, 697 S.E.2d 260, cert. dismissed, No. S10C1789, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 912 (Ga. 2010). Party seeking to examine jury regarding disqualifying ties must be permitted to pose questions before verdict. — Party seeking to examine the jury regarding disqualifying ties to insurance companies must be permitted to pose the questions before the verdict, and an error in that regard cannot be cured or deemed harmless after the verdict. Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, 757 S.E.2d 20 (2014). Trial court did not abuse discretion in granting extraordinary motion for new trial based on misleading discovery responses. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ extraordinary motion for new trial based on an auto company’s misleading discovery responses with regard to liability insurance because the plaintiffs acted with due diligence to raise the plaintiffs’ claim that the jury should have been qualified as to the auto compa- 433 Scope of Discovery (Cont’d) ny’s insurers and the failure to do so raised an unrebutted presumption that the plaintiffs were materially harmed. Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, 757 S.E.2d 20 (2014). Trial Preparation Materials Scope of work product exception. — Statute extends work product exception to parties and their representatives, such as attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, or agents. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Anticipation of litigation. — Material obtained or collected by a party is protected from discovery as work product even ‘‘before claim is instituted’’ if ‘‘reasonable grounds exist to believe that litigation is probable.’’ Department of Transp. v. Hardaway Co., 216 Ga. App. 262, 454 S.E.2d 167 (1995). Attorney-client privilege to be narrowly construed. — In determining whether statements are to have protection under the attorney-client privilege, such privilege should be confined to its narrowest permissible limits under the statute of its creation, for it is only in that way that discovery provisions can be afforded the liberal construction and interpretation that will enable them to accomplish the purpose for which they were intended. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daugherty, 111 Ga. App. 144, 141 S.E.2d 112 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2109). As with the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine is not absolute, and attorneys cannot cloak themselves in its mantle when their mental impressions and opinions are directly at issue. Accordingly, the doctrine should not apply when a client, as opposed to some other party, seeks to discover an attorney’s mental impressions because it cannot shield a lawyer’s papers from discovery in a conflict of interest context anymore than can the attorney-client privilege. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. St. Simons 9-11-26 Waterfront, LLC, 317 Ga. App. 1, 730 S.E.2d 608 (2012). Discovery of an attorney’s work product will generally be withheld. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daugherty, 111 Ga. App. 144, 141 S.E.2d 112 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2109). No basis for refusal to appear for deposition. — Work product privilege contained in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 pertains to ‘‘documents and tangible things’’ and provides no basis for a party, even a party exercising self-representation, to refuse to appear for a deposition. Jarallah v. Pickett Suite Hotel, 193 Ga. App. 325, 388 S.E.2d 333 (1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 936, 110 S. Ct. 2183, 109 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1990). Purpose of doctrine of ‘‘work product’’ is to protect attorney’s preparation for trial from discovery. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daugherty, 111 Ga. App. 144, 141 S.E.2d 112 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2109). Real purpose of the work product exception to the general broad scope of discovery is protection of the mental impressions, conclusions, and theories of persons engaged in preparing litigation. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Requirements necessary to constitute work product. — In order to escape discovery under paragraph (b)(3) of this section, documents and tangible things must have been prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or by or for that party’s representative and the materials must contain the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the person preparing them; if the items sought do not satisfy both requirements, they do not constitute work products, and may be freely discovered. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Work product exception cannot be proved by a general objection that interrogatories seek information concern- 434 ing efforts to prepare for trial. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Transcript of misdemeanor trial not work product. — Even though an accurate transcript of the testimony adduced at a misdemeanor trial may be available only because of the foresightedness of plaintiff ’s counsel, who hired the reporter with future civil litigation in mind or for other reasons, including an appeal in the event of conviction, it is nonetheless merely a record of the proceedings of a public trial, which is sought from the reporter, not the attorney, and is not privileged as the attorney’s work product. Robinson v. J.C. Penney Co., 124 Ga. App. 221, 183 S.E.2d 782 (1971). Audit documents provided to SEC. — In an action in which the shareholders sued because of stock losses following corporate acquisition of another company, the trial court neither explicitly or implicitly placed the burden of showing non-waiver of the work-product protection on a buyer; the buyer waived work-product protection when the buyer provided certain audit documents to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) because the buyer and the SEC were actual or potential adversaries when the documents were disclosed, and a confidentiality agreement did not ensure that the audit documents would remain confidential since it allowed the SEC to give the documents to others if it deemed that course of action to be in furtherance of its duties and responsibilities. McKesson Corp. v. Green, 279 Ga. 95, 610 S.E.2d 54 (2005). Company’s revenues and profits relevant. — Trial court erred in denying a partner’s motion to compel the discovery of the financial records of a company a copartner formed because the revenues and profits of the company could very well have some relevance to the proper measure of damages; the trial court erred in concluding that the revenues and profits that the company earned from business opportunities lost by the partnership could not possibly be probative of the damages that the partner could be enti- 9-11-26 tled to recover and that the partner could not have any discovery of the finances of the company because some reasonable person could say that the revenues and profits the company earned from the same business opportunities could be a fair approximation of the revenues that the partnership would have earned from the opportunities and were, therefore, probative of the lost revenue and profit of the partnership. McMillian v. McMillian, 310 Ga. App. 735, 713 S.E.2d 920 (2011). Investigations made and statements taken under attorney’s supervision. — Once the attorney-client relationship obtains as to a particular matter, an attorney may have investigations made or statements taken under the attorney’s direct instruction and supervision, and these may be deemed a part of what the attorney has done, and thus a part of the attorney’s work product. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daugherty, 111 Ga. App. 144, 141 S.E.2d 112 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2109). Investigator’s report to attorney. — Report of an investigator hired by the husband’s attorney subsequent to the filing of an action for divorce and alimony by the wife, made directly to the attorney, is attorney’s work product, and absent a showing of necessity and justification by wife, her discovery thereof must fail. Smith v. Smith, 223 Ga. 551, 156 S.E.2d 916 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2109). Statement taken by insurer. — Statement of a party or other witness to an accident, if taken by an insurer in anticipation of a claim being filed against its insured, is considered a work product, even if taken before litigation is filed. Copher v. Mackey, 220 Ga. App. 43, 467 S.E.2d 362 (1996). Not all statements taken by attorneys are work product. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Mere fact that statement is taken with an eye toward litigation does not automatically insulate the statement from discovery as work product. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. 435 Trial Preparation Materials (Cont’d) App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Attorney-client privilege does not cover the identity of documents a party reviews to prepare for a deposition. McKinnon v. Smock, 264 Ga. 375, 445 S.E.2d 526 (1994). Disclosure of document to testifying expert. — When a document is prepared in anticipation of litigation by a party’s counsel and then disclosed to that party’s testifying expert, the disclosure does not waive the work product protection that should be accorded the document and the document may only be discovered upon the showing of substantial need and of undue hardship to obtain the materials by other means. McKinnon v. Smock, 209 Ga. App. 647, 434 S.E.2d 92 (1993). Witness statements. — In order for the statement of a witness to be exempt from the general scope of discovery, the statement must have been orally given to a party or the party’s representative, who records the statement in anticipation of litigation or trial. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Written statement of witness own impressions and observations. — Written statement of a witness, whether prepared by the witness and later delivered to the party or the party’s representative, or drafted by the party or the party’s representative and adopted by the witness, is not properly considered the work product of a party or the party’s representative as the statement records the mental impressions and observations of the witness personally and not those of the party or the party’s representative. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Recordation of witness statement as part of work product. — Recordation made by a party or the party’s represen- 9-11-26 tative of the oral statement of a witness is normally a part of the work product for it will include the party’s analysis and impression of what the witness has told the party. Clarkson Indus., Inc. v. Price, 135 Ga. App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Tobacco Rd., Inc. v. Callaghan, 174 Ga. App. 539, 330 S.E.2d 768 (1985). Since federal law under which an action was brought protected the plaintiff ’s access to co-employees for information relating to it, an attorney did not violate Standard 47 of the state bar rules by obtaining the recorded statements of co-employees; the statements were protected from discovery by paragraph (b)(3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26. Norfolk S.