SLW Partners, LP v

State Bank & Trust Co. (In re SLW Partners, LP), No. 11-5291, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5065 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2012). Application Juvenile court had no authority to impose attorney fees. — Juvenile court properly concluded that the court had no authority to impose attorney fees under the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1 et seq., because the juvenile court had not adopted O.C.G.A § 9-15-14, and there was no implicit attorney fee award for frivolous litigation in the former Juvenile Court Code; the Civil Practice Act does not apply to juvenile courts. In re T.M.M.L., 313 Ga. App. 638, 722 S.E.2d 386 (2012). Attorney’s fees denied. — Taxpayer’s request for attorney’s fees was denied since there was no evidence that the County Board of Tax Assessors lacked substantial justification in asserting the Board’s interpretation of the statute. 9-15-14 Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Boyajian, 271 Ga. 881, 525 S.E.2d 687 (2000). Court did not abuse the court’s discretion in denying either the husband’s request for attorney’s fees incurred by him in defending a child custody modification action or the wife’s similar request for attorney’s fees incurred by her as a result of the parties’ inability to reach a settlement since the court granted essential relief requested by the wife in her complaint and granted the husband relief to which the wife had not agreed. Glaza v. Morgan, 248 Ga. App. 623, 548 S.E.2d 389 (2001). Trial court did not err in denying the wife’s motion for attorney’s fees regarding the owner’s damages action against the wife’s husband; while the owner failed to appear for trial after the wife and the husband were forced to expend time and resources preparing a defense to the lawsuit, the wife failed to establish that the owner’s claim lacked any justiciable issue of law or fact. Bellah v. Peterson, 259 Ga. App. 182, 576 S.E.2d 585 (2003). Defendants sought an award of attorneys’ fees after summary judgment was granted to the defendants on the breach of contract claims and promissory estoppel claims, and the jury found in defendants’ favor as to the fraud claim, but the court properly denied an award of attorneys’ fees because the plaintiffs’ claim had some factual merit or presented a justiciable issue of law. Rental Equip. Group, LLC v. Maci, LLC, 263 Ga. App. 155, 587 S.E.2d 364 (2003). Because the main case was before the Court of Appeals of Georgia on direct appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(j), the court granted an attorney’s application for discretionary appeal of the denial by the trial court of the attorney’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) and (b). After considering the record under the appropriate standards as to each subsection, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion and the evidence supported the court’s denial of the motion. Kilgore v. Sheetz, 268 Ga. App. 761, 603 S.E.2d 24 (2004). Trial court properly rejected the hospital’s claim for additional attorney fees 426 under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) because the jury could have determined that a doctor simply did not remember signing a contract; the doctor’s lack of memory did not preclude a question of fact in the case. Whitaker v. Houston County Hosp. Auth., 272 Ga. App. 870, 613 S.E.2d 664 (2005). Claim by a plaintiff, who had unsuccessfully asserted in a claim for attorney fees and costs under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 that the peer review privilege under O.C.G.A. § 31-7-133(a) was improperly applied, that asserted the same claim against the same parties in an abusive litigation action under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80 et seq., was barred by collateral estoppel. Freeman v. Wheeler, 277 Ga. App. 753, 627 S.E.2d 86 (2006). In a negligence suit wherein a train patron was attacked and raped while exiting a train station, and the defending public transportation authority was found to have intentionally made a false response regarding the creation and maintenance of certain documents, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by denying the train patron’s motion for attorney fees, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), as it was entirely within the discretion of the trial court after considering all the facts and law and there was evidence that the authority’s conduct did not expand the proceeding since the documents were destroyed before the discovery was propounded. MARTA v. Doe, 292 Ga. App. 532, 664 S.E.2d 893 (2008). Property owners alleged a water supply company acted in bad faith, was stubbornly litigious, and caused the owners unnecessary trouble and expense. As litigation between the parties was lengthy and acrimonious; each side accused the other of numerous bad acts; and the trial court considered numerous motions and pleadings and held more than three hearings, the court did not abuse the court’s discretion in failing to award fees to the owners on the owners’ own motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b). Stewart v. Tricord, LLC, 296 Ga. App. 834, 676 S.E.2d 229 (2009). There was some evidence from which a jury was authorized to find wrongful eviction including a homeowner’s filing of a dispossessory action against the tenant, 9-15-14 although the jury ultimately concluded that the tenant was not a tenant but a house guest of the homeowner. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in denying the defendant an award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b). Rescigno v. Vesali, 306 Ga. App. 610, 703 S.E.2d 65 (2010). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion when the court declined to award the builders fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 because the trial court did not find that the property owners’ allegations were without substantial justification warranting an award under § 9-15-14; in partially denying the builders’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that there were genuine issues of fact for trial, and in the court’s order denying fees, the court also stated that there were no facts revealed at trial that would have changed the court’s decision on summary judgment. O’Leary v. Whitehall Constr., 288 Ga. 790, 708 S.E.2d 353 (2011). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in denying a motion for attorney fees filed by a homeowners’ association because the proceedings were hard fought, and the feelings of the parties were intense. Campbell v. Landings Ass’n, 311 Ga. App. 476, 716 S.E.2d 543 (2011). Attorney’s fees improperly denied. — Trial court erred in denying a shooting club’s motion for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) or (b) after the club successfully obtained a writ of mandamus requiring the county to reissue the club’s building permit since: (1) there was testimony at the appeal to the board of commissioners that the building permit was legal when the permit was issued; (2) at the hearing on the motion for attorney’s fees, there was testimony that the chair of the board of commissioners told a witness that ‘‘the County Commission really would prefer to make the courts the bad guys rather than themselves’’; (3) the club introduced deposition testimony in which the county commissioners could not articulate a legally cognizable reason to justify their revocation of the building permit; (4) the county did not put up any evidence and called no witnesses to testify at either the hearing on the petition for mandamus or the hearing on the request for attor- 427 Application (Cont’d) ney’s fees; and (5) the trial court clearly found no justiciable issue of law or fact that supported the county’s position. Southland Outdoors, Inc. v. Putnam County, 265 Ga. App. 399, 593 S.E.2d 940 (2004). Trial court erred when the court denied the company president’s motion for attorney fees on the basis that the employee’s fraudulent inducement claim presented no justiciable issue of law or fact as the employee failed to present any evidence showing that the claim for fraudulent inducement had any merit because the employee’s own testimony contradicted the position taken in that claim. Omni Builders Risk v. Bennett, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 966 (Nov. 21, 2013). Award of fees was improper. — Trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to inmates who had filed an action against a county due to inadequate medical care in the county jail, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), since there was no finding that the county’s arguments lacked substantial justification, there was no finding that the issues asserted by the county were baseless, and there was no right to attorney’s fees merely because the county appealed the ruling. DeKalb County v. Adams, 263 Ga. App. 201, 587 S.E.2d 302 (2003). In an administratrix’s action against a stepfather’s estate to set aside a deed that the administratrix’s mother conveyed to the stepfather, a court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the estate pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) because there was no evidence that, in bringing suit, the administratrix’s unnecessarily expanded the proceedings, harassed the estate, or otherwise engaged in improper conduct. Doster v. Bates, 266 Ga. App. 194, 596 S.E.2d 699 (2004). Award of attorney fees to ex-husband was reversed as attorney fees were not authorized in an action seeking a change of custody by the noncustodial parent, even if child support was also sought; there was nothing in the record to suggest that the attorney fees were awarded under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 as the trial court did not rule on the ex-husband’s motion 9-15-14 seeking an amendment to the order to include reference to § 9-15-14 and seeking findings of fact to support the order. Thornton v. Intveldt, 272 Ga. App. 906, 614 S.E.2d 175 (2005). Trial court erred by granting a husband’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 without holding a hearing; further, it was illogical for the trial court to hold that the wife’s motion for a new trial was frivolous while simultaneously granting the wife’s motion for reconsideration of the final order posing similar arguments. Fox-Korucu v. Korucu, 279 Ga. 769, 621 S.E.2d 460 (2005). Trial court committed reversible error by not apportioning a welder’s attorney fees between those incurred in defending against the frivolous claims and those fees incurred in defending against the non-frivolous claims before entering an attorney fees award. Trotter v. Summerour, 273 Ga. App. 263, 614 S.E.2d 887 (2005). Insured was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees or the expenses of litigation from an insurance company because the insured’s complaint for breach of contract, tortious interference with a contract, and punitive damages failed to state any underlying claim under which relief could have been granted the insured. Perry v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (N.D. Ga. 2005). Trial court erred in failing to consider an award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) to the apartment complex owners in an action by a tenant, alleging that the owners were negligent in not repairing a window pane which allowed an intruder to enter and to commit the criminal acts against the tenant as the trial court had expressly found that there was no evidence that the owners’ attorneys had participated in spoliation of a rape kit; accordingly, the trial court’s denial as premature of the owners’ motion for fees upon the tenant’s request for spoliation sanctions was error. Bouve & Mohr, LLC v. Banks, 274 Ga. App. 758, 618 S.E.2d 650 (2005). Award of attorney fees to the estate, if predicated on O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), was erroneous as the findings necessary to support such an award were not made; 428 further, if the attorney’s fee were based on O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, it was also erroneous as there was no evidence of the parties’ financial circumstances that authorized such an award. Findley v. Findley, 280 Ga. 454, 629 S.E.2d 222 (2006). Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to a publisher, absent a statutory basis for the award and evidence as to the reasonableness of the award; hence, the award was vacated and remand was ordered for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the amount and reasonableness of the fees. In re Serpentfoot, 285 Ga. App. 325, 646 S.E.2d 267 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 661 (Ga. 2007). Award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 had to be vacated and remanded for reconsideration since the trial court had not made findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the award as such findings and conclusions were mandatory and did not have to be requested under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(a); furthermore, the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law in the trial court’s order overcame the presumption of regularity of all proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction. Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 287 Ga. App. 133, 650 S.E.2d 795 (2007). In an election contest, the election winner was not entitled to attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a). Given the language of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385(a) as to who could mail ballots for a voter, the complaint could not be described as lacking any justiciable issue of law or fact, and a sufficient number of ballots could have been found invalid so as to change the election result. Kendall v. Delaney, 283 Ga. 34, 656 S.E.2d 812 (2008). Property owner’s interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 22-1-11 was not so devoid of a justiciable issue or so lacking in substantial justification that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would accept that interpretation, such that an award of attorney fees against the owner pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) and (b) could not stand. Fox v. City of Cumming, 298 Ga. App. 134, 679 S.E.2d 365 (2009). Trial court erred in holding an attorney in criminal contempt for violating an injunction and in ordering the attorney to 9-15-14 pay a fine, costs, and attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 because the attorney did not violate a receivership order; the receivership order did not apply directly to the attorney, and the attorney, personally, neither filed the notice of lien nor took action to have the lien filed, but the attorney’s client filed the lien pro se on the advice of another attorney. Cabiness v. Lambros, 303 Ga. App. 253, 692 S.E.2d 817 (2010). Evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s award of attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) because the record was devoid of any evidence of the actual cost and reasonableness of a seller’s attorney fees. Murray v. DeKalb Farmers Mkt., Inc., 305 Ga. App. 523, 699 S.E.2d 842 (2010). Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to an injured employee because initially allowing a subrogation lien viability hearing only after a liability award and subsequently sanctioning the employee’s employer and its workers’ compensation insurer for refusing to withdraw their lien on this basis was an abuse of discretion. Austell HealthCare, Inc. v. Scott, 308 Ga. App. 393, 707 S.E.2d 599 (2011). Attorney fee award to sellers in a dispute between real property buyers and sellers was error under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 as there was evidence of mutual mistake to support the buyers’ claim for contract reformation; accordingly, it was not lacking in substantial justification and a justiciable issue was presented. Exec. Excellence, LLC v. Martin Bros. Invs., LLC, 309 Ga. App. 279, 710 S.E.2d 169 (2011). Trial court abused the court’s discretion in awarding the insureds’ attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) because counsel for a parent and an administrator did not unnecessarily enlarge the proceedings and the proceedings were not interposed for harassment. Kitchens v. Ezell, 315 Ga. App. 444, 726 S.E.2d 461 (2012). No evidence supported an award of attorney fees in favor of the insureds’ under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) because the position of a parent and an administrator that no settlement was reached was legally supportable; accordingly, the claims of the parent and the administrator were not so 429 Application (Cont’d) devoid of a justiciable issue that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would accept the claims, nor did their opposition to the insureds’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement lack substantial justification. Kitchens v. Ezell, 315 Ga. App. 444, 726 S.E.2d 461 (2012). Trial court’s order awarding attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 was vacated because the order did not include the necessary findings of fact to support the award. Hearn v. Dollar Rent A Car, Inc., 315 Ga. App. 164, 726 S.E.2d 661 (2012). Because the trial court erred, in part, by granting summary judgment in favor of a rental company and an independent third party administrator, the trial court’s attorney fees award under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) was vacated; without more specific factual findings in the trial court’s order, the court of appeals could not determine what portion of the court’s award related to the claims for which the court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed. Hearn v. Dollar Rent A Car, Inc., 315 Ga. App. 164, 726 S.E.2d 661 (2012). Trial court erred by awarding attorney fees against the plaintiff ’s counsel under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) and (b) for failing to dismiss the plaintiff ’s complaint or seek withdrawal immediately after the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment because the trial court erroneously relied on case law that was distinguishable from the facts involving the plaintiff ’s injury at a condominium unit that the plaintiff was visiting, which was being leased to a sibling without permission. Michelman v. Fairington Park Condo. Ass’n, 322 Ga. App. 316, 744 S.E.2d 839 (2013). Trial court abused the court’s discretion by awarding a father attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 because the record established that the father voluntarily engaged in settlement negotiations with the mother, and the mother’s failure to accept the validity of an informal, undocumented at-home paternity test did not render the mother’s efforts to reach an agreement with the father substantially frivolous. Patterson v. Hragyil, 322 Ga. App. 329, 744 S.E.2d 851 (2013). 9-15-14 Trial court erred in awarding the son attorney fees in an action praying for cancellation of a deed and alleging fraud, undue influence, inadequate consideration, and improper recordation because no evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the daughters defended the action without a lawful basis for doing so. Williams v. Warren, 322 Ga. App. 599, 745 S.E.2d 809 (2013). Because the ex-husband had a factual basis for filing a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to modify the protective order as the husband had abided by the terms of the protective order, the purpose of the protective order had been accomplished, there was no longer any threat of family violence, and the restrictions in the protective order had created an undue burden on the husband’s ability to obtain available employment as a law enforcement or security officer, the trial court erred in finding that the husband’s motion lacked any justiciable issue of law or fact and the award of attorney fees to the wife could not stand. Dalenberg v. Dalenberg, 325 Ga. App. 833, 755 S.E.2d 228 (2014). Because the ex-husband had a factual basis for filing a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to modify the protective order, and there was no evidentiary basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the husband knew that the husband’s Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training certification would likely be revoked as a result of the prior termination of the husband’s employment as a law enforcement officer or that the husband had misrepresented the ability to return to law enforcement, the husband’s motion was not interposed for the purposes of harassment and the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the ex-wife. Dalenberg v. Dalenberg, 325 Ga. App. 833, 755 S.E.2d 228 (2014). Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the employee without considering a potential setoff for amounts received from the employee’s settlement with the employer’s counsel and counsel’s law firm and the amounts received from an insurance company pursuant to cost of defense payments made under the company’s insurance policy. LabMD, Inc. v. Savera, 331 Ga. App. 463, 771 S.E.2d 148 (2015). 430 Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by denying the plaintiff ’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) because there was evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s admissions did not rise to the level of showing a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact, and that the defense was not substantially frivolous. Chadwick v. Brazell, 331 Ga. App. 373, 771 S.E.2d 75 (2015). Award of fees was proper. — Based on the plain and unambiguous language of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, no error was found in the trial court’s inclusion in the court’s award of attorney’s fees to a wife, the fees she incurred for appellate proceedings that occurred during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Kautter v. Kautter, 286 Ga. 16, 685 S.E.2d 266 (2009). Trial court’s award of attorney fees in favor of a seller pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) was proper because the trial court gave the buyer ample opportunity to challenge both the cost and reasonableness of the seller’s attorney fees, but the buyer did not challenge either the amount or the reasonableness of such fees, and the buyer did not object to the trial court’s method of determining the amount of the seller’s attorney fees or otherwise request a hearing on the matter; therefore, the buyer acquiesced in the trial court’s procedure and could not complain of the procedure. Murray v. DeKalb Farmers Mkt., Inc., 305 Ga. App. 523, 699 S.E.2d 842 (2010). Trial court did not err in ordering the mother and the mother’s attorney to pay the grandmother’s attorney’s fees related to a contempt motion as both the mother and the attorney knew that the visitation order contained a typographical error, referring to ‘‘respondent’’ instead of ‘‘petitioner,’’ and that their claims were made in bad faith. In re Singleton, 323 Ga. App. 396, 744 S.E.2d 912 (2013). Trial court did not err in granting the law clerks’ motion for attorney fees as a sanction due to the county’s opposition to the clerks’ motion to confirm an arbitration award with respect to the clerks’ group-pay grievance that was resolved in the clerks’ favor as the county’s argument lacked a justiciable issue of law and 9-15-14 lacked substantial justification. Fulton County v. Lord, 323 Ga. App. 384, 746 S.E.2d 188 (2013). Attorney fee award related to the wife’s contempt motion was supported by the trial court’s findings in the supplemental order, which specified that the award was made pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, because the husband lacked substantial justification to refuse to honor the prior agreement the parties reached in open court. McCarthy v. Ashment-McCarthy, 295 Ga. 231, 758 S.E.2d 306 (2014). Award of more than actual fees billed was proper. — Hindu temple’s serial filing of civil complaints against individuals lawfully reporting alleged unlawful credit card fraud activity by the temple violated the anti-SLAPP statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, and an award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 for the reasonable value of the individuals’ attorney’s services was proper. The trial court was not limited in making the award to the amount that the attorney actually billed the clients. Hindu Temple & Cmty. Ctr. of the High Desert, Inc. v. Raghunathan, 311 Ga. App. 109, 714 S.E.2d 628 (2011), cert. dismissed, No. S11C1887, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 49 (Ga. 2012). Award of hourly fees to two county salaried attorneys was proper. — In awarding attorney’s fees for vexatious litigation under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), a trial court did not err in awarding $250 per hour and $225 per hour for two county attorneys, although the attorneys were not paid hourly but were salaried employees; there was no evidence that this was not a reasonable fee given these attorneys’ experience. Jones v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke County, 312 Ga. App. 214, 718 S.E.2d 74 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0387, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 228 (Ga. 2012). Violation by attorney justifying award. — When, in a divorce proceeding, the husband’s attorney violated O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67 and pertinent court rules by making an improper deposit of funds in the court, the court properly awarded attorney’s fees paid to the wife personally by the husband’s attorney either on the basis that the actions of the latter constituted contempt, or as a sua sponte award of 431 Application (Cont’d) attorney’s fees. Cohen v. Feldman, 219 Ga. App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Cooper, 280 Ga. 145, 625 S.E.2d 754 (2006). When the plaintiff, an attorney, did not make any specific allegations of malpractice against the plaintiff ’s former counsel in a divorce action until the plaintiff responded to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, even then never demonstrating any legal basis for the plaintiff ’s claim that a particular communication constituted a breach of confidentiality, and since the plaintiff ’s action was brought for purposes of harassment, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to award attorney’s fees against the plaintiff. Cagle v. Davis, 236 Ga. App. 657, 513 S.E.2d 16 (1999). Section does not apply to federal bankruptcy proceedings. — O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 does not authorize an award for attorney’s fees or expenses for proceedings before a federal bankruptcy court; application of the statute is limited to courts of record when the Georgia Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, applies. Harkleroad v. Stringer, 231 Ga. App. 464, 499 S.E.2d 379 (1998). Bankruptcy court denied a Chapter 13 debtor’s ex-wife’s request for reimbursement of attorneys’ fees she incurred to obtain a judgment against the debtor which found that a state court’s award of attorneys’ fees in her divorce action was a debt in the nature of support that was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and was entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). Nothing in the state court’s order awarding the ex-wife attorneys’ fees allowed her to recover additional fees for enforcing the order, and there was no merit to the ex-wife’s claims that she was entitled to the additional fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, and under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 because the debtor had acted in bad faith. Owoade-Taylor v. Babatunde (In re Babatunde), No. 11-5564, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5053 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2012). Applicability. — Because O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, the anti-SLAPP statute, was 9-15-14 not intended to immunize from the consequences of abusive litigation a party who asserted a claim with respect to which there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably believed that a court would accept the asserted claim, the statute did not apply to a county’s claim for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, after the county was granted summary judgment on a property buyer’s complaint alleging that the buyer was entitled to a written verification of zoning compliance; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the county’s motion to dismiss the county’s request. EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan County, 281 Ga. 396, 638 S.E.2d 325 (2006). O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 does not authorize award to nonparties. — It was error for a trial court to award a hospital attorney fees and expenses incurred in resisting a subpoena issued in a lawsuit to which the hospital was not a party because: (1) under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(d), such fees and expenses awarded under § 9-15-14 could not exceed amounts reasonable and necessary to defend or assert the rights of a party, meaning a party to the litigation; and (2) the hospital was not a party to the case in which the subpoena was issued. Reeves v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 315 Ga. App. 582, 726 S.E.2d 544 (2012). There is no reason to think that ‘‘party,’’ as that term is used in O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(d), regarding an award of attorney fees, means anything other than a named party to litigation, and attorney’s fees, and expenses incurred by a nonparty in the defense or assertion of the nonparty’s own rights were not, by definition, fees and expenses ‘‘which are reasonable and necessary for defending or asserting the rights of a party,’’ so attorney’s fees and expenses under § 9-15-14(b) generally could not be awarded to a nonparty and, to the extent Slone v. Myers, 288 Ga. App. 8 (653 SE2d 323) (2007) held otherwise, it was overruled. Reeves v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 315 Ga. App. 582, 726 S.E.2d 544 (2012). Alleged alter ego of corporate plaintiff was not a ‘‘party’’ in the case and the court was without authority to impose 432 attorney’s fees against that alter ego. Steven E. Marshall, Bldr., Inc. v. Scherer, 206 Ga. App. 156, 424 S.E.2d 841 (1992). When county commissioners sought litigation costs under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 against a citizen against whom they obtained summary judgment on the 45th day following judgment, that did not extend the citizen’s time within which to seek attorney’s fees against the commissioners for seeking sanctions against the citizen under the same statute. Trammel v. Clayton County Bd. of Comm’rs, 250 Ga. App. 310, 551 S.E.2d 412 (2001). Ongoing estate administration did not affect award of attorney fees. — Probate court’s judgment finding a caveat to a will meritless and awarding attorney’s fees was final and appealable, even though administration of the estate was ongoing. Dismer v. Luke, 228 Ga. App. 638, 492 S.E.2d 562 (1997). Fees to be assessed against executor, not estate. — Since the probate court found that an executor kept an estate open without legitimate reason, disregarded court orders, breached the executor’s fiduciary duty to the estate, and unnecessarily expanded the proceedings once a petition for accounting had been filed, such that an award of attorney fees to the petitioner was warranted under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), those fees had to be assessed against the executor, not the estate. In re Estate of Holtzclaw, 293 Ga. App. 577, 667 S.E.2d 432 (2008). Award not mandated whenever party prevails on abusive litigation claim. — Although subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 requires the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses upon a proper determination, it does not mandate an award whenever a party prevails on an abusive litigation claim. Subsection (f ) of § 9-15-14 vests the trial court, without a jury, with responsibility for determining whether an award should be made. Deljou v. Sharp Boylston Mgt. Co., 194 Ga. App. 505, 391 S.E.2d 27 (1990). Effect of failure to grant summary judgment. — Trial court’s award to a party whose motion for summary judgment was denied must be vacated except in unusual cases when the trial judge 9-15-14 could not, at the summary judgment stage, foresee facts authorizing the grant of attorney’s fees. Felker v. Fenlason, 201 Ga. App. 207, 410 S.E.2d 326 (1991). Sanctions against the plaintiff pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 were improperly assessed after the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and, after hearing all the facts which had been presented to the jury, denied the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Gantt v. Bennett, 231 Ga. App. 238, 499 S.E.2d 75 (1998). In a HOA’s action against homeowners for violation of a garage storage covenant, in which it was determined that the owners were not bound by the covenant under O.C.G.A. § 44-3-226(a) or O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d)(4), and the HOA dismissed the HOA’s remaining claim, the owners were the prevailing parties entitled to attorney fees under the declaration; however, the trial court did not err in denying attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) given the denial of summary judgment. Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass’n, 331 Ga. App. 204, 770 S.E.2d 289 (2015). Effect of denial of directed verdict. — In considering an award under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, a trial court is not necessarily bound by the denial of a motion for a directed verdict. Atwood v. Southeast Bedding Co., 236 Ga. App. 116, 511 S.E.2d 232 (1999). Attorney’s fees improper following grant of interlocutory injunction. — Trial court erred in granting attorney’s fees under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 because the grant of an interlocutory injunction was a determination that there was a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and was equivalent to denial of a motion for summary judgment so that the subsection did not apply. Hallman v. Emory Univ., 225 Ga. App. 247, 483 S.E.2d 362 (1997). Clear lack of adversity in interpleader action. — Since there is no evidence that the lack of adversity was not clear when the plaintiff brought the plaintiff ’s interpleader action, and the plaintiff ’s conduct in bringing the action falls within the criteria of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, the defendants were entitled to attorney’s fees. Citizens & S. Trust Co. v. Trust Co. 433 Application (Cont’d) Bank, 262 Ga. 345, 417 S.E.2d 148 (1992). Adjudication of claims. — Claims asserted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 are to be adjudicated by the trial court without a jury. Ferguson v. City of Doraville, 186 Ga. App. 430, 367 S.E.2d 551, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 918, 367 S.E.2d 551 (1988), overruled on other grounds, Vogtle v. Coleman, 259 Ga. 115, 376 S.E.2d 860 (1989). When final disposition occurred. — When, on appeal by caveators from summary judgment in favor of the proponents of a will, the decision was affirmed and, after remittitur, the superior court entered an order admitting the will to probate, final disposition of the action for the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 occurred when that order was entered, not when the summary judgment motion was granted. McConnell v. Moore, 232 Ga. App. 700, 503 S.E.2d 593 (1998). Section inapplicable when all claims mutually dismissed. — In providing in subsection (e) of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 that a party could move for attorney’s fees and expenses within 45 days of ‘‘final disposition’’ of a case, the legislature certainly did not mean to include per se a case when the claiming party has induced or achieved, by mutual dismissal of all then-pending claims or counterclaims, a dismissal with prejudice of the other’s claims, actions, or defenses, particularly if the claiming party achieved the other’s agreement to dismiss with prejudice by consenting to and proclaiming by court order that the ‘‘mutual dismissals . . . are a fair and reasonable settlement of all claims in this action under all the facts and circumstances of this case. . . .’’ Hunter v. Schroeder, 186 Ga. App. 799, 368 S.E.2d 561 (1988). Following dismissal, witness seeking fees brings separate suit. — Following a dismissal of a case with prejudice, an expert witness brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to pay the witness’s fees. The court properly dismissed the motion on the ground that the court no longer had jurisdiction of the matter. The proper remedy was to bring a separate suit. Ramos v. Vourtsanis, 187 Ga. App. 9-15-14 69, 369 S.E.2d 344 (1988). Contempt. — Any prohibition against an award of attorney’s fees in a contempt action is limited to criminal contempt actions if it exists at all. Minor v. Minor, 257 Ga. 706, 362 S.E.2d 208 (1987). Imposition of attorney’s fees for failure to comply with a contempt order did not constitute improper punishment. Wright v. Stuart, 229 Ga. App. 50, 494 S.E.2d 212 (1997). Condemnation proceedings. — O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, read in conjunction with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. III, Para. I, permits trial courts to award attorney’s fees to condemnees in eminent domain cases. DOT v. Woods, 269 Ga. 53, 494 S.E.2d 507 (1998). Fees were not recoverable in a condemnation case based on the fact that the jury awarded the condemnee nearly twice what the condemnor had offered to pay. DOT v. Woods, 269 Ga. 53, 494 S.E.2d 507 (1998). When a city continued to pursue condemnation until after the special master made its award and after the condemnees filed an appeal as to valuation issues, and at that point elected to redesign the project and to dismiss its condemnation proceeding, because that decision resulted in a financial detriment to the condemnees, the trial court could, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, find that the city was liable for attorney’s fees under subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14. McKemie v. City of Griffin, 272 Ga. 843, 536 S.E.2d 66 (2000), affirming, in part, City of Griffin v. McKemie, 240 Ga. App. 180, 522 S.E.2d 288 (1999). Eminent domain actions. — Lessee’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) against the state in an eminent domain action was improperly denied; although the trial court concluded that the state was justified in bringing the action, the court failed to address whether the state bore some responsibility for unnecessarily expanding the proceedings by entering into a settlement with the owner of the property in question. Lamar Co., LLC v. State, 256 Ga. App. 524, 568 S.E.2d 752 (2002). In a suit brought by a purchaser seeking damages for wrongful foreclosure of 434 certain real property after two foreclosure sales, the trial court erred in granting the second foreclosing bank attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 based on frivolous litigation since the second bank had knowledge of the purchaser’s acquisition of the property via the first foreclosure, therefore, the purchaser’s suit did not lack substantial justification as to the second bank and the second’s bank failure to provide proper notice of the sale to the purchaser. Roylston v. Bank of Am., N.A., 290 Ga. App. 556, 660 S.E.2d 412 (2008). Award to judge improper. — Trial court erred when the court awarded a judge attorney’s fees for defending a suit the county had been forced to file against the judge. Spalding County v. Cramer, 262 Ga. 843, 426 S.E.2d 149 (1993). Judge was only entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees for the counterclaims that lacked legal justification. Heiskell v. Roberts, 295 Ga. 795, 764 S.E.2d 368 (2014). Judge who found attorney in contempt recused. — Affidavit in support of recusal was legally sufficient in a situation in which the judge who found an attorney in contempt in the underlying case was to hear a claim against the same attorney for costs and attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14. Houston v. Cavanagh, 199 Ga. App. 387, 405 S.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 405 S.E.2d 105 (1991). Attorney’s fees not recoverable in commitment proceedings. — There is no statutory authority for the award of attorney’s fees to a patient who was ordered discharged in involuntary commitment proceedings under O.C.G.A. Ch. 3, T. 37. Georgia Mental Health Inst. v. Brady, 263 Ga. 591, 436 S.E.2d 219 (1993). Inapplicable to municipal ordinance violations as quasi-criminal cases. — Prosecution for violation of a city or county ordinance is a ‘‘quasi-criminal’’ case having the nature of a criminal case, and when a party convicted of an ordinance violation files a petition for certiorari in superior court seeking review of the conviction, the proceeding in superior court is criminal and not civil, and the cost and fees provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 are inapplicable. 9-15-14 DeKalb County v. Gerard, 207 Ga. App. 43, 427 S.E.2d 36 (1993). O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 does not authorize the award against nonparties. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 210 Ga. App. 318, 436 S.E.2d 56 (1993); Swafford v. Bradford, 225 Ga. App. 486, 484 S.E.2d 300 (1997). Pre-disposition counterclaim premature. — Word ‘‘may’’ in subsection (e) of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 means that the litigant is only authorized to seek an award after the case is concluded, when the basis for an award has matured, and such an award may not be sought by counterclaim filed prior to the final disposition of the action. Hutchison v. Divorce & Custody Law Ctr., 207 Ga. App. 421, 427 S.E.2d 784 (1993); Generali — United States Branch v. Owens, 218 Ga. App. 584, 462 S.E.2d 464 (1995); Swafford v. Bradford, 225 Ga. App. 486, 484 S.E.2d 300 (1997). Sanctions. — Trial court misconstrued the clear terms of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 by concluding that the jury should decide whether sanctions should be awarded for bringing frivolous litigation. Dismer v. Luke, 228 Ga. App. 638, 492 S.E.2d 562 (1997). Because a valid general release entered into by a home buyer and home builder effectuated a binding accord and satisfaction barring any future claims between the parties, and absent evidence to void the release based on fraud, the buyer’s filed claims in a subsequent suit filed against the home builder were properly summarily dismissed; thus, assessment of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion and a penalty for filing a frivolous appeal was ordered. Pacheco v. Charles Crews Custom Homes, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 773, 658 S.E.2d 396 (2008). Award excludable as sanction under insurance policy. — It was not error for the trial court to conclude that an award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 was a sanction within the meaning of the exclusion contained in the attorney’s insurance policy. Dixon v. Home Indem. Co., 206 Ga. App. 623, 426 S.E.2d 381 (1992). Justification issue found. — When the record revealed hotly contested versions of what the parties considered to 435 Application (Cont’d) have transpired in a complex real estate transaction, given that the law requires only slight circumstances to establish fraud and conspiracy, the trial judge was authorized to find as a matter of law that the plaintiffs had pierced an essential element of the defendant’s abusive litigation claim and were thus entitled to a grant of summary judgment thereon. Seckinger v. Holtzendorf, 200 Ga. App. 604, 409 S.E.2d 76, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 409 S.E.2d 76 (1991). Although most of the claims by real property sellers warranted an attorney fee award to the buyers pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, as some claims were deemed lacking in substantial justification, there was sufficient justification to support the allegations of slander of title claims based on certain statements; accordingly, a remand for determination of which portion of the fees were allocable to which claims was warranted under § 9-15-14(d). Exec. Excellence, LLC v. Martin Bros. Invs., LLC, 309 Ga. App. 279, 710 S.E.2d 169 (2011). Sanction award based on attorney misconduct but dismissal unauthorized. — With regard to the landowners’ declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief suit seeking damages against a town and the town’s officials alleging the unconstitutionality and invalidity of an overlay zoning district, the evidence of misconduct by the landowners’ counsel in seeking an interlocutory injunction was sufficient to support the trial court’s sanction award to the town and established that the trial court’s award was not an abuse of discretion since the trial court’s finding that the landowners’ counsel knowingly and willfully presented an inaccurate and false survey in an effort to defraud the court, subvert justice, and gain an unfair advantage was a finding constituting a sufficient specification of the conduct which entitled the town to attorney’s fees and costs. However, the trial court erred by dismissing the landowners’ complaint based on the sanction order as dismissal of an action was not an authorized remedy under the sanction statute of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14. Century 9-15-14 Ctr. at Braselton, LLC v. Town of Braselton, 285 Ga. 380, 677 S.E.2d 106 (2009). Improper conduct of opposing party or counsel. — In exercising judicial discretion whether to award attorney’s fees under subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, the trial court could consider as one factor whether the opposing party or opposing counsel also contributed to the unnecessary expansion of the proceeding by any relevant form of improper conduct. Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga. App. 552, 449 S.E.2d 120 (1994). After entering judgment for the defendant in an action for grandparent’s visitation, the trial court abused the court’s discretion in deciding the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees without properly reviewing the defendant’s claim that the grandparents harassed the defendant or unnecessarily expanded the proceedings by other improper conduct. McKeen v. McKeen, 224 Ga. App. 410, 481 S.E.2d 236 (1997). Attorney’s fees were properly awarded to the plaintiff in a trespass action since the defendant was responsible for both the court’s and the plaintiff ’s difficulty in locating the defendant for service of process and other proceedings and because the defendant also was the attorney of record; the fact that the defendant was out of the country at certain times did not excuse the defendant’s failure to appear or take actions as the defendant did not seek or obtain permission for the defendant’s absences. Hipple v. Simpson Paper Co., 234 Ga. App. 516, 507 S.E.2d 156 (1998). Award of attorney’s fees for improper conduct. — In domestic dispute over visitation rights, an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate under subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 based on the defendant’s resistance to being deposed and the defendant’s failure to timely disclose to the trial court that the defendant and the defendant’s daughter had relocated out of state. Hall v. Hall, 241 Ga. App. 690, 527 S.E.2d 288 (1999). Trial court properly exercised the court’s discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-14-15(b) as the court made an award based on the finding that during the divorce proceedings, the 436 husband refused to comply with the wife’s multiple requests for production of documents, filed extraordinary motions, rejected multiple settlement offers, and moved to reopen discovery six months after discovery had concluded; although the husband argued that such events did not occur or that the events were justifiable, the trial court was authorized to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Carson v. Carson, 277 Ga. 335, 588 S.E.2d 735 (2003). Based on conduct by a husband during the litigation with the wife in a manner intended to prevent completion of the case, to harass and annoy the wife, and to cause the wife’s attorney fees to increase, sufficient evidence was presented supporting an attorney fee award under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b); moreover, the wife’s counsel’s statement as to the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees was sufficient and the husband’s failure to question the wife’s counsel or seek more information waived any complaint regarding those issues. Taylor v. Taylor, 282 Ga. 113, 646 S.E.2d 238 (2007). Since the evidence supported the trial court’s findings that a former spouse had unreasonably extended the litigation by denying being represented by an attorney and by refusing to acknowledge the attorney’s authority to enter into a settlement agreement, under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, the other spouse was properly awarded the attorney fees incurred in enforcing the agreement. Ford v. Hanna, 293 Ga. App. 863, 668 S.E.2d 271 (2008). Fact that a personal representative prolonged administration of the estate so the personal representative could wrongfully have the estate’s primary asset, a house, conveyed to the personal representative entitled the beneficiary to litigation expenses, including attorney fees, under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-15-14(b) and 13-6-11. In re Estate of Zeigler, 295 Ga. App. 156, 671 S.E.2d 218 (2008). Bad faith insurance claims. — In an insured’s suit asserting claims for breach of contract and bad faith breach of contract under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-20 and 33-4-6 in connection with an insurer’s denial of the insured’s claim for proceeds of a disability insurance policy, the parent corpo- 9-15-14 ration of the insurer, which administered the insurer’s policies, was not liable upon the insured’s claim for attorney fees and expenses under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 because even if the insured had succeeded on its underlying claims against the parent, § 33-4-6 provides the exclusive remedy for fees and costs in cases involving bad faith refusal to pay insurance proceeds. Adams v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Harassing a cosigner to pay debt. — When a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that, by pursuing an action against a cosigner, a bank had sought to harass or intimidate the cosigner into paying one or more debts for which the cosigner had no arguable legal responsibility, a recovery of damages for substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious litigation would clearly be authorized. Whatley v. Bank S., 185 Ga. App. 896, 366 S.E.2d 182, cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911, 366 S.E.2d 182 (1988). Failure of a party to agree to telephonic depositions cannot form the basis of an award of attorney’s fees and expenses when there was no evidence of the inappropriateness of the refusal at the time thereof. Ingram v. Star Touch Communications, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 329, 450 S.E.2d 334 (1994). Willful concealment of important document. — In an action for breach of an employment contract, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by awarding $75,000 in legal fees and expenses against the defendant when the court found that the defendant willfully attempted to conceal a document which could have had a major impact on the litigation. Santora v. American Combustion, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 771, 485 S.E.2d 34 (1997). Summary judgment denial does not preclude award. — Denial of summary judgment does not preclude as a matter of law the exercise of the trial court’s discretion under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 to award litigation costs and attorney’s fees for frivolous actions and defenses upon the trial of the case. Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, 405 S.E.2d 31 (1991). 437 Application (Cont’d) Denial of the accountants’ motion for summary judgment in their clients’ negligence suit against the accountants did not require reversal of the trial court’s judgment awarding the accountants damages under Yost v. Torak, 256 Ga. 92, 344 S.E.2d 414 (1986) since denial of the motion was not a determination whether the suit lacked substantial justification as the trial court was never required to address or otherwise foresee facts authorizing the grant of attorney fees under Yost regarding the merits of the complaint. Ansa Mufflers Corp. v. Worthington, 201 Ga. App. 602, 411 S.E.2d 573 (1991). Summary judgment denial precludes award. — Denial of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the main claim constitutes a binding determination that the claim did not lack substantial justification so as to render the claim frivolous, groundless, or vexatious, and as a result the defendant is not entitled to an award of damages under Yost v. Torak, 256 Ga. 92, 344 S.E.2d 414 (1986) or O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14. Contractors’ Bldg.