Hickey v

Bowden, 248 Ga. App. 647, 548 S.E.2d 347, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 259 (2001), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 275 Ga. 249, 569 S.E.2d 495, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 479 (2002). Parties may contract for lesser time limit. — While O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 provides that actions on simple contracts in writing should be brought within six years, parties are permitted to contract as to a lesser time limit within which an action may be brought so long as the period fixed be not so unreasonable as to raise a presumption of imposition or undue advantage in some way. Rabey Elec. Co. v. Housing Auth., 190 Ga. App. 89, 378 S.E.2d 169, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 77 (1989). Employment contracts. — If employment contract is in writing, employee has six years after expiration within which to bring action. Rosenstock v. Congregation Agudath Achim, 118 Ga. App. 443, 164 179 Actions on Simple Written Contracts (Cont’d) S.E.2d 283, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1424 (1968). Action by retired teachers regarding amount of benefits under employment contract. — As a class of retirees had a right to retirement pay from the Teachers Retirement System of Georgia that arose from their contracts of employment and not from a statutory right, the six-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 applicable to contract matters was controlling; the 20-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 was not the correct limitations period to apply in the circumstances. Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Plymel, 296 Ga. App. 839, 676 S.E.2d 234, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 172 (2009). Action under Employment Retirement Income Security Act. — Any claim an employee may have had against an employer under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was barred by the statute of limitations; because the action was brought in Georgia, the applicable statute of limitations was six years, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 93-24 and the employee failed to file the employee’s complaint within the six-year statute of limitations. Warren v. Schwerman, 155 Fed. Appx. 416, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19089 (11th Cir. 2005). Insurance contracts. — Contract of insurance, not executed under seal, is a simple contract in writing, and, when no contractual limitations are contained therein as to time when action on policy shall be brought, statute of limitations applicable to simple contracts in writing applies. Burton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 828, 173 S.E. 922, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 213 (1934); Patrick v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 51 Ga. App. 253, 180 S.E. 141, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 653 (1935); Banks v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 760, 194 S.E. 34, 1937 Ga. App. LEXIS 226 (1937). Insurance is a matter of contract, and the applicable statute of limitations on a simple contract is six years. Childs v. Armour Food Co., 175 Ga. App. 455, 333 S.E.2d 377, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2119 (1985). 9-3-24 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 is applicable, and provides for a six-year statute of limitations, both to claims which seek to establish the insured’s right to optional benefits — the additional coverage provided by O.C.G.A. § 33-34-5 — (since repealed) and to claims for any losses incurred by the insured to which the optional coverage might apply. Bryant v. Allstate Ins. Co., 254 Ga. 328, 326 S.E.2d 753, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 627 (1985). While a crop insurance policy’s 12month limitation period for bringing a legal action superseded O.C.G.A. § 9-324’s six-year limitation period for actions on contracts, as the insured filed a demand for arbitration within 12 months of the insurer’s denial of the claim, as required by the policy and applicable federal regulations, the insured had timely filed a “legal action.” Therefore, the insured’s subsequent lawsuit against the insurer was not time-barred. Bullington v. Blakely Crop Hail, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 147, 668 S.E.2d 732, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1050 (2008). Insurer could not recover all of the payments subject to the deductible amount because the six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions on a written contract applied to preclude any claim for deductibles paid before July 30, 2012. Fairbanks Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. (In re Fairbanks Co.), No. 18-41768-pwb, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 2385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2020). Officers’ bonds. — This section applies to action to recover for breach of warden’s bond (by virtue of death of inmate). Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 123 Ga. App. 108, 179 S.E.2d 525, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1390 (1970). Collective bargaining agreement. — In action by company for damages against union for violation of collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to § 301 of Federal Labor Management Act, sixyear period provided in former Code 1933, § 3-705 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24) was applicable, and not four-year period former Code 1933, § 3-711 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-26). Kaufman & Broad Home Systems, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers, 607 F.2d 1104, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 9956 (5th Cir. 1979). 180 Union members’ claim that union breached a collective bargaining agreement regarding work place safety was governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Sams v. United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union, 866 F.2d 1380, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 2362 (11th Cir. 1989). Promissory notes. — Actions upon promissory notes not under seal must be brought within six years after the same become due and payable. Hamby v. Crisp, 48 Ga. App. 418, 172 S.E. 842, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 91 (1934); Gaffe v. Williams, 68 Ga. App. 299, 22 S.E.2d 765, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 113 (1942). Secured transactions. — While it appeared that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, rather than O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725, would most likely apply to defendant collection attorney’s state court deficiency action against plaintiff consumer, and it was not for the federal court to say what the Georgia courts would hold, the uncertainty meant there was no intentional unfair conduct and the consumer’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, claim was dismissed. Almand v. Reynolds & Robin, P.C., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31907 (M.D. Ga. 2007). Acknowledgment of receipt of claims. — This section applies to written acknowledgment of receipt of claims, with promise to account for them. Hill v. Hackett, 80 Ga. 53, 4 S.E. 856, 1887 Ga. LEXIS 321 (1887). Contracts to be performed outside state. — This section applies to contracts to be performed in another state. Obear v. First Nat’l Bank, 97 Ga. 587, 25 S.E. 335, 1895 Ga. LEXIS 533 (1895). Computation of limitation period. — In computing time under this section, day of maturity is excluded. Blitch v. Brewer, 83 Ga. 333, 9 S.E. 837, 1889 Ga. LEXIS 61 (1889). Motion to dismiss. — This section may be set up as defense by motion to dismiss complaint, when from allegations thereof cause of action appears to be barred. Davis v. Boyett, 120 Ga. 649, 48 S.E. 185, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 666 (1904); Marbut v. Hamilton, 32 Ga. App. 187, 122 S.E. 738, 1924 Ga. App. LEXIS 326 (1924). Enforceability of limitation in contract. — Contract limitation upon right to sue, fixing shorter period than that al- 9-3-24 lowed by statute, is lawful, provided period fixed is not so unreasonable as to raise presumption of imposition or undue advantage. Darnell v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 367, 154 S.E.2d 741, 1967 Ga. App. LEXIS 1109 (1967). A 12-month limitation period in contract is enforceable and is not in conflict with this section. Gravely v. Southern Trust Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 93, 258 S.E.2d 753, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2441 (1979). Drawer of a check may not place words thereon shortening limitation period for bringing action on such check when it has been presented for payment according to its terms. Gray v. National Bank & Trust Co., 154 Ga. App. 759, 270 S.E.2d 44, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2376 (1980). Bar not avoided by agreement without consideration. — In action against administrator based on alleged liability of intestate as endorser of note, when alleged obligation was barred by statute of limitations, bar was not avoided by fact that after endorsement payee signed and delivered to endorser an agreement not to call upon the endorser for payment during the endorser’s natural life, which agreement was not based on any valuable consideration. Exchange Nat’l Bank v. Alford, 187 Ga. 60, 200 S.E. 128, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 762 (1938). Effect of laches. — Independently of statute of limitations, right to maintain action on an insurance policy may be barred by plaintiff’s laches. Burton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 828, 173 S.E. 922, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 213 (1934). Insurer obtaining rights of insured through subrogation is subject to same statute of limitations as is the insured. National Hills Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 320 F. Supp. 1146, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8973 (S.D. Ga. 1970). Claim of bar by transferee of debtor. — While as a general rule right to claim benefit of statute of limitations is personal to the debtor, it may also be claimed by debtor’s transferee when it is sought to subject property transferred to that person as to payment of debt. Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Emory Univ., 185 Ga. 181 9-3-24 Actions on Simple Written Contracts (Cont’d) 571, 196 S.E. 58, 1938 Ga. LEXIS 490 (1938). Foreclosure of mortgage when action on debt barred. — Mortgage may be foreclosed even though this section bars action on debt. Elkins v. Edwards, 8 Ga. 325, 1850 Ga. LEXIS 55 (1850). Remedy on note secured by mortgage, barred by statute of limitations, does not bar remedy on mortgage itself, which is not barred until its applicable statute of limitations has run. Alropa Corp. v. Goldstein, 69 Ga. App. 168, 25 S.E.2d 116, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 39 (1943). Leasehold interests. — O.C.G.A. § 93-24 was applicable to a contract between a corporation and a limited partnership in which the partnership agreed to sublease land from the corporation for exploratory drilling for oil and natural gas, and to have the corporation arrange for drilling on the subleased land, because the contract was not a contract for the sale of goods under the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 11-2-107, which would include oil and gas but which did not include conveyances of leasehold interests in the real property to be explored for oil and gas. ABF Capital Corp. v. Yancey, 264 Ga. App. 850, 592 S.E.2d 492, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1588 (2003). Farm quotas and impact on dissolution of family farm partnership. — In a dispute involving a family farm partnership, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the children/grandchildren as to the claim regarding the peanut and tobacco quotas and assignments where certain claims were not untimely because genuine issues of fact existed as to whether a son inappropriately used a power of attorney as to the quotas and assignments and the father/grandfather sought to recover damage to personalty. Godwin v. Mizpah Farms, LLLP, 330 Ga. App. 31, 766 S.E.2d 497, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 808 (2014). Claim based on engineering contract. — Engineering firm was properly granted summary judgment in a breach of contract suit because the three documents the customer claimed to form the written contract did not contain the essential element of consideration; thus, the parties’ agreement was not a contract in writing and the four-year limitation period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 applied and the suit was time barred. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. v. Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc., 317 Ga. App. 464, 731 S.E.2d 361, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 737 (2012), cert. denied, No. S13C0031, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 101 (Ga. Jan. 22, 2013). Questions of fact remained to be determined. — Grant of summary judgment to the creditors was reversed because questions of fact existed as to whether one creditor’s failure to confirm the foreclosure sale barred the claims asserted by it and the other creditor as well as a question of fact existed as to whether all of the debts at issue, including the 2004 loan, were owed to a single creditor and were given for the same purpose. Bryant v. Optima Int’l, 339 Ga. App. 696, 792 S.E.2d 489, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 642 (2016). Running of Limitation Time of breach, not time of damage or discovery, controlling. — Statute of limitations runs from time contract is broken and not from time actual damage results or is ascertained. Mobley v. Murray County, 178 Ga. 388, 173 S.E. 680, 1934 Ga. LEXIS 59 (1934); National Hills Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 320 F. Supp. 1146, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8973 (S.D. Ga. 1970); R.L. Sanders Roofing Co. v. Miller, 153 Ga. App. 225, 264 S.E.2d 731, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1759 (1980). Statute of limitations begins to run from time right of action accrues for breach of duty or contract or for a wrong, without regard to time when actual damage results. Ginn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 119, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10577 (5th Cir. 1969). When action is based on breach of written contract and implied warranty, time of breach, not time of discovery of breach, starts statute of limitations. National Hills Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 320 F. Supp. 1146, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8973 (S.D. Ga. 1970). Claim based on improper replacement of roof on plaintiff’s home was barred by 182 six-year statute of limitations on simple contracts because the statute of limitations runs from the time the contract is broken and not at the time actual damage results or is ascertained. Owen v. Mobley Constr. Co., 171 Ga. App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 255, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2235 (1984). Statute of limitation begins running on the date of the accident for any claim an insured might have had for no-fault benefits and does not begin to run only after the insurer dishonored the insured’s assignment of benefits. Pridgen v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 204 Ga. App. 322, 419 S.E.2d 99, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 814 (1992). When a house was not completed at closing, and the parties agreed to place funds in escrow to be released to the builder upon the completion of construction by a certain date, but the funds were subsequently released to the builder without the home being completed, the homeowners had six years from the date of the builder’s breach to sue, which occurred when the funds were released to the builder, less than six years before suit was filed, so the suit was timely. Wallace v. Bock, 279 Ga. 744, 620 S.E.2d 820, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 658 (2005). Proposition that a period of limitations to sue under a construction contract begins to run on the date of substantial completion, i.e., the date that the certificate of occupancy is issued, is certainly applicable in a case when the date of issuance of the certificate of occupancy coincides with the date that the contractor’s obligation under the construction contract became “due and payable,” but it is only the “general rule” and as such is not applicable in all circumstances. Wallace v. Bock, 279 Ga. 744, 620 S.E.2d 820, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 658 (2005). Trial court properly concluded that a plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was time-barred since the breach of the written contract at issue accrued in 1998 and the plaintiff waited until seven years later to file the complaint. Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga. App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 786 (2007). Georgia’s statute of limitations for actions to recover on a written contract did 9-3-24 not bar them from drawing on the letters of credit because the insurers’ right to draw on the letters of credit was not dependent on their ability to successfully bring a breach of contract action under the program agreements (by their terms, the letters of credit were clean and unconditional and the insurers’ right to draw on them is independent of the program agreements); O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 operated to bar only judicial remedies, but the statute did not affect the parties’ substantive rights or bar non-judicial remedies. Williams Serv. Group v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 Fed. Appx. 1, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22004 (11th Cir. 2012). Discovery rule did not apply to breach of contract. — Georgia courts have continuously held that the discovery rule does not apply to breach of contract claims, and other state courts have reached the same result when considering similar factual scenarios. The discovery rule did not apply to the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Odelia v. Alderwoods (Ga.), LLC, 823 Fed. Appx. 742, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 24616 (11th Cir. 2020). Homebuilder’s action against a financing company was time barred since the homebuilder believed that payoff amounts quoted by the financing company were inaccurate when received, and thus had reason to believe that a breach of contract had occurred at that time; O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 required the suit to be brought within six years of that date, but it was not. Koncul Enters. v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 279 Ga. App. 39, 630 S.E.2d 567, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 451 (2006). Conditions precedent. — When condition precedent to right of actions exists, statute of limitations does not begin to run until that condition is performed. Ginn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 119, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10577 (5th Cir. 1969). Applicability. — Summary judgment was properly granted to a buyer as: (1) a seller’s claim was time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725 since a document dated May 5, 2000, was not an invoice to the buyer, but was a compilation of invoices previously submitted to the buyer; (2) even if the seller provided the buyer with services in conjunction with the 183 Running of Limitation (Cont’d) goods it sold, O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725 applied as the predominant element of the agreement was the sale of goods; (3) under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, a commercial account became due and payable upon the date a statement of the account was rendered to the obligor; and (4) the seller’s claim that the six-year limitation period contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 applied was rejected as there was no contract and the claim was not raised before the trial court. All Tech Co. v. Laimer Unicon, LLC, 281 Ga. App. 579, 636 S.E.2d 753, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1177 (2006). Because the complaint was filed on July 1, 2011, to the extent the plaintiff’s backward looking breach of contract claims arose before July 1, 2005, the claims were time-barred. Nebo Ventures, LLC v. NovaPro Risk Solutions, L.P., 324 Ga. App. 836, 752 S.E.2d 18, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 947 (2013), cert. denied, No. S14C0475, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 235 (Ga. Mar. 10, 2014). Accrual of actions. — Because a plaintiff alleged that the defendant, an investment advisory company, committed a breach of fiduciary duty by collecting management fees for certain stock after the stock was categorized as an unmanaged asset, and the categorization occurred some time between March 31, 2001, and June 20, 2001, the plaintiff’s claim accrued within four years of the date of the filing of the complaint and was therefore timely; regardless of whether a four-year or a six-year statute of limitation period was applied, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment as to that particular claim on the ground that it was time-barred. Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga. App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 786 (2007). Cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty accrues each time the defendant commits a wrongful act that causes appreciable damage. Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga. App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 786 (2007). Trial court erred in finding that the agency agreement did not include a provision for indemnification. Because it did, 9-3-24 and because the record did not show that more than six years elapsed between the date upon which the claims for indemnity accrued and the filing of this lawsuit, the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment based on O.C.G.A. § 9-324. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Darryl J. Panella, LLC, 319 Ga. App. 274, 734 S.E.2d 523, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 972 (2012). Trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff because the six year limitations period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 governed the breach of contract action and the action was not commenced within six years of the last breach claimed by the plaintiff. Houghton v. Sacor Financial, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 786 S.E.2d 903, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 307 (2016). Pro se tenant’s breach of contract claim against the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development was time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 8-3-24 since the six year limitations period would have begun to run no later than September 10, 2008, and the tenant filed the tenant’s complaint on September 16, 2014, more than six years after the statute of limitations began to run on the tenant’s contract claims. Smith v. Sec’y, 680 Fed. Appx. 791, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2537 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 96, 199 L. Ed. 2d 62, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 5316 (2017). Trial court did not err in finding the firefighters’ claims over compensation were time-barred because it was undisputed from the record that of fifty firefighters who brought suit against the city, seven were promoted prior to March 31, 2008 and in the March 7, 2017 order, the trial court assumed the pay policy was divisible, and the statute of limitations began to run at the time of each promotion. Shelnutt v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 349 Ga. App. 499, 826 S.E.2d 379, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 190 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C0999, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 807 (Ga. Nov. 18, 2019). Tobacco farmers’ suit time barred. — Trial court properly dismissed the tobacco farmers’ suit for specific performance as time barred because one of the farmers testified that the last application for common stock was in the 1990s and, 184 since the instant lawsuit was filed in 2007, well after the applicable limitation period ran, the claim for specific performance was barred. Rigby v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 327 Ga. App. 29, 755 S.E.2d 915, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 257 (2014), cert. denied, No. S14C1205, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 872 (Ga. Oct. 20, 2014). If act of creditor is necessary to complete cause of action, such as demand or notice, such demand must be made within statutory period for bringing action on contract, and if not made within that period, action will be barred; there are exceptions, however, as when delay in making demand is contemplated by contract itself, as in case of note to be paid on demand at any time within payee’s life. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 69 Ga. App. 628, 26 S.E.2d 557, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 155 (1943). Running of limitation from maturity date of surety’s obligation. — Right of action upon unsealed contract of surety is barred by statute of limitation upon expiration of six years after date of maturity of obligation, not six years after date of execution of agreement, since no right of action accrues until maturity date of obligation. Chatham v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 163 Ga. App. 525, 295 S.E.2d 226, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2562 (1982). Contract payable in installments. — In entire contract for stated sum, providing for payment in annual equal installments, statute of limitations does not begin to run until after date last installment became due. Glass v. Grant, 46 Ga. App. 327, 167 S.E. 727, 1933 Ga. App. LEXIS 50 (1933); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Foster, 53 Ga. App. 21, 184 S.E. 660, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 3 (1936). Statute of limitation as to all payments under an entire contract does not begin to run until after date last payment becomes due. Wall v. Citizens & S. Bank, 153 Ga. App. 29, 264 S.E.2d 523, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1657 (1980), aff’d, 247 Ga. 216, 274 S.E.2d 486, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 645 (1981), overruled, McKeever v. State, 189 Ga. App. 445, 375 S.E.2d 899, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1437 (1988), overruled in part, Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 796 S.E.2d 261, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 33 (2017). 9-3-24 Exercise of acceleration clause. — If creditor elects to exercise option to accelerate maturity of debt, statute of limitation begins to run from time of such election. Wall v. Citizens & S. Bank, 153 Ga. App. 29, 264 S.E.2d 523, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1657 (1980), aff’d, 247 Ga. 216, 274 S.E.2d 486, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 645 (1981), overruled, McKeever v. State, 189 Ga. App. 445, 375 S.E.2d 899, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1437 (1988), overruled in part, Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 796 S.E.2d 261, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 33 (2017). Divisible sublease. — Because a sublessee failed to file its claims under a divisible sublease within the six-year period after they arose, pursuant to the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, and a different limitations period applicable to construction contracts and express warranties did not apply, partial summary judgment to the sublessor as to the timebarred claims was properly entered. New Morn Foods, Inc. v. B & B Egg Co., 286 Ga. App. 29, 648 S.E.2d 428, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 680 (2007). Parties did not express an intent to extend the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions and since the trial court erred in interpreting the anti-waiver clause to extend the statute of limitations period, the trial court also erred in denying the buyer’s motion to dismiss. Wolf Creek Landfill, LLC v. Twiggs County, 337 Ga. App. 211, 786 S.E.2d 862, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 298 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1678, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 825 (Ga. Dec. 8, 2016). Employment contracts. — If employee elects to treat employment contract as continuing after wrongful discharge, right of action as to last installment of the employee’s salary does not accrue until expiration of stipulated term of employment. Rosenstock v. Congregation Agudath Achim, 118 Ga. App. 443, 164 S.E.2d 283, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1424 (1968). Migrant workers’ breach of contract claims. — Contrary to the employers’ argument, the state law breach of contract claims of guest workers from Mexico arising prior to July 11, 2003, were not barred by the two-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 because 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(14) specified that the 185 Running of Limitation (Cont’d) workers held contract claims for underpayment, and the six-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 applied; the workers’ state law breach of contract claims were filed on July 11, 2005, easily within six years of the dates the claims accrued, and so the claims were timely filed under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, and were not subject to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. Morales-Arcadio v. Shannon Produce Farms, Inc., No. 605CV062, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3159 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2006). Immigrant workers’ claims. — When plaintiff Mexican temporary farm workers filed a breach of contract claim against defendant employer, alleging the employer violated the terms of an immigration clearance order, which promised compliance with all employment-related law and reimbursement for certain expenses and payment of wages on a weekly basis, the six-year statute of limitations for simple contracts, provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, applied to such claims, rather than the two-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 as to payment of wages because regulations governing the worker program expressly stated that the job clearance order created a contract between the employer and the worker, thus invoking the six-year statute of limitations specified in § 9-3-24. Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22921 (S.D. Ga. 2010). Date city policy changed triggered statute. — City’s policy of paying employees for up to 90 days of sick leave upon retirement was not an executory contract, and therefore, the city’s decision to phase out the policy triggered the running of the statute of limitations, and not the employee’s retirement date, even though the amount of payment would be calculated at the time of retirement. City of Lafayette v. Bates, 234 Ga. App. 662, 507 S.E.2d 252. Severable contract. — An action alleging that defendant company breached a sales representative agreement by removing areas from the representative’s territory and by repeatedly reducing the commission rate below that provided in the agreement was not time barred as to 9-3-24 sales within the six-year limitation period prior to the suit, even though the removal of territory and rate reduction occurred more than six years before the suit was brought, since the commissions were not due until sales were consummated. Douglas & Lomason Co. v. Hall, 212 Ga. App. 475, 441 S.E.2d 870, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 304 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1045, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 700 (Ga. May 5, 1994). Life insurance policies. — In absence of policy provision postponing time of payment of insurance, statutory period of limitation runs from time of insured’s death, if on such date demand could be made payable by presenting proper proof. Burton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 828, 173 S.E. 922, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 213 (1934). When insurance policy provides for payment upon receipt and approval of proof of death, statute does not commence to run until company either approves proof of death or refuses to concede death, not from the date of the death. Burton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 828, 173 S.E. 922, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 213 (1934). Disability insurance contracts. — Right of action upon insurance contract with provision that no payment thereunder shall be payable until submission of due proof of disability does not ordinarily arise until sum claimed thereunder is due and payable. Patrick v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 51 Ga. App. 253, 180 S.E. 141, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 653 (1935). On cause of action of beneficiary of insurance policy for money payable by reason of disability, statute begins to run from day on which the person could have made demand payable by presenting proper proof of total and permanent disabilities, for on that date beneficiary, by the beneficiary’s own act and in spite of insurance company, might have made demand payable by proper notice or proof of loss. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 69 Ga. App. 628, 26 S.E.2d 557, 1943 Ga. App. LEXIS 155 (1943). Dentist filed a lawsuit more than seven years after submitting a claim for benefits under the dentist’s disability insurance policies; thus, the dentist’s suit was untimely, both under the provisions of the 186 policies, and under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Giddens v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of the United States, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26981 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 445 F.3d 1286, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8970 (11th Cir. 2006). Trial court did not err in finding that a retirement plan participant’s breach of contract action, which was related to the denial of the participant’s claim for disability benefits, was barred by the sixyear statute of limitation contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 because the participant brought the participant’s claim for benefits under a retirement plan more than six years after those benefits became due and payable; the six-year statute of limitation began to run when the participant received a Social Security award because at that point, the participant satisfied the conditions precedent for disability benefits, and those benefits became due and payable under the retirement plan. Paschal v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. Emples. Ret. Plan, 305 Ga. App. 6, 699 S.E.2d 357, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 661 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1888, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 72 (Ga. Jan. 24, 2011). When “no action” clause of insurance contract specifically prohibits action for breach of contract until injured party has secured final judgment against insured, statute of limitations does not begin to run until date of such final judgment. Ginn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 119, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 10577 (5th Cir. 1969). Inapplicable to fire insurance policy with express contrary language. — One-year time-to-sue clause in an insured’s homeowner’s insurance policy was clear and unambiguous, and it was not tolled during the 60-day loss payment period; as the insured’s suit was not filed within the one-year period from the date of loss, as required in the policy, the insured’s action against the insurer was properly dismissed. The limitations period pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 was not controlling due to the clear and unambiguous policy language. Thornton v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 287 Ga. 379, 695 S.E.2d 642, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 483 (2010). 9-3-24 Statute of limitations in claims for optional benefits begins to run on the date of the accident, and the claim for optional benefits under O.C.G.A. § 3334-5 (since repealed) must be filed within six years thereof, as provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Bryant v.