O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 — Roberts v

Georgia, 228 Fed. Appx. 851, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8005 (11th Cir. 2007). Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. — Employee’s race discrimination claims against an employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, based on a failure to promote, were barred by the applicable two-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Saunders v. Emory Healthcare, Inc., 360 Fed. Appx. 110, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 615 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1216, 131 S. Ct. 1473, 179 L. Ed. 2d 300, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 1389 (2011), superseded by statute as stated in, Higgens v. Trident Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 16-24035-Civ, 9-3-33 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224483 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 2017). Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. — There was no error in dismissing the petitioner’s civil rights complaint without prejudice and the petitioner’s subsequent motion to reconsider because the petitioner did not identify any legal standards or procedures the judge improperly applied, manifest errors in fact-ﬁnding by the judge, or newly discovered evidence; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the Section 1983 action was brought. McFarlin v. Douglas County, 587 Fed. Appx. 593, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18700 (11th Cir. 2014). Because imposition of a sentence upon a plea of nolo contendere was not a dismissal or a nolle prosse, O.C.G.A. § 35-337(h)(2)(A), providing for restriction of access to certain criminal history records, did not apply to an applicant’s plea of nolo contendre to theft by taking; and the applicant’s civil rights claim was barred by the statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 9-333. Nasir v. Gwinnett County State Court, 341 Ga. App. 63, 798 S.E.2d 695, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 143 (2017), cert. denied, No. S17C1482, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 808 (Ga. Sept. 13, 2017). Relevancy of delay in ﬁling action. — If the plaintiff has ﬁled the plaintiff’s lawsuit within the statute of limitation, the plaintiff is entitled to seek to recover without having to address the irrelevant issue of why the plaintiff failed to institute the litigation earlier. The law only requires that a plaintiff ﬁle a lawsuit within the applicable statute of limitation. Therefore, the only “delay” in ﬁling a complaint that has any legal relevancy whatsoever is that which renders the complaint untimely, not that which merely renders the complaint nearly untimely. Turner v. W.E. Pruett Co., 202 Ga. App. 287, 414 S.E.2d 248, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1737 (1991), cert. denied, No. S92C0469, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. Feb. 4, 1992). Length of time that has passed between an allegedly actionable occurrence and the giving of an eyewitness’ account of that 246 occurrence may be relevant to the credibility of that eyewitness’ account. The memory of any eyewitness, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant, can fade over time. However, the length of time that has passed between an allegedly actionable occurrence and the ﬁling of a lawsuit based upon that occurrence has absolutely no arguable relevance whatsoever to the credibility of the plaintiff’s eyewitnesses. Turner v. W.E. Pruett Co., 202 Ga. App. 287, 414 S.E.2d 248, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1737 (1991), cert. denied, No. S92C0469, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. Feb. 4, 1992). Separate classiﬁcation of medical malpractice actions is rational exercise of legislative power, as is different treatment for actions for loss of consortium arising out of medical malpractice, insofar as limitation of actions is concerned. Hamby v. Neurological Assocs., P.C., 243 Ga. 698, 256 S.E.2d 378, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1034 (1979); Perry v. Atlanta Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 255 Ga. 431, 339 S.E.2d 264, 1986 Ga. LEXIS 544 (1986). Accrual of damages not limited. — Statute of limitations sets time in which action must be ﬁled, but does not limit time in which damages may accrue, as the plaintiff may by amendment allege and prove additional damages which may have occurred after action is ﬁled. Renfroe v. Bronson, 156 Ga. App. 216, 274 S.E.2d 659, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3003 (1980). Word “year” in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 means a calendar year, that is, from January 1 to December 31, inclusive. Georgia R.R. & Banking v. Thigpen, 113 Ga. App. 65, 147 S.E.2d 346, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 968 (1966). Day of injury counts. — In computing time, day on which act was done is included. Peterson v. Georgia R.R. & Banking, 97 Ga. 798, 25 S.E. 370, 1895 Ga. LEXIS 585 (1895). Day of the injury must be counted in determining whether action was brought within period of limitation, and no fractions of day are recognized. Dowling v. Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290, 39 S.E.2d 576, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 521 (1946); Lowe v. Bailey, 112 Ga. App. 516, 145 S.E.2d 622, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 758 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 824, 87 S. Ct. 56, 17 L. 9-3-33 Ed. 2d 61, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 665 (1966), overruled, Lowe v. Pue, 150 Ga. App. 234, 257 S.E.2d 209, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2129 (1979); Davis v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 280, 147 S.E.2d 868, 1966 Ga. App. LEXIS 1037 (1966), overruled, Lowe v. Pue, 150 Ga. App. 234, 257 S.E.2d 209, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2129 (1979); Holliday v. Lacy, 118 Ga. App. 341, 163 S.E.2d 750, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 932 (1968). Effect of O.C.G.A. §§ 1-3-1(d)(3) and 9-11-6(a). — Time provisions of former Code 1933, § 102-102 and Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, §§ 5 and 6 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 13-1(d)(3) and 9-11-6(a)) will not permit claim that was otherwise bound by twoyear statute of limitations in former Code 1933, § 3-1004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-333) to be ﬁled two years to the day after the date of the accident. Reese v. Henderson, 156 Ga. App. 809, 275 S.E.2d 664, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3208 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in Davis v. DESA Int’l, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 318, 433 S.E.2d 410, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 874 (1993), superseded by statute as stated in Weems v. Munson Transp., 210 Ga. App. 766, 437 S.E.2d 640, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1324 (1993). When the plaintiff’s cause of action sounded in two phases, one setting forth an action for slander and the second for an interference with the plaintiff’s business, the trial court erred in granting the defendant summary judgment on the basis of the bar of the statute of limitations, under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, since the cause of action arose some three years prior to when the suit was brought. Hill v. Crabb, 166 Ga. App. 387, 304 S.E.2d 510, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2180 (1983). Wrongful death action. — In a wrongful death action, the Georgia statute of limitations was applicable because it constituted substantive law under Maryland’s choice of law rules. Potts v. United Technologies Corp., 879 F. Supp. 1196, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20327 (N.D. Ga. 1994). As children of a deceased nursing home resident had not served two defendants by the time of a hearing on their motion to dismiss the wrongful death complaint against them, which hearing was held more than 17 months after the suit was 247 General Consideration (Cont’d) ﬁled and more than eight months after the motion seeking dismissal on the grounds of laches, and the children offered no reason for the delay, there was no abuse of discretion in granting the dismissal request; there was a two-year limitation period on the wrongful death claim under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, and the ﬁrst complaint had been ﬁled two days before that statutory period expired. Williams v. Alvista Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 283 Ga. App. 613, 642 S.E.2d 232, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 137 (2007). Plaintiffs’ motion to add the decedent’s widow as a plaintiff in the wrongful death action was improperly denied as the plaintiff’s motion met the relation-back requirements because the proposed amendment would not have altered the substance of the wrongful death claim or changed the underlying circumstances set forth in the original complaint; the widow’s claim clearly arose out of the same occurrence as that alleged in the original complaint; there was no evidence of prejudice to the defendants or dilatory tactics by the plaintiffs as the original complaint was ﬁled within the applicable statute of limitation; and, although the widow initially did not want to participate in the lawsuit, later the widow’s mind was changed. Seay v. Valdosta Kidney Clinic, LLC, 353 Ga. App. 378, 837 S.E.2d 529, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 3 (2020). Cause of action for legal malpractice, alleging negligence or unskillfulness, may sound in tort and thus be subject to the one-year and/or two-year limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga. App. 411, 306 S.E.2d 340, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2506 (1983), aff’d, 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d 818, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 607 (1984); Kilby v. Shepherd, 177 Ga. App. 462, 339 S.E.2d 742, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1443 (1986). Cause of action for legal malpractice, alleging negligence or unskillfulness, sounds in contract (agency) and, in the case of an oral agreement, is subject to the four-year statute of limitation in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, but a cause of action can also sound in tort and, thus, be subject to the 9-3-33 one-year and/or two-year limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Ballard v. Frey, 179 Ga. App. 455, 346 S.E.2d 893, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2765 (1984); Coleman v. Hicks, 209 Ga. App. 467, 433 S.E.2d 621, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 904 (1993), cert. denied, No. S93C1714, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 1076 (Ga. Nov. 5, 1993). When the defendant’s counterclaim did not seek tort damages for any “injuries to the person” within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, but sought only those damages alleged to be the result of plaintiff-attorney’s negligent breach of a contract of employment, the trial court erred in striking the counterclaim based upon the twoyear statute of limitation defense. Ballard v. Frey, 179 Ga. App. 455, 346 S.E.2d 893, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2765 (1984). Legal malpractice claim may sound either in tort or contract, depending on the circumstances. The circumstances on which it depends, however, are those involving the attorney-client relationship, the duty involved, and the breach thereof, not those involving the nature of the underlying action for which the attorney was consulted or retained. Plumlee v. Davis, 221 Ga. App. 848, 473 S.E.2d 510. In a legal malpractice action based on the defendant’s failure to advise the plaintiff regarding the applicable statute of limitation in a prior action, the statute of limitation began to run when the statute of limitation on the plaintiff’s original personal injury claim expired without suit being ﬁled. Harrison v. Beckham, 238 Ga. App. 199, 518 S.E.2d 435. Actions barred. — Action brought on December 3, 1952, for damages for injuries to the person alleged to have been sustained on December 3, 1950, was barred by this section. Gibson v. Kelley, 88 Ga. App. 817, 78 S.E.2d 76, 1953 Ga. App. LEXIS 1216 (1953). Action brought November 24, 1964, to recover damages for injury sustained November 24, 1962, is barred by this section, as running of the statute begins on the day the injury was suffered, without reference to time of day or fractions of days. Earwood v. Liberty Loan Corp., 136 Ga. App. 799, 222 S.E.2d 204, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1488 (1975). Since the automobile collision occurred on April 7, 1978, at 5:00 p.m., and the 248 plaintiff ﬁled a complaint on Monday, April 7, 1980, at 3:56 p.m., the claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in this section. Reese v. Henderson, 156 Ga. App. 809, 275 S.E.2d 664, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 3208 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in Davis v. DESA Int’l, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 318, 433 S.E.2d 410, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 874 (1993), superseded by statute as stated in Weems v. Munson Transp., 210 Ga. App. 766, 437 S.E.2d 640, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1324 (1993). Trial court properly dismissed the second of two personal injury lawsuits, with prejudice, as such did not act as a renewal action, given evidence that the ﬁrst suit, though timely ﬁled, was void because service was never perfected; moreover, dismissal was properly entered with prejudice as res judicata barred the litigant from ﬁling a subsequent lawsuit on a claim that was already held as timebarred. Towe v. Connors, 284 Ga. App. 320, 644 S.E.2d 176, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 294 (2007). Because the alleged incident in a hospital occurred nearly ﬁve years before the complaint was ﬁled, the claims involving a hospital incident were time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; thus, the district court did not abuse the court’s discretion in dismissing the action against the state and several of the state’s officials. Simon v. Georgia, 282 Fed. Appx. 739, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13048 (11th Cir. 2008). Resident’s third automobile personal injury lawsuit against a former resident was properly dismissed because service of the resident’s second lawsuit was not perfected in accordance with the Georgia Long-Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and the period of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 ran before the third lawsuit (allegedly as a renewal of the second lawsuit under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61) was ﬁled. Coles v. Reese, 316 Ga. App. 545, 730 S.E.2d 33, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 605 (2012). Trial court should have dismissed an employee’s tort claims against a supervisor because an arbitration between them and their employer was not a proceeding that could be renewed under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a), and the claims were untimely under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 since the claims 9-3-33 were not ﬁled within six months of the dismissal or discontinuation of the employee’s earlier federal action. Green v. Flanagan, 317 Ga. App. 152, 730 S.E.2d 161, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 634 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1993, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 282 (Ga. Mar. 18, 2013). Many of the actions cited by an employee as supporting the employee’s intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress claims related to failure to promote the employee were barred by Georgia’s twoyear statute of limitations at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; the statute’s four-year period related to consortium claims. Scott v. Rite Aid of Ga., Inc., 918 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7606 (M.D. Ga. 2013). Conclusion that the personal injury claimant was guilty of laches was upheld based on a ﬁnding that the claimant ﬁrst attempted to serve the opposing party ﬁve days before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, the opposing party was not served until a month after the initial attempt, and the claimant failed to explain how the claimant determined the opposing party’s last address. Walker v. Culpepper, 321 Ga. App. 629, 742 S.E.2d 144, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 358 (2013), overruled in part, Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Ga. App. 314, 765 S.E.2d 413, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 717 (2014). Trial court properly dismissed the employee’s claims for defamation, intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress, and negligent retention as barred by the statute of limitations because the limitations periods were only one or two years, the complaint was not ﬁled until nearly four years after the employee was terminated, and the statute of limitations was not tolled due to fraudulent concealment, which the employee knew about when the employee ﬁled the employee’s federal action, more than two years earlier. Clemons v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 844, 790 S.E.2d 814, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 497 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0519, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 427 (Ga. May 15, 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 657, 199 L. Ed. 2d 532, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 457 (2018). Insurance subrogation actions. — Under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(f), in a subrogation action by an insurer to recover 249 General Consideration (Cont’d) personal injury payments made to its insured, the insurer is bound by the twoyear limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, not the 20-year limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-322. Whirl v. Safeco Ins. Co., 241 Ga. App. 654, 527 S.E.2d 262, 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 1683 (1999), cert. denied, No. S00C0682, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 437 (Ga. May 26, 2000). Negligence of court clerk. — Action brought to recover damages from superior court clerk for negligent failure to send record in appeal case to Supreme Court within time required by law was an action to recover damages for conversion of personal property, not an action for injury to the person under this section. Singletary v. GMAC, 73 F.2d 453, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 2730 (5th Cir. 1934). Maritime injuries. — In action brought by shore worker as vicarious seaman to recover for maritime injuries caused by negligence or unseaworthiness of vessel, appropriate statute of limitations period is not this section, but rather three-year period under federal Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 688). Flowers v. Savannah Mach. & Foundry Co., 310 F.2d 135, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 3547 (5th Cir. 1962). Application to mandamus claim. — After federal claims were dismissed in a former employee’s action against a county employer, the employee’s mandamus claims against a county official for reinstatement were not straightforward so as to allow the court to accept jurisdiction of state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because it was unclear whether ante litem notice was required under O.C.G.A. § 3611-1 and whether a one-year limitations of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applied to the mandamus claim. Toma v. Columbia County, No. CV 106-145, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30096 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2007). Application to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. — Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. E. 2d 254 (1985), requires the retroactive application of the two-year limitations period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 for personal injuries to all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in Georgia. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27436 (11th Cir. 1986); Day v. Brown, 207 Ga. App. 134, 9-3-33 427 S.E.2d 104, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (1993). Georgia two-year limitations period for personal injuries under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising in Georgia, but state tolling provisions apply to § 1983 claims as well. Camps v. City of Warner Robins, 822 F. Supp. 724, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7079 (M.D. Ga. 1993). In an employment discrimination case in which a former employee’s initial complaint was dismissed without prejudice because the former employee had not effected service within 120 days, a district court’s dismissal of the former employee’s 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims in a second complaint was affirmed because the claims were not timely under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, the Georgia statute borrowed for 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims. Since the former employee’s initial complaint had been dismissed by court order granting the defendants’ motions, the former employee’s initial suit was void and incapable of renewal under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61. Miller v. Georgia, 223 Fed. Appx. 842, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6218 (11th Cir. 2007). In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which a death row inmate challenged Georgia’s three-drug lethal injection method, the complaint was untimely; the complaint was governed by the two-year statute of limitations found in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, and the inmate’s claim accrued in 2001 when the General Assembly adopted lethal injection as Georgia’s method of execution for death sentences as found in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-38. Alderman v. Donald, 293 Fed. Appx. 693, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 19072 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 943, 129 S. Ct. 27, 171 L. Ed. 2d 930, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5428 (2008). Detainee’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against six unnamed deputies were dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(n) when more than two years after bringing suit and more than four years after the detainee’s alleged injury occurred, the detainee failed to substitute named parties as defendants, and thus, the two-year limitations period in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims expired. Williams v. Barrett, 287 Fed. Appx. 768, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15329 (11th Cir. 2008). 250 Appeal from denial of a prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging Eighth Amendment violations was frivolous because all of the prisoner’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Kellat v. Douglas County, No. 10-15713-D, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26442 (11th Cir. Apr. 7, 2011). In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in which a pro se inmate appealed a district court’s adverse ruling on the inmate’s deliberate indifference claim, that claim was untimely under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 and the inmate did not meet the standard in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90(a) to toll the limitations period. Though the inmate undoubtedly had mental problems both before and after the assault in prison, under medication the inmate was able to manage the ordinary affairs of the inmate’s life. Thompson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 485 Fed. Appx. 345, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12274 (11th Cir. 2012). Application to Bivens claims. — Two-year personal injury limitations period applied to claims for damages for malicious prosecution and various constitutional violations under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16633 (11th Cir. 1996). Claims for damages for malicious prosecution and various constitutional violations under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) accrued on the date plaintiff’s convictions were reversed. Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16633 (11th Cir. 1996). Injuries to Person Two-year limitation of action for wrongful death is public policy of this state, which bars institution of such litigation after lapse of this period; this period cannot be extended by legislatures of foreign states. Taylor v. Murray, 231 Ga. 852, 204 S.E.2d 747, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 1259 (1974). Injury to person is injury to physical body of the person. Dalrymple v. Brunswick Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 Ga. App. 754, 181 S.E. 597, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 464 (1935). 9-3-33 Personal injuries are not conﬁned to injuries to body. Hutcherson v. Durden, 113 Ga. 987, 39 S.E. 495, 1901 Ga. LEXIS 443 (1901). Personal injuries include all actionable injuries to individual. — Injuries to the person, within meaning of this section, are not conﬁned to physical injuries, but rather to all actionable injuries to the individual personally, as distinguished from injuries to the individual’s property or property rights. Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6564 (S.D. Ga. 1974). Phrase “injuries to the person” includes not only injuries to physical body, but every other injury for which an action may be brought done to the individual and not to the individual’s property; pain and suffering, medical expenses, and lost earnings are part of injury to the person. Sharpe v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 528 F.2d 546, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 12456 (5th Cir. 1976). District court properly dismissed an inmate’s civil rights action sua sponte as theft-based claims arising from allegations that corrections officials, inter alia, conspired to harass the inmate and destroyed business and personal interests, were barred by the limitations period, the inmate did not assert that equitable tolling applied, and the statutory tolling provisions were inapplicable. Seibert v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 680 Fed. Appx. 837, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3247 (11th Cir. 2017). Bivens action. — Two-year period of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applies to a so-called Bivens action alleging conduct by federal agents in violation of a person’s constitutional rights. S.W. Daniel, Inc. v. Urrea, 715 F. Supp. 1082, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10852 (N.D. Ga. 1989). Monetary loss or damage resulting from injury must be recovered within two years, not four. Leggett v. Benton Bros. Drayage & Storage Co., 138 Ga. App. 761, 227 S.E.2d 397, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2646 (1976). Injury to one’s health is an injury to the person, as are any resulting monetary damages. Dalrymple v. Brunswick 251 Injuries to Person (Cont’d) Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 Ga. App. 754, 181 S.E. 597, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 464 (1935). Claim for injury to earning capacity is claim for injury to the person, and therefore the statute of limitation is two years. Leggett v. Benton Bros. Drayage & Storage Co., 138 Ga. App. 761, 227 S.E.2d 397, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2646 (1976). Applicable statute of limitation for lost wages arising out of personal injury done to the plaintiff is two years. Leggett v. Benton Bros. Drayage & Storage Co., 138 Ga. App. 761, 227 S.E.2d 397, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2646 (1976). Battery resulting from unauthorized operation. — Statute of limitations for battery resulting from an unauthorized operation is the two-year statute of limitations for injuries to the person and the four-year statute of limitations for loss of consortium. Gowen v. Carpenter, 189 Ga. App. 477, 376 S.E.2d 384, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1455 (1988); Gowen v. Cady, 189 Ga. App. 473, 376 S.E.2d 390, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 1454 (1988). Civil rights actions. — Two-year limitation in actions for injuries to persons is applicable to civil rights actions. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12766 (D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 480 F.2d 805, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11519 (5th Cir. 1973). Invasion of privacy claim was governed by the two-year statute of limitation for injury to the person, and not by the one-year statute of limitation for injury to reputation. Hudson v. Montcalm Publishing Corp., 190 Ga. App. 629, 379 S.E.2d 572, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 377 (1989). Invasion of privacy and intrusion on seclusion claims were untimely as to a program that was activated on the plaintiffs’ computer more than two years before the complaint was ﬁled. As to other alleged conduct, a voluntarily dismissed class action did not toll a subsequent class action based on the same conduct, and Georgia law did not apply to information allegedly gathered outside Georgia. Krise v. Sei/Aaron’s, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1209- 9-3-33 TWT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133818 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2017). Federal civil rights actions. — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 provides a two-year limitations period for “actions for injuries to the person,” and is the statute of limitations that applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions heard by federal district courts sitting in Georgia. Sadiqq v. Bramlett, 559 F. Supp. 362, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18795 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Since the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not contain its own statute of limitations, it is well settled that the period of limitations to be used is the most analogous one provided by state law. The applicable limitations period for ﬁrst amendment and due process claims is not the six-month period provided by O.C.G.A. § 45-19-36 for ﬁling an administrative complaint for unlawful discrimination committed by a public employer; the most analogous limitations period provided by Georgia law for these claims appears to be either the one provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (enforcement of statutory rights) or the one provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (injuries to person or reputation). Cook v. Ashmore, 579 F. Supp. 78, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20170 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Georgia’s two year limitations period for actions for injuries to the person (including wrongful death) is also applicable to plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Robinette v. Johnston, 637 F. Supp. 922, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24057 (M.D. Ga. 1986). Proper limitations period for all federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Georgia is the two-year limitations period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-333. Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6687 (11th Cir. 1987). Two-year limitation set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applies to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Byrd v. City of Atlanta, 683 F. Supp. 804, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2676 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Two-year personal injury limitations period applied to a claim against the state and a county alleging racial discrimination in the siting and permitting of a solid 252 waste landﬁll under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 2000d. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14607 (11th Cir. 1996). Georgia Tort Claims Act does not expand the state’s exposure for federal civil rights actions beyond that provided in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Doe #102 v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 582, 492 S.E.2d 516. Employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was time-barred because the last discriminatory act did not occur within two years of the date plaintiff ﬁled the complaint. Welch v. Delta Air Lines, 978 F. Supp. 1133, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15030 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Parent’s intervention in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages for the wrongful death of a child was barred because the parent ﬁled the parent’s motion more than two years after the parent’s cause of action accrued. Miracle by Miracle v. Spooner, 978 F. Supp. 1161, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16150 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Appellants’ § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims against a school district arising out of the wife’s termination was a tort action and, thus, the district court properly held that it was barred by the two year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 and, as the § 1983 claim was the only basis for federal question jurisdiction, it properly dismissed state contract and tort claims. Because appeal would be frivolous, appellants’ motion for in forma pauperis status was denied. Falls-Miller v. Savannah-Chatham Cty. Pub. Sch. Bd., No. 20-14594-HH, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9750 (11th Cir. Apr. 2, 2021). Relation back of civil rights claim based on alleged conspiracy between defendants and judge. — Federal civil rights claim grounded on allegations of a malicious conspiracy between the defendants and the judge who issued a restraining order, brought three years after the accrual of the cause of action and after the original claim for breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual rights, and indemnity, did not relate back and was barred by the statute of limitations. Henson v. American Family Corp., 171 Ga. App. 724, 321 S.E.2d 205, 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 3002 (1984). 9-3-33 Tortious communication of disease, such as tuberculosis of the lungs, by one person to another by causing an individual to work with a person suffering from the disease, is an injury to the person, and any monetary loss or damages ﬂowing therefrom are recoverable as damages ﬂowing from an injury to the person; hence, right of action accrues immediately upon communication of the disease. Dalrymple v. Brunswick Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 Ga. App. 754, 181 S.E. 597, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 464 (1935). Action for damages brought by administrator under former Code 1933, §§ 105-1309 and 105-1310 (see now O.C.G.A. § 51-4-5) to recover for beneﬁt of dependent next of kin of deceased is action for injury done to the person, and must be brought within two-year period of limitation prescribed by former Code 1933, § 3-1004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-333). Patellis v. King, 52 Ga. App. 118, 182 S.E. 808, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 73 (1935). Malicious notice of intent to sue. — When the defendant maliciously sent the plaintiff, who did not owe it anything, notice of intention to sue in June, 1937, thereby frightening the plaintiff, making the plaintiff nervous, and causing a nervous breakdown which was completed in September, 1939, resulting in permanent impairment of the plaintiff’s health, and action was not brought until June, 1941, cause of action, if any, was barred by the statute of limitations. Fraser v. Atlanta Title & Trust Co., 66 Ga. App. 630, 19 S.E.2d 38, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 254 (1942). Malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest and imprisonment. — Actions for malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of legal process, for false arrest or false imprisonment, or for malicious use of civil process are all actions for damages for injuries to the person of the party complainant, and under this section are not barred until two years after they arise. McCullough v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 50 Ga. App. 237, 177 S.E. 601, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 717 (1934) (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33). Action for malicious use of civil process is action for injury to the person, rather than one for injury to the reputation, and 253 Injuries to Person (Cont’d) therefore is not barred under this section until two years after the cause of action accrues. Securities Inv. Co. v. Bennett, 117 Ga. App. 415, 160 S.E.2d 602, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1109 (1968). Action ﬁled by administrator for damages from malicious arrest and prosecution of intestate is subject to two year statute of limitation in this section. Nevels v. Detroiter Mobile Homes, 124 Ga. App. 112, 183 S.E.2d 77, 1971 Ga. App. LEXIS 832 (1971). False imprisonment is injury to the person that must be brought within two years of release from imprisonment. Meyers v. Glover, 152 Ga. App. 679, 263 S.E.2d 539, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 3005 (1979), overruled, McCord v. Jones, 168 Ga. App. 891, 311 S.E.2d 209, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2947 (1983). Statute of limitation for malicious prosecution is two years. Brown v. Quarles, 154 Ga. App. 350, 268 S.E.2d 403, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2160 (1980). Suit for malicious prosecution must be brought within two years after the underlying criminal prosecution is ended in plaintiff’s favor. Daniel v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 255 Ga. 29, 334 S.E.2d 659, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 848 (1985). Malicious prosecution action resulting from incarceration on warrants charging the plaintiff with writing bad checks accrued when the statute of limitations on the criminal charges expired without the plaintiff having been prosecuted, not when the warrants were “dismissed” by the district attorney’s office. Banta v. Quik-Thrift Food Stores, Inc., 187 Ga. App. 250, 370 S.E.2d 3, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 646 (1988). Action for false imprisonment must be brought within two years of its accrual, which is from the release from imprisonment. Reese v. Clayton County, 185 Ga. App. 207, 363 S.E.2d 618, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2474 (1987); Campbell v. Hyatt Regency, 193 Ga. App. 542, 388 S.E.2d 341, 1989 Ga. App. LEXIS 1537 (1989). False imprisonment is an intentional tort. The action must be brought within two years of its accrual, which is from the release from imprisonment. Collier v. Ev- 9-3-33 ans, 199 Ga. App. 763, 406 S.E.2d 90, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 649 (1991). Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim was not time barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations because that claim did not accrue until the charges against the plaintiffs were dropped, which was within the two-year limitations period; the plaintiffs’ claim for false imprisonment was time barred because the plaintiffs were no longer falsely imprisoned after the defendants obtained an arrest warrant, which was more than two years prior to the plaintiffs ﬁling their complaint, and the plaintiffs did not suffer a continuing tort of false imprisonment once the plaintiffs were held pursuant to the warrant. Black v. Wigington, No. 1:12CV-03365-RWS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13003 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 811 F.3d 1259, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1057 (11th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff’s false arrest complaint against the defendants, an officer and a city, was untimely because the plaintiff’s claim for false arrest accrued on May 18, 2011, which was when a magistrate judge reviewed the plaintiff’s charges to ﬁx the amount of the bond and the plaintiff was released on bail, the plaintiff had two years from May 18, 2011, when the plaintiff started being held pursuant to legal process, to commence an action for false arrest, and the plaintiff waited more than two years, until July 19, 2013, to ﬁle the complaint. White v. Hiers, 652 Fed. Appx. 784, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10402 (11th Cir. 2016). Abusive litigation. — In a suit seeking damages for abusive litigation, when the action complained of was reduced to judgment in 1984, and the instant action was not ﬁled until 1988, the trial court correctly found that the action for abusive litigation was time barred. Walker v. McLarty, 199 Ga. App. 460, 405 S.E.2d 294, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 540 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1038, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 746 (Ga. May 15, 1991). But see Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (reversing Graves v. State, 227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 874 (1997)). Interference with right to testify. — Action for recovery of damages for interference with the plaintiff’s right to testify 254 as witness is one for injuries to the person and must be commenced within two years of alleged interference. Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6564 (S.D. Ga. 1974). Wrongful death. — Action for damages for homicide instituted by administrator of deceased to recover for beneﬁt of dependent brother of deceased is an action for injury done to the person, and must be brought within two years from time of injury. King v. Patellis, 181 Ga. 157, 181 S.E. 667, 1935 Ga. LEXIS 48 (1935). Action by wife to recover damages for negligent homicide of husband is action for injury done to the person, and must be brought within two years after the date of the husband’s death. Ivester v. Southern Ry., 61 Ga. App. 364, 6 S.E.2d 214, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 298 (1939); Odom v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 208 Ga. 45, 64 S.E.2d 889, 1951 Ga. LEXIS 530 (1951). Uninsured motorist case. — Trial court erroneously dismissed the insured party’s uninsured motorist action against the insurer; the insured party, by attempting service twice, showed due diligence under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e) in determining that the defendant, who allegedly struck the insured party, had either departed from the state or could not, after due diligence, be found within the state, and the insured party made all three requests for service by publication before the statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 expired, and the latter two requests were pending for decision by the trial court for more than three months in violation of O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21(b). Luca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 281 Ga. App. 658, 637 S.E.2d 86, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1195 (2006). Traffic violation pending, which tolled limitations period. — Summary judgment in favor of the defendant was reversed because the plaintiff met the plaintiff’s burden of producing evidence that the two year limitation period applicable to the plaintiff’s tort suit had not run because the limitation was tolled as the plaintiff established that the prosecution of the defendant for the traffic violation remained pending in municipal court until November 18, 2014, which was less than two years before the lawsuit was 9-3-33 ﬁled. Williams v. Durden, 347 Ga. App. 363, 819 S.E.2d 524, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 569 (2018). Injuries due to seller’s negligence. — This section is applicable when personal injuries arise due to the seller’s negligence. Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14052 (N.D. Ga. 1975). When cause of action for medical malpractice arose prior to July 1, 1977, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 applied rather than O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71. Morgan v. Carter, 157 Ga. App. 218, 276 S.E.2d 889, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 1712 (1981). This section does not apply when action against common carrier is upon contract to safely carry even though breach alleged resulted in injuries to the person for which damages are sought to be recovered. Patterson v. Augusta & S.R.R., 94 Ga. 140, 21 S.E. 283, 1894 Ga. LEXIS 31 (1894). Pregnancy as injury in negligent sterilization action. — After the mother sued a doctor for alleged negligent sterilization, the pregnancy was the injury, and the general tort statute of limitations did not begin to run until the occurrence of this injury. Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 803 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in Quinn v. Stafford, 257 Ga. 608, 362 S.E.2d 49, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 995 (1987). Applies to action on theory of strict liability. — There is no reason to differentiate between actions for personal injuries brought under a theory of strict liability as opposed to negligence for purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Since O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b) must be strictly construed, the 1978 amendment thereof, which provides that strict product liability actions must be brought within ten years from sale or use, was not intended to preclude the application of a general statute of limitations, such as § 9-3-33, which would otherwise apply, or to suggest that no general statute of limitations applied to strict products liability actions under § 51-1-11(b) prior to the 1978 amendment. Daniel v. American Optical Corp., 251 Ga. 166, 304 S.E.2d 383, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 759 (1983). Time of discovery of injury caused by intrauterine device. — In an action 255 Injuries to Person (Cont’d) brought against the manufacturer of an intrauterine device by a user for personal injuries sustained, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when the user knew or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the causal relationship between her injuries and the manufacturer’s alleged misconduct, so a federal district court erred in granting summary judgment for the manufacturer on the ground that the action was barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Ballew v. A.H. Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 26068 (11th Cir. 1982). Recording of telephone conversations. — Two-year statute of limitations applicable to injuries to the person, rather than four-year limitation applicable to property damage, is applied to cause of action for invasion of privacy arising out of recordings of telephone conversations. Jones v. Hudgins, 163 Ga. App. 793, 295 S.E.2d 119, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2652 (1982). Medical expenses constitute damage ﬂowing from personal injury, and are thus subject to the two-year limitation period for personal injury claims set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; to hold otherwise would enable litigants to circumvent the limitation period for personal injuries by declaring that the damages being sought constituted property claims. Epps v. Hin, 255 Ga. App. 370, 565 S.E.2d 577, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 631 (2002). Intentional termination of life support a wrongful death claim, not a malpractice claim. — Trial court properly refused to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim asserting tortious termination of life support based on the defendant’s argument that it was really a medical malpractice claim and, therefore, required an expert medical affidavit under O.C.G.A. § 9-119.1; because such a claim is a suit for wrongful death, not medical malpractice, no expert medical affidavit was necessary. DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hawkins, 288 Ga. App. 840, 655 S.E.2d 823, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1269 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0710, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 477 (Ga. May 19, 2008), overruled in part, Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (2016). 9-3-33 Because the four-year time limit does not apply to loss of consortium claims arising out of medical malpractice, and the plaintiffs only have two years in which to ﬁle the plaintiffs’ claims for loss of consortium arising out of medical malpractice, the spouse’s loss of consortium claim was time barred as the claim was ﬁled more than two years after the patient’s injury. Beamon v. Mahadevan, 329 Ga. App. 685, 766 S.E.2d 98, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 763 (2014). Dental malpractice. — Trial court erred by granting a dentist summary judgment in a dental malpractice suit as being ﬁled outside the two-year limitations period because the court erred by ruling that the patient’s consultation with an oral surgeon working with the dentist ended the tolling caused by the dentist’s fraudulent concealment of the cause of action. MacDowell v. Gallant, 323 Ga. App. 61, 744 S.E.2d 836, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 502 (2013), aff’d, 295 Ga. 329, 759 S.E.2d 818, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 490 (2014). Sexual abuse by priest. — In a case in which the plaintiff allegedly suffered childhood sexual abuse while serving as an altar boy, the trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s respondeat-superior claim because the suppression of information about whether the defendants knew the abusive priest was dangerous in the 1970s could not have hindered an attempt to hold the defendants vicariously liable for the priest’s conduct once the plaintiff reached the age of majority in the 1980s. Doe v. St. Joseph’s Catholic Church, 313 Ga. 558, 870 S.E.2d 365, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 59 (2022). In a sexual abuse by a priest case, the plaintiff’s negligent supervision, training, and retention, negligent failure to warn and provide adequate security, breach of ﬁduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment claims were improperly dismissed as the plaintiff adequately pled actual fraud for purposes of tolling as the plaintiff could possibly establish the existence of a conﬁdential relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants, and that the defendants’ alleged fraudulent concealment about the abusive priest debarred or deterred the plaintiff from discovering the plaintiff’s 256 causes of action; and the plaintiff could show that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to discover the defendants’ fraud. Doe v. St. Joseph’s Catholic Church, 313 Ga. 558, 870 S.E.2d 365, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 59 (2022). Injuries to Reputation Actions for injuries to reputation must be brought within one year from date of alleged defamatory acts, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff had knowledge of act or acts at the time of their occurrence. Davis v. Hospital Auth., 154 Ga. App. 654, 269 S.E.2d 867, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2328 (1980); Jacobs v. Shaw, 219 Ga. App. 425, 465 S.E.2d 460, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 1048 (1995), overruled in part, Inﬁnite Energy, Inc. v. Pardue, 310 Ga. App. 355, 713 S.E.2d 456, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 570 (2011); Lively v. McDaniel, 240 Ga. App. 132, 522 S.E.2d 711. Since actions for injuries to the reputation must be brought within one year from the date of the alleged defamation, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff had knowledge of the act at the time of its occurrence, summary judgment was correctly granted against the plaintiff when the complaint was not ﬁled until more than one year after the incident. Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 509 S.E.2d 378. Conspiracy to defame action against a police officer was properly dismissed on statute of limitations grounds as: (1) under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-3, a libel was published as soon as it was communicated, and the claim accrued no later than the date of the officer’s last communication with the newspaper defendants; (2) there was no evidence that the officer directed or procured the reporters to record and publish the officer’s comments; (3) under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, a party had one year from the date that a slanderous statement was uttered or published to bring suit; (4) case law did not support the teenager’s claim that the limitation period for conspiracy to defame ran from the date of the publication of the articles; and (5) an invasion of privacy claim was not an injury to the teenager’s person and was not subject to the two-year limitation period 9-3-33 in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 since the interest protected was clearly that of reputation. Torrance v. Morris Publ’g Group, LLC, 281 Ga. App. 563, 636 S.E.2d 740, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1172 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0213, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 160 (Ga. Feb. 5, 2007). Trial court did not err in entering judgment in favor of a company on a debtor’s libel claim because the debtor’s claim was untimely under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; the debtor’s libel claim was based upon the company’s allegations in a deﬁciency claim against the debtor, which was ﬁled in January 2007, and the company’s subsequent failure to dismiss the claim after the debt was discharged in bankruptcy in March 2008, and the debtor ﬁrst asserted the claim in September 2009. Sevostiyanova v. Tempest Recovery Servs., 307 Ga. App. 868, 705 S.E.2d 878, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 32 (2011). Many of the defendant’s social media posts were not actionable as some were only opinions or subjective assessments as to which reasonable minds could differ, rather than statements of fact that could be proven false; and O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 barred any claim for libel based on posts published more than one year before the plaintiffs ﬁled their action. N. Atlanta Golf Operations, LLC v. Ward, 363 Ga. App. 259, 870 S.E.2d 814, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 148 (2022). Day of receipt, not day of writing, controls. — Action for defamation occurred when a letter containing allegedly defamatory statements was received, not when the letter was written. Clark v. Clark, 969 F. Supp. 1319, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9410 (S.D. Ga. 1997). Claim for slander or conspiracy to slander, whether for personal damage or damage to a business reputation, remained a claim for injury to reputation, subject to the one-year statute of limitation. Barnwell v. Barnett & Co., 222 Ga. App. 694, 476 S.E.2d 1. Accrual of right. — As to allegation of public disclosure resulting in injury to reputation, right of action for injury to reputation accrues when act by which reputation is injured occurs. Jones v. Hudgins, 163 Ga. App. 793, 295 S.E.2d 119, 1982 Ga. App. LEXIS 2652 (1982). 257 9-3-33 Injuries to Reputation (Cont’d) Claims for slander, libel, and conspiracy to libel and slander involve injuries to the reputation, not injuries to the person, and are subject to the one-year statute of limitation. Lee v. Gore, 221 Ga. App. 632, 472 S.E.2d 164. One asphalt testing company was entitled to summary judgment as to a defamation claim because the claim was barred by the limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 and the characterization of the claim as one for “injurious falsehood” was not a viable claim in that plaintiffs failed to plead special damages. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., No. CV206-229, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11002 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2009), aff’d in part, 657 F.3d 1146, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19266 (11th Cir. 2011). Admissibility of statements otherwise not actionable as defamation. — In an action by a former employee against an employer for defamation and invasion of privacy, statements made more than one year before suit was ﬁled were not actionable as defamation, but the statements might be admissible to explain the underlying circumstances and defamatory nature of an announcement of plaintiff’s termination made less than one year before the suit. Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 215 Ga. App. 97, 450 S.E.2d 222, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1126 (1994), cert. denied, No. S95C0360, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 299 (Ga. Feb. 20, 1995). Wrongful dishonor of checks. — Action for wrongful dishonor of checks sounds in tort, and the statute of limitations for a wrongful dishonor claim would certainly be no greater than two years and quite possibly no greater than one year. Associated Writers Guild of Am., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank, 195 Ga. App. 820, 395 S.E.2d 23, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 698 (1990). Ignorance of commission of libel will not toll this section. Irvin v. Bentley, 18 Ga. App. 662, 90 S.E. 359, 1916 Ga. App. LEXIS 1178 (1916). Claim for defamation barred. — Former employee’s defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations because the claim was ﬁled more than one year after the challenged action occurred. Garcia v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 321 Ga. App. 48, 741 S.E.2d 285, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 337 (2013). Debtor’s claim for reputation damages resulting from a wrongful foreclosure was time barred because the claim was brought more than one year after the date of the foreclosure and, even if an allegedly evasive answer by the lender’s counsel was enough to warrant an equitable tolling, it was not enough to resurrect a limitations period that had already run. McDaniel v. SunTrust Bank (In re McDaniel), 523 B.R. 895, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 5111 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2014). Loss of Consortium Four year limitation for claims for loss of consortium is an exception, and additional claims not speciﬁcally excepted in this section are not excepted by virtue of having been brought in conjunction with an excepted claim. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Harbin, 132 Ga. App. 65, 207 S.E.2d 597, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1601 (1974). Claim for loss of consortium does not extend the period during which damages may be asserted for physical injuries to the person. Branton v. Draper Corp., 185 Ga. App. 820, 366 S.E.2d 206, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 51 (1988). Statute of limitations and loss of consortium claim. — Trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the loss of consortium claims based on expiration of the statute of limitation, when the statute of limitation had not yet expired on the plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claims. Babb v. Cook, 203 Ga. App. 437, 417 S.E.2d 63, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 444 (1992), overruled, Farrie v. McCall, 256 Ga. App. 446, 568 S.E.2d 603, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 926 (2002), overruled in part, Giles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Ga. App. 314, 765 S.E.2d 413, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 717 (2014). Running of the statute of limitations period for a personal injury claim does not bar a derivative loss of consortium claim. Whitten v. Richards, 240 Ga. App. 719, 523 S.E.2d 906; Epps v. Hin, 255 Ga. App. 370, 565 S.E.2d 577, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 631 (2002). 258 Since the patient and husband did not plead a loss of consortium claim in their original complaint ﬁled against the psychologist and clinic, and since the statute of limitation for that cause of action had expired by the time the patient’s and husband’s reﬁled complaint was ﬁled, the loss of consortium claim was time barred. Blier v. Greene, 263 Ga. App. 35, 587 S.E.2d 190, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1009 (2003), cert. denied, No. S04C0114, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 102 (Ga. Jan. 20, 2004), cert. denied, No. S04C0106, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 103 (Ga. Jan. 20, 2004). Because a husband and wife failed to show what efforts they took in exercising due diligence in serving a driver close to the running of the relevant statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, their personal injury claim was properly dismissed, but the wife’s loss of consortium claim survived. Parker v. Silviano, 284 Ga. App. 278, 643 S.E.2d 819, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 308 (2007). Running of Limitations Appointment of a temporary administrator.— Appointment of a temporary administrator did not result in the representation of the estate for purposes of tolling; consequently, the statute of limitation as to the estate claims remained tolled from the mother’s death until the administrator was named the permanent administrator, less than two years before the current action. Somani v. Cannon, 363 Ga. App. 610, 872 S.E.2d 9, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 182 (2022). Section runs from accrual of right of action. — Point from which statute of limitations began to run under former Code 1933, § 3-1004, (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33) was when right of action accrued, not when the act or omission occurred, as would be the case under Ga. L. 1976, p. 1363, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 93-71). Simons v. Conn, 151 Ga. App. 525, 260 S.E.2d 402, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2621 (1979), superseded by statute as stated in Hart v. Eldridge, 158 Ga. App. 834, 282 S.E.2d 369, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2436 (1981). Test to be applied in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run against an action sounding in tort is in 9-3-33 whether the act causing the damage is in and of itself an invasion of some right of the plaintiff, and thus constitutes a legal injury and gives rise to a cause of action. If the act is of itself not unlawful in this sense, and a recovery is sought only on account of damage subsequently accruing from and consequent upon the act, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run only when the damage is sustained; but if the act causing such subsequent damage is of itself unlawful in the sense that it constitutes a legal injury to the plaintiff, and is thus a completed wrong, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run from the time the act is committed, however slight the actual damage then may be. Fox v. Ravinia Club, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 260, 414 S.E.2d 243, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1741 (1991), cert. denied, No. S92C0426, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 91 (Ga. Feb. 4, 1992). Plaintiff’s claims for personal injuries were in excess of two years old and therefore barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Although the plaintiff cannot specify when the medical condition appeared, the plaintiff possessed sufficient information during the pendency of the two prior cases to have notice of the claim for personal injury asserted in this action. Newton v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 163 F.R.D. 625, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14552 (S.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 95 F.3d 59, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20147 (11th Cir. 1996). Businessman’s Bivens action against a former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) researcher, in which the business alleged a violation of rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 and 5 rights, was time barred under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 because the businessman’s suit was ﬁled more than two years after the researcher was indicted for leaking DEA records about the businessman to a newspaper; in accordance with the federal discovery rule, the claims accrued when the indictment issued, as the indictment, coupled with information that the businessman already possessed about the researcher’s involvement, gave the businessman constructive knowledge of the researcher’s involvement. Ashcroft v. Randel, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22712 (N.D. Ga. 2005). In an inmate’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit asserting violations of the inmate’s U.S. 259 Running of Limitations (Cont’d) Const., amend. 1 rights due to the withholding of some of the inmate’s mail, the prison employees, on the basis of the twoyear limitations period in O.C.G.A. § 9-333, were entitled to summary judgment as to those claims that were based on incidents that occurred more than two years before the inmate ﬁled suit; the prison employees’ content-based denial of publications that were sent to the inmate constituted discrete acts that triggered the limitations period at the time each act occurred, rather than constituting a continuing violation. Daker v. Ferrero, 506 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62668 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Content-based denial of a publication to an inmate and the failure to provide an adequate post-denial procedure are both discrete acts that trigger the two-year limitations period in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 with regard to the inmate’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Daker v. Ferrero, 506 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62668 (N.D. Ga. 2007). All of a former public employee’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 because: (1) to the extent that the employee raised a substantive due process claim based on a property interest in continued employment with the employer, the employee knew of all of the relevant facts as to that claim when the employee resigned on March 5, 2007; (2) as to the employee’s claims that the employee’s reputation was damaged in violation of the employee’s due process rights and that the employee was entitled to a name clearing hearing, the employee was aware of all of the relevant facts, at the latest, on January 25, 2008, by which time the employee knew of the termination letter and disciplinary action recommendation form; (3) the employee’s argument that the employee was unaware that the employee was actually terminated until 2009 was without merit because the employee resigned in lieu of termination; and (4) the employee’s constructive discharge claim was untimely because the employee was aware of the circumstances surrounding 9-3-33 the employee’s resignation as of March 5, 2007, the date that the employee resigned. Bell v. Metro. Atlanta RTA, 521 Fed. Appx. 862, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11584 (11th Cir. 2013). Changes made in 2013 were not substantial changes to Georgia’s execution protocol and the defendant’s method-ofexecution claim accrued in October 2001 and must have been ﬁled by October 2003 to be timely; the defendant’s federal complaint challenging lethal injection, ﬁled on May 12, 2017, was over ten years too late. Ledford v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1312, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8554 (11th Cir. 2017). No tolling despite handicapped and disabled plaintiffs. — Summary judgment was properly granted to the superintendent of schools in a case brought by the parents of handicapped and disabled children allegedly sexually molested by a special education teacher because the statute of limitations provided for in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 had expired as parents, as next friends for the children, had ﬁled suit on a speciﬁc date against the school district and such date barred the subsequent, later ﬁling of a complaint against the superintendent after the statute of limitations period had expired. Harper v. Patterson, 270 Ga. App. 437, 606 S.E.2d 887, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1500 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0551, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 275 (Ga. Mar. 28, 2005). Using mental incapacity to toll statute of limitations. — In an arrestee’s suit alleging state tort claims and a federal claim of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, it was error to dismiss the complaint as untimely because the arrestee’s allegation of mental incapacity under the tolling provisions was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds since the arrestee’s allegation that, when the arrestee was released from jail, the arrestee was of such unsound mind that the arrestee was unable to carry on the arrestee’s ordinary life affairs was sufficient. Meyer v. Gwinnett County, 636 Fed. Appx. 487, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 253 (11th Cir. 2016). Notice to a municipality. — Trial court erred by dismissing an arrestee’s 260 suit against a city alleging false arrest and other claims as being time-barred for not being ﬁled within the two-year limitation period established in O.C.G.A. § 9-333, because the arrestee established that the arrestee had provided a timely ante litem notice, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 3633-5(b), to the city and had properly included evidence of the notice in the record as an exhibit to the appellate brief. Simon v. City of Atlanta, 287 Ga. App. 119, 650 S.E.2d 783, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 895 (2007). Fraudulent concealment. — Claim for fraudulent concealment had to be asserted within two years of October 2002 in order to not be barred by the two-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-333. Therefore, since the concealment claim was not asserted until a January 2005 due process hearing request was ﬁled, then the concealment claim was time-barred, and the school board’s motion to dismiss was properly granted. DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. J.W.M., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58912 (N.D. Ga. 2006). When could plaintiff maintain action to successful result. — When question is raised as to whether action is barred by statute of limitations, true test to determine when cause of action accrued is to ascertain time when the plaintiff could ﬁrst have maintained action to a successful result. Cheney v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 277 F. Supp. 386, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7473 (N.D. Ga. 1967). True test to determine when cause of action has accrued is to ascertain time when the plaintiff could ﬁrst maintain an action to a successful result. Crawford v. McDonald, 125 Ga. App. 289, 187 S.E.2d 542, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1301 (1972); Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14052 (N.D. Ga. 1975). If act causing subsequent damage is of itself unlawful, in sense that it constitutes legal injury to the plaintiff and is thus a completed wrong, a cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run from the time act is committed, however slight the actual damage then may be. Barrett v. Jackson, 44 Ga. App. 611, 162 S.E. 308, 1932 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 9-3-33 (1932); Fraser v. Atlanta Title & Trust Co., 66 Ga. App. 630, 19 S.E.2d 38, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 254 (1942). Test to be applied in determining when statute of limitations begins to run against an action sounding in tort is whether an act causing damage is in and of itself an invasion of some right of the plaintiff, and thus constitutes legal injury and gives rise to the cause of action. Barrett v. Jackson, 44 Ga. App. 611, 162 S.E. 308, 1932 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 (1932); Fraser v. Atlanta Title & Trust Co., 66 Ga. App. 630, 19 S.E.2d 38, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 254 (1942). If act is of itself not unlawful, and recovery is sought only on account of damage subsequently accruing from and consequent upon such act, a cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run only when damage is sustained. Barrett v. Jackson, 44 Ga. App. 611, 162 S.E. 308, 1932 Ga. App. LEXIS 422 (1932); Fraser v. Atlanta Title & Trust Co., 66 Ga. App. 630, 19 S.E.2d 38, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 254 (1942). Running of statute from date of tortious conduct. — Statute of limitation begins to run on date of tortious conduct, and continues to run until its running effects a bar to any action based upon that misconduct. Rakestraw v. Berenson, 153 Ga. App. 513, 266 S.E.2d 249, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1875 (1980). Statute of limitations for challenge to Georgia Sex Offender Registry Act. — In an action challenging the respondents’ continued enforcement of the Georgia Sex Offender Registry Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 et seq., the court held that the two-year limitation period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 for personal injury claims applied to claims for violations of the federal constitution involving injuries to individual rights and because the petition sought a determination only as to whether the petitioner was required to comply with the Act in the future, the causes of action had not yet accrued and were not time-barred. Gardei v. Conway, 313 Ga. 132, 868 S.E.2d 775, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 15 (2022). In tort claim, failure to timely serve did not require dismissal with prejudice. — In a personal injury case arising from a car wreck, the trial court erred by 261 Running of Limitations (Cont’d) dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for failure to timely serve the defendant because dismissal for insufficiency of service of process was a ﬁnding by the trial court that service was not perfected in a reasonable and diligent manner within the prescribed statute of limitation but not a ruling that plaintiff’s action was, in fact, barred by the running of the statute of limitation. Griffin v. Stewart, 362 Ga. App. 669, 870 S.E.2d 3, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 85 (2022). Running of period in tort claim. — Trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the tort claim; the appellant testiﬁed in deposition that the last occurrence of the alleged sexual abuse was on April 30, 1990, and the suit was ﬁled November 3, 1992; this suit was not brought within two years after the cause of action accrued. Long v. Marino, 212 Ga. App. 113, 441 S.E.2d 475, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 136 (1994). Tort claims against a church and conference arising out of a sexual relationship between the plaintiff and a minister were time barred because the claims against the minister were not ﬁled until three years after the minister left the church and there was insufficient evidence of the plaintiff’s incompetency to toll the running of the statute. Alpharetta First United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 221 Ga. App. 748, 472 S.E.2d 532. Because a customer did not ﬁle a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 racial discrimination claim against the restaurant owner until over three years after the incident, the claims asserted in an individual capacity were time-barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Higginbotham v. E.H., Inc., No. CV204-208, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35181 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2005). Because the two-year statute of limitations under either O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, the personal injury statute, or O.C.G.A. § 93-71, the medical malpractice statute, ran on the claims of negligence asserted by the plaintiffs against a veterinarian based on the death of the plaintiffs’ pet kitten, the trial court properly granted the veterinarian’s motion for summary judgment as 9-3-33 to those claims. Langley v. Shannon, 278 Ga. App. 173, 628 S.E.2d 608, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 271 (2006). Trial court’s denial of summary judgment to a hotel limited liability corporation (LLC) in a personal injury action by an injured patron was error, as the action was originally brought against a different entity, the patron attempted to add the LLC and then dismissed that action and brought a new action after expiration of the limitations period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 against the LLC based on the renewal statute pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 92-61, but the patron never sought or obtained court permission to add the LLC as a party, as required by O.C.G.A. §§ 9-1115(a) and 9-11-21; as the amendment to add the LLC was more than a correction of a misnomer because the two named defendants were separate entities, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-10(a) was inapplicable and leave of court was required in order to add the LLC. Valdosta Hotel Props., LLC v. White, 278 Ga. App. 206, 628 S.E.2d 642, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 289 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C1296, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 425 (Ga. June 12, 2006). Trial court’s dismissal of a driver’s negligence lawsuit ﬁled against an insured’s insurer did not deprive the driver of any Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial or right of access to the courts under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII, given that the Seventh Amendment did not apply to suits in state courts and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XII dealt with a litigant’s choice of either self-representation or representation by counsel, not access to the courts; however, the driver’s action was properly dismissed as timebarred under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Crane v. Lazaro, 281 Ga. App. 127, 635 S.E.2d 319, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 946 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0006, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 907 (Ga. Oct. 30, 2006), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1200, 127 S. Ct. 1278, 167 L. Ed. 2d 69, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1335 (2007). Because a personal injury plaintiff failed to ﬁle an action against an uninsured/underinsured motorist insurer within the applicable statutory period, and the action was not subject to renewal, as the magistrate court’s determined that service was made by an unauthorized per- 262 son, thus rendering the original action void, the insurer was entitled to dismissal. Lewis v. Waller, 282 Ga. App. 8, 637 S.E.2d 505, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1288 (2006). Child’s tort claims against a parent for alleged child abuse were time-barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; a continuing tort theory did not apply to the child’s posttraumatic stress disorder claim because even if the child had not discovered the full impact of the alleged harm until nearly 27 years after the injury, the child’s exposure to the alleged acts ceased over two years before the child ﬁled suit. Kirkland v. Kirkland, 285 Ga. App. 238, 645 S.E.2d 626, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1385, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 646 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1312, 128 S. Ct. 1898, 170 L. Ed. 2d 749, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3112 (2008); 552 U.S. 1312, 128 S. Ct. 1898, 170 L. Ed. 2d 749 (2008). In a personal injury suit arising from the slip and fall by the injured party, because the trial court dismissed the injured party’s ﬁrst action as void for failure to perfect service, the second action could not amount to a renewal action under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a); further, given that the second complaint disclosed on its face that the action was time-barred, it was correctly dismissed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Baxley v.