Brooks v

Young, 220 Ga. App. 47, 467 S.E.2d 230 (1996), overruled on other grounds, Allen v. Kahn, 231 Ga. App. 438, 499 S.E.2d 164 (1998). Validity of service of original action outside statute of limitation. — When an original action was filed prior to the running of the statute of limitation and proper service was not perfected on the defendants until after the expiration thereof, the renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, remained available to the plaintiff because the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the original action before the trial court ruled on the reasonableness of the service therein. This decision overrules Brooks v. Young, 220 Ga. App. 47, 467 S.E.2d 230 (1996), to the extent it holds that there can be no valid service of an original action outside the statute of limitations. Allen v. Kahn, 231 Ga. App. 438, 499 S.E.2d 164 (1998). 72 Proper dismissal of second complaint. — When the trial court’s dismissal in the original action was based upon the court’s finding that the plaintiff had not acted diligently in perfecting service on the defendant, that the determination rendered the original action void; accordingly, the renewal statute did not apply and the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff ’s second complaint. King v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 103, 550 S.E.2d 673 (2001). Service in renewal action. — Court of appeals correctly reversed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to a driver and a corporation based on a second driver’s lack of diligence in serving the second driver’s complaint in the driver’s voluntarily dismissed original action because the supreme court previously held that inasmuch as diligence in perfecting service of process in an action properly refiled under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) had to be measured from the time of filing the renewed suit, any delay in service in a valid first action was not available as an affirmative defense in the renewal action; the first driver and corporation essentially sought the rewriting of an unambiguous statute, but their arguments were properly directed to the General Assembly because when the General Assembly wished to put a firm deadline on filing lawsuits, the legislature knew how to enact a statute of repose instead of a statute of limitation. Robinson v. Boyd, 288 Ga. 53, 701 S.E.2d 165 (2010). Lack of diligence not shown. — Trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff ’s action based on the fact that the defendant had been served after the limitation period expired and that the plaintiff failed to act diligently to ensure service in a timely fashion as the undisputed factual record showed that the plaintiff did in fact pay the filing fees and service fee; and apart from the unsupported finding that the plaintiff failed to pay the filing fees, the trial court provided no further justification for the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff lacked due diligence in serving 9-11-4 the defendant, nor did the record show any. Callaway v. Goodwin, 327 Ga. App. 875, 761 S.E.2d 407 (2014). Application for dismission of guardian. — Because the application for dismission of a guardian was published as required by O.C.G.A. § 29-2-84(a), the probate court did not lack personal jurisdiction even though the ward was never served with notice of the dismission under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 or O.C.G.A. § 29-2-77. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 227 Ga. App. 830, 490 S.E.2d 489 (1997). Personal service on garnishee. — O.C.G.A. § 18-4-62, relating to the method for service of process on a garnishee, does not expressly state that the personal service provisions of subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 are unavailable, and further, subsection (j) of that section provides that ‘‘service shall be sufficient when made in accordance with the statutes relating particularly to the proceeding or in accordance with this section.’’ Alpha Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Cartwright, 248 Ga. 701, 285 S.E.2d 713 (1982). In rem forfeiture actions. — Property owner’s motion to dismiss was properly denied in city’s in rem forfeiture action because the service requirements of the Civil Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(a), did not apply and the property owner was informed of the owner’s appellate rights as required by O.C.G.A. § 32-3-1 et seq. Whigham v. City of Atlanta, 262 Ga. App. 742, 586 S.E.2d 412 (2003). Construction with other law. — O.C.G.A. § 9-6-27(a) complemented, rather than conflicted with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(k), which expressly established that the methods of service could have been used as alternative methods of service in special statutory proceedings; a taxpayer’s failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-6-27(a) in a case seeking mandamus and injunctive relief against a county was immaterial because the taxpayer served the county in the ordinary manner. Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743, 594 S.E.2d 324, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816, 125 S. Ct. 63, 160 L. Ed. 2d 22 (2004). 73 9-11-4