Rather, the record showed that although the prospective juror was troubled by the emotional aspects of the case involving sexual offenses against a child, the juror would be able to put the juror’s em

Cwikla v. State, 313 Ga. App. 526, 722 S.E.2d 156 (2012). Juror employed as security guard. — Trial court did not err in refusing to strike for cause a juror who apparently was employed as a private security guard. The decision which held that police officers, employed full-time, must be excused if challenged for cause in criminal cases was inapplicable to this case. Dixon v. State, 180 Ga. App. 222, 348 S.E.2d 742 (1986). Excluding student scheduled to take exams. — If error was assigned on the failure to excuse a juror for cause, a student who indicated the student was going to have two exams later that week, one on Wednesday and one on Friday, and the trial commenced on Monday and concluded on Tuesday, there was no showing that the student’s impartiality would be, or was, in any way affected by such circumstances; and there being no basis for disqualification under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163 or O.C.G.A. § 15-12-164, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by failing to remove the juror. Robinson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 248, 348 S.E.2d 761 (1986). Juror serving at earlier session. — Although service at a preceding court session rendered a juror ineligible, and thus incompetent, the juror’s service was not grounds for a new trial, and the juror’s service without challenge prevented the verdict from being set aside for cause. Jordan v. Smith, 119 Ga. 443, 46 S.E. 679 (1904). Voir dire. — Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault was affirmed because the prosecutor was required to mention the defendant’s name during voir dire, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-163(b)(4) and 15-12-164(a)(2), to see if any of the jurors knew the defendant. Thus, there was no ground for a mistrial. Alexander v. State, 264 Ga. App. 251, 590 S.E.2d 233 (2003). Personal knowledge of juror in sexual molestation case. — Although the juror was troubled by the emotional aspects of deciding a case involving sexual offenses against a child because the juror had recently learned that the children of a friend had been sexually molested by a relative, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in failing to remove the juror for cause. Garland v. State, 263 Ga. 495, 435 S.E.2d 431 (1993). Comprehension of English. — Trial court did not err in not striking two jurors for cause on the ground that the jurors could not communicate in English under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(b) when the court found that one juror showed no difficulty and was apparently trying to use concerns about language to get off the jury; the other’s English was clear and the juror complained only about understanding legal terms. Ford v. State, 289 Ga. App. 865, 658 S.E.2d 428 (2008). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by refusing to excuse a prospective juror for cause under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(b)(6) due to the juror’s concerns about the juror’s ability to speak and understand English. The juror was questioned about the juror’s asserted language difficulties, and the trial court found that the juror’s speech and comprehension were good. Abdullah v. State, 284 Ga. 399, 667 S.E.2d 584 (2008). When asked by the court whether the juror could perform the duty of a juror, the juror stated that the juror could; thus, the trial court did not err by denying appellants’ challenge for cause of a juror the appellants’ contended could not speak English because the juror admitted that the juror ‘‘missed a few things’’ even though the juror was paying attention. Overton v. State, 295 Ga. App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0654, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 212 (Ga. 2009). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in denying defendant’s motion to strike for cause a prospective juror who lacked English language proficiency because the trial judge remarked that the judge believed the juror was qualified and had a ‘‘pretty good vocabulary,’’ and the juror understood ‘‘just about everything defense counsel said, including some words that were not particularly simple, straightforward kind of words.’’ Gonzalez v. State, 299 Ga. App. 777, 683 S.E.2d 878 (2009). Trial court did not err in striking a juror for cause because the juror said that the juror understood 90 percent of what was said, but that English was not the juror’s native language and that the juror did not understand some of the legal terminology that had been used, and because the trial court determined that the jurors needed to understand 100 percent of the proceedings. Bianchi v. State, 327 Ga. App. 440, 759 S.E.2d 536 (2014). Juror with hearing difficulties. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by failing to remove a juror based on defendant’s contention that the juror was unable to hear. Carter v. State, 228 Ga. App. 335, 491 S.E.2d 525 (1997). Trial court did not err in ruling that the state could use one of the state’s peremptory strikes to remove a juror whom the prosecutor regarded as disabled because of the juror’s hearing difficulties. Hill v. Duncan, 249 Ga. App. 342, 548 S.E.2d 83 (2001). Trial court did not err in not striking for cause a juror with a hearing difficulty; juror, whose difficulty was mostly in one ear, agreed to use amplified headphones if selected, and the juror also responded to almost all questions asked with no apparent difficulty. Ford v. State, 289 Ga. App. 865, 658 S.E.2d 428 (2008). Mental illness or mental retardation. — Simple fact that an individual makes one visit — or multiple visits — to a psychiatrist does not per se disqualify that individual from jury service due to mental illness. Bolick v. State, 244 Ga. App. 567, 536 S.E.2d 242 (2000). Trial court did not err by refusing to Grounds for Challenge (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) allow the defendant to pose a general question to the entire jury panel on voir dire as to whether anyone on the panel had ever been treated for any type of mental illness because the court agreed that defense counsel had the right during individual questioning to explore any concerns which might arise regarding the mental health of a potential juror. Caldwell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 885, 549 S.E.2d 449 (2001). Prospective juror’s excuse for cause under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(b)(3) and (c) was not an abuse of discretion since: (1) the juror had been previously treated for schizophrenia and other mental health problems; (2) the juror exhibited bizarre behavior while waiting to be questioned on voir dire; (3) the juror’s answers to voir dire questions were often disconnected and rambling; and (4) the trial court consulted with the juror’s doctor, who opined in writing that the juror was mentally ill and incapable of serving on a jury. Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 902, 124 S. Ct. 251, 157 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2003). 2. Disqualifying Relationships Paragraph (b)(4) is based upon doctrine that juror would naturally favor kinsman. Wright v. Smith, 104 Ga. 174, 30 S.E. 651 (1898); Temples v. Central of Ga. Ry., 15 Ga. App. 115, 82 S.E. 777 (1914). Relationship which disqualifies juror is relationship by consanguinity; the relationship by affinity extends only to the husband or wife of such blood kin. Pope v. State, 52 Ga. App. 411, 183 S.E. 630 (1936). Relationship to prosecutor ground for new trial. — If it appears that a juror is related within the prohibited degree to the prosecutor, the law declares the disqualification; and if such relation is unknown to the accused until after the verdict, a new trial will be granted. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939). DFCS worker not disqualified. — During voir dire, after the defendant made a motion to disqualify for cause a juror who was the daughter of a DFCS worker involved in the case, the court ruled this was not cause for disqualification because the worker was seated at the table with the prosecutor during jury selection, but did not testify or otherwise participate in the trial. McLelland v. State, 203 Ga. App. 93, 416 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 340 (1992). Persons related to prosecutor disqualified. — Juror whose brother married the sister of the prosecutor’s wife did not thereby become related to prosecutor so as to be disqualified. Lemming v. State, 61 Ga. App. 605, 7 S.E.2d 42 (1940). Acquaintance with family members. — Trial court did not improperly seat six jurors in a death penalty case as: (1) the first juror testified that, despite the juror’s acquaintance with the victim’s family, the juror could act impartially, listen to the evidence, and decide the case based upon the facts and arguments; (2) a second juror stated that the juror’s acquaintance with a family member of the victim would have no bearing on the juror’s consideration of the case; and (3) four jurors testified that the juror could fairly consider all possible punishments for the crime, not just the death penalty. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006). Person who swears out a warrant against a criminal defendant is the ‘‘prosecutor’’ for purposes of jury selection; therefore, that person’s spouse should be disqualified. McKee v. State, 168 Ga. App. 214, 308 S.E.2d 574 (1983). Kin of person who swore out warrant against criminal defendant. — Member of the venire who stated the member was a third cousin of the man who swore out the affidavit for the warrant for defendant’s arrest should have been dismissed for cause, and the trial court committed reversible error when the court refused to disqualify the member. Howard v. State, 191 Ga. App. 418, 382 S.E.2d 159 (1989). Because there was no marriage between the defendant and the mother of his children, a legal relationship by affinity was never created; accordingly, the defendant and a juror who was a second cousin to the mother of the defendant’s children were not related by affinity, and the juror was not disqualified by her kinship pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(b)(4). Wilmore v. State, 268 Ga. App. 646, 602 S.E.2d 343 (2004). Application if relationship is to unindicted coconspirator. — Rule of law that disqualifies a juror if the juror is related within the prohibited degree to a prosecutor or to one of the defendants in a joint indictment applies in principle in a case when a conspiracy is alleged to exist between two persons, although only one is indicted and on trial. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939). Juror related to stockholder in insolvent bank disqualified. — On the trial of an officer of an insolvent bank, a juror who is related within the prohibited degrees to a stockholder or depositor in the insolvent bank is disqualified. Fordham v. State, 148 Ga. 758, 98 S.E. 267 (1919). Kin of prosecutor, accused, or victim. — Juror who was the daughter of the arresting officer is not disqualified from sitting on the jury for principal cause even though the officer was a potential witness because the disqualification statute applies only to the near kin of the prosecutor, defendant, or victim. Jones v. State, 184 Ga. App. 4, 360 S.E.2d 599 (1987). Trial court did not err in denying a new trial based on a juror’s failure to disclose the juror’s former marriage 20 years earlier to the victim’s first cousin. Scott v. State, 274 Ga. 153, 549 S.E.2d 338 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 929, 122 S. Ct. 1301, 152 L. Ed. 2d 212 (2002). Defendant waived juror’s disqualification of kinship to victim. — Trial court was authorized to find that a defendant waived the disqualification of a juror based on that juror’s familial relation to the victim of the crimes for which the defendant was convicted as the defendant did not offer any evidence that the defendant did not know of, and could not have discovered, the juror’s disqualifying relationship. Although the juror testified at the hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial that the juror only learned that the juror’s uncle was the victim’s grandfather after the juror’s service was complete, the juror’s ignorance of the relationship was not probative of whether the defendant knew, or through the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, the relationship. Moran v. State, 293 Ga. App. 279, 666 S.E.2d 726 (2008). Business relationship. — Trial court erred in not striking for cause potential jurors who had a business relationship with the corporation which was the victim of the burglary in issue and the employer of the victim of the armed robbery in issue, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have the shareholders of the victim corporation removed for cause. Kirkland v. State, 274 Ga. 778, 560 S.E.2d 6 (2002). Trial court properly excluded a juror who was a cousin of the defendant and a relative of one of the defendant’s grandparents who testified at the trial; even if the juror’s statements about the particular degrees of consanguinity were vague, it was within the trial court’s discretion to exclude the juror whether or not the test of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-135(a) was met. Paige v. State, 281 Ga. 504, 639 S.E.2d 478 (2007). Step-uncle of victim not disqualified. — If prospective juror’s brother was the step-father of the victim and, thus, the prospective juror was the step-uncle of the victim, the victim and the brother of the prospective juror were certainly related but the victim and the prospective juror were not related within any prohibited degree. Day v. State, 188 Ga. App. 648, 374 S.E.2d 87 (1988). Relationship among jurors not a disqualification. — Juror who was the father and employer of another juror was not disqualified from serving on the jury. Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 664, 492 S.E.2d 868 (1997). Lack of knowledge of relationship does not relieve disqualification. — Juror who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to the prosecutor is disqualified by the fact of relationship and the fact that the juror did not know of the relationship or that the juror’s kinsman was a prosecutor does not relieve the disqualification. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939). Juror’s own opinion as to bias. — Juror may be found disqualified because Grounds for Challenge (Cont’d) 2. Disqualifying Relationships (Cont’d) of a relationship with a party, even though the juror insists the juror is not biased; therefore, the juror’s opinion of the juror’s qualification is by no means determinative. Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510, 421 S.E.2d 528 (1992). Sheriff is not prosecutor. — Sheriff could not be characterized as the ‘‘prosecutor’’ under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163(b)(4) since the sheriff participated in the arrest only as an assisting officer and did not testify at trial. Davis v. State, 194 Ga. App. 482, 391 S.E.2d 124 (1990). Members of group acting as prosecutor disqualified. — Members of an electric membership corporation were disqualified from serving as jurors in a prosecution for criminal damage to property owned by the corporation, even though the corporation was not listed as the actual prosecutor. Lowman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 556, 398 S.E.2d 832 (1990). Employment relationship not a disqualification. — In a prosecution for malice murder, the fact that the spouse of a prospective juror was employed at the motel where the crimes occurred did not require that the juror be stricken for cause. Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1133, 115 S. Ct. 2559, 132 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1995). Employment by institutional victim not a per se disqualification. — While kinship to the victim may automatically disqualify prospective jurors in a criminal case pursuant to paragraph (b)(4) of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-163, mere employment by a university when the actual victim was the university library is not a per se disqualification. Willingham v. State, 198 Ga. App. 178, 401 S.E.2d 63 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 980, 112 S. Ct. 581, 116 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1991). Fiancé of a police officer was not subject to disqualification for principal cause, even though the officer was one of the arresting officers and was a witness in the case. Croom v. State, 217 Ga. App. 596, 458 S.E.2d 679 (1995). Mother-in-law of investigating officer. — Even if the defendant’s allegation were true that a juror who served during defendant’s felony murder prosecution was the mother-in-law of a law enforcement officer who investigated the murder, the trial court did not err in refusing to strike the juror for cause since a juror need only be struck for cause when he or she is in a close relationship to the prosecutor of a criminal trial, to the accused, or to the victim. Bryant v. State, 270 Ga. 266, 507 S.E.2d 451 (1998). Acquaintance with police officer witness is not grounds to disqualify a juror for cause. Smith v. State, 234 Ga. App. 586, 506 S.E.2d 406 (1998). 3. Involvement in Prosecution Involvement in prosecution a disqualification. — One who is actively engaged in any way in the prosecution of one accused of crime is disqualified from sitting as a trier in the case. Johnson v. Mayor of Hazlehurst, 8 Ga. App. 841, 70 S.E. 258 (1911). One who contributes to fund for purpose of defraying expense of apprehending criminal or for prosecution of the case is prosecutor. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939). If one other than an officer of the law takes such an interest in apprehending a person who is supposed to have committed a crime that one contributes one’s funds to aid in the apprehension and prosecution of such person, one is not a competent juror on the trial of another person alleged to have conspired with the absent one and to have aided that person in the commission of the crime, and those related to such contributor within the prohibited degree would also be barred from passing judgment on the person being tried. Harris v. State, 188 Ga. 745, 4 S.E.2d 651 (1939). Failure to make adequate inquiry of juror whose child had been prosecuted. — Trial court abused the court’s discretion by excusing for cause a juror whose child had been prosecuted by one of the assistant district attorneys who was prosecuting the defendant’s case and had been represented by the attorney who was representing a co-defendant because no adequate inquiry was made by the trial court as to whether an actual bias existed to justify excusing the juror for cause. Simon v. State, 320 Ga. App. 15, 739 S.E.2d 34 (2013).