The juror’s failure to respond truthfully during voir dire when asked whether the juror had been arrested for a felony constituted legal cause to remove the juror as the trial court was faced with a j

O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172, under JURIES IN FELONY CASES.

O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172

Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 301, 680 S.E.2d 156 (2009). Trial court, after conducting a proper and thorough inquiry, had ample factual and legal support for the court’s decision to remove a juror and thus did not abuse the court’s discretion. The court found that: (1) the juror knew more of the prosecution’s witnesses than the juror conveyed during voir dire; (2) the juror repeatedly referred to other jurors of the Reasons for Replacement (Cont’d) juror’s knowledge of the defendants’ and the victim’s families; (3) the person whom the juror was dating associated with many people involved in the case; (4) the juror indicated that the juror felt that the juror was in a difficult position by having to make a decision whether to find the defendants guilty and then return to the juror’s community; and (5) the juror made extra-judicial comments, such as referring to one of the witnesses as a drug dealer, although no evidence of this claim was presented. Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 705 S.E.2d 649 (2011). It was proper to remove a juror because the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in concluding that the opinion of a juror, combined with the juror’s violation of the trial court’s instructions by attempting to influence other jurors with that opinion prior to deliberations, constituted ‘‘legal cause’’ for the juror’s removal; the fact that the juror eventually stated that the juror could be impartial did not require the trial court to ignore the numerous times the juror equivocated or the other jurors’ testimony showing that the juror expressed a fixed and definite opinion and did not make the trial court’s credibility decision to strike the juror error. Butler v. State, 290 Ga. 412, 721 S.E.2d 876 (2012). Replacement of juror held proper. — In a rape and sexual molestation trial, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in removing a juror for cause under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 as her husband had been arrested for sexual molestation in the same county, and she worried about the impact her vote on a verdict might have on her husband’s case. Weathersby v. State, 263 Ga. App. 341, 587 S.E.2d 836 (2003). Trial court did not err in replacing a juror who stated that the juror’s daughter and niece were acquainted with both the murder victim and the defendant, and that the juror’s niece and the victim ‘‘actually had more than like a friendly relationship,’’ that, although the juror had not received any specific threats, the juror felt pressure to find the defendant not guilty ‘‘out of fear,’’ and stated that the juror’s feelings would prevent the juror from being fair and impartial in deliberating on the case. Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 632 S.E.2d 152 (2006). Two defendants’ attorneys were not ineffective under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I. Para. XIV and U.S. Const., amend. 6 for failing to object to the trial court’s decision to replace a juror who was late to court with one of the alternate jurors who was fully qualified to sit on the jury under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-169; the juror’s tardiness was a sound basis for dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14, 635 S.E.2d 723 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1215, 127 S. Ct. 1266, 167 L. Ed. 2d 91 (2007). Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a juror’s release pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 because the trial judge exercised informed and sound discretion to remove the juror and seat an alternate after receiving reliable information that the juror’s child was suffering from a medical condition that required an emergency admission to the hospital. Taylor v. State, 285 Ga. App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 655 (Ga. 2007). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault were proper because the dismissal of juror two and the replacement of that juror with an alternate juror was an adequate remedy authorized by O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Tolbert v. State, 300 Ga. App. 51, 684 S.E.2d 120 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0168, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 196 (Ga. 2010). Discharge of a juror during a defendant’s trial served the legally relevant purpose of preserving public respect for the integrity of the judicial process after counsel and the judge suspected that the juror had acted deliberately in approaching a member of the victim’s family so that the juror would be excused from the trial, and since the juror disobeyed the trial court’s instructions and was tardy to court. White v. State, 287 Ga. 713, 699 S.E.2d 291 (2010). Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion under O.C.G.A. § 15-12-172 by removing a juror and replacing the juror with an alternate juror during jury deliberations because communications between the juror and the bailiff regarding the juror’s opinion on the defendant’s guilt on vehicular homicide charges may have improperly influenced the juror’s consideration of the case. Brown v. State, 310 Ga. App. 285, 712 S.E.2d 521 (2011). Trial court did not err in dismissing a juror and seating an alternate in place of the juror because it was not an abuse of discretion to remove a juror who failed during voir dire to provide accurate information that the state had a legitimate right to know. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 498, 713 S.E.2d 376 (2011). Trial court was within the court’s discretion to excuse a juror based on the totality of the circumstances because the trial court believed that the juror’s acquaintance with a witness and with the school where the defendant, various witnesses, and the juror’s son had attended classes, made the juror very uncomfortable and would affect the juror’s ability to 15-12-172 deliberate. Pate v. State, 315 Ga. App. 205, 726 S.E.2d 691 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1308, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1027 (Ga. 2012). Trial court’s decision to proceed with 11 jurors and an alternate after it was discovered that only 11 jurors and the alternate had been in the jury box during the oath and instructions, instead of the 12 jurors that were selected, was not improper; replacing the missing juror had no more effect of denying the defendant a qualified jury than if the juror had become ill or died. Crowley v. State, 315 Ga. App. 755, 728 S.E.2d 282 (2012). Replacing the juror who committed misconduct by sharing with a state’s witness the juror’s thoughts on the case and then individually polling the remaining jurors to ascertain that the jurors could remain fair and impartial was an adequate remedy and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (2014).