Testimony that the defendant had arthritis in the right hand at most created a conflict in the evidence, as there was also testimony that the defendant, a carpenter, used both hands in the defendant’s

Carder v. State, 291 Ga. App. 265, 661 S.E.2d 632, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 460 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Victim testified that as the victim walked in front of the defendant’s car, the defendant hit the gas pedal, throwing the victim onto the hood; accelerated when the victim asked the defendant to stop; and slammed on the brakes, causing the victim to slide down the hood, and the victim’s legs and foot to be broken as they went underneath the car. As the victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to establish these facts under former O.C.G.A. § 244-8, the defendant was properly convicted of aggravated battery. Cash v. State, 293 Ga. App. 702, 667 S.E.2d 691, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1055 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Victim’s testimony that the defendant kicked in the door of the victim’s residence, entered without permission, pointed a shotgun at the victim, and threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not give defendant money was sufficient in and of itself to support the defendant’s conviction for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 981 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim’s testimony that the defendant was the individual who approached the victim’s car with a gun and ordered the victim out, causing the victim to be in fear. Kashamba v. State, 295 Ga. App. 540, 672 S.E.2d 512, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 38 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Victim’s uncorroborated testimony that the defendant entered the victim’s home by removing the back door from the door’s hinges, ordered the victim at gunpoint to get in the defendant’s truck, and did not bring the victim back home for hours, was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary and kidnapping. Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 30 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim’s testimony that the defendant was the individual who approached the victim’s car with a gun and ordered the victim out, causing the victim to be in fear. Kashamba v. State, 295 Ga. App. 540, 672 S.E.2d 512, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 38 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant’s convictions for aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and false imprisonment with regard to allegations that the defendant forced a romantic friend’s minor child to perform oral sex on the defendant several times over a three year period, based on the testimony of the victim (which alone was sufficient), the videotaped forensic interview of the victim, the testimony of the police investigator and the victim’s mother concerning what the victim told them, as well as the testimony of the victim’s siblings, who were eyewitnesses to one incident. Further, the testimony of the victim that the defendant locked the victim in the house and would not let the victim leave supported the conviction on the false imprisonment charge. Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 677 S.E.2d 377, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Secret Service agent testimony. — Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on hearsay grounds to portions of a Secret Service agent’s testimony about what the agent learned during the investigation since the agent did not repeat the testimony of an out-of-court declarant. Bearden v. State, 316 Ga. App. 721, 728 S.E.2d 874, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 534 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C1778, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 277 (Ga. Mar. 18, 2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In child molestation case, the victim’s testimony did not require corroboration because: (1) the defendant’s 15-year-old granddaughter testified that the defendant molested her in his home and in his pickup truck between the time she was in kindergarten until about the time she was in the sixth grade; (2) a physician testified that she found physical evidence that was consistent with penetration and sexual abuse; (3) an older granddaughter testified that she was molested by defendant 25 years ago; and (4) evidence was presented that defendant molested his five-year-old great granddaughter. Delk v. State, 274 Ga. App. 261, 619 S.E.2d 310, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 657 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of five counts of aggravated child molestation, two counts of child molestation, and one count of enticing a child for indecent purposes because the state presented evidence showing that the defendant had sexually abused the defendant’s two minor stepdaughters; and the testimony of one of the victims alone about the abuse supported the defendant’s convictions, despite the absence of any physical evidence. Bland v. State, 363 Ga. App. 268, 870 S.E.2d 823, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 143 (2022). Testimony alone sufficient to prove mental suffering. Fabe v. Floyd, 199 Ga. App. 322, 405 S.E.2d 265, 1991 Ga. App. General Consideration (Cont’d) LEXIS 475 (1991) (on motion for rehearing) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 244-8). Former statute not controlling in federal court. — Georgia law requires independent corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony; this Georgia rule is not controlling upon collateral review by a federal court. Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 21628 (5th Cir. 1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Juvenile proceedings. — Requirement of independent corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony now set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 is applicable to a juvenile proceeding. In re J.H.M., 202 Ga. App. 79, 413 S.E.2d 515, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1668 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Basis for principle of requiring corroboration in a felony when the only witness is an accomplice is to safeguard against one person falsely maintaining that the person and the defendant were accomplices to commit the crime. Coleman v. State, 227 Ga. 769, 183 S.E.2d 379, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 838 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). At common law one could be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; in Georgia, in felony cases, when the only witness is an accomplice, the accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated and at common law, the doctrine did not amount to a rule of evidence, but merely to a “counsel of caution” given by the judge to a jury. LaFray v. State, 48 Ga. App. 133, 172 S.E. 155 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). If witness not accomplice. — Unless a witness sought to be impeached is an accomplice of the accused, the witness’s testimony, without any corroboration, may authorize the conviction of the accused in a felony case. Preston v. State, 42 Ga. App. 280, 155 S.E. 774, 1930 Ga. App. LEXIS 344 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017). State was not barred from retrying the defendant because a properly instructed jury could have found that a witness in the car in which the victim was shot was not an accomplice as there was evidence, including inconsistencies in the witness’s and the former girlfriend’s testimony and their statements to the police, to conclude that the witness had no knowledge that the defendant intended to shoot the victim, did not share the defendant’s criminal intent to do so, and jumped out of the car and fled the scene out of fear and surprise. Because a properly instructed jury could have found that the witness was not an accomplice, corroboration of the witness’s testimony was not required. Johnson v. State, 311 Ga. 221, 857 S.E.2d 463, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 133 (2021). Uncorroborated testimony of accomplice is not sufficient to authorize a felony conviction. Holton v. State, 61 Ga. App. 654, 7 S.E.2d 202, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 209 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Dye v. State, 77 Ga. App. 517, 48 S.E.2d 742, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 590 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Potts v. State, 86 Ga. App. 779, 72 S.E.2d 553, 1952 Ga. App. LEXIS 1059 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Edenfield v. State, 95 Ga. App. 2, 96 S.E.2d 533, 1957 Ga. App. LEXIS 693 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Harris v. State, 96 Ga. App. 395, 100 S.E.2d 120, 1957 Ga. App. LEXIS 591 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Famber v. State, 134 Ga. App. 112, 213 S.E.2d 525, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1925 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Adams v. State, 140 Ga. App. 621, 231 S.E.2d 547, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1585 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Dudley v. State, 148 Ga. App. 560, 251 S.E.2d 815, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 3211 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2625 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 1066 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Defendant may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1026 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Rule applies only when accomplice is sole witness. — Rule that a felony conviction is not to be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice applies only when the accomplice is the sole witness upon whose testimony the state relies. McDaniel v. State, 158 Ga. App. 320, 279 S.E.2d 762, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2183 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Defendant’s conviction did not rely solely on accomplice testimony, contrary to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, because the accomplice’s sister testified. White v. State, 315 Ga. App. 54, 726 S.E.2d 548, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 312 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Corroboration of accomplice not necessary to sustain a misdemeanor conviction. Parsons v. State, 43 Ga. 197 (1871) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3702); Grant v. State, 89 Ga. 393, 15 S.E. 488 (1892) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Martin v. State, 17 Ga. App. 372, 86 S.E. 945 (1915) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Carson v. State, 37 Ga. App. 100, 138 S.E. 920 (1927) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Dobbs v. State, 44 Ga. App. 749, 162 S.E. 845 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1017); Johnson v. State, 57 Ga. App. 813, 197 S.E. 61 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 51 S.E.2d 13 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Bell v. State, 85 Ga. App. 242, 68 S.E.2d 925 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Drummond v. State, 87 Ga. App. 105, 73 S.E.2d 43 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121) ; , (for comment, see 16 Ga. B.J. 226 (1953)); Bridges v. State, 106 Ga. App. 363, 126 S.E.2d 903 (1962).C.C.R. v. State, 145 Ga. App. 27, 243 S.E.2d 601, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1847 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Neal v. State, 152 Ga. App. 270, 262 S.E.2d 561, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2891 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Dabney v. State, 154 Ga. App. 355, 268 S.E.2d 408, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2162 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Trial court did not err in denying the codefendant’s motion for directed verdict as to the defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor theft by shoplifting because no corroboration of accomplice testimony was necessary to support a misdemeanor conviction. Dixson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 379, 721 S.E.2d 555, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 1057 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0656, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 398 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0654, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 373 (Ga. Apr. 24, 2012), overruled in part, Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 800 S.E.2d 356, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 375 (2017) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Even though the prosecution was initiated as one seeking felony punishment, the factfinder was empowered to determine that the value of the property taken was less than the felony value, and when that was the decision the factfinder reached, the case was not a “felony case” for purposes of the accomplice corroboration requirement and the testimony of a single witness accomplice did not have to be corroborated. Heatherly v. State, 301 Ga. 386, 801 S.E.2d 827, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 533 (2017). When several crimes are charged, each offense must be corroborated if accomplices are involved. Whitfield v. State, 159 Ga. App. 398, 283 S.E.2d 627, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2620 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Distinction between general and specific testimony. — Distinction must be made between evidence which tends to prove the truth of the accomplice’s general testimony and that which tends to prove the identity and participation of the accused. Gaudin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 252, 211 S.E.2d 189, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Boggus v. State, 136 Ga. App. 917, 222 S.E.2d 686, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1530 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 225 S.E.2d 281, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1041 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1888 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Adams v. State, 140 Ga. App. 621, 231 S.E.2d 547, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1585 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Corroboration as to material facts. — If the accomplice is corroborated in material parts of the accomplice’s testiGeneral Consideration (Cont’d) mony, then the accomplice may be believed by the jury as to other material parts as to which there is no corroboration. Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 434, 197 S.E.2d 495, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1505 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Quaid v. State, 132 Ga. App. 478, 208 S.E.2d 336, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1724 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Partial corroboration. — Simply because an accomplice’s testimony is corroborated in most details, it does not follow that the accomplice’s testimony alone as to the identity and participation of the accused is sufficient to justify conviction. Nix v. State, 133 Ga. App. 417, 211 S.E.2d 26, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1092 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Gaudin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 252, 211 S.E.2d 189, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1035 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Hill v. State, 236 Ga. 831, 225 S.E.2d 281, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1041 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565, 228 S.E.2d 741, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1888 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Hobbs v. State, 142 Ga. App. 782, 237 S.E.2d 16, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2142 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Two crimes in unified transaction. — When armed robbery was an integral part of a murder transaction and was simultaneous with the murder, independent corroboration of the murder is adequate to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony as to the entire unified transaction including the armed robbery. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 905 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Independent evidence of defendant’s involvement. — Evidence showed that a witness’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated to prove the defendant’s involvement in the attempted robbery and murder of the victim because independent evidence showed that the defendant knew that the victim had lots of money; that the shooter planned and participated in the robbery with the defendant; that the defendant sent a driver to pick the shooter up on the night that the victim was shot; that the defendant threatened one of the defendant’s escorts with a gun after the murder when the defendant suspected that the escort had spoken to police; and that the defendant fled Atlanta when the defendant knew that police could have been looking for the defendant in connection with the victim’s murder. Rutledge v. State, 298 Ga. 37, 779 S.E.2d 275, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 788 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Witness as party. — Fact that the witness is a party and is a prisoner convicted of a crime does not afford any basis to disregard the witness’s testimony. Balkcom v. Vickers, 220 Ga. 345, 138 S.E.2d 868, 1964 Ga. LEXIS 547 (1964), overruled in part, Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 727 S.E.2d 112, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 364 (2012) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Testimony of victim. — When the alleged victim of the attack was the only witness to positively identify the defendant as the perpetrator, but when the victim’s testimony was in many material respects corroborated, the jury had the right to believe the victim’s testimony. Finney v. State, 51 Ga. App. 545, 181 S.E. 144, 1935 Ga. App. LEXIS 400 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121). While the victim had just pulled into the parking lot of the victim’s employer when defendant pointed a gun at the victim and demanded the victim’s wallet, the victim’s positive identification of defendant as the robber was sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt and to support defendant’s armed robbery conviction. Parks v. State, 257 Ga. App. 25, 570 S.E.2d 350, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1530 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Because the victim’s statement of sexual abuse was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 to convict defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated child molestation, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, the victim’s testimony did not have to be corroborated by physical evidence. Gartrell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 726, 613 S.E.2d 226, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 376 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Evidence that the defendant intentionally struck the victim with a stick and that either the defendant or one of the other parties to the assault intentionally struck the victim with their fists and a concrete block supported an aggravated assault conviction; further, although the victim was the only person who testified about having been hit with a concrete block, and was not sure which of the victim’s attackers struck that blow, this testimony was sufficient to establish that the victim was hit with a concrete block because it made no difference whether an accomplice, and not the defendant, assaulted the victim in the manner alleged in the indictment. Oliver v. State, 278 Ga. App. 425, 629 S.E.2d 63, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 334 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Even if a burglary victim had not testified that the checks were missing, an intent to steal could have been inferred since the evidence showed the defendant’s unlawful entry into the building of another where valuable goods were kept, and the trial court did not err in charging the jury that it was allowed to “infer” an intent to steal in the context of burglary; while the defendant denied the burglary upon a defense of alibi, the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact, and the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was without merit. Studiemeyer v. State, 278 Ga. App. 756, 629 S.E.2d 593, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 408 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Victim’s testimony as to the non-consensual and forcible nature of the victim’s sexual contact with the defendant, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction of rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1). Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 633, 667 S.E.2d 899, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1046 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). While the state failed to produce a weapon, fingerprints, or other physical evidence tying defendant to the crimes, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the jury was authorized to accept the cashier’s identification testimony; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for armed robbery. Clowers v. State, 299 Ga. App. 576, 683 S.E.2d 46, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 871 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). The testimony of an armed robbery victim and the victim’s love interest, who were eyewitnesses to the defendant’s crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault, and who separately identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery and assault, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. Crawford v. State, 301 Ga. App. 633, 688 S.E.2d 409, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1423 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts of aggravated assault because the victim’s testimony that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and that a shot was subsequently fired wounding the victim was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant committed a violent injury to the victim. Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 101, 690 S.E.2d 220, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 67 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of child victim. — Even though child victim’s testimony was the only direct evidence proving the essential elements, the child’s testimony was sufficient to authorize defendant’s conviction. Cantrell v. State, 231 Ga. App. 629, 500 S.E.2d 386 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Georgia law does not require corroboration of a child molestation victim’s testimony. Atkins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 489, 533 S.E.2d 152, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 453 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). In a child molestation prosecution, the victim’s testimony that defendant touched the victim “down there” was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction. Kidd v. State, 257 Ga. App. 744, 572 S.E.2d 80, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 1314 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of child molestation (O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a)) and aggraGeneral Consideration (Cont’d) vated child molestation (O.C.G.A. § 16-622.2(b)), pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8. The testimony of the victim’s cousin, two school friends, and the interviewing detective, was admissible as substantive evidence under the former Child Hearsay Statute, former O.C.G.A. § 24-316. Vaughn v. State, 301 Ga. App. 391, 687 S.E.2d 651, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1394 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Victim need not be corroborated. — There is no requirement that the testimony of the victim of an alleged assault be corroborated in order to legally convict the accused. Gay v. State, 143 Ga. App. 857, 240 S.E.2d 226, 1977 Ga. App. LEXIS 2540 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Samuels v. State, 223 Ga. App. 275, 477 S.E.2d 414 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). When the victim’s testimony established each and every element of the four offenses, the victim’s testimony, alone, was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 339, 416 S.E.2d 755, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 408 (1992), cert. denied, No. S92C0785, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 363 (Ga. Apr. 24, 1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony of three victims of armed robbery was sufficient to support conviction, and the testimony did not require corroboration. Johnson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 194, 444 S.E.2d 334, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 488 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). When a third person testifies that a witness for the prosecution was an accomplice of the third person, and that the defendant was not a party to the crime, the testimony of the witness for the prosecution may not be excluded on the principle of requiring corroboration in a felony since the only witness is an accomplice. Coleman v. State, 227 Ga. 769, 183 S.E.2d 379, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 838 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Subscribing witnesses. — Bill of sale to personalty, though attested by two subscribing witnesses, is admissible in evidence upon due proof of the document’s execution by only one of the witnesses, without calling or accounting for the other. Cooper v. O’Brien, 98 Ga. 773, 26 S.E. 470, 1896 Ga. LEXIS 144 (1896) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5156). Transaction with deceased person. — Generally, the testimony of one witness is sufficient to establish a fact, even though such witness may be testifying to a transaction or communications with a deceased person. Donald v. Groves, 160 Ga. 163, 126 S.E. 583, 1925 Ga. LEXIS 105 (1925) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5742). Grounds for new trial. — Motion to rule out testimony of a witness who is a coindictee on the ground that such testimony shows the witness to be an accomplice is not a legal ground of objection, but the argument can be considered in connection with the general grounds of a motion for a new trial which contend that there is insufficient corroboration to warrant a conviction. Patterson v. State, 109 Ga. App. 582, 137 S.E.2d 74, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 925 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Crime of illegally selling drugs was not one of those listed in the former statute which would require the testimony of a second witness to support a conviction. Crews v. State, 133 Ga. App. 764, 213 S.E.2d 34, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 2274 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Johnson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 771, 266 S.E.2d 551, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1974 (1980). (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121. Corroboration of facts in perjury prosecution. — State complied with O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 in producing more than two fact witnesses to testify about the facts alleged to have been falsely sworn to, i.e., the underlying acts the defendants used as a basis to swear out arrest warrants, but the state was not required to produce opinion witnesses to testify that the defendants swore falsely and committed perjury. Watson v. State, 235 Ga. App. 381, 509 S.E.2d 87 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Witness testimony about inaccurate date-time stamp. — Trial court did not err in admitting under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-48(b) still photographs taken from an ATM’s videotapes in a defendant’s theft by deception prosecution because while a bank investigator testified that the date-time stamp was inaccurate by approximately one hour, such an inaccuracy went to the weight to be given the evidence but not to the evidence’s admissibility. Parks v. State, 294 Ga. App. 646, 669 S.E.2d 684, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1296 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Testimony was sufficient to sustain adjudication of child deprivation. — Juvenile court did not err in adjudicating a child deprived and granting temporary custody of the child to the Department of Family and Children Services because, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of the pediatrician, the detective, and the caseworker were sufficient to sustain the adjudication that the child was deprived. In the Interest of K.B., 302 Ga. App. 50, 690 S.E.2d 627, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 36 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Who Is an Accomplice Test for determining. — Test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice is: “could the witness himself have been indicted for the offense, either as principal or as accessory?” Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 705, 45 S.E. 630, 1903 Ga. LEXIS 665 (1903); Montford v. State, 144 Ga. 582, 87 S.E. 797, 1916 Ga. LEXIS 51 (1916); LaFray v. State, 48 Ga. App. 133, 172 S.E. 115, 1933 Ga. App. LEXIS 495 (1933); Kearce v. State, 178 Ga. 220, 172 S.E. 643, 1934 Ga. LEXIS 16 (1934); Head v. State, 59 Ga. App. 451, 1 S.E.2d 227, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 319 (1939); Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 534, 1 S.E.2d 405, 1939 Ga. LEXIS 747 (1939); Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (1941); Stebbins v. State, 78 Ga. App. 534, 51 S.E.2d 592, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 922 (1949); Harris v. State, 96 Ga. App. 395, 100 S.E.2d 120, 1957 Ga. App. LEXIS 591 (1957); Fortner v. State, 96 Ga. App. 855, 101 S.E.2d 908, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 926 (1958); Payne v. State, 135 Ga. App. 245, 217 S.E.2d 476, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1632 (1975); Herrin v. State, 138 Ga. App. 729, 227 S.E.2d 498, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 2301 (1976). Former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 provides, in part, that in felony cases when the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient. This rule has been applied to juvenile proceedings. In re A.Z., 301 Ga. App. 524, 687 S.E.2d 887, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1357 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0587, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 357 (Ga. Apr. 19, 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Accessory before the fact and principals in the first and second degrees are all accomplices. Kearce v. State, 178 Ga. 220, 172 S.E. 643, 1934 Ga. LEXIS 16 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Stebbins v. State, 78 Ga. App. 534, 51 S.E.2d 592, 1949 Ga. App. LEXIS 922 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Accessory after the fact was not an accomplice within the meaning of the former statute. Allen v. State, 74 Ga. 769 (1885) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3755); Springer v. State, 102 Ga. 447, 30 S.E. 971 (1897) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Kearce v. State, 178 Ga. 220, 172 S.E. 643 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mills v. State, 193 Ga. 139, 17 S.E.2d 719 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121); Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210, 240 S.E.2d 68 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234 (1983) , aff’d, 252 Ga. 418, 314 S.E.2d 210 (1984).Givens v. State, 273 Ga. 818, 546 S.E.2d 509, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 337 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Association in crime. — An accomplice is one who is associated with others in the commission of a crime, all being principals. Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). An accomplice is defined as one who is associated with others in the commission of a crime, all being principals. Johnson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 771, 266 S.E.2d 551, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1974 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Defendant’s convictions were not based on insufficient evidence when a witness gave uncorroborated testimony because the witness was not the defendant’s acWho Is an Accomplice (Cont’d) complice as: (1) the defendant only asked the witness how to make a fake brick of cocaine; and (2) nothing showed the witness advised, encouraged, or counseled the defendant to commit a crime, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(4), or that the witness intended to participate in a crime. Williams v. State, 289 Ga. 672, 715 S.E.2d 76, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 663 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Witness not accomplice. — Evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to sustain the verdict because the evidence authorized the jury to find that the witness was not an accomplice at all, notwithstanding that the trial judge in the judge’s capacity as a thirteenth juror found otherwise; and, even if the jury had found that the witness was an accomplice, there was some evidence that would have authorized the jury to find sufficient corroboration of the witness’s testimony, notwithstanding that the trial judge as the thirteenth juror found corroboration wanting. State v. Grier, 309 Ga. 452, 847 S.E.2d 313, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 517 (2020). Trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury that the testimony of an accomplice had to be corroborated because the defendant’s mother was not an accomplice as the evidence did not show that the mother aided or abetted the commission of the crimes or advised the defendant to do so, that the mother was ever at the crime scene, or that the mother witnessed, participated in, or was even aware of the incident until the defendant appeared at the mother’s door covered in blood and announced that the defendant had killed the victim; and the mother’s actions of helping the defendant, and initially denying to investigators that the mother knew anything, were more typical of an accessory after the fact than an accomplice. Horton v. State, 310 Ga. 310, 849 S.E.2d 382, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 740 (2020). Trial court did not plainly err by failing to give an accomplice testimony jury instruction because there was no evidence that the witnesses shared defendant’s intent to murder the victim or that they aided or abetted the killing in any way. as the evidence indicated only that the witnesses heard about the victim’s killing later. Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 865 S.E.2d 150, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 680 (2021). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s felony murder conviction because the jury could have reasonably concluded that the witness was not an accomplice in the charged crimes, so the witness’s testimony did not require corroborating evidence. The jury was instructed on the pertinent legal principles, the general verdict did not specify whether the jury found that the witness was an accomplice, and the jury could have inferred from the witness’s testimony that the witness had no prior knowledge of defendant’s intent to shoot the victim or do anything other than buy marijuana and that the witness had not participated in the shooting. Caldwell v. State, 313 Ga. 640, 872 S.E.2d 712, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 141 (2022). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and other crimes as the evidence regarding the defendant’s cell phone data that connected the defendant to the murders did not need to be excluded from the sufficiency analysis even if it was improperly admitted; questions about a witness’s credibility was for the jury to decide; and the jury was authorized to credit the witness’s own testimony that the witness did not know the defendant would shoot the victims and that the witness was afraid the defendant might shoot the witness, too, and to find that the witness was not an accomplice and that the witness’s testimony did not need to be corroborated. Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 875 S.E.2d 636, 2022 Ga. LEXIS 167 (2022). Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault as the evidence presented in the joint trial of the defendant and the two other defendants authorized the jury to conclude that no corroboration was required because the state’s witness was not an accomplice. Bronner v. State, 364 Ga. App. 280, 874 S.E.2d 474, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 297 (2022). Aiding and abetting. — An “accomplice” is one who is present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or who could be convicted of the crime as an accessory before the fact. Venable v. State, 56 Ga. App. 366, 192 S.E. 646, 1937 Ga. App. LEXIS 354 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121). An “accomplice” is one who is present at the commission of the crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or who could be convicted of such crime as an accessory before the fact. Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 534, 1 S.E.2d 405, 1939 Ga. LEXIS 747 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Definition of an accomplice is one who was present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Participation in the commission of the same criminal act and in the execution of a common criminal intent is necessary to render one criminal, in a legal sense, an accomplice of another. Venable v. State, 56 Ga. App. 366, 192 S.E. 646, 1937 Ga. App. LEXIS 354 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Cooper v. State, 197 Ga. 611, 30 S.E.2d 177, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 306 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Johnson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 771, 266 S.E.2d 551, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1974 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 282 S.E.2d 90, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 955 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). An accessory after the fact is not an accomplice. Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 301 S.E.2d 234, 1983 Ga. LEXIS 1026 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8). Voluntary participation in the commission of the same criminal act is necessary to make one an accomplice; a participation that is the result of the will of another is not such participation as will make such a participant guilty. Perryman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 562 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Fortner v. State, 96 Ga. App. 855, 101 S.E.2d 908, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 926 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38121). Criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of crime and is essential to render one an accomplice. It follows that when this element is absent, one is not an accomplice. Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800, 16 S.E.2d 504, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 417 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121); Johnson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 771, 266 S.E.2d 551, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1974 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Presence at scene of crime. — Although a witness may have been present at or near the scene of the crime, and may have concealed the fact for a time, yet if the witness did not in any way aid, abet, procure, or participate in the crime, the witness is not an accomplice. Venable v. State, 56 Ga. App. 366, 192 S.E. 646, 1937 Ga. App. LEXIS 354 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Accomplice corroboration jury instruction was not required because there was no evidence that three witnesses for the state were the defendant’s accomplices in a gang robbery and murder; although there was evidence that the three were present near or at the time of the shooting, the accomplices were in a separate vehicle, and if the accomplices had committed the crimes, the defendant would have been completely innocent. Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 816 S.E.2d 663, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 454 (2018). Instruction on accomplice testimony should have been given. — Trial court plainly erred when instructing the jury that a single witness’s testimony was sufficient to prove a fact without also instructing the jury on the requirement that an accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated because it was a clear and obvious error for the trial court to instruct the jury that the testimony of a single witness was sufficient to establish a fact without also instructing the jury that an accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated. Pindling v. State, 311 Ga. 232, 857 S.E.2d 474, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 141 (2021). Tactical reason not to request accomplice corroboration instruction. — Clear and obvious error for the trial court not to instruct the jury as to corroboWho Is an Accomplice (Cont’d) ration requirements of O.C.G.A. § 2414-8 but the record made clear that the defendant intentionally relinquished the right to have the jury instructed on accomplice-corroboration requirement as counsel established a tactical reason for not requesting the instruction as the decision was made to focus on putting blame on the accomplice. Vasquez v. State, 306 Ga. 216, 830 S.E.2d 143, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 433 (2019). Curative instruction improperly denied on accomplice. — Trial court erred by failing to give a curative instruction after the state made improper and inaccurate statements in its closing argument regarding its authority to determine that the state’s witness was not an accomplice; and the jury was to determine whether the state’s witness was an accomplice. Bronner v. State, 364 Ga. App. 280, 874 S.E.2d 474, 2022 Ga. App. LEXIS 297 (2022). Witness guilty only of concealing evidence of a crime after the crime’s commission was not an “accomplice” within the meaning of the former statute. Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 207 S.E.2d 494, 1974 Ga. LEXIS 992 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Joint indictment and plea of guilty. — Neither the joinder of a witness in an indictment with the defendant, nor a plea of guilty entered by the witness, necessarily makes the witness an accomplice with the defendant so as to require corroboration of the witness’s testimony on the latter’s trial. Maddox v. State, 131 Ga. App. 86, 205 S.E.2d 31, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1337 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Parties jointly indicted. — Former statute has no application to one who, while jointly indicted with the accused, is not shown by the evidence to have been the accused’s accomplice or to have participated in the crime. Walker v. State, 118 Ga. 757, 45 S.E. 608, 1903 Ga. LEXIS 681 (1903) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991); Davis v. State, 122 Ga. 564, 50 S.E. 376, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 260 (1905) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 991). Evidence of conviction or plea of guilty is admissible to show the guilt of the accomplice and thereby show the status or relationship of the parties and thus lay the foundation for determining the character of testimony against the defendant and whether or not corroboration thereof is required. Dye v. State, 77 Ga. App. 517, 48 S.E.2d 742, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 590 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-121). Concealment of crime constitutes complicity. — Fact that witness concealed the crime for which defendant was on trial made the witness an accomplice within the meaning of former O.C.G.A.