The officer’s testimony that the sister said the taking was without the sister’s permission was inadmissible hearsay and was insufficient to support the adjudication even though the evidence was admit

In the Interest of E.C., 311 Ga. App. 549, 716 S.E.2d 601, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 784 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Police investigator’s hearsay statements admissible. — Because defendant was provided a full opportunity for confrontation regarding the victim’s prior out-of-court statements, the trial court did not err in admitting a police investigator’s hearsay evidence. Gartrell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 726, 613 S.E.2d 226, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 376 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Detective’s statement meant to bolster witness testimony. — Trial court erred in permitting the detective to testify about what five witnesses told the detective, after the five witnesses testified against defendant, and in then comparing their statements to what defendant had said on the same subject in defendant’s statements to police, which demonstrated inconsistencies between defendant’s statements and those made by the five witnesses; the statements of the five witnesses were prior consistent statements that were inadmissible hearsay because they were offered solely to bolster their testimony in the eyes of the jury since the veracity of their testimony had not been challenged when they testified earlier in the case before the detective testified. Baugh v. State, 276 Ga. 736, 585 S.E.2d 616, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 632 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s hearsay objection because an officer’s testimony about what the victim’s motel neighbor said to the officer, which came before that witness took the stand, was not a prior consistent statement but was hearsay; however, the error was harmless because any improper bolstering of the victim’s neighbor’s testimony by the officer’s hearsay testimony had no real effect on the defendant’s convictions since the victim’s neighbor did testify, and that testimony repeated and expanded on the prior statements the officer had recounted. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 498, 713 S.E.2d 376, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 541 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Exclusion of videotape of defendant’s statement. — Trial court did not err in excluding a videotape of a statement defendant gave to a detective at the time of defendant’s arrest as the statement was not offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive and was pure hearsay. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 999 (2004), overruled on other grounds, State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Evidence of 9-1-1 call. — In a DUI case, it was error for the trial court to overrule the defendant’s objection to a police officer’s testimony as to what a 9-1-1 caller had said to the officer, but the error was harmless; the hearsay was cumulative because the officer’s testimony that the defendant was asleep behind the wheel mirrored that of the caller. Hopkins v. State, 283 Ga. App. 654, 642 S.E.2d 356, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 150 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Victim’s statements hours after crime. — Statements to a police officer by the victim in a prosecution for battery which were made three-and-one-half hours after the incident and which bore no mark of spontaneity or other such state of mind, undeniably free of conscious device or afterthought, were not part of the res gestae; as pure hearsay, the statements were inadmissible since the state did not show “necessity,” to wit, that the declarant was unavailable and that the state made reasonable efforts to secure the presence of the declarant. Wilbourne v. State, 214 Ga. App. 371, 448 S.E.2d 37, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 884 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony on content of record. — When the defendant did not tender the copies of the convictions which the defendant desired to have introduced to impeach the witnesses, but only made a proffer of the testimony of the clerk’s representative, the state’s objection based on the failure to produce the best evidence was properly sustained. The testimony of the deputy clerk as to the content of the records was not only not the best evidence, it was also hearsay. Lipscomb v. State, 194 Ga. App. 657, 391 S.E.2d 773, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 282 (1990), cert. denied, No. S90C0799, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 774 (Ga. Apr. 5, 1990), overruled in part, Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 796 S.E.2d 261, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 33 (2017) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Even assuming that the trial court erred in refusing to admit an employee of a power company to testify that she saw on her computer screen a particular entry reflecting that a work order had issued for the defendant’s address because there had been a disruption in electrical service to the defendant’s home the night before the victims were killed and that it had been reported to the power company that the electric meter had been disconnected, it did not constitute reversible error since there was other evidence that the electric meter had been removed from the house the night before the victims were killed, and the power company’s data did not Criminal (Cont’d) identify the persons who had removed the meter. Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 703 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). 3. Hearsay Not Found a. Civil That portion of the birth certificate which relates to the date of birth and the sex of the child, and certain facts concerning the name, race, place of residence, and other facts concerning the child’s mother, is not obtained by the physician through hearsay and is clearly admissible. Posey v. State, 46 Ga. App. 290, 167 S.E. 340, 1932 Ga. App. LEXIS 128 (1932) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5762). Homeowner’s suit for fraud. — Homeowner countersued a contractor for fraud. Testimony by a subcontractor that the contractor’s project supervisor told the subcontractor to increase the bid because the homeowner was “loaded” was not hearsay, because the testimony was not admitted to show the truth of the matters asserted, and the testimony was a circumstance relevant to the fraud claim. Lumpkin v. Deventer N. Am., Inc., 295 Ga. App. 312, 672 S.E.2d 405, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1338 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0643, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 115 (Ga. Mar. 9, 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Evidence not offered to prove truth of matter asserted. — Probate court did not abuse the court’s discretion by admitting double hearsay from a witness who, when asked what the testator told the witness that the propounder had said about the caveator, responded, “that the caveator had taken his money and went to Florida and was not coming back” because the second level of alleged hearsay, what the propounder said to the testator about the caveator, was not hearsay, since it was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted but rather for the effect it had on the testator; the caveator’s theory of the case was that the statement by the propounder to the testator was not true, and the evidence was introduced to show where the testator got the misinformation. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 288 Ga. 711, 24-8-802 707 S.E.2d 60, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 183 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Cumulative evidence of properly admitted proof of title. — In a dispute over two subdivision lots, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that was cumulative to properly admitted evidence showing a legal property owner’s record title, and the evidence was not hearsay, as alleged by a claimant who sought title to the property by prescription; further, the evidence was relevant to the issue of whether a claimant’s adverse possession ripened into title by prescription. Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 642 S.E.2d 28, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 132 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony of caseworker in parental termination case. — In a termination of parental rights case, a parent failed to show that the testimony of the sole witness, a caseworker, was hearsay; although another employee worked on the case before the witness, the witness was the caseworker at the time of the hearing, and the record did not show that the witness lacked personal knowledge of the facts the witness testified to, most of which were memorialized in the trial court’s previous orders, which were admitted without objection at the termination hearing. In the Interest of M.D.L., 285 Ga. App. 357, 646 S.E.2d 331, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 520 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Debtor’s opinion testimony as to value. — Debtor’s testimony, standing alone, was insufficient under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-66 to establish the fair and reasonable value of the debtor’s car at the time the car was repossessed because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the debtor’s “opinion” testimony about the value of the car two years earlier was based entirely upon hearsay and that, absent any evidence to show that the hearsay was reliable, the debtor failed to demonstrate a sufficient foundation for the debtor’s conclusions; the debtor had no education or experience in the value of vehicles and the debtor presented no evidence of the price the debtor paid for the car, the condition of the car at the time the car was repossessed, the potential market for such cars, or other relevant factors to be considered in reaching a conclusion about the car’s value. Sevostiyanova v. Tempest Recovery Servs., 307 Ga. App. 868, 705 S.E.2d 878, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 32 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Deposition testimony of driver and passenger involved in traffic accident was not hearsay in a suit wherein occupants of another vehicle sought damages from the driver of a truck parked in the emergency lane of a highway. Reid v. Midwest Transp., 270 Ga. App. 557, 607 S.E.2d 170, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1519 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0599, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 266 (Ga. Mar. 28, 2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). An official publication of the New York Stock Exchange, purporting to show the monthly average prices of cotton, which was introduced without objection in a hearing before an auditor and acted on by the auditor and the parties as if the quotations were correct, cannot, on a hearing by the judge of exceptions of fact to the auditor’s report, be excluded on the ground that it was hearsay evidence. McKenzie v. Perdue, 67 Ga. App. 202, 19 S.E.2d 765, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 353, rev’d, 194 Ga. 356, 21 S.E.2d 705, 1942 Ga. LEXIS 587 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-301). b. Criminal Evidence not offered to prove truth of matter asserted. — Challenged testimony was not inadmissible hearsay because: (1) neither the identification testimony by the victim, nor a detective regarding the alleged hearsay in obtaining the defendant’s name, violated the defendant’s rights to confrontation and cross-examination as neither witness actually repeated any alleged hearsay; (2) the evidence did not create a credibility problem that could only be cured by crossexamination, and the state did not offer the evidence to establish the truth of the matter asserted; and (3) the testimony explained why the police included the defendant’s photograph in the line-up. Jennings v. State, 285 Ga. App. 774, 648 S.E.2d 105, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 646 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1576, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 667 (Ga. Sept. 10, 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony of locksmith. — Locksmith receipt indicating that defendant had a key made for a vehicle was not inadmissible hearsay evidence in the defendant’s prosecution for, inter alia, trafficking in cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-1331(a)(1) because the receipt was not offered as proof of what was asserted therein but as evidence that a piece of paper with the defendant’s name on it was found in the same residence where cocaine and firearms were located, thereby linking the defendant circumstantially to the residence and the contraband; thus, the receipt was original evidence. Weems v. State, 295 Ga. App. 680, 673 S.E.2d 50, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 420 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Officer’s testimony about dispatcher’s statement. — As an officer’s testimony about a dispatcher’s statement that two Hispanic males were involved in a firearm discharge was not offered for the truth of the dispatcher’s statement, but to explain the officer’s subsequent conduct, the testimony was not hearsay. Herieia v. State, 297 Ga. App. 872, 678 S.E.2d 548, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 602 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Evidence that defendant was told age of victims. — Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to testimony that defendant was told that the declarant “didn’t want any guy to take off with [the declarant’s] 16-year-old daughter”; the testimony was not hearsay as the testimony was admitted to show that defendant was told that the girls were only 16. Ford v. State, 274 Ga. App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 763 (2005), cert. denied, No. S05C1921, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 789 (Ga. Nov. 7, 2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Anything seen or heard by a witness in the presence of a defendant is admissible and does not constitute hearsay. Grindle v. State, 151 Ga. App. 164, 259 S.E.2d 166, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2484 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-301). Receipt removed from burglarized house. — In a burglary case, the trial court did not err in allowing a receipt from one of the burglarized homes to be admitted into evidence and in allowing the Criminal (Cont’d) occupant of the home to testify about the receipt; the receipt and the testimony were not offered to demonstrate who purchased the item or any of the circumstances surrounding that purchase, but to show that the defendant removed the receipt from the home, and the testimony did not constitute hearsay. Perez v. State, 284 Ga. App. 212, 643 S.E.2d 792, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 289 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). When a witness testified as to what the witness told another person, the statement was not hearsay. Holloman v. State, 167 Ga. App. 683, 307 S.E.2d 266, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2576 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). When facts testified to are proved without contravention by witness whose knowledge of the facts is immediate and personal, this is not hearsay, and the admission of like statements made by another, even if hearsay, does not under these circumstances constitute reversible error. Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 183, 279 S.E.2d 483, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2118 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony of phone conversation with officer. — Trial court did not admit hearsay testimony by allowing a police officer to testify as to a conversation the officer had with defendant over the phone and to authenticate defendant’s voice as being the voice of the person defendant talked to over the phone; voluntary, noncustodial, incriminating statements of defendants are admissible through the testimony of anyone who heard them. Ingram v. State, 268 Ga. App. 149, 601 S.E.2d 736, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 873 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony not hearsay that was based on officer’s observation of cell phone calls. — Testimony by an investigating officer that after confiscating a codefendant’s cell phone, the officer used the recently called function and discovered that the phone had been used to call a taxi service just prior to the robbery of a taxi driver was properly admitted as the evidence was not hearsay under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-801 and 24-8-802) because the evidence was based on the officer’s own veracity and competence. Troutman v. State, 297 Ga. App. 196, 676 S.E.2d 836, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 397 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony of police sergeant’s own actions was not hearsay. — With regard to a defendant’s murder conviction, the trial court did not err by overruling a hearsay objection to testimony by a police sergeant regarding investigative work performed on the case since the sergeant participated in the investigation through desk work; using information gained by the police obtained telephone records and subscriber information to identify potential suspects; and testified on the stand to the steps the sergeant personally took that led to the identification of the defendant as a suspect. The testimony of the sergeant was not hearsay as the sergeant did not relay information told by other persons and the testimony was nothing more than a recitation of the sergeant’s own actions. Henley v. State, 285 Ga. 500, 678 S.E.2d 884, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 301, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1076, 130 S. Ct. 800, 175 L. Ed. 2d 559, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8805 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Investigator’s testimony was original evidence. — Although defendant contended that the waiver certificate was hearsay under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-801 and 24-8802) and improperly placed the defendant’s character in issue, testimony was considered hearsay only if the witness was testifying to another party’s statement in order to prove or demonstrate the truth of that statement; otherwise it was a verbal act and thus original evidence rather than hearsay. Therefore, defendant’s hearsay objection was meritless because the investigator wrote the statement as well as read the statement into evidence, and thus, the statement was original evidence. Bynum v. State, 300 Ga. App. 163, 684 S.E.2d 330, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1111 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0225, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 300 (Ga. Mar. 29, 2010), overruled in part, Martin v. McLaughlin, 298 Ga. 44, 779 S.E.2d 294, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 793 (2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony of security agent as to value of shoplifted items. — Defendant was properly convicted of felony theft by shoplifting because a jury was permitted to consider a security agent’s testimony regarding the value of the items stolen since the agent had personal knowledge of the prices of the subject merchandise from a cash register readout. Bell v. State, 262 Ga. App. 788, 586 S.E.2d 455, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1023 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony of investigating officer that “co-indictee’s name is Lawrence” was not hearsay, but was a statement of undisputed fact, identifying for the jury that person to whom the officer was then talking. Jackson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 53, 432 S.E.2d 649, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 755 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Investigating officer’s testimony about original lead. — Investigating officer’s testimony that the officer investigated defendant based on information the officer received from an unnamed source did not constitute hearsay because the officer did not divulge the content of that information. Jenkins v. State, 268 Ga. 468, 491 S.E.2d 54 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Questions summarizing prior testimony. — Prosecution’s questioning of a state’s witness, summarizing incriminating testimony of previous state’s witnesses for the witness, who was then asked whether that witness had, in fact, heard that testimony, was not objectionable on the ground that it sought to elicit hearsay, where the previous witnesses’ testimony was offered under oath and was subject to cross-examination. King v. State, 185 Ga. App. 698, 365 S.E.2d 852, 1988 Ga. App. LEXIS 260 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Admission of transcript from earlier conviction. — When defendant in a prosecution for rape and aggravated sodomy pled guilty to a prior charge of aggravated sexual assault, admission of a transcript of the prior victim’s testimony given at a hearing to compel the witness to testify was proper under the necessity exception to hearsay evidence. McBee v. State, 228 Ga. App. 16, 491 S.E.2d 97 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Prior consistent statement. — Because the veracity of a witness’s trial testimony was placed in issue, the witness’s prior testimony was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement. Jackson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 278, 609 S.E.2d 207, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 26 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Victim’s statement to a doctor was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement as the victim testified at trial and was cross-examined by the defendant; the defendant had asserted in opening statement and the defendant implied during cross-examination that because the victim’s parent would have been upset if the parent believed the victim were having consensual sex, the victim falsely testified that the defendant forced the victim to engage in sex, which testimony was designed to preserve the victim’s relationship with the parent, and to continue the victim’s receipt of food and shelter from the parent. Smith v. State, 282 Ga. App. 339, 638 S.E.2d 791, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1384 (2006), overruled, Middleton v. State, 309 Ga. 337, 846 S.E.2d 73, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 476 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). When a victim testified that the victim could not remember all of the details of a robbery, which occurred six years before the trial, it was not error to introduce the victim’s prior consistent statement. The victim was a forgetful witness who testified at trial and who was cross-examined by the defendant. Williams v. State, 291 Ga. App. 279, 661 S.E.2d 658, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 471 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1497, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 707 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). After the victim’s mother testified that the defendant admitted to the mother that the defendant molested the victim, the trial court did not err in allowing an investigator to testify that the mother had told the investigator the same thing because the mother testified at trial and was cross-examined, and the defendant placed the mother’s veracity in issue during Criminal (Cont’d) cross-examination by attempting to show that the mother had an improper motive for testifying against the defendant, a motive that developed after the mother made the prior consistent statement to the investigator. Davis v. State, 303 Ga. App. 799, 694 S.E.2d 381, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 403 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Admission of an investigator’s summary of a victim’s prior consistent statement was not reversible error because the record contained other unchallenged testimony by witnesses other than the victim conveying the content of the victim’s prior statement and that the victim’s prior statement was consistent with the victim’s trial testimony; it was not likely that the subsequent admission of the victim’s statement itself contributed to the guilty verdict, and by the time the statement was read, any bolstering effect of the repetitive nature of the prior statement had occurred without objection. Arnold v. State, 305 Ga. App. 45, 699 S.E.2d 77, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 650 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1898, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 84 (Ga. Jan. 13, 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Trial court did not err by admitting prior consistent statements of the victim and the defendant’s son in videotaped interviews that also included comments by the interviewer because nothing in the record demonstrated that the portion of the videotape that the trial court ruled would not be presented for the jury was played for the jury, and the defendant’s counsel made no objection after the videotape was played. Wade v. State, 305 Ga. App. 382, 700 S.E.2d 827, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 663 (2010), cert. denied, No. S10C1993, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 61 (Ga. Jan. 24, 2011), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1041, 131 S. Ct. 3066, 180 L. Ed. 2d 893, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4911 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony concerning surveillance videotape. — To the extent that In re C.G., 261 Ga. App. 814 (2003) finds that a surveillance videotape merely depicting nonverbal conduct constitutes a hearsay statement, it is hereby disapproved. Hammock v. State, 311 Ga. App. 344, 715 S.E.2d 709, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 653 (2011), writ denied, No. S11C1888, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 68 (Ga. Jan. 9, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Testimony concerning a surveillance videotape was not hearsay because the witnesses did not offer any testimony about what someone else said or wrote outside of court, but rather, the witnesses testified about the witnesses’ personal observations of the conduct that appeared on the videotape; because the testimony did not ask the jury to assume the truth of out-of-court statements made by others, and instead, the value of the testimony rested on the witnesses’ own veracity and competence, the testimony was not hearsay. Hammock v. State, 311 Ga. App. 344, 715 S.E.2d 709, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 653 (2011), writ denied, No. S11C1888, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 68 (Ga. Jan. 9, 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Identification of defendant in photo array. — In a prosecution for armed robbery and related offenses, the trial court properly allowed hearsay evidence of identification. It was not error to allow a police officer to testify as to who the victims identified in the photo arrays as a law enforcement officer could testify to a pretrial identification if the person who actually made the identification testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Monfort v. State, 281 Ga. App. 29, 635 S.E.2d 336, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 992 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Recorded telephone conversation with informant. — Because the informant’s recorded statements provided context for the defendant’s portion of the telephone conversation, the informant’s statements were not hearsay as the statements entailed admissions of a party opponent, and the Confrontation Clause did not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted, the trial court did not err in admitting the recording. Jones v. State, 339 Ga. App. 95, 791 S.E.2d 625, 2016 Ga. App. LEXIS 559 (2016), cert. denied, No. S17C0590, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 411 (Ga. May 15, 2017). Evidence rested upon veracity of witness, not other person. — In a trial for theft by taking, it was error to preclude a witness from giving testimony that potentially would have corroborated the defendant’s explanation for the defendant’s possession of a stolen trailer on the ground that the testimony was hearsay under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-801 and 24-8-802). The value of the evidence rested upon the veracity of the witness, not the veracity of the person referred to by the witness; furthermore, the error was not harmless, as the unsatisfactoriness of the defendant’s explanation for possessing the trailer was central to the conviction. Boivin v. State, 298 Ga. App. 411, 680 S.E.2d 415, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 560 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1768, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 533 (Ga. Sept. 8, 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Trial court did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial on the ground that an eyewitness’s testimony was based on hearsay because to the extent the testimony exposed prior difficulties between the codefendants and the victim, the testimony was cumulative of other testimony that the defendant and the codefendant threatened the victim the day before the shooting; the other evidence implicating the defendant in the shooting made it highly probable that the hearsay testimony did not contribute to the verdict. Mathis v. State, 291 Ga. 268, 728 S.E.2d 661, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 625 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). 4. Examples Not Within Rule Ownership of clothing. — If a person testifies that certain articles of clothing exhibited to the person are similar to those worn by a suspect in a murder case, whom the accused is attempting to identify as the guilty party, it is proper to exclude hearsay testimony identifying the ownership of the clothing as being that of the suspect; this evidence does not come within the exception to the hearsay evidence rule. Bryant v. State, 197 Ga. 641, 30 S.E.2d 259, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 314 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38301). Objections 1. Specificity of Objections General rule requires that an objection to testimony point out in detail why the testimony is subject to the objection made. Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 270 S.E.2d 201, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2398 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-301). When general objection fails. — When an objection is made to evidence as a whole or en bloc, a part of which is not subject to the objection, the entire general objection fails. Jones v. State, 154 Ga. App. 806, 270 S.E.2d 201, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2398 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-301). 2. Admission over Objection Illegal admission over objection requires new trial. — If, by the introduction of hearsay evidence, it is probable that the jury might have been led to believe that the jury could consider it as sufficient to establish the fact stated, then if that fact be material, and timely objection be urged, a new trial should result. Glisson v. State, 57 Ga. App. 169, 194 S.E. 877, 1938 Ga. App. LEXIS 509 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38301). Illegal admission over proper objection of hearsay evidence not embraced within any of the exceptions, relating to a vital issue, as to which the other evidence is in conflict, which admission is prejudicial to the losing party, is cause for a new trial. Fuller v. State, 196 Ga. 237, 26 S.E.2d 281, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 319 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-301). Inadmissible hearsay which is received over objection does not require a new trial if it appears that the evidence could not have affected the verdict because other evidence by a witness with immediate and personal knowledge is sufficient to establish the fact in question. Glass v. State, 235 Ga. 17, 218 S.E.2d 776, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 768 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-301). Necessity exception satisfied to warrant admission of hearsay. — With regard to a defendant’s convictions for malice murder and other crimes, the trial court did not err in admitting hearsay testimony of a witness who testified about prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim, over the hearsay objection of trial counsel, under the necessity excepAdmission over Objection (Cont’d) tion to the hearsay rule; considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in permitting the testimony under the necessity exception since the witness in question testified that the victim and the witness were roommates for a while, were teammates on a college track team, and had become close enough in the course of their friendship to have shared intimate details of their lives and relationships, including the witness’s observations of bruises on the victim, which the victim told the witness were inflicted by the defendant. Culmer v. State, 282 Ga. 330, 647 S.E.2d 30, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 469 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1). Failure to object to hearsay. — In a plumbing company’s action to recover for septic services performed, the company failed to object to the homeowners’ affidavits supporting the homeowners’ defense of fraud by the company and, therefore, 24-8-803 the company waived any objection to any alleged hearsay under O.C.G.A. § 24-8802. Shuford v. Aames Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 327 Ga. App. 844, 761 S.E.2d 395, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 (2014). Under the new rules of evidence, an objection to hearsay evidence not raised at the summary judgment stage until a party’s brief on appeal is not the required contemporaneous objection. Patterson v. Kevon, LLC, 304 Ga. 232, 818 S.E.2d 575, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 536 (2018). Any error as to alleged hearsay waived by failure to object. — In a dispute between the buyer and seller of a gas station, the seller failed to preserve the seller’s argument regarding alleged hearsay evidence by failing to object at trial. The court rejected the seller’s contention that the old evidence code applied because the document in question was generated in 2012, and the trial occurred in 2018. Spirits, Inc. v. Patel, 350 Ga. App. 153, 828 S.E.2d 381, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 258 (2019).