The trial court’s imposition of a sentence within the statutory limits would not be disturbed

Tyner v. State, 313 Ga. App. 557, 722 S.E.2d 177 (2012). No error in imposition of sentence. — As the defendant was not sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) or to the maximum term pursuant to § 17-10-7(a) for a conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b), the defendant’s claim that the sentencing imposed was improper lacked merit. Tatum v. State, 297 Ga. App. 550, 677 S.E.2d 740 (2009). Sentence of 30 years for each of the three attempted armed-robbery convictions fell within the statutory range and was not void. Issa v. State, 340 Ga. App. 327, 796 S.E.2d 725 (2017). Sentence was within statutory range. — Trial court did not err in imposing separate sentences for the defendant’s two convictions because the sentence was within the statutory range and the law allowed separate and consecutive punishment for separate criminal transactions; O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 applies to the use of prior convictions to enhance the punishment of repeat offenders, and the statute does not apply to the trial court’s authority to impose separate sentences for a defendant’s current convictions of two distinct offenses committed on different dates. Ross v. State, 313 Ga. App. 695, 722 S.E.2d 411 (2012). Sentence not cruel and unusual. — Trial court did not commit cruel and unusual punishment in sentencing a defendant to two consecutive terms of 20 years to serve in confinement for two burglary convictions under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), based on the defendant’s recidivism under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), because the sentence was within statutory limits. Hight v. State, 302 Ga. App. 826, 692 S.E.2d 69 (2010). Cited in Stinson v. State, 65 Ga. App. 592, 16 S.E.2d 111 (1941); Vann v. State, 72 Ga. App. 301, 33 S.E.2d 742 (1945); Norton v. State, 73 Ga. App. 307, 36 S.E.2d 120 (1945); Randall v. State, 73 Ga. App. 354, 36 S.E.2d 450 (1945); Rampley v. State, 81 Ga. App. 782, 60 S.E.2d 180 (1950); Cozzolino v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 213 Ga. 225, 98 S.E.2d 613 (1957); Hooks v. State, 215 Ga. 869, 114 S.E.2d 6 (1960); Lewis v. State, 113 Ga. App. 714, 149 S.E.2d 596 (1966); McEwen v. State, 113 Ga. App. 765, 149 S.E.2d 716 (1966); Burke v. State, 116 Ga. App. 753, 159 S.E.2d 176 (1967); Little v. State, 121 Ga. App. 792, 175 S.E.2d 922 (1970); Cook v. Smith, 427 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1970); Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831 (1972); Hobbs v. State, 229 Ga. 556, 192 S.E.2d 903 (1972); Green v. State, 129 Ga. App. 27, 198 S.E.2d 343 (1973); Mathis v. State, 133 Ga. App. 445, 211 S.E.2d 400 (1974); Ingram v. State, 137 Ga. App. 412, 224 S.E.2d 527 (1976); Hinton v. State, 138 Ga. App. 702, 227 S.E.2d 474 (1976); Herrin v. State, 138 Ga. App. 729, 227 S.E.2d 498 (1976); Brogdon v. State, 138 Ga. App. 900, 228 S.E.2d 5 (1976); Lloyd v. State, 139 Ga. App. 625, 229 S.E.2d 106 (1976); Massey v. State, 141 Ga. App. 557, 234 S.E.2d 144 (1977); Cox v. State, 241 Ga. 154, 244 S.E.2d 1 (1978); Simmons v. State, 148 Ga. App. 317, 251 S.E.2d 167 (1978); Green v. State, 244 Ga. 755, 262 S.E.2d 68 (1979); Newton v. State, 154 Ga. App. 98, 267 S.E.2d 641 (1980); Wilson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 174, 279 S.E.2d 345 (1981); Jackson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 702, 282 S.E.2d 181 (1981); Davis v. State, 159 Ga. App. 356, 283 S.E.2d 286 (1981); Peavy v. State, 159 Ga. App. 280, 283 S.E.2d 346 (1981); State v. Shuman, 161 Ga. App. 304, 287 S.E.2d 757 (1982); Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. App. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579 (1982); Jones v. State, 161 Ga. App. 620, 288 S.E.2d 795 (1982); Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 320, 292 S.E.2d 77 (1982); Waters v. State, 249 Ga. 671, 293 S.E.2d 333 (1982); Bradshaw v. State, 162 Ga. App. 750, 293 S.E.2d 360 (1982); Staton v. State, 164 Ga. App. 464, 297 S.E.2d 375 (1982); Dodd v. Williams, 560 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Griffin v. State, 170 Ga. App. 287, 316 S.E.2d 797 (1984); Dobbs v. State, 180 Ga. App. 714, 350 S.E.2d 469 (1986); Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1987); Darty v. State, 188 Ga. App. 447, 373 S.E.2d 389 (1988); Edwards v. State, 188 Ga. App. 667, 374 S.E.2d 97 (1988); Brown v. State, 191 Ga. App. 875, 383 S.E.2d 361 (1989); Yearby v. State, 259 Ga. 461, 385 S.E.2d 414 (1989); Smith v. State, 193 Ga. App. 208, 387 S.E.2d 419 (1989); Tenney v. State, 194 Ga. App. 820, 392 S.E.2d 294 (1990); Daniel v. State, 196 Ga. App. 160, 395 S.E.2d 638 (1990); Andrews v. State, 200 Ga. App. 47, 406 S.E.2d 801 (1991); Brenneman v. State, 200 Ga. App. 111, 407 S.E.2d 93 (1991); Jenkins v. State, 201 Ga. App. 654, 413 S.E.2d 460 (1991); Rich v. State, 207 Ga. App. 343, 427 S.E.2d 796 (1993); Wallace v. State, 216 Ga. App. 718, 455 S.E.2d 615 (1995); Knight v. State, 221 Ga. App. 92, 470 S.E.2d 486 (1996); Beck v. State, 222 Ga. App. 168, 473 S.E.2d 263 (1996); Scott v. State, 240 Ga. App. 586, 524 S.E.2d 287 (1999); Mann v. State, 240 Ga. App. 809, 524 S.E.2d 763 (1999); Burruss v. State, 242 Ga. App. 241, 529 S.E.2d 375 (2000); Gary v. State, 244 Ga. App. 577, 536 S.E.2d 220 (2000); Davis v. State, 244 Ga. App. 715, 536 S.E.2d 603 (2000); Henderson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 31, 543 S.E.2d 95 (2000); Teasley v. State, 247 Ga. App. 580, 545 S.E.2d 17 (2001); Walton v. State, 247 Ga. App. 717, 544 S.E.2d 540 (2001); Sweeder v. State, 246 Ga. App. 557, 541 S.E.2d 414 (2000); Duncan v. State, 253 Ga. App. 239, 558 General Consideration (Cont’d) S.E.2d 783 (2002); McGee v. State, 255 Ga. App. 708, 566 S.E.2d 431 (2002); Harper v. State, 262 Ga. App. 136, 586 S.E.2d 336 (2003); McMorris v. State, 263 Ga. App. 630, 588 S.E.2d 817 (2003); Shields v. State, 264 Ga. App. 232, 590 S.E.2d 217 (2003); Dawson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 824, 581 S.E.2d 371 (2003); Hunter v. State, 261 Ga. App. 276, 582 S.E.2d 228 (2003); Woodson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 731, 605 S.E.2d 822 (2004); Henry v. State, 279 Ga. 615, 619 S.E.2d 609 (2005); Scott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 106, 635 S.E.2d 582 (2006); Dozier v. Jackson, 282 Ga. App. 264, 638 S.E.2d 337 (2006); Snelson v. State, 286 Ga. App. 203, 648 S.E.2d 647 (2007); Self v. State, 288 Ga. App. 77, 653 S.E.2d 787 (2007); Smith v. State, 289 Ga. App. 742, 658 S.E.2d 156 (2008); Dunagan v. State, 283 Ga. 501, 661 S.E.2d 525 (2008); Hooks v. State, 284 Ga. 531, 668 S.E.2d 718 (2008); Hampton v. State, 294 Ga. App. 857, 670 S.E.2d 502 (2008); Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008); Cobb v. State, 309 Ga. App. 70, 709 S.E.2d 9 (2011); McCowan v. State, 325 Ga. App. 509, 753 S.E.2d 775 (2014); Williams v. State, 326 Ga. App. 784, 757 S.E.2d 448 (2014); Payne v. State, 338 Ga. App. 677, 791 S.E.2d 451 (2016); Harvey v. State, 344 Ga. App. 761, 811 S.E.2d 479 (2018); Troutman v. State, 348 Ga. App. 375, 823 S.E.2d 66 (2019); Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862, 823 S.E.2d 291 (2019); Dozier v. Watson, 305 Ga. 629, 827 S.E.2d 276 (2019); Purnell v. State, 843 S.E.2d 637, No. A20A0526, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 287 (2020). Allegation and Proof of Prior Convictions Knowing and voluntarily entered pleas. — Defendant’s signature on forms in which the defendant acknowledged that the defendant was aware of specified constitutional rights and that the defendant was waiving those rights by pleading guilty, which the defendant signed in regard to three prior negotiated guilty pleas, showed that the defendant was aware the defendant was waiving constitutional rights when entering those guilty pleas, and permitted the trial court to find the state met the state’s burden of proving the defendant’s guilty pleas were validly entered; accordingly, the state showed that those prior pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered for the purpose of the defendant being sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c). Hall v. State, 261 Ga. App. 64, 581 S.E.2d 695 (2003). Offenses charged in indictment for which defendant is on trial cannot be considered in determining defendant’s status as a recidivist. McCoy v. State, 168 Ga. App. 598, 310 S.E.2d 2 (1983). First offender guilty plea was not prior conviction. — Defendant would not have been subject to recidivist treatment and plea counsel’s advice in this regard was erroneous because one of the prior felony convictions was based on a first offender guilty plea, which did not constitute a ‘‘conviction’’ for those purposes. Ingram v. State, 338 Ga. App. 552, 790 S.E.2d 641 (2016). First offender probation not admissible. — Trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior guilty plea, which had been resolved by placing the defendant on probation, as a first offender, in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist; however, the error was harmless since there was evidence of another guilty plea to felony counts sufficient to support a maximum sentence. Scott v. State, 216 Ga. App. 692, 455 S.E.2d 609 (1995). Defendant violated the terms of first offender probation. — Due to the defendant’s earlier violation of the terms of the defendant’s first offender probation, the defendant was a convicted felon at the time of sentencing by the trial court; therefore, the trial court did not err in treating the defendant as a repeat offender. Daniels v. State, 271 Ga. 167, 517 S.E.2d 66 (1999). Prior federal felony conviction shown to be felony under Georgia law. — For purposes of Georgia’s recidivist statute, the defendant’s federal conviction for conspiracy to transport stolen goods, in which the defendant admitted that the defendant stole more than $5,000 worth of silver, and that the defendant transported that stolen property across state lines, was a conviction that would have constituted a felony under Georgia law based on the state offense of theft by receiving as the defendant received stolen property with a value that exceeded $500. Nordahl v. State, 344 Ga. App. 686, 811 S.E.2d 465 (2018), aff ’d, 306 Ga. 15, 829 S.E.2d 99 (2019). Convictions while a juvenile. — Defendant could not be found to be a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) since one of the defendant’s prior felony convictions was invalid as the conviction was for burglaries committed when the defendant was 16 years of age; the superior court did not have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court to find the defendant guilty of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28(b)(1) because the punishment for burglary was neither death nor life imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Smith v. State, 266 Ga. App. 111, 596 S.E.2d 230 (2004). Convictions when juvenile tried as adult. — Defendant’s sentence to life in prison without parole, under the three felony recidivist sentencing provision of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), was proper as the trial court could rely on an armed robbery conviction from the superior court against the defendant when the defendant was 16 years old as the court properly assumed jurisdiction over the matter. Moore v. State, 276 Ga. App. 55, 622 S.E.2d 417 (2005). Out-of-state convictions for acts committed while defendant was a juvenile could not be used as prior felony convictions for purposes of recidivist sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 because the defendant would not have been convicted of felonies in this state, but would have been adjudicated delinquent. Miller v. State, 231 Ga. App. 869, 501 S.E.2d 42 (1998). Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist because the trial court committed no error in using the defendant’s 1991 Michigan armed robbery conviction as a predicate offense for recidivist punishment as the state met the state’s burden of proving that the defendant’s Michigan conviction was for conduct that would have been considered a felony under Georgia law because, if the defendant had committed the offense of armed robbery in Georgia as a juvenile in 1991, a superior court would have had concurrent jurisdiction over the matter and the defendant could have been convicted of the felony offense of armed robbery. Anderson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 739, 788 S.E.2d 831 (2016). Requirements of indictment for recidivist punishment. — Indictment for the second offense must allege the indictment and conviction of the accused for the first offense. Harris v. State, 40 Ga. App. 228, 149 S.E. 153 (1929). Defendant must be indicted as a recidivist in order to impose recidivist punishment. Brown v. State, 144 Ga. App. 509, 241 S.E.2d 621 (1978). For one to receive recidivist punishment one must have been indicted under a recidivist statute, one’s prior convictions having been considered by the grand jury and having been included in the indictment. Aldridge v. State, 158 Ga. App. 719, 282 S.E.2d 189 (1981). Defendant’s prior felony convictions could not be used against the defendant since there was no recidivist charge contained in the indictment and the record did not contain any other affirmative notice to the defendant that the defendant’s prior felony offenses would be used against the defendant for recidivist purposes during sentencing. State v. Freeman, 198 Ga. App. 553, 402 S.E.2d 529 (1991). In a prosecution for armed robbery, even though the defendant was not indicted as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7, the court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist since the state provided notice to the defendant that the defendant’s prior offenses would be used against the defendant for recidivist purposes during sentencing. Kinsey v. State, 219 Ga. App. 204, 464 S.E.2d 648 (1995). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for burglary, the trial court properly sentenced the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 to 20 years, with ten years to serve in prison without parole and the remainder of the sentence suspended on the condition that the defendant not violate any laws, as a result of three prior felony convictions because the defendant waived any claimed error by failing to challenge the sentence. However, even if Allegation and Proof of Prior Convictions (Cont’d) the error had not been waived, the recidivist sentence was proper since the state proved all four of the convictions that were listed in the indictment and notices and, although the trial court stated that the court was not relying on the defendant’s robbery convictions in imposing a sentence, there was no reason those convictions could not be used to support the sentence. Battise v. State, 295 Ga. App. 833, 673 S.E.2d 262 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0917, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 369 (Ga. 2009). Trial court did not err by sentencing the defendant as a recidivist since the defendant’s convictions for selling cocaine and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon were separate convictions and were not merged for sentencing purposes. The trial court’s use of the same waiver form with regard to the defendant’s guilty pleas did not negate the fact that the convictions were separate and were not consolidated. Crutchfield v. State, 295 Ga. App. 490, 672 S.E.2d 467 (2009). Recidivist punishment appropriate. — Because the state provided adequate notice to the defendant of the state’s intent to ask for recidivist sentencing and counsel chose to move forward at sentencing without making any objection, the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist. Pruitt v. State, 354 Ga. App. 73, 840 S.E.2d 597 (2020). No evidence that out-of-state convictions were felonies in Georgia. — Because the trial court considered the out-of-state convictions without evidence that the convictions were for conduct that would have constituted felonies in Georgia, the felony sentences were vacated and the case remanded for re-sentencing. Woodson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 67, 530 S.E.2d 2 (2000), aff ’d, 273 Ga. 557, 544 S.E.2d 431 (2001). When the defendant was sentenced to a life sentence as a recidivist, but a certified copy of the defendant’s prior conviction from another state was not included in the record, the appellate court could not uphold the sentence as the court had no opportunity to inspect the prior conviction, nor did the state offer any proof that the acts of which the defendant was convicted in the prior conviction were a felony in Georgia, and it appeared that the prior sentence was for probation alone, meaning that the defendant was not ‘‘sentenced to confinement in a penal institution’’ as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a). Wheeler v. State, 270 Ga. App. 363, 606 S.E.2d 612 (2004). Trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist because the defendant’s prior Florida convictions did not match the elements of felonies in Georgia and, thus, did not qualify as predicate convictions. Butler v. State, 354 Ga. App. 473, 841 S.E.2d 162 (2020). Proof of previous felony allegation must be made before the accused can be subjected to the maximum punishment prescribed. Harris v. State, 40 Ga. App. 228, 149 S.E. 153 (1929). Failure to charge recidivism in indictment not error. — Since the state served notice to the defendant that the state planned to seek recidivist sentencing and to offer the defendant’s prior convictions into evidence as aggravating factors, it was not error for the state to fail to charge the defendant under the recidivist statute in the indictment or for the court to sentence the defendant under such statute. Mikell v. State, 231 Ga. App. 85, 498 S.E.2d 531 (1998). When sentencing the defendant as a recidivist, the trial court erred in considering prior convictions which were not supported by admissible evidence. Williams v. State, 235 Ga. App. 876, 510 S.E.2d 848 (1999). Recidivism evidence used to enhance sentence. — Trial court may impose a higher degree of punishment for an offense due to evidence in aggravation of the punishment of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-2 and not have sentenced the defendant under a recidivist statute when the defendant was never indicted under a recidivist statute. Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 716, 431 S.E.2d 469 (1993). Trial court properly resentenced the defendant to ten years, six to serve, on the defendant’s guilty plea to sale of marijuana as the state provided an additional recidivist notice which listed three prior felony convictions and O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a) did not give the trial judge discretion to impose less than the maximum sentence under those circumstances. West v. State, 255 Ga. App. 334, 565 S.E.2d 538 (2002). Because the state introduced certified copies of convictions at the defendant’s sentencing proving that, while represented by counsel, defendant pled guilty to at least three separate felony offenses, and the defendant did not produce any counter evidence showing an infringement of the defendant’s rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the pleas, the state properly met the state’s burden of proof of showing recidivism. Clark v. State, 279 Ga. 243, 611 S.E.2d 38 (2005). Trial court did not err in considering the defendant’s three prior sale-of-cocaine convictions as three separate convictions for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c); even though two of the prior convictions were entered on the same date by the same judge and had concurrent sentences, the convictions were separately indicted and concerned two separate sales of cocaine that took place on different days. Butler v. State, 277 Ga. App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (2005). Because the defendant’s three prior felony convictions, and a subsequent conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as a result of one or more of those felonies, remained separate felonies that could be used to impose a recidivist punishment for the commission of yet another felony, and the defendant did not seek to collaterally attack any of those convictions, the recidivists sentences imposed under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 were valid. Campbell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 331, 631 S.E.2d 388 (2006). Trial court properly sentenced the defendant as a repeat offender under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) since the defendant had previously been convicted of three prior crimes which would have been felonies if committed in Georgia; moreover, there was no evidence in the record to support claims that defendant was not represented by counsel in the prior matters. McConnell v. State, 281 Ga. App. 303, 635 S.E.2d 882 (2006). Because sufficient proof of the necessary prior convictions, even without inclusion of the defendant’s first offender plea, existed to authorize punishment under both O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30 and 17-10-7, the recidivist sentence imposed by the trial court was upheld. Johnson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 724, 644 S.E.2d 544, cert. denied, No. S07C1179, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2007). Trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion complaining of the imposition of recidivist sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) as the defendant did not establish that the trial court erred in considering any of the defendant’s three prior felony convictions for purposes of recidivist sentencing. Defendant’s argument that a third prior conviction was not final since the conviction still involved a period of probation that had not yet been discharged or revoked was found meritless as the prior conviction at issue did not involve a first offender sentence. Land v. State, 291 Ga. App. 617, 662 S.E.2d 368 (2008). Trial court correctly sentenced a defendant to serve life without the possibility of parole because the defendant was a four-time recidivist and the maximum sentence for rape was life in prison. Further, the state provided the defendant with notice prior to trial that the state would seek to have the defendant sentenced as a recidivist, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. Hall v. State, 292 Ga. App. 544, 664 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, No. S08C1841, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 926 (Ga. 2008). Trial court erred in using the defendant’s August 2001 felony convictions to sentence the defendant as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a) because, at the time of the defendant’s sentencing for escape in October 2001, the August 2001 convictions were unavailable for recidivist treatment since those convictions were pending on appeal; the defendant was found guilty and sentenced on armed robberies in August 2001, the defendant appealed those convictions, and the convictions were affirmed three years later. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 273, 687 S.E.2d 417 (2009). Trial court properly sentenced the deAllegation and Proof of Prior Convictions (Cont’d) fendant as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 following a shoplifting conviction because the record of the plea proceeding in a prior case wherein the defendant pled guilty belied the claim that the defendant was not adequately advised of the right to a jury trial, thus, the trial court did not err in considering, for purposes of sentencing, that prior conviction. Foster v. State, 319 Ga. App. 815, 738 S.E.2d 651 (2013). Because the felony convictions not challenged by the defendant would have sufficed to render the defendant a recidivist and because both of the defendant’s attacks on prior convictions for drug possession with intent to distribute lacked merit, the trial court did not err when the court considered those prior convictions and sentenced the defendant to serve 30 years without parole under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and 17-10-7(c). Merritt v. State, 329 Ga. App. 871, 766 S.E.2d 217 (2014). Evidence of previous conviction relevant to punishment for second conviction. — As to defendants charged with a felony punishable by labor in the penitentiary, evidence of a previous conviction and sentence for a felony is relevant evidence on the question of the punishment to be inflicted in the event of a conviction for a second felony. Kryder v. State, 212 Ga. 272, 91 S.E.2d 612, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 850, 77 S. Ct. 71, 1 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1956). Introduction of former indictments, pleas of guilty, and sentences are the highest and best evidence of such facts. Timbs v. State, 71 Ga. App. 141, 30 S.E.2d 290 (1944). Use of arrest photographs to demonstrate prior convictions. — Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion during the sentencing phase of the defendant’s trial on charges of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the court considered photographs that were taken when the defendant was arrested on another charge to determine that the defendant was the person convicted of that charge, even though the defendant was arrested and convicted under another name, or when the court found that the defendant was subject to a sentence of life in prison without parole because the defendant had prior felony convictions. Farmer v. State, 268 Ga. App. 831, 603 S.E.2d 16 (2004). Allegation and proof of prior convictions generally. — Fact of a former sentence must be charged in the indictment if a second conviction would affect the grade of the offense, or require the imposition of a different punishment. McWhorter v. State, 118 Ga. 55, 44 S.E. 873 (1903). If under this section it was provided that the maximum punishment is to be inflicted in the event the accused has been convicted of a prior felony, such fact becomes a part of the offense charged, and it was necessary to allege and prove the prior conviction. Berry v. State, 51 Ga. App. 442, 180 S.E. 635 (1935). If prior felony convictions are intended to be proved for the purpose of obtaining a maximum sentence, the previous convictions must be alleged in the indictment as well as proved on the trial of the case. Kitchens v. State, 113 Ga. App. 663, 149 S.E.2d 373 (1966). Trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 because the trial court did not admit into the record two certified copies of the defendant’s prior convictions tendered by the state or a third copy that the prosecution had been waiting to receive from the clerk’s office, and defense counsel did not waive the requirement that the convictions be proven by the state. Tanksley v. State, 323 Ga. App. 299, 743 S.E.2d 585 (2013). It is mandatory that previous convictions be set out in indictment. Croker v. Smith, 225 Ga. 529, 169 S.E.2d 787 (1969). If the state elects to aver in a possession of firearm by felon count that the defendant has been convicted of more than one prior felony offense, such averment is descriptive of the manner in which the offense was committed and, as such, the state must make an honest attempt to prove the offense ‘‘as laid.’’ State v. Freeman, 198 Ga. App. 553, 402 S.E.2d 529 (1991). Prior convictions not required in indictment. — Since 1974 when Georgia adopted judge sentencing (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-2) it is not required that the prior convictions be included in the indictment but only that the accused receive notice of the state’s intention to seek recidivist punishment and of the identity of the prior convictions. Wainwright v. State, 208 Ga. App. 777, 432 S.E.2d 555 (1993). When the prior convictions do no more than subject the defendant to a greater risk of the maximum sentence (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a)) or even to a certainty of the maximum sentence (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b)) for the crime as indicted, the prior convictions need not be alleged in the indictment; imposition of the maximum sentence has already been authorized by the grand jury’s action, and adequate advance notice to the defendant is assured by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-2(a). Wainwright v. State, 208 Ga. App. 777, 432 S.E.2d 555 (1993). Records of the defendant’s pleas to two prior indictments tendered in aggravation of punishment were properly not treated as one offense since there was no evidence that the indictments were ‘‘consolidated for trial’’ as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(d). Robinson v. State, 232 Ga. App. 280, 501 S.E.2d 536 (1998). Since the state gave the defendant notice that the state intended to seek sentencing under the recidivist statute and, at sentencing, offered into evidence certified copies of previous convictions, imposition of an enhanced sentence was not invalid on grounds that the trial court never admitted the certified copies into evidence. Moore v. State, 250 Ga. App. 75, 550 S.E.2d 667 (2001). Although the language in the convictions may not track Georgia’s armed robbery statute, if a defendant’s Missouri conviction’s language describes that the defendant was in possession of a deadly weapon when the defendant forcefully and violently took valuables from the victim, such description was sufficient to prove that the defendant was convicted of an offense in Missouri, which would have been the serious violent felony of armed robbery had the offense occurred in Georgia pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b)(2). Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 582 S.E.2d 575 (2003). Trial court did not err in not including a recidivism count in the indictment as the defendant’s prior convictions did not constitute facts increasing the defendant’s punishment that were required to be submitted to a jury. Nordahl v. State, 344 Ga. App. 686, 811 S.E.2d 465 (2018), aff ’d, 306 Ga. 15, 829 S.E.2d 99 (2019). Failure to object to void sentence did not mean sentence not vacated on appeal. — If, at the time of a recidivist sentencing, the period of probation on the defendant’s prior first offender sentence had expired with no revocation, the discharge was automatic and the first offender sentence was not a felony ‘‘conviction.’’ The recidivist sentence was thus illegal, and since a challenge to the void sentence was not waived by the defendant’s failure to object, the sentence was vacated. Headspeth v. State, 266 Ga. App. 414, 597 S.E.2d 503 (2004). Defendant was properly sentenced under the recidivist statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a), even though a certified copy of the prior conviction was not formally entered into evidence since the state put the defendant on notice that the state would offer evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction, the defendant did not challenge the legal sufficiency of the prior conviction, and the defendant’s own witness acknowledged that the defendant had a prior conviction. Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. App. 29, 596 S.E.2d 205 (2004). Alford plea sufficient. — In a trial in which the state sought to show that the defendant was a recidivist for sentencing purposes, although the documents did not contain direct evidence of the defendant’s plea in one of the prior convictions, the documents were sufficient to establish that the defendant entered an Alford plea, which was a guilty plea and was sufficient for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7; for the one conviction at issue, the documents included an indictment which was left blank as to the plea section, a sentencing form which indicated that defendant entered an Alford plea, and an order of restitution. Wynn v. State, 271 Ga. App. 10, 609 S.E.2d 97 (2004). Allegation and Proof of Prior Convictions (Cont’d) Because the state: (1) conceded that the trial court erred by using two felony and three misdemeanor shoplifting convictions; (2) failed to meet the state’s burden of proving that the defendant was represented by counsel before pleading guilty to those crimes; and (3) failed to show that the defendant was represented by counsel or waived such a right, on three previous misdemeanor shoplifting convictions, the trial court should not have used the convictions to enhance the defendant’s shoplifting conviction into a felony; moreover, the defendant overcame presumption of regularity of the trial court’s decision as two of the underlying felonies were the same ones which were ruled inadmissible. Simmons v. State, 278 Ga. App. 372, 629 S.E.2d 86 (2006). Trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) because the state did not introduce any evidence that the defendant had previously pled guilty or been convicted of any crime. Dobbs v. State, 302 Ga. App. 628, 691 S.E.2d 387 (2010). Defendant sentenced to life in prison without parole, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7(c), based on the defendant’s prior convictions stemming from guilty pleas, was not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of the defendant’s trial counsel’s failure to review the transcripts of the defendant’s prior plea colloquies because: (1) no per se rule required counsel to review the transcripts; and (2) counsel otherwise adequately investigated the validity of the prior convictions. Barker v. Barrow, 290 Ga. 711, 723 S.E.2d 905, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 987, 133 S. Ct. 540, 184 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2012). State did not ‘‘use up’’ prior felony conviction to prove element of crime. — Trial court’s consideration of a prior felony conviction in imposing punishment under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) was proper because the state did not ‘‘use up’’ evidence of the prior felony conviction to establish a charge of firearm possession by a convicted felon charge; instead, the state only offered evidence of the defendant’s previous felony indictment, not the conviction. Thompson v. State, 294 Ga. App. 768, 670 S.E.2d 226 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0482, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 252 (Ga. 2009). First offender conviction had to be violated and adjudication of guilt entered. — Because it was unclear whether one of the defendant’s convictions, which was a first offender conviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 et seq., was successfully completed, in which case there was no ‘‘conviction’’ as that term was defined under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-3(4) because there was no adjudication of guilt, or alternatively, whether the first offender sentence was violated and the trial court thereafter entered an adjudication of guilt and a sentence thereon, in which case the conviction could be counted as one of the three felonies for purposes of recidivist sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), a remand of the sentencing for further determination was required. Swan v. State, 276 Ga. App. 827, 625 S.E.2d 97 (2005). Proof of validity of prior guilty plea. — In a prosecution for rape and aggravated sodomy, proof that the defendant’s plea of guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute required sentencing of the defendant as a recidivist. Miller v. State, 214 Ga. App. 393, 448 S.E.2d 20 (1994). Trial court did not deprive the defendant of due process of law by admitting in evidence the defendant’s prior guilty plea so as to make the defendant eligible for a recidivist sentence; even though a transcript of the plea proceeding was not available, the validity of the plea was shown by extrinsic evidence. Nash v. State, 233 Ga. App. 75, 503 S.E.2d 23 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 271 Ga. 281, 519 S.E.2d 893 (1999). Defendant was properly sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) because the evidence of the defendant’s guilty plea in another state indicated that the defendant was represented by counsel when the defendant entered the plea and the defendant produced no evidence that the plea was not valid. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 1, 601 S.E.2d 392 (2004). Remand for further sentencing proceedings was necessary because the state was not given an opportunity to show that a prior conviction, based on a guilty plea, upon which the state relied during sentencing was constitutional. Grant v. State, 326 Ga. App. 121, 756 S.E.2d 255 (2014). Certified copy of plea submitted. — Trial court did not err in admitting the defendant’s prior guilty plea to armed robbery because the state tendered a certified copy of the guilty plea during the sentencing hearing and, thus, met the state’s initial burden by proving the existence of the prior guilty plea and that the defendant was represented by counsel. Freeman v. State, 244 Ga. App. 393, 535 S.E.2d 349 (2000). Trial court properly used a prior guilty plea to sentence the defendant as a recidivist when the state presented a certified copy of the plea that was signed and initialed by defense counsel along with a plea hearing transcript; even if the plea hearing transcript was uncertified and unauthenticated, the certified copy of the plea was admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-9-920), and the defendant had not produced evidence of invalidity once the fact of conviction was proved and the state showed that the defendant had been represented by counsel. Moorer v. State, 286 Ga. App. 395, 649 S.E.2d 537 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1910, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 806 (Ga. 2007). When the defendant was sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(d), the sentence was properly supported by certified copies of each of the four prior convictions. Hester v. State, 274 Ga. App. 276, 617 S.E.2d 232 (2005). Trial court did not err in considering the defendant’s prior guilty plea in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist after the defendant was convicted of felony theft by taking because the state, by tendering the certified copy of the plea, met the state’s initial burden of proving that the defendant had entered the guilty plea. Sheppard v. State, 300 Ga. App. 631, 686 S.E.2d 295 (2009). State may prove as many prior convictions as have occurred. — In alleging former conviction or plea of guilty by the defendant of similar offenses, the state is not limited to the alleging or 17-10-7 proving of only one. It may allege and prove as many as have in fact occurred, or any portion thereof. Law v. State, 121 Ga. App. 106, 173 S.E.2d 98, appeal dismissed, 226 Ga. 591, 176 S.E.2d 80 (1970). Convictions on separate counts of the same indictment count as one prior felony for purposes of recidivist sentencing. Fuller v. State, 233 Ga. App. 211, 504 S.E.2d 62 (1998). Trial court erred in sentencing the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) because two of the defendant’s prior convictions were pleas that had been consolidated for trial under § 17-10-7(d) and, thus, were deemed to be only one conviction. Stone v. State, 245 Ga. App. 728, 538 S.E.2d 791 (2000). When the defendant was sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(d), the trial court properly considered two convictions arising from the same crime as one conviction for recidivist sentencing purposes, but the court was not required to consider convictions entered two years apart as one conviction because the probation granted for the earlier offense was revoked on the same day defendant was sentenced on the later offense. Hester v. State, 274 Ga. App. 276, 617 S.E.2d 232 (2005). Offenses not consolidated for trial. — Trial court correctly concluded that a defendant’s three prior offenses were not consolidated for trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(d). The three prior crimes involved different victims, and each conviction had a separate case number, indictment, and sentencing order. Barbee v. State, 308 Ga. App. 322, 707 S.E.2d 550 (2011). Prior felony conviction resulting from guilty verdict. — Since the defendant was shown to have at least one prior felony conviction resulting from a guilty verdict rather than a guilty plea, and since the defendant was found guilty of another separate felony, it was not error to sentence the defendant as a recidivist pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a). Cribbs v. State, 204 Ga. App. 109, 418 S.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 921, 418 S.E.2d 405 (1992). First offender record properly considered. — Defendant’s first offender reAllegation and Proof of Prior Convictions (Cont’d) cord was properly considered at the defendant’s sentencing hearing and evidence regarding the defendant’s underlying behavior in connection with the first offender plea was not required. Williams v. State, 228 Ga. App. 622, 492 S.E.2d 290 (1997). Admissibility of proof of extraneous crime. — To be admissible, proof of extraneous crime must tend to establish commission of the crime in question. Kitchens v. State, 113 Ga. App. 663, 149 S.E.2d 373 (1966). Prior conviction may be used to show motive, scheme, or plan. — While the primary object of alleging and proving that the defendant, in a trial for larceny (now theft) of an automobile, had been previously convicted of numerous designated felonies and sentenced to confinement and labor in the penitentiary for each of those offenses, may be to make the defendant receive the maximum sentence under the provisions of this section, yet such proof, especially as to the defendant’s previous conviction of the larceny of an automobile, is admissible to show motive, scheme, or plan. Weeks v. State, 66 Ga. App. 553, 18 S.E.2d 503 (1942). If a particular group of tools has been used in a particular way in previous burglaries related in point of time, the evidence may be admissible to show modus operandi, or it may be shown that the tools in question have in fact been used by the defendant in the commission of the crime for the purpose of showing the intent accompanying the possession. Kitchens v. State, 113 Ga. App. 663, 149 S.E.2d 373 (1966). Effect of written admission of prior conviction. — Written admission made to the court of the allegation in the indictment of a prior conviction by the defendant does not make it necessary to strike this allegation from the indictment nor make evidence of such fact inadmissible. Berry v. State, 51 Ga. App. 442, 180 S.E. 635 (1935). If indicted as a recidivist on narcotics offense with prior convictions for nonnarcotics offenses, sentencing under this section was proper. Green v. State, 154 Ga. App. 295, 267 S.E.2d 898 (1980). If indicted on narcotics charge with a prior narcotics conviction, the specific recidivist statute for narcotics offenders should be applied rather than the general recidivist statute. Green v. State, 154 Ga. App. 295, 267 S.E.2d 898 (1980). Recidivist sentencing applied in drug possession conviction. — Since there had been three prior felony convictions, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 applied to a sentencing for possession of cocaine. Gray v. State, 254 Ga. App. 487, 562 S.E.2d 712 (2002). Recidivist sentencing properly applied. — Trial court did not err in imposing recidivist sentencing because the state’s evidence served as sufficient proof of the existence of the defendant’s prior guilty pleas and that the defendant was represented by counsel when those pleas were taken. Horne v. State, 318 Ga. App. 484, 733 S.E.2d 487 (2012). Driving motor vehicle after being declared habitual violator. — Defendant could not be sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b) since the defendant’s habitual violator convictions did not fall within the definition of ‘‘serious violent felony.’’ Ball v. State, 233 Ga. App. 859, 506 S.E.2d 149 (1998). Identity of names in prior and present indictments is prima facie proof. — Identity of names shown in two previous indictments with the name in the present indictment was sufficient in the instant case to establish prima facie that the defendant was the same man previously charged and sentenced. Timbs v. State, 71 Ga. App. 141, 30 S.E.2d 290 (1944). Defendant may rebut evidence of previous conviction. — In a prosecution for a second felonious offense, if record evidence of a former conviction is introduced showing one of the same name as that of the defendant on trial, the defendant has the opportunity of showing that the defendant is not the individual named in the previous indictments, and until the defendant proves otherwise, the evidence would be taken as proof that the defendant is the person named in the previous indictments. It is not conclusive, but is prima facie evidence of a former conviction. Timbs v. State, 71 Ga. App. 141, 30 S.E.2d 290 (1944). If defendant does not rebut such identity, it is sufficiently established. — If the defendant is being prosecuted under a certain name, and the record evidence of a former conviction shows an individual of the same name to have been formerly convicted and sentenced in the same court for two felonies committed in the same county, and the defendant in the defendant’s statement to the jury does not deny that the defendant is the person named in the former sentences, and there is no evidence to rebut this prima facie proof by the record evidence of identity, and this record evidence is undisputed, the identity of the defendant as the person named in the former sentences was thus sufficiently established. Timbs v. State, 71 Ga. App. 141, 30 S.E.2d 290 (1944). Because the defendant did not present any evidence that one of the three prior convictions presented by the state for sentencing purposes was a first-offender sentence, the defendant was properly sentenced as a recidivist. Swan v. State, 275 Ga. App. 137, 619 S.E.2d 809 (2005). Concordance of name. — In the absence of any denial by the defendant and no proof to the contrary, concordance of name is sufficient to show that the defendant and the individual previously convicted are the same person. Mincey v. State, 186 Ga. App. 839, 368 S.E.2d 796 (1988). Judge may inspect record and act on own knowledge as to identity. — After a second conviction, the judge may inspect the record of the former trial, act on the judge’s own knowledge, or hear evidence to satisfy the judge of the identity of the accused. McWhorter v. State, 118 Ga. 55, 44 S.E. 873 (1903). Conviction with maximum sentence invalid if indictment silent as to prior convictions. — Conviction and sentence of an accused given the maximum punishment is illegal if the indictment contains no reference to the defendant’s former convictions and sentences. Harris v. State, 40 Ga. App. 228, 149 S.E. 153 (1929). Notice of prior offenses used for recidivist purposes. — Although it is not essential that the indictment set forth the prior offenses, if the indictment does not set forth prior offenses it is necessary that the record contain an ‘‘affirmative notice to defendant that his prior felony offenses would be used against him for recidivist purposes during sentencing.’’ Ross v. State, 210 Ga. App. 455, 436 S.E.2d 496 (1993). Defendant was not improperly sentenced under the general recidivist statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), as the defendant was served with notice that certified copies of the defendant’s three prior felony convictions would be used against the defendant in sentencing as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-10-2(a); once the convictions were offered, the trial court was authorized to sentence the defendant under § 17-10-7. Walker v. State, 268 Ga. App. 669, 602 S.E.2d 351 (2004). Trial court did not err in finding that the state provided sufficient notice of the state’s intent to seek recidivist punishment because the state first provided the defendant with notice of the state’s intent to seek recidivist punishment in January 2014; and the amended notice from June 2016 was provided well before the February 10, 2017 hearing, at which the defendant ultimately pled guilty, and the state provided specific details regarding the defendant’s previous three convictions that the state intended to use in aggravation of punishment, including the fact that those offenses were considered felonies in their respective jurisdictions and would similarly be considered felonies in Georgia. Nordahl v. State, 344 Ga. App. 686, 811 S.E.2d 465 (2018), aff ’d, 306 Ga. 15, 829 S.E.2d 99 (2019). Recidivism indictment which contains a defect in the allegation of prior convictions is not rendered void by such defect, assuming that the defect was not brought to the attention of the jury during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. Wooten v. State, 160 Ga. App. 747, 288 S.E.2d 94 (1981). Prior convictions as a separate ‘‘count.’’ — Placing a defendant’s prior convictions in an indictment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 did not constitute a separate and distinct ‘‘count’’ of the indictment so as to charge the defendant with Allegation and Proof of Prior Convictions (Cont’d) an offense. Parrish v. State, 160 Ga. App. 601, 287 S.E.2d 603 (1981). Prior federal conviction for receiving, possessing, and concealing explosives, knowing the explosives have been stolen, was not necessarily conduct which would be considered felonious under the laws of Georgia, and that conviction cannot be considered a prior conviction within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b). Wallace v. State, 175 Ga. App. 685, 333 S.E.2d 874 (1985). Prior out-of-state convictions. — Although the language of a Florida indictment did not track Georgia’s armed robbery statute, the Florida indictment was sufficient to prove that the defendant was convicted of two offenses in Florida which would have each been the serious violent felony of armed robbery had the offenses been committed in Georgia. Smith v. State, 241 Ga. App. 770, 527 S.E.2d 608 (2000). There was no merit to the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to life in prison without parole under the recidivist provisions of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b)(2) since the defendant was convicted of a serious violent felony, armed robbery, and the state produced evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted in Florida of the offense of armed robbery, which, if committed in Georgia, would also have been a serious violent felony as defined in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(a). Cordy v. State, 257 Ga. App. 726, 572 S.E.2d 73 (2002). Fla. Stat. Ch. 812.13(2)(a) specifically provided that armed robbery was committed while robbing using ‘‘force, violence, assault,’’ or intimidation and carrying a firearm or other deadly weapon, so the defendant’s conviction of this crime, even though it was noted that the defendant did not carry the firearm involved in the offense, adequately supported the imposition of a life sentence without parole under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b)(2) for defendant’s subsequent offense. King v. State, 258 Ga. App. 872, 575 S.E.2d 679 (2002). Defendant was properly sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) because it was shown that the defendant pled guilty in Alabama to theft of an automobile, and, under Georgia law, theft of a motor vehicle was a felony regardless of the value of the vehicle under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12(a)(5)(A). Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 1, 601 S.E.2d 392 (2004). Defendant’s case was remanded for resentencing after a conviction for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine because the trial court considered an uncertified Arkansas docket sheet in aggravation of sentence and a Tennessee conviction that might not qualify as a prior felony in Georgia under the recidivist statute. Elliot v. State, 274 Ga. App. 73, 616 S.E.2d 844 (2005). Because the state met the state’s statutory burden of proving that the defendant had at least three prior out-of-state convictions for offenses that would have constituted felonies under Georgia law, the trial court was entitled to sentence the defendant as a fourth-time felony offender under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c). Nelson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 92, 625 S.E.2d 465 (2005). Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant’s two Oklahoma convictions would have constituted felonies under Georgia law for purposes of sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a); the state introduced copies of the applicable Oklahoma statutes and there was no basis for concluding that the trial judge was required to review certified copies of the Oklahoma statutes in order to reach the court’s conclusions. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 7, 635 S.E.2d 278 (2006). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for armed robbery and other crimes, the trial court did not err by sentencing the defendant under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(b) based on the existence of an out-of-state robbery with a dangerous weapon conviction because, for sentencing purposes, Georgia defines armed robbery as a serious violent felony and the out-of-state conviction for the crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon was properly treated as armed robbery under Georgia law. Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008). Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s use of prior felonies defendant committed in California to sentence the defendant as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), as the elements of Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11054(f ), 11350(a) (possession of cocaine) were sufficiently similar to those of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-26(1)(D), 16-13-30(c); and the elements of Cal. Penal. Code § 211 (robbery) were sufficiently similar to those of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40. Williams v. State, 296 Ga. App. 270, 674 S.E.2d 115 (2009). Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist because the records of an Alabama conviction showed that the defendant pled guilty to the offense of burglary in the third degree and received a sentence of four years imprisonment; the elements of the crime as charged in the Alabama indictment were similar to the elements required to commit the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Wells v. State, 313 Ga. App. 528, 722 S.E.2d 133 (2012). Trial court properly imposed recidivist punishment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 based on the defendant’s prior federal conviction for conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314, because the conviction’s elements matched felony conspiracy to commit a crime under Georgia law as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8. Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 829 S.E.2d 99 (2019). Offenses heard on same day not ‘‘consolidated for trial.’’ — When previous offenses were merely heard on the same day for convenience or efficiency, but were not in fact ‘‘consolidated for trial,’’ the offenses constituted separate offenses for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), especially if a separate indictment was charged for each of the offenses and a separate sentence was handed down for each offense. Clarke v. State, 167 Ga. App. 402, 306 S.E.2d 702 (1983). Prior convictions were not consolidated for trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) although the convictions involved separate indictments and pleas of guilty before the same judge on the same date, concurrent sentences in separate orders, and similar but separate probation orders. Moore v. State, 169 Ga. App. 24, 311 S.E.2d 226 (1983). Since two convictions were the result of guilty pleas entered on the same date to two separate accusations, since the defendant was sentenced for each conviction, sentences to be served concurrently, and since a separate order of sentence was entered on each accusation, the trial court did not err in concluding that those two prior convictions had not been consolidated for trial within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c). Parker v. State, 170 Ga. App. 295, 316 S.E.2d 855 (1984), overruled on other grounds, Darty v. State, 188 Ga. App. 447, 373 S.E.2d 389 (1988). Concurrent sentence entered on same day not consolidated. — Since the record reflected that the defendant was found guilty of armed robbery and pled guilty to possessing heroin on two separate dates and all three convictions were the result of separate indictments and a separate order of sentence was entered on each indictment, the fact that the sentences were entered on the same day and that the sentences on the possession charges ran concurrent with the armed robbery sentence did not require the conclusion that the three prior convictions had been ‘‘consolidated for trial’’ within the meaning of O.C.G.A.