Laws 4453-4454, § 33, as well as Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV, gave the court such jurisdiction. Nelson v. Powell, 293 Ga. App. 227, 666 S.E.2d 598 (2008). New trials are granted by superior court as a court, not by a presiding judge in the judge’s capacity as judge. Page: 263 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:24:49 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP NEW TRIAL Allen v. State, 102 Ga. 619, 29 S.E. 470 (1897) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1056). New trial may be granted after trial before jury and before appeal. Eufaula Home Ins. Co. v. Plant & Cubbedge, 37 Ga. 672 (1868). Discretion of trial court. — Trial court is vested with discretion in granting new trials. Martin & Sons v. Bank of Leesburg, 137 Ga. 285, 73 S.E. 387 (1911). When trial judge refuses to order new trial on ground of inadequate damages in tort action, this court will interfere with that discretion only in case of manifest abuse. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944). Because the defendant did not rebut the presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the broad range of professional conduct, because the trial court considered and rejected counsel’s motion for a mistrial, and because an eyewitness could testify about the certainty of the eyewitness’s identification, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial. Greenwood v. State, 309 Ga. App. 893, 714 S.E.2d 602 (2011). Certiorari lies though court may grant new trial. — Although city court may have power to grant new trials, it is an inferior court whose final judgments may be reviewed by superior court upon certiorari. Archie v. State, 99 Ga. 23, 25 S.E. 612 (1896). First grant of new trial by judge of superior court is never disturbed by appellate court, unless it is made to appear that in doing so the judge manifestly abused the discretion resting in the judge. Law v. Hodges, 53 Ga. App. 319, 185 S.E. 584 (1936). Mere difference of opinion as to amount of recovery. — New trial should not be granted based on mere difference of opinion between appellate court and jury as to amount of recovery in action of tort for unliquidated damages. Something more must be disclosed to warrant interference, when substantial damages have been returned. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944). Bias, passion, prejudice, or mistake must appear to justify setting aside verdict. — When amount of verdict, though less than appellate court would have approved, does not afford such evidence of bias, passion, prejudice, or mistake as to justify setting the verdict aside as inadequate, the appellate court must affirm the verdict. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944). Presumption that trial judge knew rule as to obligation to approve jury’s verdict. — In interpreting language of order overruling motion for new trial, appellate court must presume that trial judge knew rule as to obligation to approve jury’s verdict devolving upon the judge, and that in overruling motion the judge did exercise this discretion, unless language of order indicates to the contrary and that court agreed to verdict against the court’s own judgment and against dictates of the judge’s own conscience, merely because the judge did not feel that the judge had the duty or authority to override findings of jury upon disputed issues of fact. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E. 236 (1944). Damages rules and new trial rules exist independently. — Rules of law governing (1) right of jury to originally fix damages, (2) right of appellate court to grant new trial when verdict is alleged to be excessive or inadequate, and (3) right of trial judge to grant new trial when in the judge’s discretion the judge thinks the verdict unfair, unjust, contrary to evidence, excessive, or too small, exist apart from and independent of each other. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E. 236 (1944). Approval of verdict necessary to finalize verdict when party moves for new trial on general grounds. — Before verdict becomes final the verdict should, when losing party requires it by motion for new trial, receive approval of mind and conscience of trial judge. Until the judge’s approval is given, the verdict does not become binding in a case when motion for new trial contains general grounds. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 236 (1944). New trial may be granted on condition that plaintiff refuses to agree to reduction in verdict. Bank of Page: 264 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP APPEAL AND ERROR Oglethorpe v. Hicks, 15 Ga. App. 92, 82 S.E. 635 (1914); Carter v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 144 Ga. 488, 87 S.E. 415 (1915); Biggers v. Mathews, 144 Ga. 857, 88 S.E. 190 (1916). Party may be eliminated by order of appellate court, so judgment is against other defendant. Lovell v. Frankum, 24 Ga. App. 261, 100 S.E. 575 (1919). Motion for new trial cannot be used to withdraw guilty plea. — One who has filed plea of guilty in criminal case cannot move for new trial; neither before nor after sentence can a motion for a new trial be employed as a means of withdrawing a plea of guilty. Bearden v. State, 13 Ga. App. 264, 79 S.E. 79 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1083). Effect of judge’s condemnatory language during sentencing. — Disqualification to render judgment on motion for new trial does not result from the judge’s use of language condemnatory of the accused when imposing sentence. Harrison Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:24:49 v. State, 20 Ga. App. 157, 92 S.E. 970 (1917) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1083). Restriction on superior court’s jurisdiction on appeal from probate proceeding. — When appellant filed a motion in probate court to set aside or amend the probate of a will due to newly discovered evidence of a later will, the probate court properly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction when the appellant was not a party to the original probate; on appeal, the jurisdiction of the superior court was limited to that of the probate court. In re Lott, 171 Ga. App. 25, 318 S.E.2d 688 (1984). Cited in Vance v. Gamble, 95 Ga. 730, 22 S.E. 576 (1895); Cowart v. Strickland, 149 Ga. 397, 100 S.E. 447, 7 A.L.R. 1110 (1919); City of Macon v. Herrington, 198 Ga. 576, 32 S.E.2d 517 (1944); Church of God of Union Ass’y, Inc. v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961); Bowen v. Ball, 215 Ga. App. 640, 451 S.E.2d 502 (1994).