Strohecker v

Gwinnett County Police Dep’t, 182 Ga. App. 853, 357 S.E.2d 305 (1987). Appeals from decisions of superior courts reviewing decision of state and local administrative agencies must be by application pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35; the words ‘‘by certiorari Page: 588 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP APPEAL AND ERROR Application (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) or de novo proceedings’’ in paragraph (a)(1) relate only to the category ‘‘lower courts’’ and not to the category ‘‘state and local administrative agencies’’; since no application for appeal was made from the superior court’s order affirming the decision of the administrative law judge of the Department of Natural Resources, the appellate court was without jurisdiction to entertain the application. St. Simons Island Save the Beach Ass’n. v. Glynn County Bd. of Comm’rs., 205 Ga. App. 428, 422 S.E.2d 258 (1992). When the underlying subject matter was the decision of a trial court reviewing the decision of a state administrative agency, appellate review was required to be secured by the grant of an application for discretionary appeal. Prison Health Servs., Inc. v. Georgia Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 265 Ga. 810, 462 S.E.2d 601 (1995). Decision of the local school board in this case to appeal the State Board’s decision to the superior court constituted a decision of a local administrative agency within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. As such, a direct appeal to the appellate court from the superior court’s final disposition was not authorized. Gurley v. Gordon County Bd. of Educ., 231 Ga. App. 481, 498 S.E.2d 64 (1998). Georgia Supreme Court could only review the decision of a superior court involving the review of a local zoning board decision by granting an application to appeal to the party seeking to have such superior court decision reviewed; it did not have jurisdiction to review a direct appeal. Powell v. City of Snellville, 275 Ga. 207, 563 S.E.2d 860 (2002). Appeal from a decision of the superior court reviewing a decision of a magistrate court by a de novo proceeding was subject to the discretionary appeal procedures of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Dean’s Catering v. Sturm & Assocs., 231 Ga. App. 202, 498 S.E.2d 786 (1998). Revenue department assessment is a decision of a state administrative agency within the meaning of paragraph (a)(1), and an application must be filed. Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:36 Miles v. Collins, 259 Ga. 536, 384 S.E.2d 630 (1989). Appeal from a ruling on a declaratory judgment action that was essentially an appeal from an administrative decision to suspend a driver’s license was dismissed since the driver was required to proceed by application for discretionary appeal. Miller v. Georgia Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 265 Ga. 62, 453 S.E.2d 725 (1995); Greenburg v. Griffith, 226 Ga. App. 818, 487 S.E.2d 411 (1997). Appeals from temporary restraining orders. — Although paragraph (a)(9) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 makes appeals from temporary restraining orders subject to the procedural requirements of § 5-6-35, such an order may be directly appealable if the order is entered following a lengthy adversary hearing and effectively grants plaintiff all of the relief he or she seeks. Dolinger v. Driver, 269 Ga. 141, 498 S.E.2d 252 (1998). In an interlocutory appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(j), a trial court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order was upheld that directed a shopping center owner to keep the north entrance open because the language of a 2004 easement was clear in that the easement provided for ingress and egress through that entrance. Nat’l Hills Exch., LLC v. Thompson, No. A12A2259, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 4 ( Jan. 9, 2013). Appeal from probate court to superior court. — Under the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, no application for appeal is required for decisions of superior courts reviewing judgments of the probate courts. The statute mandates that a direct appeal is available from the superior court affirmance of a probate court case. Phillips v. State, 261 Ga. 190, 402 S.E.2d 737 (1991). Appeal from board of commissioners. — An appeal in a case involving the board of county commissioners’ removal from office of a person appointed to that office by the board required compliance with discretionary appeal procedure; overruling Parsons v. Chatham County Bd. of Comm’rs, 204 Ga. App. 139(1), 418 S.E.2d 459 (1992) and Geron v. Calibre Cos., 250 Ga. 213(1), 296 S.E.2d 602 (1982). Swafford v. Dade County Bd. of Comm’rs, Page: 589 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:36 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP CERTIORARI AND APPEALS TO APPELLATE COURTS 266 Ga. 646, 469 S.E.2d 666 (1996). Paragraph (a)(7) applicable to criminal cases. — The 1984 amendment requiring applications to appeal orders denying extraordinary motions for new trial applies to criminal cases as well as civil cases. Pitts v. State, 254 Ga. 298, 328 S.E.2d 732 (1985). Appeal dismissed as moot. — County board of education member’s appeal of a judgment denying a request to reverse the governor’s order removing the member from office under O.C.G.A. § 45-10-4 for violating O.C.G.A. § 45-10-3 was dismissed because the term to which the member had originally been elected expired. Roberts v. Deal, 290 Ga. 705, 723 S.E.2d 901 (2012). Appeal dismissed when no application. — Appeal from judgment for costs entered in an action for damages in the amount of $1,951.00 must be dismissed when the discretion of the Court of Appeals is not invoked by application. Gardner v. Villa Monte Homes, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 896, 328 S.E.2d 565 (1985). Failure to file an application for a discretionary appeal pursuant to paragraph (a)(7) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction over a direct appeal. Ibietatorremendia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 786, 332 S.E.2d 20 (1985). When a father’s petition for legitimation was denied, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to review the order because the father had failed to follow the discretionary procedures to appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2), nor did he file his application for such review within the time period allowed by § 5-6-35(d); his appeal from an order terminating his parental rights and allowing adoption of the minor by the stepfather, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1 et seq., was also denied when the issues that the father raised related to the lack of a hearing on his legitimation proceeding, which was already determined to be not reviewable. In the Interest of C.M.L., 260 Ga. App. 502, 580 S.E.2d 276 (2003). Defendant’s direct appeal from a trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because an application to appeal under O.C.G.A. 5-6-35 § 5-6-35(a) was required but not submitted. Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 581 S.E.2d 333 (2003). Application is required to appeal a domestic relations case in which a ‘‘judgment’’ or an ‘‘order’’ has been entered. Any party who seeks to appeal a ‘‘judgment’’ or an ‘‘order’’ entered in a domestic relations case must follow the procedure set out in paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Horton v. Kitchens, 259 Ga. 446, 383 S.E.2d 871 (1989). Appeal from order revoking juvenile probation. — Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(5) and (d) do not apply to appeals from orders revoking juveniles’ probation because orders of disposition under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-65(a) are final judgments, directly appealable under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1); therefore, an order of disposition entered upon the revocation of a juvenile’s probation was directly appealable and the Court of Appeals of Georgia had jurisdiction over such an appeal. In the Interest of N.M., 316 Ga. App. 649, 730 S.E.2d 127 (2012). Failure to file application to appeal results in dismissal of appeal in domestic relations cases. Bedford v. Bedford, 246 Ga. 780, 273 S.E.2d 167 (1980). Child support. — In an action for repayment of child support expended by the Department of Human Resources, the failure to file an application for appeal required under paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 did not result in dismissal of the appeal. An action for repayment under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-5 is one for collection of a debt and requires discretionary appeal procedures only when the judgment is $2,500 (now $10,000.00) or less, pursuant to paragraph (a)(6) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Department of Human Resources v. Johnson, 175 Ga. App. 610, 333 S.E.2d 845 (1985). Appeals from orders awarding support for minor children are domestic relations cases which require compliance with the discretionary appeal procedure of paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Jackson v. Roach, 199 Ga. App. 653, 405 S.E.2d 712, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 405 S.E.2d 712 (1991); Davis v. Welch, 205 Ga. App. 462, 422 S.E.2d 323 (1992). Father’s appeal from superior court’s Page: 590 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP APPEAL AND ERROR Application (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) order under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-12, modifying the amount of his child support obligation, should have been brought as a discretionary appeal. Fitzgerald v. Department of Human Resources, 231 Ga. App. 129, 497 S.E.2d 659 (1998). Sufficient filing under subsection (d). — Although a notice of appeal must be filed in the court ‘‘wherein the case was determined’’ putting that court on notice that its jurisdiction is affected according to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-37, there is no such requirement regarding an application, since subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 only requires the application to be filed with the clerk of the appellate court. In re A.R.B., 209 Ga. App. 324, 433 S.E.2d 411 (1993). When an application is transferred from one appellate court to the other, the 30-day time period is to be computed from the date of the filing in the court to which that application has been transferred. Marr v. Georgia Dep’t of Educ., 264 Ga. 841, 452 S.E.2d 112 (1995). Effect of failure to file timely application. — In a case governed by the appeal procedures of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, the trial court has the authority to dismiss the appeal when the appellant fails to file timely an application to appeal. Tobitt v. Tobitt, 249 Ga. 245, 290 S.E.2d 49 (1982). When no application for review was filed with the Court of Appeals within 30 days of the lower court’s judgment denying the claim for unemployment compensation, an attempted direct appeal was a nullity requiring dismissal. Depass v. Board of Review, 172 Ga. App. 561, 324 S.E.2d 505 (1984). Denial of extraordinary motion for new trial. — Subsection (a)(7) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 does not purport to confer direct appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of issues that could and should have been raised in a timely motion for new trial, an extraordinary motion for new trial is properly denied and will be affirmed on appeal if the motion raises only issues that could and should have been raised in a timely motion for new trial. Bohannon v. State, 203 Ga. App. Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:36 783, 417 S.E.2d 679 (1992). Appeal of denial of motion to set aside arising out of divorce case will be dismissed for failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Steele v. Niggelie, 163 Ga. App. 98, 293 S.E.2d 368 (1982). O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 cannot be construed to expand the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over direct orders of lower courts granting or denying motions whose substance and function are to obtain the set-aside of a judgment, including one based upon equitable grounds. Cain v. Moore, 207 Ga. App. 726, 429 S.E.2d 135 (1993). O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(8) requires that review of an order denying a motion to set aside be preceded by an application for discretionary review. When both O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(a) and 5-6-35(a) are involved, an application for appeal is required when the underlying subject matter of the appeal is listed in § 5-6-35(a), even though the party may be appealing a judgment or order that is procedurally subject to a direct appeal under § 5-6-34(a). Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 710 S.E.2d 130 (2011). Appeal from summary judgment grant improperly denied. — Brown v. Rutledge, 263 Ga. 474, 435 S.E.2d 187 (1993). Appeal from legitimation proceeding is required to be made by application to the appropriate appellate court, rather than by direct appeal. Brown v. Williams, 174 Ga. App. 604, 332 S.E.2d 48 (1985). Legitimation proceeding is a type of domestic relations case, and an application for permission to appeal must be made in accordance with paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Hill v. Adams, 182 Ga. App. 848, 357 S.E.2d 300 (1987). Direct appeal of an order terminating putative father’s parental rights was proper, even when the relief he sought was expressed in terms of overturning the denial of his petition to legitimate. In re D.S.P., 233 Ga. App. 346, 504 S.E.2d 211 (1998). Although an order denying a putative father’s petition to legitimate his minor child was subject to the discretionary appeal procedure under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2), it was directly appealable Page: 591 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:36 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP CERTIORARI AND APPEALS TO APPELLATE COURTS under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(d) when the father filed the appeal together with an appeal from the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. In the Interest of T.A.M., 280 Ga. App. 494, 634 S.E.2d 456 (2006). Action for equitable partition to enforce separation agreement. — Although it had its roots in the parties’ divorce action, an action for an equitable partition to enforce the separation agreement which was part of the divorce decree is a new action and not merely a continuation of the divorce action. For this reason, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 does not apply to this situation, and the husband’s direct appeal from the partition order is proper. Larimer v. Larimer, 249 Ga. 500, 292 S.E.2d 71 (1982). Failure to file notice of appeal within time required by subsection (g). — Subsection (g) of Ga. L. 1979, p. 619, §§ 3, 6 (see O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(g)), read in conjunction with Ga. L. 1978, p. 1986, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(b)(1)), requires that notice of appeal from judgment in contempt of alimony judgment shall be dismissed if the appellant fails to file the notice within ten days after order is issued granting application for such appeal. Harris v. Harris, 245 Ga. 75, 263 S.E.2d 113 (1980). Notice of appeal is subject to dismissal if the appellant fails to file the notice within ten days after an order is issued granting an application for such appeal. Caldwell v. Elbert County School Dist., 247 Ga. 359, 276 S.E.2d 43 (1981). Transcript production appeal was untimely. — Defendant’s appeal of the denial of the defendant’s post-conviction motion requesting production of a trial transcript at government expense was dismissed as untimely. Coles v. State, 223 Ga. App. 491, 477 S.E.2d 897 (1996). Transcript of termination hearing not required. — Although a parent argued that the trial court erred in denying the parent a copy of the termination hearing transcript to submit with the parent’s application for discretionary review, there was no requirement under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(c) or Ga. Ct. App. R. 31 that the transcript be filed with the application. In re D. R., 298 Ga. App. 774, 681 S.E.2d 218 (2009), overruled on other grounds, In re A.C., 285 Ga. 829, 686 S.E.2d 635 (2009). Applicability of section to judgment on auditor’s report in equity case. — When an auditor is appointed in an equity case and renders a report which contains findings of fact and conclusions of law which are approved by the trial court, judgment entered on such report or summary judgment entered in case where there are no genuine issues as to material facts set forth in the report is subject to the application requirement of this section. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Rayle, 246 Ga. 727, 273 S.E.2d 139 (1980). When an auditor is appointed in an equity case and renders a report which contains findings of fact and conclusions of law which are approved by the trial court, a judgment rendered on such report is subject to the application requirement of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Ravan v. Stephens, 248 Ga. 289, 282 S.E.2d 312 (1981). Notice of appeal from judgment of contempt must meet time requirement of subsection (g). — Notice of appeal from judgment of contempt regarding a domestic relations decree is subject to dismissal if the appellant fails to file the notice within ten days after an order is issued granting an application for such appeal. Walters v. Walters, 245 Ga. 695, 266 S.E.2d 507 (1980). Action seeking to vacate judgment for contempt. — When the court entered an order adjudicating a former spouse in contempt, and after time for appealing the contempt order had expired, former spouse brought action seeking to vacate and set aside the judgment for contempt on ground that judgment in the divorce case was void, for legal purposes this was the same as an appeal from the order holding the appellant in contempt. Failure to file an application to appeal made dismissal proper. Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 171, 275 S.E.2d 657 (1981). Action did not require application for discretionary appeal. — Tenants’ action was not one that required an application for discretionary appeal when the action was not filed as a renewal of claims made in a de novo appeal to a superior court from a dispossessory action brought in a magistrate court and when the supePage: 592 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP APPEAL AND ERROR Application (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) rior court had denied the tenants’ motion to add counterclaims before dismissing the appeal in the dispossessory action. Slone v. Myers, 288 Ga. App. 8, 653 S.E.2d 323 (2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 881, 129 S. Ct. 196, 172 L.Ed.2d 140 (2008). Denial of application to appeal nonfinal order is not res judicata. — Denial of application to appeal nonfinal order is perhaps persuasive but is not res judicata in appellate court when later reviewing final order in same case. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Rayle, 246 Ga. 727, 273 S.E.2d 139 (1980). Appeal from decision to terminate city employee. — Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from a decision of a city manager approving the termination of a city employee. Salter v. City of Thomaston, 200 Ga. App. 536, 409 S.E.2d 88 (1991). Dismissal for appealing review of administrative decision under general appeals statute. — Whern the taxpayer did not file an application for discretionary appeal from a decision of the superior court reviewing a decision of the Department of Revenue, but chose to appeal directly to the O.C.G.A. Supreme Court pursuant to § 5-6-34(a), such appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with procedure for appeal from decisions of administrative agencies required by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Strickland, 249 Ga. 829, 294 S.E.2d 471 (1982). Appeal from small claims court not brought under paragraph (a)(1). — When plaintiff commenced a dispossessory proceeding against the defendant in the Small Claims Court of Putnam County and received a dispossessory warrant against the defendant, who appealed to the Superior Court of Putnam County where a jury found for defendant, and plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals and the defendant cross-appealed, when the appeal was not brought under paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, the appeal and cross-appeal will be dismissed. Manley v. Williams, 166 Ga. App. 298, 304 S.E.2d 468 (1983). Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:36 When appeal deals with dismissal of garnishment proceeding for delinquent payments under divorce decree directing payment on installment notes and the divorce is only incidental thereto, a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to file an application for appeal will be denied. Kile v. Kile, 165 Ga. App. 321, 301 S.E.2d 289 (1983). Appeal arising out of superior court’s dismissal of appeal from judgment by recorder’s court should be brought under the provision pertaining to discretionary appeals and the failure to do so subjects the appeal to dismissal. Wimbish v. State, 166 Ga. App. 223, 303 S.E.2d 766 (1983). Appeal from superior court’s review of use and enforcement of investigative powers of the board of medical examiners required discretionary appeal procedures. Rankin v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Exmrs., 220 Ga. App. 421, 469 S.E.2d 500 (1996). No direct appeal from recorder’s court to Supreme Court. — Direct appeal from the recorder’s court to the Supreme Court was not available in a case challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance. Instead, the proper method of review was by certiorari to the superior court. Russell v. City of E. Point, 261 Ga. 213, 403 S.E.2d 50 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 971, 112 S. Ct. 448, 116 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1991). Dismissal of appeal of final judgment is res judicata. — Dismissal by Supreme Court of direct appeal for lack of application as required by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 invokes doctrine of res judicata when judgment appealed was final and on merits. Byrd v. Byrd, 248 Ga. 163, 281 S.E.2d 617 (1981). Denial of discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 by Supreme Court invokes doctrine of res judicata when judgment appealed was final and on the merits. Steele v. Niggelie, 163 Ga. App. 98, 293 S.E.2d 368 (1982). Appeal from decision as to State Board of Education’s administrative decision. — When the affirmance of the local board of education by the State Board of Education is a decision of a state administrative agency acting in a Page: 593 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:36 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP CERTIORARI AND APPEALS TO APPELLATE COURTS quasi-judicial capacity and the order of the superior court is itself an appellate decision, reviewing the decision of the state board, the appeal is from a decision of a superior court reviewing a decision of a state administrative agency, within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Accordingly, failure to obtain an order of the Court of Appeals permitting the filing of such an appeal must result in the appeal’s dismissal. Hogan v. Taylor County Bd. of Educ., 157 Ga. App. 680, 278 S.E.2d 106 (1981). Appeal of lower court’s review of agency decision. — Requirements of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 must be followed as a necessary prerequisite to secure discretionary appellate review of decisions of superior courts reviewing decisions of state administrative agencies. Heiny v. Department of Pub. Safety, 169 Ga. App. 37, 311 S.E.2d 848 (1983). Appeals from decisions of superior courts reviewing decisions of state and local administrative agencies shall be by application in nature of a petition, enumerating errors to be urged on appeal and stating why the appellate court has jurisdiction. Wheeler v. Strickland, 248 Ga. 85, 281 S.E.2d 556 (1981); City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Midtown N., Ltd., 257 Ga. 496, 360 S.E.2d 569 (1987). Superior courts have authority and responsibility in workers’ compensation cases. — Under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, the superior courts have all of the authority and all of the responsibilities which the appellate courts formerly had in workers’ compensation cases. Southeastern Aluminum Recycling, Inc. v. Rayburn, 251 Ga. 365, 306 S.E.2d 240 (1983). Cross-appeal to appealable order. — An appeal which, standing alone, would be subject to discretionary appeal procedures, is appealable as a matter of right if it is classifiable as a cross-appeal to an appealable order. Buschel v. Kysor/Warren, 213 Ga. App. 91, 444 S.E.2d 105 (1994). Cross appeal in workers’ compensation case. — In a workers’ compensation case, even though no application was made by the employer as required by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, since the claimant had taken direct appeal, the employer’s cross appeal could be filed also. Linder v. Alterman Foods, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 786, 292 S.E.2d 900 (1982). Administrative agency decision. — To conclude that, following review by the superior court, a decision of the administrator of the Office of Consumer Affairs to issue an investigative demand is appealable as a matter of right, but the administrator’s decision on the merits is appealable only by application would be contrary to the clear purpose of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. The agency’s decision to issue an investigative demand is a ‘‘decision’’ of an administrative agency within the meaning of subsection (a) of § 5-6-35 and an appeal from a grant of summary judgment by the superior court to the administrator should be dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of § 5-6-35. Tri-State Bldg. & Supply, Inc. v. Reid, 251 Ga. 38, 302 S.E.2d 566 (1983). Atlanta Bureau of Zoning Adjustment is ‘‘local administrative agency’’ within meaning of paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, thereby requiring discretionary-appeal applications from decisions of the superior court reviewing decisions of the Bureau of Zoning Adjustment. Rybert & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 258 Ga. 347, 368 S.E.2d 739 (1988), overruled on other grounds, Southern States Landfill, Inc. v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustments, 261 Ga. 759, 410 S.E.2d 721 (1991). Appeal of court order affirming denial of unemployment compensation claim. — When the appellant files a direct appeal from a superior court order affirming the Department of Labor’s denial of the appellant’s claim for unemployment compensation without first obtaining an order from the appellate court granting permission for such an appeal pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, the appeal will be dismissed. Cook v. Caldwell, 166 Ga. App. 452, 305 S.E.2d 187 (1983). Appeal from State Personnel Board as to termination of state employee. — Direct appeal from an order affirming a decision of the State Personnel Board which reversed the termination of the appellee’s employment as a correctional Page: 594 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP APPEAL AND ERROR Application (Cont’d) 1. In General (Cont’d) officer which was not brought under the discretionary appeal provisions of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Meeks, 165 Ga. App. 269, 299 S.E.2d 757 (1983). Appeal from an order of a superior court affirming a decision of the State Personnel Board which denies an appeal from the sustaining of a dismissal from employment as a correctional officer by a hearing officer must be brought under the discretionary provisions of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. When that procedure is not followed, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the appeal and, accordingly, it must be dismissed. Summerset v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 167 Ga. App. 730, 307 S.E.2d 678 (1983). Appeals of an action, labeled ‘‘tort-negligence,’’ which a state prisoner, brought against officials of a correctional institute, were not dismissed under subdivision (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 because the defendant filed separate tort actions seeking damages for official actions which could have been the subject of administrative grievances. McBride v. Zant, 204 Ga. App. 183, 418 S.E.2d 781 (1992). Appeal from order awarding sanction. — Order imposing a monetary sanction for wilfully failing to attend a scheduled post-judgment deposition was in the nature of an award for frivolous litigation and required an application for discretionary appeal. Bonnell v. Amtex, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 378, 457 S.E.2d 590 (1995). Order imposing a sanction for unnecessarily expanding a proceeding was in the nature of an award for frivolous litigation within the purview of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) and, as such, was not directly appealable, but required an application for discretionary appeal. Hill v. Doe, 239 Ga. App. 869, 522 S.E.2d 471 (1999). Appeal of finding of contempt. — Finding of wilful contempt of a court order entering judgment on a jury verdict not dealing with alimony or child custody is directly appealable notwithstanding the denial of a simultaneously filed applica- Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:36 tion for discretionary appeal. Stephens v. Stephens, 184 Ga. App. 538, 362 S.E.2d 118 (1987). Supreme court had no jurisdiction to consider a trial court’s order holding a common law husband in contempt because the enumeration that addressed the contempt order was not predicated upon a proper and timely appeal from that order or from any other appealable order that encompassed that subsequent ruling since the contempt order was not prior to or contemporaneous with that final judgment such that it can be enumerated in the case pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(d) but was a subsequent ruling that the husband was not entitled to enumerate; a separate appeal was not proper in the absence of compliance with the discretionary appeal procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2), no application seeking discretionary review of the contempt order had ever been filed, and the record did not contain any transcript of the contempt hearing. Norman v. Ault, 287 Ga. 324, 695 S.E.2d 633 (2010). Denial of motions to stay or discharge contempt confinement. — Since a contempt order itself cannot be appealed directly, neither the denial of a motion to stay incarceration for contempt nor the denial of a motion for discharge from confinement can be appealed directly. The procedure for taking such appeals, if allowable at all, is governed by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Strickland v. Strickland, 252 Ga. 218, 312 S.E.2d 606 (1984). Review of order regarding termination of liquor-wholesaling relationship. — Matter before the state revenue commissioner (the proposed termination by a liquor producer of four of its designated wholesalers) was a ‘‘contested case’’ within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, not involving the suspension or cancellation of licenses, and the trial court was thus correct in treating the review of the commissioner’s order denying the proposal as a petition for judicial review pursuant to the APA; there having been no application to appeal the decision of the superior court affirming the commissioner’s order, as required by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35, the motion to dismiss the appeal Page: 595 Job Path: @psc3912/cville_data1/stcodes/ga/lexis/ep_rv_04_txt 0000 41826-12 Date: 06/14/13 Time: 12:43:36 GA RV 13 RV 4(T4-6) - EP CERTIORARI AND APPEALS TO APPELLATE COURTS was granted. Schieffelin & Co. v. Strickland, 253 Ga. 385, 320 S.E.2d 358 (1984). Appeal on issue of liquor license. — Supreme Court of Georgia holds that when the underlying subject matter of an appeal prevails over the relief sought when both the direct and discretionary appeal statutes are implicated, such appeals must be brought under the discretionary appeals statute, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35; accordingly, the trial court’s grant of a liquor license applicant’s writ of mandamus petition against a county commission that had denied the applicant’s request for a license should have been by such procedure. Augusta-Richmond County v. Lee, 277 Ga. 483, 592 S.E.2d 71 (2004). Appeal from denial of liquor license. — Although the nightclub had a right pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 to seek a discretionary review of the trial court’s judgment affirming an administrative agency’s decision to deny the nightclub’s application for renewal of the nightclub’s liquor license, the nightclub did not have a right to directly appeal that judgment after the Supreme Court reviewed and rejected the nightclub’s discretionary appeal, as the denial of the discretionary appeal was a ruling on the merits; thus, the nightclub was not entitled to have the Supreme Court review those same claims again. Northwest Soc. & Civic Club, Inc. v. Franklin, 276 Ga. 859, 583 S.E.2d 858 (2003). Appeals of awards of attorney’s fees or expenses of litigation. — Effective July 1, 1986, applications to appeal awards of attorney’s fees or expenses of litigation under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 are required, and a direct appeal will be dismissed for failure to comply with O.C.G.A.