McCarley, 246 Ga. App. 171, 539 S.E.2d 871 (2000). Failure timely to seek substitution held not excusable neglect. — When there was no evidence from which the trial court could find excusable neglect as a matter of fact and, as a matter of law, plaintiff ’s explanation that counsel was confused as to the law in Georgia regarding substitution of an executor of a decedent’s estate in place of a deceased defendant did not constitute excusable neglect, the trial court abused the court’s discretion in denying the executor’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff ’s suit for their failure to seek substitution of parties within the 180-day limitation period in paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25. King v. Green, 189 Ga. App. 105, 375 S.E.2d 53, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 375 S.E.2d 53 (1988). Plaintiff ’s failure to make a timely substitution of parties was not excused based on the fact that a guardian was representing the decedent’s interests in the case prior to the decedent’s death. Stephenson v. Ingram, 239 Ga. App. 892, 522 S.E.2d 500 (1999). Judgment obtained against a deceased defendant is void, and the trial court does not err in vacating the judgment, setting the judgment aside, and dismissing the action, when no party has been substituted since the suggestion of death and no reason has been shown that the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect so as to allow an extension of time. Franklin v. Collins, 167 Ga. App. 596, 307 S.E.2d 66 (1983). Judgment pending substitution void. — Summary judgment for the defendant, granted after the plaintiff ’s death and prior to substitution for the decedent, was void as to the decedent. Allen v. City of Moultrie, 162 Ga. App. 188, 290 S.E.2d 529 (1982). Transfer of Interest O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 does not determine what actions shall survive transfer of interest by a party; the statute deals only with the mechanics of substitution in an action which does survive under the applicable substantive law. Goodyear v. Trust Co. Bank, 248 Ga. 407, 284 S.E.2d 6 (1981). Transfer of interest during course of litigation contemplated. — Subsection (c) of this section, providing for substitution of the transferee of interest in the action, applies only when the transfer is made pending or during the course of litigation. Employers’ Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Keelin, 132 Ga. App. 459, 208 S.E.2d 328 (1974). Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 vests discretion in the trial judge to allow the original plaintiff to continue suit either alone or joined by the interest transferee when the transfer of interest occurred after the filing of the suit. Gene Thompson Lumber Co. v. Davis Parmer Lumber Co., 189 Ga. App. 573, 377 S.E.2d 15, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 377 S.E.2d 15 (1988). In an action for default on certain promissory notes in relation to a condominium investment, the trial court did not err in permitting the intervention of the FSLIC as a real party in interest, even though the FSLIC was abolished by a federal act reorganizing the savings and loan system. The trial court can substitute FSLIC’s successor, the Resolution Trust Corporation, at any time. Stovall v. FSLIC, 260 Ga. 475, 396 S.E.2d 484 (1990). From party to nonparty. — Subsection (c) of this section contemplates a transfer of interest, during litigation, from one who is a party to the case to one who is not, not a purported transfer from one who is not a party to the litigation to one who is. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ed. V. Collins Contracting, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 183, 248 S.E.2d 220 (1978). In an action for conversion, the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict in the defendant’s favor on grounds that the plaintiff had assigned the plaintiff ’s interests in accounts receivable to another corporation, and thus was not the proper party to bring suit, when, for all this record showed, the plaintiff was the damaged party; the defendant did not prove otherwise, nor was the defendant the proper party to complain on behalf of the other corporation. Privitera v. Addison, 190 Ga. App. 102, 378 S.E.2d 312, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 898, 378 S.E.2d 312 (1989). Continuance of original action not automatically authorized. — Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25, when operative, does not automatically authorize the continuance of an original action in all cases following the transfer of an interest. If a cause of action does not survive a subsequent transfer of interest, subsection (c), standing alone, would not revive the action. Gene Thompson Lumber Co. v. Davis Parmer Lumber Co., 189 Ga. App. 573, 377 S.E.2d 15, cert denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 377 S.E.2d 15 (1988). When transfer of interest, such as assignment, takes place prior to commencement of action, Ga. L. 1968, p. 1104, § 6, (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17) controls and requires that the action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Employers’ Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Keelin, 132 Ga. App. 459, 208 S.E.2d 328 (1974). Action not surviving transfer of interest. — Action which sought to compel a party to do an affirmative act in regard to property in which the party no longer held an interest could not be continued, absent substitution of parties as provided in sub- section (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25. Georgia Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331, 466 S.E.2d 846 (1996). Effect of dissolution, merger, or consolidation of corporation. — After dissolution of a corporation in any manner other than by court decree, or the corporation’s merger or consolidation with another corporation, any pending actions by such a corporation can proceed as if the dissolution, merger, or consolidation had never taken place. Rosing v. Dwoskin Decorating Co., 141 Ga. App. 617, 234 S.E.2d 128 (1977). Merging banks. — In a suit brought by mortgagors against the mortgagor bank that was taken over by a successor bank, the appellate court erred in dismissing the successor bank’s appeal under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 for lack of standing based on the trial court’s failure to add or substitute it as the defendant because the two corporations were deemed the same entity under federal and state law by virtue of their merger, thus, the claims originally filed by and against the mortgagee bank could continue. Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Tidwell, 293 Ga. 697, 749 S.E.2d 730 (2013). Public Officers Failure of complaint to show names of defendant public officers does not subject the complaint to dismissal. McDowell v. Judges Ex Officio, 235 Ga. 364, 219 S.E.2d 713 (1975). Change of name of board after filing of complaint. — When action was filed by board under correct name provided by statute then in effect, fact that no motion was made in writing to substitute new name of the board when changed by the legislature did not subject the action to dismissal because subsection (c) of this section provides that such an action may be continued by the original party. Clark v. Board of Dental Exmrs., 240 Ga. 289, 240 S.E.2d 250 (1977).