A prosecution of a defendant for a violation of a different provision of the statutes or based on different facts than a former prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances: (a) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in § 1.24 and the subsequent prosecution is for: (1) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution; (2) any offense of which the defendant should have been tried on the first prosecution under Subsection (b) of § 65.30 of the Criminal Procedure Code unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or (3) the same conduct, unless (A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil, or (B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began. (b) The former prosecution was terminated, after the complaint was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense. (c) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination is defined in § 1.24, and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly terminated. SOURCE: Guam PC § 287; M.P.C. § 1.09; Mass. ch. 268, § 12; *N.J. § 2C:1-9. CROSS-REFERENCES: § 1.24 this Title. COURT DECISIONS: D.C.GUAM:APP.DIV. Because the offenses of speeding, expired safety decal, and failure to display a taxi I.D. card, all violations of the Vehicle Code, all occurred as a result of a single stop by a police officer, it is in violation of the double jeopardy provisions of 9 GCA § 1.26 to charge the defendant separately and bring him to trial separately on the separate offenses. Once the ticket was issued and the defendant required to appear in a Traffic Court, the prosecution that cannot again bring him to court, even if it is a Superior Court, based upon the same set of circumstances. People v. Arenas, Cr. #82-026A. COMMENT: §§ 1.24 and 1.26 supersede former § 687 of the Penal Code. § 1.24 is based upon Model Penal Code § 1.08 as modified by New Jersey commission. Section 1.24 states the circumstances in which a former prosecution is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same case, in the narrowest sense of a violation of the same statute based upon the same facts. A bar arises in four general situations: (a) where the first prosecution results in an acquittal; (b) where collateral estoppel operates; (c) where the first prosecution results in a conviction; or (d) where the first prosecution is improperly terminated after the jury has been empaneled and sworn and the first witness is sworn.
§ 1.26 is based on Model Penal Code § 1.09. It deals with those situations in which a former trial or proceeding prior to trial is barred due to a subsequent prosecution for a different offense, whether a violation of a different statute or a different violation of the same statute. There are five general situations in which a prosecution for a “different offense” may be barred by a previous trial or proceeding prior to trial. The situation in which this bar operates are clearly set out in the two Sections.