COL120106
Unless otherwise provided by law, in any prosecution in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person, it is a defense that: (a) the defendant was a victim of the offense; or (b) under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the defendant withdrew from participation in the offense and made a reasonable effort to stop the commission of the offense. SOURCE: M.P.C. § 2.06(6); *Cal. § 454 (T.D.1, 1967); Mass. ch. 263, § 21(b); N.J. § 2C:2-6(e). CROSS-REFERENCES: § 4.70 this Code. COMMENT: The two defenses to criminal complicity, or criminal facilitation, or to the charge of being an accomplice are already well established in case law. The first subsection sets forth the defense that the individual was a victim of the crime, even though such activity, such as paying a kidnapper's ransom, conceivably could aid him in his criminal purpose. Instead of the judge reading the definition from a set of case-derived jury instructions, he now has this definition in law. An example of where such a defense is not available exists in the case of People v. Root, (District Court of Guam, unpublished decision). The defendant, while temporarily abandoning (perhaps) his criminal purpose, immediately jumped back in after the deed (murder) was accomplished and assisted his principal in looting the body.