(a) When Sentence May Not Require Prison Term.
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(1) The court, in its discretion, may make disposition with respect to any person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing a sentence of imprisonment, unless a minimum term is made mandatory by a provision of the Guam Code Annotated. (2) “Minimum”, wherever it appears in this Code, means, for purposes of imposing punishment upon a person convicted of a crime, that the court shall impose the entire term of confinement, the full amount of the fine and the complete requirement of community service prescribed by law. The court shall not suspend in full or in part any punishment described as minimum, specifically, the crimes enumerated in the habitual offender statute (P.L. 32-049, codified as § 80.50 of Article 2 of this Chapter 9), and all other violent offenses that carry a minimum punishment. (3) When used for the purpose of describing or requiring a sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to this Code, the terms “minimum,” “mandatory,” “minimum mandatory,” “mandatory minimum,” “minimum sentence of,” “a sentence of no less than,” “a sentence of at least,” and any derivative thereof, shall be construed as being synonymous. (b) Notwithstanding Subsection (a) the court shall not suspend imposition of sentence or place an offender on probation if, having due regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the offender, the court finds that imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public because: (1) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the offender would commit another crime; (2) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by commitment to an institution; or (3) a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offender’s crime. (c) The following factors, while not controlling, shall be accorded weight in determining whether to suspend imposition of sentence or to place the offender on probation whether: (1) The offender’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm. (2) The offender did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious harm. (3) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the offender’s criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense. (4) The offender has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury which was sustained. (5) The offender has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime. (6) The offender is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment. (d) If a person who has been convicted of a crime is not sentenced to imprisonment, the court shall place him on probation if he is in need of the supervision, guidance, assistance or direction that probation can provide. SOURCE: See Guam § 1231; Rule 32(a), Rules of Cr. Proc.; cf. Cal. § 235 (1971); § 330; Mass. ch. 264, § 20; N.J. § 2C:44-1. Enacted 1977. Subsection (a) amended by P.L. 14-143:15 (Sept. 29, 1978); amended by P.L. 32-074:2 (Nov. 27, 2013). Subsections (c)(3), (5), (8), (9) and (11) repealed by P.L. 14-143:16. Remaining subsections renumbered accordingly pursuant to P.L. 14-143:16. 2018 NOTE: Subitem designations added in subsection (a) pursuant to authority granted by 1 GCA § 1606.
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CROSS-REFERENCES: ABA, Project on Standards for Criminal Justice. Probation §§ 1.1(a)-(c), 1.2, 1.3 (Approved Draft 1970) § 80.66. COMMENT: No general preference is stated in favor of imprisonment or probation; however, Subsection (b) states three (3) factors, any one of which, if found to exist, require a sentence of imprisonment for the protection of the public. Subsection (c) lists factors which the court should weigh in favor of withholding imprisonment. A sentence of probation no longer involves or requires suspension of the imposition or the execution of any other sentence. Nevertheless, where probation is revoked, the court has available the same sentencing alternatives that were available at the time of initial sentencing. In 1978 the Legislature repealed a large number of subparagraphs of Subsection (c) with the effect that these subparagraphs no longer have any statutory weight in determining whether to suspend a sentence or the place the offender on probation. The Legislature felt that the statutory reference to these conditions weighed heavily in favor of probation or suspension of sentence when, in fact, the Legislature intended that, for the crimes involved, the offenders be placed in prison. The conditions eliminated referred to acting under strong provocation, the victim’s inducing or facilitating the offense; the conduct resulting from circumstances unlikely to recur; history, character and attitudes of the offender which indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime; and imprisonment would entail hardship to the offender or his dependents. The Legislature believed that such were not good reasons for suspending a sentence for one already convicted of a particular crime. Of course, it is recognized that the judge does not necessarily have to give his reasons for suspending sentence and may, in fact, consider some of the repealed matter in determining a sentence.