Except as otherwise provided by law, a person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment as follows: (a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, the court shall impose a sentence of not less than five (5) years and not more than twenty (20) years;
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(b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, the court shall impose a sentence of not less than three (3) years and not more than ten (10) years; and (c) In the case of a felony of the third degree, the court may impose a sentence of not more than five (5) years. SOURCE: Criminal and Correctional Code (1977), enacted by P.L. 13-185 (Sept. 2, 1976). Repealed and reenacted by P.L. 14-143:10 (Sept. 29, 1978). COMMENT: Section 80.30 provides the basic maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment which may be imposed upon convictions upon felony. The power to sentence rests with the judge, including the power to set a maximum term below the statutory limit. The judge may, but is never required to set a minimum term for felonies of the first two degrees. This would be changed by several proposals now in the Legislature, but not enacted as of August 5, 1977. The length of minimum terms is limited and the power to impose them is intended to be limited to exceptional cases. Article II gives the sentencing judge the authority to set maximum terms, and in general leaves the release decision to the Parole Board (see Article V - Section 80.70, et seq). In the most serious category of cases, the public sense of security and justice require an assurance that a dangerous offender, or one who has committed a serious crime, cannot within a short time be released. Certainly, the sentencing judge would impose a very high maximum term for such serious offenses and a responsible Parole Board would not release the offender at an early date. Nevertheless, the Legislature and the Commission felt that a minimum sentence is the only way that a sentencing judge has to assure the public that a dangerous person will not be set at liberty at an early date. For this reason, Sections 80.30 and 80.32 allow a sentencing judge to impose a minimum term in the more serious category of crimes. The effect of Section 80.72 is to provide, also, a minimum term of ten years in the case of every sentence to life imprisonment, such as was the case under the Guam Penal Code. COURT DECISIONS: D.C. GUAM: APP. DIV. 1981 It is proper to admit reliable evidence concerning prior illegal acts at sentencing, even though these acts did not result in convictions, when the evidence is supported. In any event, the defendant received a two-year sentence of a maximum of five years even with the admission of the evidence complained of. People v. Santos, Case #CR-80-034A. D.C. GUAM: APP. DIV. 1982 We find that § 80.30 is the general sentencing statute to be applied and the presentence report properly stated defendant had a prior conviction as required by statute. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. We interpret the language of § 80.30 as the general sentencing statute and the correct code section to apply to this case. Section 80.31 allows for a lesser penalty for a first offense in the discretion of the court; § 80.32 allows for a greater penalty than that provided in § 80.30, also in the court’s discretion. People v. Salas, D.C. App. 82-48A (1982). Aff’d, CA9 1984 (unpublished) 730 F.2d 768. D.C. GUAM: APP. DIV. 1986 The aggravated assault statute, § 19.20 of the Criminal and Correctional Code of Guam, (FN2) was enacted in its present form on January 1, 1978. The penalty provision for § 19.20, which is § 80.30 of the Guam Criminal and Correctional Code, [9 GCA] was also enacted at this same time. As previously stated, however, § 80.37 was not adopted by the Guam Legislature until October 1, 1978, under Public Law 14 143. Under this same Public Law 14 143, the Guam Legislature also repealed and reenacted Section 80.30, the aggravated assault penalty provision. Had the Guam Legislature wished to exclude any felony from the reach of § 80.37, the Legislature could have easily done so under Public Law 14 143. It obviously chose not to. This legislative inaction, together with the clear and unambiguous language of Section 80.37 and the legislative history of § 80.37 evidences that the Guam Legislature intended to enhance the punishment for all those who possess or use a deadly weapon “in the commission of a felony punishable under the laws of Guam.” See People of the Territory of Guam v. Snaer, 758 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir., 1985), cert. denied U.S., 106 S. Ct. 90, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985). 1986 WL 68911, People of Territory of Guam v. Iglesias, (D.Guam App. Div. 1986) D.C. GUAM: APP. DIV. 1990 This finding is erroneous but in defendant’s favor. § 80.31 sets forth the applicable prison terms for first offenders but applies only to “the cases to which § 80.30 is applicable.” § 80.30 sets forth the applicable prison terms for all offenses “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” § 40.20 describes the acts which constitute second degree robbery and sets forth prison terms specifically applicable to second degree robbery convictions. Thus, §§ 80.30 and 80.31 do not apply to second degree robbery convictions because § 40.20 “otherwise provide[s]” for sentencing. The second degree robbery conviction in this case therefore carries a maximum sentence of ten years. People v. Chargualaf, 1990 WL 320350, D.C. Cr. 88-068A.
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