895.47 Indemnification of the Wisconsin State Agencies Building Corporation and the Wisconsin State Public Building Corporation. If the Wisconsin State Agencies Building Corporation or the Wisconsin State Public Building Corporation is the defendant in an action or special proceeding in its capacity as owner of facilities occupied by any department or agents of any department of state government, the judgment as to damages and costs shall be paid by the state from the appropriation made under s. 20.865 (1) (fm). The state, when it does not provide legal counsel to the defendant, its members, officers or employees, shall pay reasonable attorney fees and costs of defending the action regardless of the results of the litigation, unless the court or jury finds that the member, officer or employee did not act within the scope of that person’s employment. Failure by the defendant to give notice to the department of justice of an action or special proceeding commenced against it, its members, officers or employees as soon as reasonably possible shall bar recovery by the defendant, its members, officers or employees from the state under this section. Attorney fees and expenses may not be recovered if the state offers the member, officer or employee legal counsel and the offer is refused. History: 1977 c. 344, 447.
895.472 Indemnification of a financial institution. A financial institution, as defined in s. 943.80 (2), that compensates a customer for a pecuniary loss resulting from a financial crime, as defined in s. 943.80 (1), or assumes the loss, may bring a civil action against the person who committed the crime to recover the amount of the loss, any other damages incurred by the financial institution as a result of the crime, and the costs incurred to bring the action, including attorney’s fees. History: 2005 a. 212 s. 2; 2007 a. 97 s. 239.
SUBCHAPTER II EXEMPTIONS FROM, AND LIMITATIONS ON, LIABILITY 895.475 Exemption from civil liability for furnishing safety inspection or advisory services. The furnishing of, or failure to furnish, safety inspection or advisory services in-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
27
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
tended to reduce the likelihood of injury, death or loss shall not subject a state officer, employee or agent, or an insurer, the insurer’s agent or employee undertaking to perform such services as an incident to insurance, to liability for damages from injury, death or loss occurring as a result of any act or omission in the course of the safety inspection or advisory services. This section shall not apply if the active negligence of the state officer, employee or agent, or of the insurer, the insurer’s agent or employee created the condition that was the proximate cause of injury, death or loss. This section shall not apply to an insurer, the insurer’s agent or employee performing the safety inspection or advisory services when required to do so under the provisions of a written service contract. History: 1991 a. 39; 2005 a. 155 s. 42; Stats. 2005 s. 895.475. A “written service contract” is a contract that obligates the insurer to provide loss control services to an insured. Samuels Recycling Co. v. CNA Insurance Cos., 223 Wis. 2d 233, 588 N.W.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3511. This section does not provide immunity from liability for a post-loss claim investigation performed by or on behalf of an insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract. This exemption from civil liability applies when an insurer voluntarily inspects an insured’s property to ensure that it is safe and up-to-code, not when it arrives on the scene after the fact to adjust the insured’s post-loss insurance claim based on its contractual obligations to do so. The very use of the terms “safety inspection” and “advisory services,” as well as the exclusion for contractually obligated services, clearly indicates that this section is forward-looking, involving voluntary loss prevention services. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Ropicky, 2021 WI App 25, 397 Wis. 2d 196, 959 N.W.2d 356, 20-0791.
895.476 Civil liability exemption; exposure to the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19. (1) In this section: (a) “COVID-19” means the infection caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 or by any viral strain originating from SARS-CoV-2, and conditions associated with the infection. (b) “Entity” means a partnership, corporation, association, governmental entity, tribal government, tribal entity, or other legal entity, including a school, institution of higher education, or nonprofit organization. “Entity” includes an employer or business owner, employee, agent, or independent contractor of the entity, regardless of whether the person is paid or an unpaid volunteer. “Entity” includes an employer covered under ch. 108. (2) Beginning March 1, 2020, an entity is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to any individual or damages caused by an act or omission resulting in or relating to exposure, directly or indirectly, to the novel coronavirus identified as SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19 in the course of or through the performance or provision of the entity’s functions or services. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the act or omission involves reckless or wanton conduct or intentional misconduct. (4) Immunity under this section is in addition to, not in lieu of, other immunity granted by law, and nothing in this section limits immunity granted under any other provision of law, including immunity granted under s. 893.80 (4).
895.48
2. A technical college district. 3. The governing body of a private nonprofit institution of higher education located in this state. (2) RESIDENCE HALL DIRECTORS. (am) Notwithstanding chs. 441, 447, 448, and 450, a residence hall director may administer an opioid antagonist to any student or other person who appears to be undergoing an opioid-related drug overdose if all of the following are satisfied: 1. The residence hall director has received training on the administration of opioid antagonists that is approved by his or her employer specified in sub. (1) (f) 1., 2., or 3. 2. As soon as practicable after administering the opioid antagonist, the residence hall director reports the drug overdose by dialing the telephone number “911” or, in an area in which the telephone number “911” is not available, the telephone number for an emergency medical service provider. (bm) A residence hall director is immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in administering an opioid antagonist under par. (am) unless the act or omission constitutes a high degree of negligence. This paragraph does not apply to a residence hall director who is a health care professional. (cm) An employer specified in sub. (1) (f) 1., 2., or 3. who approves training required under par. (am) 1. for the administration of opioid antagonists by a residence hall director is immune from civil liability for the act of approval unless it constitutes a high degree of negligence. (3m) ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS. An elementary or secondary school and its designated school personnel, and a physician, advanced practice registered nurse, or physician assistant who provides or administers an opioid antagonist, are not liable for any injury that results from the opioid antagonist, regardless of whether authorization was given by the pupil’s parent or guardian or by the pupil’s physician, advanced practice registered nurse, or physician assistant, unless the injury is the result of an act or omission that constitutes gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. The immunity from liability provided under this subsection is in addition to and not in lieu of that provided under s. 895.48. NOTE: Sub. (3m) is shown as amended eff. 9-1-26 by 2025 Wis. Act 17. Prior to 9-1-26 it reads: (3m) ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS. An elementary or secondary school and its designated school personnel, and a physician, advanced practice nurse prescriber, or physician assistant who provides or administers an opioid antagonist, are not liable for any injury that results from the opioid antagonist, regardless of whether authorization was given by the pupil’s parent or guardian or by the pupil’s physician, advanced practice nurse prescriber, or physician assistant, unless the injury is the result of an act or omission that constitutes gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. The immunity from liability provided under this subsection is in addition to and not in lieu of that provided under s. 895.48. History: 2017 a. 29; 2023 a. 194; 2025 a. 17.
History: 2021 a. 4.
895.478 Civil liability exemption; opioid antagonists. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (a) “Administer” has the meaning given in s. 118.29 (1) (a). (b) “Health care professional” has the meaning given in s. 118.29 (1) (c). (c) “High degree of negligence” has the meaning given in s. 118.29 (1) (d). (d) “Opioid antagonist” has the meaning given in s. 450.01 (13v). (e) “Opioid-related drug overdose” has the meaning given in s. 256.40 (1) (d). (f) “Residence hall director” means the individual employed by any of the following to reside at a residence hall for students and oversee the management and operation of the hall: 1. The University of Wisconsin System.
895.48 Civil liability exemption; emergency medical care. (1) Except as provided in sub. (1g), any person who renders emergency care at the scene of any emergency or accident in good faith shall be immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in rendering such emergency care. (1g) The immunity described in sub. (1) and s. 450.11 (1i) (c) 3. does not extend when employees trained in health care or health care professionals render emergency care for compensation and within the scope of their usual and customary employment or practice at a hospital or other institution equipped with hospital facilities, at the scene of any emergency or accident, enroute to a hospital or other institution equipped with hospital facilities, or at a physician’s office. (1m) (a) Except as provided in par. (b), any physician, podiatrist, or athletic trainer licensed under ch. 448, physician assistant who is licensed under subch. IX of ch. 448 or who holds a compact privilege under subch. XIII of ch. 448, naturopathic doctor
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.48
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
licensed under ch. 466, chiropractor licensed under ch. 446, dentist or dental therapist who is licensed under subch. I of ch. 447 or who holds a compact privilege under subch. II of ch. 447, emergency medical services practitioner licensed under s. 256.15, emergency medical responder certified under s. 256.15 (8), registered nurse licensed under ch. 441, massage therapist or bodywork therapist licensed under ch. 460, or naturopathic doctor licensed under ch. 466 who renders voluntary health care to a participant in an athletic event or contest sponsored by a nonprofit corporation, as defined in s. 66.0129 (6) (b), a private school, as defined in s. 115.001 (3r), a tribal school, as defined in s. 115.001 (15m), a public agency, as defined in s. 46.856 (1) (b), or a school, as defined in s. 609.655 (1) (c), is immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in rendering that care if all of the following conditions exist: 1. The health care is rendered at the site of the event or contest, during transportation to a health care facility from the event or contest, or in a locker room or similar facility immediately before, during or immediately after the event or contest. 2. The physician, naturopathic doctor, podiatrist, athletic trainer, chiropractor, dentist, dental therapist, emergency medical services practitioner, as defined in s. 256.01 (5), emergency medical responder, as defined in s. 256.01 (4p), physician assistant, registered nurse, massage therapist or bodywork therapist does not receive compensation for the health care, other than reimbursement for expenses. (b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to health care services provided by a volunteer health care provider under s. 146.89. (4) (ag) In this subsection: 1. “Cardiac arrest” means the sudden cessation of cardiac function and the disappearance of arterial blood pressure that connote ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia. 2. “Pulseless ventricular tachycardia” means a disturbance in the normal rhythm of the heart that is characterized by rapid electrical activity of the heart with no cardiac output. (am) Any of the following, other than an emergency medical services practitioner or an emergency medical responder — defibrillation, is immune from civil liability for the acts or omissions of a person in rendering in good faith emergency care by use of an automated external defibrillator to an individual who appears to be in cardiac arrest: 1. The person who renders the care. 2. The owner of the automated external defibrillator. 3. The person who provides the automated external defibrillator for use, if the person ensures that the automated external defibrillator is maintained and tested in accordance with any operational guidelines of the manufacturer. 4. Any person who provides training in the use of an automated external defibrillator to the person who renders care. (b) The immunity specified in par. (am) does not extend to any of the following: 1. A person whose act or omission resulting from the use or the provision for use of the automated external defibrillator constitutes gross negligence. 2. A health care professional who renders emergency care for compensation and within the scope of his or her usual and customary employment or practice at a hospital or other institution equipped with hospital facilities, at the scene of an emergency or accident, enroute to a hospital or other institution equipped with hospital facilities or at a physician’s office. History: 1977 c. 164; 1987 a. 14; 1989 a. 31; 1993 a. 109; 1995 a. 227; 1997 a. 67, 156, 191; 1999 a. 7, 9, 32, 56, 186; 2001 a. 74; 2003 a. 33; 2005 a. 155, 188, 486; 2007 a. 130; 2009 a. 113, 302, 355; 2011 a. 260; 2013 a. 200; 2017 a. 12; 2021 a. 130; 2023 a. 81, 87, 88; 2025 a. 128. Whatever the precise scope of “scene of any emergency or accident” in sub. (1),
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
28
the phrase is sufficiently broad to include the defendant’s home when the injured, bleeding plaintiff arrived after being hurt in an incident involving an all-terrain vehicle in nearby woods. In the circumstances of the case, “emergency care” under sub. (1) refers to the initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention rendered to the plaintiff during the period before care could be transferred to professional medical personnel. Mueller v. McMillan Warner Insurance Co., 2006 WI 54, 290 Wis. 2d 571, 714 N.W.2d 183, 05-0121. There are three requirements before sub. (1) relieves a person from liability: 1) emergency care must be rendered at the scene of the emergency; 2) the care rendered must be emergency care; and 3) any emergency care must be rendered in good faith. Clayton v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2007 WI App 228, 305 Wis. 2d 766, 741 N.W.2d 297, 07-0051. Discussing the “Good Samaritan” law. 67 Atty. Gen. 218. Incidental benefits received by volunteer members of the National Ski Patrol in exchange for rendering emergency care to disabled skiers may result in a loss of civil liability immunity under the Good Samaritan law. 79 Atty. Gen. 194. The Good Samaritan Statute. Lieb. 62 MLR 469 (1979). The Good Samaritan Statute: Civil Liability Exemptions for Emergency Care. Szymanski. Wis. Law. July 2007.
895.4801 Immunity for health care providers during COVID-19 emergency. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (a) “Health care professional” means an individual licensed, registered, or certified by the medical examining board under subch. II of ch. 448 or the board of nursing under ch. 441. (b) “Health care provider” has the meaning given in s. 146.38 (1) (b) and includes an adult family home, as defined in s. 50.01 (1). (2) IMMUNITY. Subject to sub. (3), any health care professional, health care provider, or employee, agent, or contractor of a health care professional or health care provider is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to any individual or any damages caused by actions or omissions that satisfy all of the following: (a) The action or omission is committed while the professional, provider, employee, agent, or contractor is providing services during the state of emergency declared under s. 323.10 on March 12, 2020, by executive order 72, or the 60 days following the date that the state of emergency terminates. (b) The actions or omissions relate to health services provided or not provided in good faith or are substantially consistent with any of the following: 1. Any direction, guidance, recommendation, or other statement made by a federal, state, or local official to address or in response to the emergency or disaster declared as described under par. (a). 2. Any guidance published by the department of health services, the federal department of health and human services, or any divisions or agencies of the federal department of health and human services relied upon in good faith. (c) The actions or omissions do not involve reckless or wanton conduct or intentional misconduct. (3) APPLICABILITY. This section does not apply if s. 257.03, 257.04, 323.41, or 323.44 applies. History: 2019 a. 185. This section is unconstitutional. Under this section, health care professionals and providers have immunity for any acts or omissions so long as those acts or omissions were in good faith and occurred during the state of emergency declared in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, or within 60 days thereafter. There is no requirement that the acts or omissions have any nexus to the state of emergency. The breadth of the immunity is not narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest that prompted the statute when it denies the right to a jury trial for claims involving medical care that was provided for a reason other than the treatment of COVID-19. Wren v. Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital Milwaukee, Inc., 2025 WI App 22, 415 Wis. 2d 758, 19 N.W.3d 614, 24-0126.
895.4802 Civil liability exemption; hazardous materials. (1) In this section: (a) “Discharge” has the meaning given under s. 292.01 (3). (b) “Hazardous substance” has the meaning given under s. 299.01 (6). (c) “Hazardous substance prediction” means any declaration or estimate of the likely spread or impact of an actual discharge of
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
29
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
a hazardous substance that is based on meteorological, mathematical, computer or similar models. (d) “Hazardous substance predictor” means any person who makes a hazardous substance prediction pursuant to a contract or agreement with a public agency or pursuant to a contract or agreement with a person who possesses or controls hazardous substances for the purpose of assisting that person in supplying a public agency with a hazardous substance prediction in the event of an actual discharge of a hazardous substance. (2) Any person is immune from civil liability for his or her good faith acts or omissions related to assistance or advice which the person provides relating to an emergency or a potential emergency regarding either of the following: (a) Mitigating or attempting to mitigate the effects of an actual or threatened discharge of a hazardous substance. (b) Preventing or cleaning up or attempting to prevent or clean up an actual or threatened discharge of a hazardous substance. (3) The immunity under sub. (2) does not extend to any person: (a) Whose act or omission causes in whole or in part the actual or threatened discharge and who would otherwise be liable for the act or omission; (b) Who would be liable for the discharge under chs. 281 to 285 or 289 to 299 or any rule promulgated or permit or order issued under chs. 281 to 285 or 289 to 299; (c) Whose act or omission constitutes gross negligence or involves reckless, wanton or intentional misconduct; or (d) Who receives or expects to receive compensation, other than reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, for rendering the advice and assistance. (4) (a) Any hazardous substance predictor or any person who provides the technology to enable hazardous substance predictions to be made is immune from civil liability for his or her good faith acts or omissions in making that prediction or providing that technology. (b) The good faith of any hazardous substance predictor or any person who provides the technology to make a prediction is presumed in any civil action. Any person who asserts that the acts or omissions under par. (a) were not made in good faith has the burden of proving that assertion by clear and convincing evidence. (c) The immunity under par. (a) does not extend to any person described under sub. (3) (a), (b), or (c). History: 2005 a. 155 ss. 45, 47; 2005 a. 347 s. 55. NOTE: 2005 Wis. Act 347, which affected this section, contains extensive explanatory notes.
895.4803 Civil liability exemption; information concerning paternity. Any member of the staff of a hospital who is designated by the hospital and trained by the department of children and families under s. 69.14 (1) (cm) and who in good faith provides to a child’s available parents written information that is provided by the department of children and families and oral information or an audio or video presentation about statements acknowledging paternity as prescribed by the state registrar under s. 69.15 (3) (b) 3. and about the significance and benefits of, and alternatives to, establishing paternity, under the requirements of s. 69.14 (1) (cm), is immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in providing that oral information or audio or video presentation and written information. History: 2005 a. 155 ss. 46, 48; 2007 a. 20; 2017 a. 334.
895.481 Civil liability exemption; equine activities. (1) In this section: (a) “Equine” means a donkey, hinny, horse, mule or pony. (b) “Equine activity” means any of the following:
895.481
1. Shows, fairs, competitions, performances or parades that involve any breeds of equines and any equine disciplines, including combined training, competitive trail riding, cutting, dressage, driving, endurance trail riding, English or western performance riding, grand prix jumping, horse racing, hunter and jumper shows, hunting, polo, pulling, rodeos, 3-day events and western games. 2. Equine training or teaching. 3. Boarding of equines. 4. Riding, inspecting or evaluating an equine belonging to another, regardless of whether the owner of the equine receives monetary or other consideration for the use of the equine or permits the riding, inspection or evaluation of the equine. 5. Riding, training or driving an equine or being a passenger on an equine. 5d. Equine-assisted learning. 5r. Equine-assisted psychotherapy. 6. Riding, training or driving a vehicle pulled by an equine or being a passenger on a vehicle pulled by an equine. 7. Assisting in the medical treatment of an equine. 8. Shoeing of an equine. 9. Assisting a person participating in an activity listed in subds. 1. to 8. (c) “Equine activity sponsor” means a person, whether operating for profit or nonprofit, who organizes or provides the facilities for an equine activity, including owners or operators of arenas, clubs, fairs, schools, stables and therapeutic riding programs. (d) “Equine professional” means a person engaged for compensation in the rental of equines or equine equipment or tack or in the instruction of a person in the riding or driving of an equine or in being a passenger upon an equine. (e) “Inherent risk of equine activities” means a danger or condition that is an integral part of equine activities, including all of the following: 1. The propensity of an equine to behave in a way that may result in injury or death to a person on or near it. 2. The unpredictability of an equine’s reaction to a sound, movement or unfamiliar object, person or animal. 3. A collision with an object or another animal. 4. The potential for a person participating in an equine activity to act in a negligent manner, to fail to control the equine or to not act within his or her ability. 5. Natural hazards, including surface and subsurface conditions. (f) “Property” means real property and buildings, structures and improvements on the real property. (g) “Spectator” means a person who attends or watches an equine activity but does not participate in the equine activity or perform any act or omission related to the equine activity that contributes to the injury or death of a participant in the equine activity. (2) Except as provided in subs. (3) and (6), a person, including an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional, is immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to his or her participation in equine activities if a person participating in the equine activity is injured or killed as the result of an inherent risk of equine activities. (3) The immunity under sub. (2) does not apply if the person seeking immunity does any of the following: (a) Provides equipment or tack that he or she knew or should have known was faulty and the faulty equipment or tack causes the injury or death. (b) Provides an equine to a person and fails to make a reason-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.481
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
able effort to determine the ability of the person to engage safely in an equine activity or to safely manage the particular equine provided based on the person’s representations of his or her ability. (c) Fails to conspicuously post warning signs of a dangerous inconspicuous condition known to him or her on the property that he or she owns, leases, rents or is otherwise in lawful control of or possession. (d) Acts in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the person. (e) Intentionally causes the injury or death. (3m) A person whose only involvement in an equine activity is as a spectator shall not be considered to be participating in the equine activity. (4) Every equine professional shall post and maintain signs in a clearly visible location on or near stables, corrals or arenas owned, operated or controlled by the equine professional. The signs shall be white with black lettering, each letter a minimum of one inch in height, and shall contain the following notice: “NOTICE: A person who is engaged for compensation in the rental of equines or equine equipment or tack or in the instruction of a person in the riding or driving of an equine or in being a passenger upon an equine is not liable for the injury or death of a person involved in equine activities resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities, as defined in section 895.481 (1) (e) of the Wisconsin Statutes.” (5) If an equine professional uses a written contract for the rental of equines or equine equipment or tack or for the instruction of a person in the riding, driving or being a passenger upon an equine, the contract shall contain the notice set forth in sub. (4) in clearly readable bold print of not less than the same size as the print used in the remainder of the contract. (6) This section does not limit the liability of a person under any applicable products liability laws. (7) This section does not limit the immunity created under s. 895.52. History: 1995 a. 256; 2015 a. 66. The application of this section is not limited to equine professionals. The exception to immunity under sub. (3) (a) for faulty equipment did not apply when no connection between the equipment and the plaintiff’s injuries was shown. Kangas v. Perry, 2000 WI App 234, 239 Wis. 2d 392, 620 N.W.2d 429, 00-0001. “Provides an equine” in sub. (3) (b) means to make available for use an equine that the provider either owns or controls and does not encompass an equine previously sold or given to the individual claiming damages. Barritt v. Lowe, 2003 WI App 185, 266 Wis. 2d 863, 669 N.W.2d 189, 03-0034. A person asserting that the person has immunity because the person was “riding,” as an “equine activity,” at the time of the injury-producing accident need not show that the person was on the back of a horse at the moment of the accident. The statute is worded in terms of immunity for acts or omissions “related to” participation in an equine activity and not only for the act of the activity itself. Hellen v. Hellen, 2013 WI App 69, 348 Wis. 2d 223, 831 N.W.2d 430, 12-1916. While it is true that a person who already owns or controls an equine can participate in an equine activity without being provided with an equine, in order for a person who does not own or control an equine to participate in an equine activity, someone must provide an equine within the meaning of sub. (3) (b). It is immaterial whether the person who allegedly provides the equine retains sole or primary control of the equine. Hellen v. Hellen, 2013 WI App 69, 348 Wis. 2d 223, 831 N.W.2d 430, 12-1916. The exception under sub. (3) (b) centers on the assessment by a provider of a horse of a rider’s abilities based on the rider’s representations of his or her ability. The exception does not abrogate immunity for a provider’s negligent management of a horse, and the exception does not require an actual demonstration of riding ability or a test ride. Dilley v. Holiday Acres Properties, Inc., 905 F.3d 508 (2018). Under Barritt, 2003 WI App 185, “providing an equine,” for purposes of the exception under sub. (3) (b), means that the defendant owns or controls the equine in question and makes it available for the plaintiff’s use. A riding instructor does not “provide” a horse owned by the riding student merely by exercising control over the riding lesson. Dilley v. Holiday Acres Properties, Inc., 905 F.3d 508 (2018). The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy. Anzivino. 102 MLR 747 (2019).
895.482 Civil liability exemption; ski patrol members. (1) In this section: (a) “Compensation” means wages, salary, commission or bonuses paid for services rendered, but does not include the pro-
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
30
vision, at a discounted price or without charge, of food, beverages, clothing, passes or other incidental benefits to ski patrol members. (b) “Ski patrol member” means a registered member of the national ski patrol who serves in that capacity without compensation. (2) Except as provided in sub. (3), a ski patrol member is immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions while he or she is acting in his or her capacity as a ski patrol member, including the rendering of emergency care. (3) The immunity under this section does not apply if the act or omission of the ski patrol member involves reckless, wanton or intentional misconduct. History: 1991 a. 318.
895.483 Civil liability exemption; regional and local emergency response teams and their sponsoring agencies. (1) A regional emergency response team, a member of such a team, and a local agency, as defined in s. 323.70 (1) (b), that contracts with the division of emergency management in the department of military affairs for the provision of a regional emergency response team, are immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to carrying out responsibilities under a contract under s. 323.70 (2). (2) A local emergency response team, a member of such a team and the county, city, village, or town that contracts to provide the emergency response team to the county are immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to carrying out responsibilities pursuant to a designation under s. 323.61 (2m) (e). (3) A local emergency planning committee created under s. 59.54 (8) (a) 1. that receives a grant under s. 323.61 is immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to carrying out responsibilities under s. 323.61. (4) An urban search and rescue task force, a member of such a task force, and a local agency, as defined in s. 323.70 (1) (b), that contracts with the division of emergency management in the department of military affairs for the provision of emergency services, are immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to carrying out responsibilities under a contract under s. 323.72 (1). History: 1991 a. 104; 1995 a. 13, 201; 1997 a. 27; 2001 a. 16; 2009 a. 42, 43; 2011 a. 258; 2021 a. 104. A town that responds to a Level B hazardous waste release in its own capacity in the absence of a county wide agreement does not receive immunity from civil liability under former sub. (2), 1997 stats., but other statutory and common law immunities apply. OAG 1-99.
895.484 Civil liability exemption; entering a vehicle to render assistance. (1) In this section: (a) “Domestic animal” means a dog, cat, or other animal that is domesticated and kept as a household pet, but does not include a farm animal, as defined in s. 951.01 (3). (b) “Vehicle” means a motor vehicle, or any other vehicle, that is used to transport persons or cargo and that is enclosed. (2) A person is immune from civil liability for property damage or injury that results from his or her forcible entry into a vehicle if all of the following are true: (a) A person or a domestic animal was present in the vehicle and the actor had a good faith belief that the person or domestic animal was in imminent danger of suffering bodily harm unless he or she exited or was removed from the vehicle. (b) The actor determined that the vehicle was locked and that forcible entry was necessary to enable the actor to enter the vehicle or to enable the person or domestic animal to be removed from or to exit the vehicle. (c) The actor dialed the telephone number “911” or otherwise contacted law enforcement, emergency medical services, or animal control before he or she forcibly entered the vehicle.
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
31
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
(d) The actor remained with the person or domestic animal until a law enforcement officer, emergency medical service provider, animal control officer, or other emergency medical responder, as defined in s. 256.01 (4p), arrived at the scene. (e) The actor used no more force than he or she reasonably believed necessary to enter the vehicle in order to remove the person or domestic animal or to allow the person or domestic animal to exit the vehicle. (f) If the actor left the scene before the owner or operator of the vehicle returned to the scene, the actor placed a notice on the windshield of the vehicle that included his or her name, telephone number, and mailing address, the reason he or she entered the vehicle, and the location, if known, of the person or domestic animal when the actor left the scene. History: 2015 a. 103; 2017 a. 12.
895.485 Civil liability exemption; out-of-home care providers and child-placing agencies. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (ag) “Age or developmentally appropriate activities” has the meaning given in s. 48.02 (1dm). (b) “Foster home” has the meaning given in s. 48.02 (6). (c) “Out-of-home care provider” has the meaning given in s. 48.02 (12r). (d) “Reasonable and prudent parent standard” has the meaning given in s. 48.02 (14r). (2) FOSTER PARENTS; LIABILITY EXEMPTION. Except as provided in ss. 167.10 (7) and 343.15 (2), any foster parent licensed under s. 48.62 is immune from civil liability for any of the following: (a) An act or omission of the foster parent while that parent is acting in his or her capacity as a foster parent. (b) An act or omission of a child who is placed in a foster home while the child is in the foster parent’s care. (3) FOSTER PARENTS; EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY EXEMPTION. The immunity specified in sub. (2) does not apply if the act or omission of a foster parent was not done in good faith or was not in compliance with any written instructions received from the agency that placed the child regarding specific care and supervision of the child. The good faith of a foster parent and the compliance of the foster parent with any written instructions received from the agency that placed the child are presumed in a civil action. Any person who asserts that a foster parent did not act in good faith, or did not comply with written instructions received from the agency that placed the child, has the burden of proving that assertion. (4) CHILD-PLACING AGENCIES; LIABILITY EXEMPTION; EXCEPTIONS. Any agency that acts in good faith in placing a child with a foster parent is immune from civil liability for any act or omission of the agency, the foster parent, or the child unless all of the following occur: (a) The agency has failed to provide the foster parent with any information relating to a medical, physical, mental, or emotional condition of the child that the agency is required to disclose under this paragraph. The department of children and families shall promulgate rules specifying the kind of information that an agency shall disclose to a foster parent that relates to a medical, physical, mental, or emotional condition of the child. (b) Bodily injury to the child or any other person or damage to the property of the child or any other person occurs as a direct result of the failure under par. (a). (5) OUT-OF-HOME CARE PROVIDERS; LIABILITY EXEMPTION. Except as provided in ss. 167.10 (7) and 343.15 (2), an out-ofhome care provider who grants permission for a child in the care of the out-of-home care provider to participate in an age or devel-
895.486
opmentally appropriate activity is immune from civil liability for any act or omission of the out-of-home care provider in granting that permission if in granting that permission the out-of-home care provider applied the reasonable and prudent parent standard in accordance with the requirements of ss. 48.383 (1) and 938.383 (1) and the rules promulgated under ss. 48.383 (3) and 938.383 (3). The immunity provided under this subsection applies only to the decision granting that permission itself and does not extend to any other act or omission of the out-of-home care provider, including any act or omission relating to the out-ofhome care provider’s duty to comply with any provision of licensure under s. 48.70, rule promulgated under s. 48.67, or any other statute, rule, or regulation that is applicable to the out-of-home care provider’s duty to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the child. The immunity provided under this subsection does not affect any immunity from, limitation on, or defense to liability that is available under any other statute or the common law. (6) OUT-OF-HOME CARE PROVIDERS; LIABILITY EXEMPTION; PRESUMPTIONS. An out-of-home care provider who grants permission for a child in the care of the out-of-home care provider to participate in an age or developmentally appropriate activity is presumed to have applied the reasonable and prudent parent standard in granting that permission. Any person who asserts that an out-of-home care provider did not apply the reasonable and prudent parent standard in granting that permission has the burden of proving that assertion. History: 1987 a. 377; 1989 a. 31; 1993 a. 446; 1995 a. 27 s. 9126 (19); 2007 a. 20; 2009 a. 28; 2015 a. 128. NOTE: 1987 Wis. Act 377 contains a prefatory note explaining the act. Cross-reference: See also ch. DCF 37, Wis. adm. code. Foster parents are not agents of the county for purposes of tort liability. Kara B. v. Dane County, 198 Wis. 2d 24, 542 N.W.2d 777 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-1081. See also Estate of Cooper v. Milwaukee County, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (2000).
895.486 Civil immunity exemption; reports of insurance fraud. (1) In this section, “insurance fraud” means the presentation of any statement, document or claim, or the preparation of a statement, document or claim with the knowledge that the statement, document or claim will be presented, that the person knew or should have known contained materially false, incomplete or misleading information concerning any of the following: (a) An application for the issuance of an insurance policy. (b) A claim for payment, reimbursement or benefits payable under an insurance policy. (c) A payment made in accordance with the terms of an insurance policy. (d) A premium on an insurance policy. (e) The rating of an insurance policy. (2) Any person who, absent malice, files a report with or furnishes information concerning suspected, anticipated, or completed insurance fraud is immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in filing the report or furnishing the information to any of the following or to their agents, employees or designees: (a) The office of the commissioner of insurance. (b) A law enforcement officer. (c) The National Association of Insurance Commissioners. (d) Any governmental agency established to detect and prevent insurance fraud. (e) Any nonprofit organization established to detect and prevent insurance fraud. (f) Any insurer or authorized representative of an insurer. (3) Any information furnished by an insurer in response to a report or information furnished under sub. (2) is confidential and may be made public only if required in a civil or criminal action.
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.486
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
(4) If a civil action is commenced against a person for damages related to the filing of a report or the furnishing of information under sub. (2) and the court determines that the person is immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in filing the report or furnishing the information, the person filing the report or furnishing the information shall recover costs under ch. 814 and, notwithstanding s. 814.04 (1), reasonable attorney fees. History: 1995 a. 177.
895.487 Civil liability exemption; employment references. (1) In this section: (a) “Employee” has the meaning given in s. 101.01 (3) and also includes a former employee. (b) “Employer” has the meaning given in s. 101.01 (4). (c) “Reference” means a statement about an employee’s job performance or qualifications for employment and includes a statement about an employee’s job performance or qualifications for employment provided pursuant to the settlement of a dispute between the employer and employee or provided pursuant to an agreement between the employer and employee relating to the termination of the employee’s employment. (2) An employer who, on the request of an employee or a prospective employer of the employee, provides a reference to that prospective employer is presumed to be acting in good faith and, unless lack of good faith is shown by clear and convincing evidence, is immune from all civil liability that may result from providing that reference. The presumption of good faith under this subsection may be rebutted only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the employer knowingly provided false information in the reference, that the employer made the reference maliciously or that the employer made the reference in violation of s. 111.322. History: 1995 a. 441; 1997 a. 35. The malice referred to in sub. (2) is express malice, which requires a showing of ill will, bad intent, envy, spite, hatred, revenge, or other bad motives against the person defamed, and not actual malice, which requires statements made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Gibson v. Overnite Transportation Co., 2003 WI App 210, 267 Wis. 2d 429, 671 N.W.2d 388, 02-3158. Employer Liability for Employment References. Mac Kelly. Wis. Law. Apr. 2008.
895.488 Civil liability exemption; owner or person in lawful possession of the premises. (1) In this section: (a) “Construction site” has the meaning given in s. 943.15 (2) (a). (b) “Owner or person in lawful possession of the premises” has the meaning given in s. 943.15 (2) (b). (2) The owner or person in lawful possession of the premises and his or her employees are immune from civil liability for the injury or death of an assessor or a member of the staff of an assessor who enters a construction site without the permission of the owner or person in lawful possession of the premises or his or her employee to make an assessment on behalf of the state or a political subdivision. (3) The immunity under this section does not apply if the injury or death resulted from the reckless, wanton, or intentional misconduct of the owner or person in lawful possession of the premises or his or her employee. History: 2009 a. 68.
895.489 Civil liability exemption; tenancy references. (1) In this section: (a) “Reference” means a written or oral statement about the rental performance of an applicant for tenancy and may include statements about the applicant’s payment history, conformance to rental agreement requirements, or conformance to local and state laws; factual statements regarding any rental agreement enforcement actions, including notices given under s. 704.17, 704.19, or
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
32
710.15 (5r); and factual statements about any dispute settlement between the landlord and applicant in accordance with any agreement between the landlord and applicant relating to termination of the applicant’s tenancy. (b) “Tenant” means a residential tenant, regardless of the type of tenancy or rental period. (2) A landlord who, on the request of a prospective landlord of an applicant for tenancy or on the request of the applicant for tenancy, provides a reference to the prospective landlord is presumed to be acting in good faith and, unless lack of good faith is shown by clear and convincing evidence, is immune from all civil liability that may result from providing that reference. The presumption of good faith under this subsection may be rebutted only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the landlord knowingly provided false information in the reference or made the reference maliciously. History: 2013 a. 76.
895.492 Civil liability exemption; certificate of qualification for employment. (1) In this section: (a) “Employee” has the meaning given in s. 101.01 (3) and also includes a former employee. (b) “Employer” has the meaning given in s. 101.01 (4). (2) An employer who hires an employee who has been issued a certificate of qualification for employment under s. 973.25 is immune from liability for the intentional acts or omissions of the employee, for the acts of the employee that are outside of the course of the employee’s employment, and in any proceeding on a claim against the employer for negligent hiring, retention, training, or supervision of the employee unless the employer, when he or she hired the employee, acted maliciously towards the plaintiff or with intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. History: 2019 a. 123; 2021 a. 240 s. 30.
895.497 Civil liability exemption: furnishing safety services relating to child safety restraint systems. (1) In this section: (a) “Child passenger safety technician” means a person who holds a valid certification as a child passenger safety technician or technician instructor issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration or any entity authorized by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to issue such certifications. (b) “Safety program” means any program utilizing the services of child passenger safety technicians and not conducted for pecuniary profit that provides assistance, inspections, education, or advice to the public in the fitting, installation, or adjustment of child safety restraint systems. (c) “Sponsoring organization” means any person or organization that does any of the following: 1. Employs a child passenger safety technician. 2. Sponsors, offers, or organizes any safety program. 3. Owns property on which a safety program is conducted. (2) (a) A child passenger safety technician who inspects, installs, fits, or adjusts any child safety restraint system specified under s. 347.48 (4), or who provides education or other assistance or advice relating to the safe installation, fitting, or adjustment of child safety restraint systems, is immune from civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in rendering in good faith such services. (b) The immunity under par. (a) does not extend to any of the following: 1. A person who receives compensation for providing the services specified in par. (a), other than reimbursement for expenses. 2. A person whose acts or omissions in providing the ser-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
33
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
vices specified in par. (a) involve reckless, wanton, or intentional misconduct. (c) The good faith of a person in providing the services specified in par. (a) is presumed in any civil action if the services provided are within the scope of the person’s training for which the person has been certified. Any person who asserts that the acts or omissions under par. (a) were not made in good faith has the burden of proving that assertion by clear and convincing evidence. (3) A sponsoring organization is immune from civil liability arising from any acts or omissions of a child passenger safety technician in providing services specified in sub. (2) (a) or arising in connection with a safety program if the sponsoring organization receives no compensation for the services provided by the child passenger safety technician or for participating in the safety program. History: 2005 a. 322; 2007 a. 97.
895.501 Civil liability exemption; credit card reencoders and scanning devices. (1) In this section: (a) “Automated teller machine” has the meaning given in s. 134.85 (1) (a). (b) “Credit card” has the meaning given in s. 943.202 (1) (b). (c) “Reencoder” has the meaning given in s. 943.202 (1) (c). (d) “Scanning device” has the meaning given in s. 943.202 (1) (d). (2) Any person who sells or distributes motor vehicle fuel and who dispenses that fuel from a pump capable of reading a credit card and any person who owns or is responsible for an automated teller machine is immune from civil liability for the unauthorized access, storage, or use of credit card information by another person by means of a credit card reencoder or scanning device that has been installed on his or her machine. History: 2017 a. 54.
895.506 Civil liability exemption; weight gain and obesity claims. (1) Any person who manufactures, markets, packs, distributes, advertises, or sells food, as defined in 21 USC 321 (f), is immune from civil liability for a person’s weight gain or obesity caused by the consumption of the food, or for a health condition related to weight gain or obesity. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any of the following: (a) A claim that a defendant under sub. (1) knowingly violated a federal or state law concerning the manufacturing, marketing, distribution, advertisement, labeling, or sale of the food, and the violation was the proximate cause of the weight gain, obesity, or related health condition. (b) A claim for breach of contract or express warranty in connection with the purchase of the food. (c) A claim regarding the sale of food that is adulterated under 21 USC 342. (3) In addition to the costs allowed under s. 814.04, a defendant that prevails on a motion under s. 802.08 filed in an action under sub. (2) may recover reasonable attorney fees and the costs of the investigation and litigation. History: 2005 a. 325; 2007 a. 97.
895.508 Liability exemption; provision of previously owned eyeglasses. (1) In this section, “charitable organization” means an organization described in section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code and exempt from federal income tax under section 501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. (2) A charitable organization is not liable for any damages arising out of providing previously owned eyeglasses to an individual if all of the following are true: (a) The recipient of the eyeglasses is at least 14 years of age.
895.51
(b) The eyeglasses are provided without charge. (c) For distribution of eyeglasses, the eyeglasses are provided by a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist who has done any of the following: 1. Personally examined the individual who will receive the eyeglasses and issued a prescription for the eyeglasses. 2. Personally consulted with the licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist who issued the prescription for the eyeglasses. History: 2021 a. 257.
895.51 Civil liability exemption: food or emergency household products; emergency medical supplies; donation, sale, or distribution. (1) In this section: (b) “Charitable organization” means an organization the contributions to which are deductible by corporations in computing net income under s. 71.26 (2). (bd) “Cost of production” means the cost of inputs, wages, operating the manufacturing facility, and transporting the product. (bg) “Emergency medical supplies” means any medical equipment or supplies necessary to limit the spread of, or provide treatment for, a disease associated with the public health emergency related to the 2019 novel coronavirus pandemic, including life support devices, personal protective equipment, cleaning supplies, and any other items determined to be necessary by the secretary of health services. (c) “Food distribution service” means a program of a private nonprofit organization that provides food products directly to individuals with low incomes or that collects food products for and distributes food products to persons who provide the food products directly to individuals with low incomes. (d) “Food products” has the meaning specified in s. 93.01 (6). (dm) “Governmental unit” means the United States; the state; any county, city, village, or town; any political subdivision, department, division, board, or agency of the United States, the state, or any county, city, village, or town; or any federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state or an agency of the tribe or band. (dp) “Public health emergency related to the 2019 novel coronavirus pandemic” means the period covered by the public health emergency declared under 42 USC 247d by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services on January 31, 2020, in response to the 2019 novel coronavirus or the national emergency declared by the U.S. president under 50 USC 1621 on March 13, 2020, in response to the 2019 novel coronavirus. (dr) “Qualified emergency household products” includes flashlights, generators, blankets, personal care products, household cleaning products, and emergency supplies that meet the standards for safety and quality established by federal or state law, regulation, or rule, that are not defective, and that have not been recalled by the consumer products safety commission. (e) “Qualified food” means food products that meet the standards of quality established by state law or rule or federal law or regulations, including food products that are not readily marketable due to appearance, age, freshness, grade, size, surplusage or other condition, except that “qualified food” does not include canned food products that are leaking, swollen, dented on a seam or not airtight. (2) Any person engaged in the processing, distribution, or sale of food products, for profit or not for profit, who donates or sells, at a price not to exceed overhead and transportation costs, qualified food to a charitable organization, food distribution service, or governmental unit is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to an individual caused by the qualified food donated or sold by the person. (2m) Any person engaged in the manufacturing, distribution,
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.51
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
or sale of qualified emergency household products, for profit or not for profit, who donates or sells, at a price not to exceed overhead and transportation costs, qualified emergency household products to a charitable organization or governmental unit in response to a state of emergency declared under s. 323.10 or 323.11 is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to an individual caused by the qualified emergency household product donated or sold by the person. (2r) Any person engaged in the manufacturing, distribution, or sale of emergency medical supplies, who donates or sells, at a price not to exceed the cost of production, emergency medical supplies to a charitable organization or governmental unit to respond to the public health emergency related to the 2019 novel coronavirus pandemic is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to an individual caused by the emergency medical supplies donated or sold by the person. (3) Any charitable organization or food distribution service which distributes free of charge qualified food to any person is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to an individual caused by the qualified food distributed by the charitable organization or food distribution service. (3m) Any charitable organization that distributes free of charge qualified emergency household products received under sub. (2m) is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to an individual caused by the qualified emergency household product distributed by the charitable organization. (3r) Any charitable organization that distributes free of charge emergency medical supplies received under sub. (2r) is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to an individual caused by the emergency medical supplies distributed by the charitable organization. (4) This section does not apply if the death or injury was caused by willful or wanton acts or omissions. History: 1981 c. 219; 1983 a. 189 s. 329 (20); 1987 a. 27; 1987 a. 312 s. 17; 1989 a. 108; 1991 a. 39; 2005 a. 155; 2007 a. 79; 2009 a. 42, 180; 2019 a. 185.
895.512 Civil liability exemption; access to toilet facility. If an employee of a retail establishment permits a person to use the establishment’s toilet facility, under the requirements of s. 146.29, the employee and the establishment are immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to the person, or an individual other than an employee who accompanies the person, that is caused by or during the use of the facility, unless the death or injury was caused by a willful or wanton act or omission of the employee. History: 2009 a. 198.
895.514 Civil liability exemption; Health Insurance Risk-Sharing Plan and Authority. (1) In this section: (a) “Authority” means the Health Insurance Risk-Sharing Plan Authority established under subch. III of ch. 149, 2011 stats. (b) “Board” means the board of directors of the authority. (c) “Commissioner” means the commissioner of insurance of this state. (d) “Plan” means the health care insurance plan established under subch. II of ch. 149, 2011 stats. (2) No cause of action of any nature may arise against, and no liability may be imposed upon, the authority, plan, or board; or any agent, employee, or director of any of them; or insurers participating in the plan; or the commissioner; or any agent, employee, or representative of the commissioner, for any act or omission by any of them in the performance of their powers and duties under ch. 149, 2011 stats., under 2013 Wisconsin Act 20, section 9122 (1L), or under 2013 Wisconsin Act 116, section 32 (1) (b), unless the person asserting liability proves that the act or omission constitutes willful misconduct.
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
34
(3) (a) Except as provided in 2013 Wisconsin Act 20, section 9122 (1L), and 2013 Wisconsin Act 116, section 32 (1) (b), neither the state nor any political subdivision of the state nor any officer, employee, or agent of the state or a political subdivision acting within the scope of employment or agency is liable for any debt, obligation, act, or omission of the authority. (b) All of the expenses incurred by the authority, or the commissioner, or any agent, employee, or representative of the commissioner, in exercising its duties and powers under ch. 149, 2011 stats., under 2013 Wisconsin Act 20, section 9122 (1L), or under 2013 Wisconsin Act 116, section 32 (1) (b), shall be payable only from funds of the authority. History: 2013 a. 20, 116; 2015 a. 55, 85.
895.515 Civil liability exemption; equipment or technology donation. (1) In this section: (a) “Commercial equipment or technology” means goods or related procedures used or bought for use primarily in a business, including farming and a profession. (b) “Institution of higher education” means an institution within the University of Wisconsin System, a technical college or a private, nonprofit institution of higher education located in this state. (2) Any person engaged in the sale or use of commercial equipment or technology, for profit or not for profit, who donates any commercial equipment or technology to a public or private elementary or secondary school, a tribal school, as defined in s. 115.001 (15m), or an institution of higher education or who accepts reimbursement in an amount not to exceed overhead and transportation costs for any commercial equipment or technology provided to a public or private elementary or secondary school, to a tribal school, or to an institution of higher education is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to an individual caused by the commercial equipment or technology. (3) This section does not apply if the death or injury was caused by a willful or wanton act or omission of the person who donated or accepted reimbursement for the commercial equipment or technology. (4m) This section does not apply to the manufacturer of the donated commercial equipment or technology. History: 1995 a. 112; 1997 a. 237; 2005 a. 155; 2009 a. 302.
895.517 Civil liability exemption: solid waste donation or sale. (1) In this section: (a) “Charitable organization” has the meaning given in s. 895.51 (1) (b). (b) “Municipality” has the meaning given in s. 289.01 (23). (c) “Qualified food” has the meaning given in s. 895.51 (1) (e). (d) “Responsible unit” has the meaning given in s. 287.01 (9). (e) “Solid waste” has the meaning given in s. 289.01 (33). (2) Any person who donates or sells, at a price not exceeding overhead and transportation costs, solid waste, or a material that is separated from mixed soil waste, to a materials reuse program that is operated by a charitable organization, municipality or responsible unit is immune from civil liability for the death of or injury to an individual or the damage to property caused by the solid waste or material donated or sold by the person. (3) This section does not apply if the death or injury was caused by willful or wanton acts or omissions. (4) This section does not apply to the sale or donation of qualified food. History: 1997 a. 60; 2005 a. 155.
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
35
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
895.519 Civil liability exemption; private campgrounds. (1) In this section: (am) “Inherent risk of camping” means a danger or condition that is an integral part of camping, including dangers posed by any of the following: 1. Features of the natural world, such as trees, tree stumps, roots, brush, rocks, mud, sand, and soil. 2. Uneven or unpredictable terrain. 3. Natural bodies of water. 4. Another camper or visitor at the private campground acting in a negligent manner, where the campground owner or employees are not involved. 5. A lack of lighting, including lighting at campsites. 6. Campfires in a fire pit or enclosure provided by the campground. 7. Weather. 8. Insects, birds, and other wildlife. (bm) “Private campground” means a facility that is issued a campground license under s. 97.67 and that is owned and operated by a private property owner, as defined in s. 895.52 (1) (e). (2) Except as provided in sub. (3), a private campground, an owner or operator of a private campground, and any employees and officers of a private campground or private campground owner or operator are immune from civil liability for acts or omissions related to camping at a private campground if a person is injured or killed, or property is damaged, as a result of an inherent risk of camping. (3) The immunity of sub. (2) does not apply if the person seeking immunity does any of the following: (a) Intentionally causes the injury, death, or property damage. (b) Acts with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the party or the property damaged. In this paragraph, “willful or wanton disregard” means conduct committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for the safety of others. (c) Fails to conspicuously post warning signs of a dangerous inconspicuous condition known to him or her on the property that he or she owns, leases, rents, or is otherwise in lawful control or possession of. (4) This section does not limit the immunity created under s. 895.52. (5) Nothing in this section affects the assumption of risk under s. 895.525 by a person participating in a recreational activity including camping. History: 2015 a. 293; 2017 a. 365 ss. 87, 110. The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy. Anzivino. 102 MLR 747 (2019).
895.52 Recreational activities; limitation of property owners’ liability. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (ag) “Agricultural tourism activity” means an educational or recreational activity that takes place on a farm, ranch, grove, or other place where agricultural, horticultural, or silvicultural crops are grown or farm animals or farmed fish are raised, and that allows visitors to tour, explore, observe, learn about, participate in, or be entertained by an aspect of agricultural production, harvesting, or husbandry that occurs on the farm, ranch, grove, or other place. (ar) “Governmental body” means any of the following: 1. The federal government. 2. This state. 3. A county or municipal governing body, agency, board, commission, committee, council, department, district or any other public body corporate and politic created by constitution, statute, ordinance, rule or order.
895.52
4. A governmental or quasi-governmental corporation. 5. A formally constituted subunit or an agency of subd. 1., 2., 3. or 4. (b) “Injury” means an injury to a person or to property. (c) “Nonprofit organization” means an organization or association not organized or conducted for pecuniary profit. (d) “Owner” means either of the following: 1. A person, including a governmental body or nonprofit organization, that owns, leases or occupies property. 2. A governmental body or nonprofit organization that has a recreational agreement with another owner. (e) “Private property owner” means any owner other than a governmental body or nonprofit organization. (f) “Property” means real property and buildings, structures and improvements thereon, and the waters of the state, as defined under s. 281.01 (18). (g) “Recreational activity” means any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure, including practice or instruction in any such activity. “Recreational activity” includes hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, horseback riding, birdwatching, motorcycling, operating an all-terrain vehicle or utility terrain vehicle, operating a vehicle, as defined in s. 340.01 (74), on a road designated under s. 23.115, recreational aviation, ballooning, hang gliding, hiking, tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, skating, water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training, harvesting the products of nature, participating in an agricultural tourism activity, sport shooting and any other outdoor sport, game or educational activity. “Recreational activity” does not include any organized team sport activity sponsored by the owner of the property on which the activity takes place. (h) “Recreational agreement” means a written authorization granted by an owner to a governmental body or nonprofit organization permitting public access to all or a specified part of the owner’s property for any recreational activity. (hm) “Recreational aviation” means the use of an aircraft, other than to provide transportation to persons or property for compensation or hire, upon privately owned land. For purposes of this definition, “privately owned land” does not include a public-use airport, as defined in s. 114.002 (18m). (i) “Residential property” means a building or structure designed for and used as a private dwelling accommodation or private living quarters, and the land surrounding the building or structure within a 300-foot radius. (2) NO DUTY; IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. (a) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and no officer, employee or agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the owner’s property to engage in a recreational activity: 1. A duty to keep the property safe for recreational activities. 2. A duty to inspect the property, except as provided under s. 23.115 (2). 3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or activity on the property. (b) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and no officer, employee or agent of an owner is liable for the death of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner’s property or for any death or injury resulting from an attack by a wild animal. (3) LIABILITY; STATE PROPERTY. Subsection (2) does not limit the liability of an officer, employee or agent of this state or of any of its agencies for either of the following: (a) A death or injury that occurs on property of which this
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.52
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
state or any of its agencies is the owner at any event for which the owner charges an admission fee for spectators. (b) A death or injury caused by a malicious act or by a malicious failure to warn against an unsafe condition of which an officer, employee or agent knew, which occurs on property designated by the department of natural resources under s. 23.115 or designated by another state agency for a recreational activity. (4) LIABILITY; PROPERTY OF GOVERNMENTAL BODIES OTHER THAN THIS STATE. Subsection (2) does not limit the liability of a governmental body other than this state or any of its agencies or of an officer, employee or agent of such a governmental body for either of the following: (a) A death or injury that occurs on property of which a governmental body is the owner at any event for which the owner charges an admission fee for spectators. (b) A death or injury caused by a malicious act or by a malicious failure to warn against an unsafe condition of which an officer, employee or agent of a governmental body knew, which occurs on property designated by the governmental body for recreational activities. (5) LIABILITY; PROPERTY OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS. Subsection (2) does not limit the liability of a nonprofit organization or any of its officers, employees or agents for a death or injury caused by a malicious act or a malicious failure to warn against an unsafe condition of which an officer, employee or agent of the nonprofit organization knew, which occurs on property of which the nonprofit organization is the owner. (6) LIABILITY; PRIVATE PROPERTY. Subsection (2) does not limit the liability of a private property owner or of an employee or agent of a private property owner whose property is used for a recreational activity if any of the following conditions exist: (a) The private property owner collects money, goods or services in payment for the use of the owner’s property for the recreational activity during which the death or injury occurs, and the aggregate value of all payments received by the owner for the use of the owner’s property for recreational activities during the year in which the death or injury occurs exceeds $2,000. The following do not constitute payment to a private property owner for the use of his or her property for a recreational activity: 1. A gift of wild animals or any other product resulting from the recreational activity. 2. An indirect nonpecuniary benefit to the private property owner or to the property that results from the recreational activity. 3. A donation of money, goods or services made for the management and conservation of the resources on the property. 4. A payment of not more than $5 per person per day for permission to gather any product of nature on an owner’s property. 5. A payment received from a governmental body. 6. A payment received from a nonprofit organization for a recreational agreement. 7. A payment made to purchase products or goods offered for sale on the property. (b) The death or injury is caused by the malicious failure of the private property owner or an employee or agent of the private property owner to warn against an unsafe condition on the property, of which the private property owner knew. (c) The death or injury is caused by a malicious act of the private property owner or of an employee or agent of a private property owner. (d) The death or injury occurs on property owned by a private property owner to a social guest who has been expressly and individually invited by the private property owner for the specific oc-
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
36
casion during which the death or injury occurs, if the death or injury occurs on any of the following: 1. Platted land. 2. Residential property. 3. Property within 300 feet of a building or structure on land that is classified as commercial or manufacturing under s. 70.32 (2) (a) 2. or 3. (e) The death or injury is sustained by an employee of a private property owner acting within the scope of his or her duties. (7) NO DUTY OR LIABILITY CREATED. Except as expressly provided in this section, nothing in this section, s. 101.11, or s. 895.529 nor the common law attractive nuisance doctrine creates any duty of care or ground of liability toward any person who uses another’s property for a recreational activity. History: 1983 a. 418; 1985 a. 29; 1989 a. 31; 1995 a. 27, 223, 227; 1997 a. 242; 2011 a. 93, 208; 2013 a. 20, 269, 318; 2015 a. 195. NOTE: 1983 Wis. Act 418 contains a statement of legislative intent in section 1. A municipality is immune from liability for a defective highway or public sidewalk only when the municipality has turned the highway or sidewalk over, at least in part, to recreational activities and when damages result from recreational activity. Bystery v. Village of Sauk City, 146 Wis. 2d 247, 430 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1988). See also Langenhahn v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 2019 WI App 11, 386 Wis. 2d 243, 926 N.W.2d 210, 17-2178. “Recreational activity” does not apply to random wanderings of a young child that are not similar to activities listed in sub. (1) (g). Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989). The state’s role as trustee of public waters is equivalent to ownership, giving rise to recreational immunity. Sauer v. Reliance Insurance Co., 152 Wis. 2d 234, 448 N.W.2d 256 (Ct. App. 1989). Indirect pecuniary benefits constitute “payment” under sub. (6) (a). Douglas v. Dewey, 154 Wis. 2d 451, 453 N.W.2d 500 (Ct. App. 1990). “Injury” under sub. (1) (b) includes death. Moua v. Northern States Power Co., 157 Wis. 2d 177, 458 N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1990). By providing a lifeguard a landowner does not assume a duty to provide lifeguard services in a non-negligent manner. Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991). For purposes of sub. (4) (b), conduct is “malicious” when it is the result of hatred, ill will, or revenge, or is undertaken when insult or injury is intended. Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991). Immunity is not limited to injuries caused by defects in property itself, but applies to all injuries sustained during use. Johnson v. City of Darlington, 160 Wis. 2d 418, 466 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1991). A young child’s inability to intend to engage in recreational activity does not render landowner immunity inapplicable when the activity is recreational in nature. Nelson v. Schreiner, 161 Wis. 2d 798, 469 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1991). Illegal gambling conducted by a club occupying city park land placed the club outside the protection of the immunity statute. Lee v. Elk Rod & Gun Club, Inc., 164 Wis. 2d 103, 473 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1991). A party is not immune as an occupant when evidence unequivocally shows intentional and permanent abandonment of the premises has occurred. Mooney v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 164 Wis. 2d 516, 476 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1991). Walking to or from a non-immune activity does not change a landowner’s status. Hupf v. City of Appleton, 165 Wis. 2d 215, 477 N.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1991). Sub. (2) (b) does not require a person injured by a wild animal to be engaged in a recreational activity for immunity to attach to the property owner. A captive deer is a wild animal. Hudson v. Janesville Conservation Club, 168 Wis. 2d 436, 484 N.W.2d 132 (1992). A municipal pier was the type of property intended to be covered by the recreational immunity statute. Crowbridge v. Village of Egg Harbor, 179 Wis. 2d 565, 508 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1993). A church that paid a fee to reserve park space, including a ball diamond, for a picnic where a “pickup” softball was played was not a sponsor of an organized team sport activity under sub. (1) (g). Weina v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 179 Wis. 2d 774, 508 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1993). Whether a person intended to engage in recreational activity is not dispositive in determining whether recreational activity is engaged in. The nature and purpose of the activity must be given primary consideration. Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994). Recreational immunity does not extend to activities of the landowner acting independently of its functions as owner. Immunity did not apply to city paramedics providing service to an accident victim at a city park. Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994). Limited liability for nonprofit organizations is not unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Szarzynski v. YMCA, 184 Wis. 2d 875, 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994). Visiting a neighbor to say hello is not a recreational activity under this section. Sievert v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 528 N.W.2d 413 (1995). That a local firefighters’ picnic generated profits that were used for park maintenance and improvements and the purchase of fire equipment did not result in the event being a commercial, rather than recreational, activity under this section. Fischer v. Doylestown Fire Department, 199 Wis. 2d 83, 543 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1995), 95-0796.
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
37
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
Land need not be open for recreational use for immunity to apply under this section. The focus is on the activity of the person who enters on and uses the land. Immunity applies without regard to the owner’s permission. Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996), 94-2549. An activity essentially recreational in nature will not be divided into component parts, at one moment recreational and at another not, in applying this section. Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996), 94-2549. Recreational immunity does not attach to a landowner when an act of the landowner’s officer, employee, or agent that is unrelated to the maintenance or condition of the land causes injury to a recreational land user. Kosky v. International Ass’n of Lions Clubs, 210 Wis. 2d 463, 565 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2532. A portable ice shanty located on a frozen lake does not qualify as recreational “property,” and its presence on the lake is insufficient to establish its owner as an “occupant” of the lake entitled to recreational immunity. Doane v. Helenville Mutual Insurance Co., 216 Wis. 2d 345, 575 N.W.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-1420. Walking for exercise through a park on the way to do errands was a recreational activity. Lasky v. City of Stevens Point, 220 Wis. 2d 1, 582 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2728. To find immunity under this section, the court must examine not only the plaintiff’s reason for being on the property, but also the activity taking place on the property. While a spectator’s presence at a school football game is recreational, the exception from landowner immunity for injuries incurred in recreational activities for sponsors of organized sports extends to spectators, not just participants. Meyer v. School District, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999), 98-0482. An attendee at a fair who was injured while attempting to capture a runaway steer was engaged in recreational activity. There is no “Good Samaritan” exception to the recreational immunity provided by this section. Schultz v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance, Co., 229 Wis. 2d 513, 600 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3466. Immunity for nonprofit organizations is not limited to those that act in the public interest and gratuitously open their land to the general public. It is not a violation of equal protection to treat “non-charitable” nonprofit organizations differently than private property owners. Bethke v. Lauderdale of La Crosse, Inc., 2000 WI App 107, 235 Wis. 2d 103, 612 N.W.2d 332, 99-1897. Although individual condominium unit owners held title to an undivided interest in common areas, a condominium association was an occupant and therefore an owner under sub. (1) (d). Bethke v. Lauderdale of La Crosse, Inc., 2000 WI App 107, 235 Wis. 2d 103, 612 N.W.2d 332, 99-1897. An “owner” under sub. (1) (d) 1. includes an “occupant.” A child who is an occupant is capable of extending an invitation that triggers the social guest exception under sub. (6) (d). A guest’s continuous act that begins on an owner’s property but propels the guest a few feet from the property where an injury occurs compelled the conclusion that sub. (6) (d) must be construed to allow for the extension of the social guest status to the injuries suffered. Waters v. Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62, 243 Wis. 2d 703, 627 N.W.2d 497, 99-1702. The owner of property subject to an easement is an “owner” under sub. (1) (d). The plaintiff’s walking across the easement to gain access to a boat was recreational as the walk was inextricably connected to recreational activity. The plaintiff user of the easement, who was granted the right to use it by a third-person holder of the easement, was not a social guest of the land owner under sub. (6) (d) expressly and individually invited to use the property. The fact that the easement owner granted the right of use as part of the sale of the boat did not render the landowner exempt from immunity under sub. (6) (a). Urban v. Grasser, 2001 WI 63, 243 Wis. 2d 673, 627 N.W.2d 511, 99-0933. This section is liberally construed in favor of property owners when the activity in question is not specifically listed but is substantially similar to listed activities or when the activity is undertaken in circumstances substantially similar to the circumstances of a recreational activity. Minnesota Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Paper Recycling of La Crosse, 2001 WI 64, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527, 99-0327. Because a child’s subjective assessment of recreational activity could include every form of child’s play, an objective, reasonable adult standard must be applied to determine whether a child’s play is recreational. Crawling through stacks of baled paper at an industrial site while lighting matches and starting fires was not recreational activity. Minnesota Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Paper Recycling of La Crosse, 2001 WI 64, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527, 99-0327. The nature of property can be a significant factor in determining whether an activity is recreational, although it is not dispositive. That a commercial site is used only for a business purpose that is not open to the public, as indicated by a fence to keep people away, argues against childrens’ mischievous conduct on the premises being substantially similar to a recreational activity. Minnesota Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Paper Recycling of La Crosse, 2001 WI 64, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527, 99-0327. A suit by an elementary school student injured while playing during a mandatory school recess was not barred by this section because the student did not enter the school property to engage in a recreational activity, but for education purposes in order to comply with the state’s compulsory attendance and truancy laws. Auman v. School District, 2001 WI 125, 248 Wis. 2d 548, 635 N.W.2d 762, 00-2356. A deer stand is a “structure” under sub. (1) (f). A structure or improvement need not be owned by the owner of the underlying land to constitute “property” under sub. (1) (f). Peterson v. Midwest Security Insurance Co., 2001 WI 131, 248 Wis. 2d 567, 636 N.W.2d 727, 99-2987. Sponsorship under sub. (1) (g) contemplates a relationship between the person or organization paying for or planning the project or activity and the intended beneficiary and envisions a relationship between the sponsor and the activity resulting in financial benefits to the sponsor. That a city sponsored one soccer association did not mean it was a sponsor of all organized soccer team activities on city fields. Miller v. Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co., 2003 WI App 58, 260 Wis. 2d 581, 659 N.W.2d 494, 02-1632. As long as one of the purposes for engaging in the activity is recreation, the statute attaches and bars a claim. Kautz v. Ozaukee County Agricultural Society, 2004 WI App 203, 276 Wis. 2d 833, 688 N.W.2d 771, 03-3281. That the plaintiff’s claim was that the plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff became infected with E Coli as a result of climbing on farm equipment and not as a re-
895.52
sult of an activity on land or improvements to land was irrelevant. Whether or not the equipment was property within the meaning of this section, the injuring mechanism was not the farm equipment, but rather the bacteria from animal waste tracked onto the equipment from the defendant’s real property and was directly related to the condition or maintenance of the defendant’s real property. Kautz v. Ozaukee County Agricultural Society, 2004 WI App 203, 276 Wis. 2d 833, 688 N.W.2d 771, 03-3281. An owner under sub. (1) (d) 1. includes a person who has the actual use of the property without legal title, dominion, or tenancy and encompasses a resident of land who is more transient than either a lessee or an owner. An owner under sub. (1) (d) 2. is a governmental body or nonprofit organization that has a written authorization granted by an owner permitting public access to the owner’s property for any recreational activity. It would be unreasonable to allow a snowmobile association immunity if it were granted an easement directly, but disallow it if the easement went first to a government entity, which then arranged with the association to manage, maintain, and construct the trails necessary for recreational access. Leu v. Price County Snowmobile Trails Ass’n, 2005 WI App 81, 280 Wis. 2d 765, 695 N.W.2d 889, 04-1859. Walking may or may not be a recreational activity under the statute, depending on the circumstances. Mere presence on property suitable for recreational activity when a plaintiff is injured does not, ipso facto, make this section applicable. Although the injured person’s subjective assessment of the activity is pertinent, it is not controlling. A court must consider the nature of the property, the nature of the owner’s activity, and the reason the injured person is on the property. A court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the activity, including the intrinsic nature, purpose, and consequences of the activity. Rintelman v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater Milwaukee, Inc., 2005 WI App 246, 288 Wis. 2d 394, 707 N.W.2d 897, 04-2669. The legislature did not enact this section to stop landowners from engaging in negligent behavior, but to induce property owners to open their land for recreational use. Recreational users are to bear the risk of the recreational activity. Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, 2007 WI App 43, 300 Wis. 2d 498, 730 N.W.2d 428, 060914. This section does not distinguish between active and passive negligence. Claims for passive negligence, such as a snowmobile club’s alleged failure to retrieve grooming equipment from a trail, were no more viable than claims for active negligence, such as an alleged decision to leave the disabled equipment partially on the trail in a blind curve. All of the acts alleged were related to the condition or maintenance of the snowmobile trail. Held v. Ackerville Snowmobile Club, 2007 WI App 43, 300 Wis. 2d 498, 730 N.W.2d 428, 06-0914. Sub. (1) (c) does not define nonprofit by referencing the chapter under which corporations were incorporated, either ch. 180 or 181, so that factor is not dispositive of the question. It would be an absurd result to read this section as making a for-profit organization out of an organization that throughout its existence has been governed by articles of incorporation that define it as a nonprofit, has been documented by state agencies as a nonprofit, and has been in compliance with Internal Revenue Service regulations as a nonprofit. De La Trinidad v. Capitol Indemnity Corp., 2009 WI 8, 315 Wis. 2d 324, 759 N.W.2d 586, 07-0045. An occupant under sub. (1) (d) 1. includes persons who, while not owners or tenants, have the actual use of land. Occupant includes one who has the actual use of property without legal title, dominion, or tenancy. In order to give meaning to “occupies,” the term should be interpreted to encompass a resident of land who is more transient than either a lessee or an owner. Milton v. Washburn County, 2011 WI App 48, 332 Wis. 2d 319, 797 N.W.2d 924, 10-0316. By including “cutting or removing wood” within the definition of “recreational activity,” the legislature made a policy choice that engaging in the activity of “cutting or removing wood” is a recreational activity. In cases in which an individual is injured while engaging in an activity specifically enumerated under the statute, courts have determined that the activity is “recreational,” without examining the various aspects or the purposes of the activity. WEA Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Krisik, 2013 WI App 139, 352 Wis. 2d 73, 841 N.W.2d 290, 11-1335. For purposes of this section, sub. (1) (d) 1. defines an “owner,” as a person that owns, leases, or occupies property. It is not the rule that one occupies property for purposes of the recreational immunity statute only when there is express permission to enter the property. WEA Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Krisik, 2013 WI App 139, 352 Wis. 2d 73, 841 N.W.2d 290, 11-1335. Case law makes clear that the act of walking to or from an immune activity constitutes recreational activity. Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc., 2015 WI App 61, 364 Wis. 2d 658, 869 N.W.2d 515, 14-1131. Recreational immunity applies when a temporary condition is placed upon the land. The length of time the allegedly negligent unsafe condition is present does not matter. A temporary, artificial condition may constitute a “condition” of the land under sub. (2) (a) 3. Carini v. ProHealth Care, Inc., 2015 WI App 61, 364 Wis. 2d 658, 869 N.W.2d 515, 14-1131. The defendant hot air balloon company was not entitled to recreational immunity because the defendant was not an “occupier” of land under sub. (1) (d) 1. None of the prior cases interpreting this section has granted immunity to a third party not responsible for opening up the land to the public. Defining the defendant as an “occupier” would not further the policy of opening as much property as possible for recreational use because the land was already open for public recreational purposes. Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492, 141508. The defendant hot air balloon company was not an owner of property under sub. (1) (d) 1. as the balloon was not a structure and not “property” under sub. (1) (f). The hot air balloon ride was not constructed on real property. It was transient, designed to be moved at the end of the day, and not designed to remain in one place. Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492, 141508. “Supervising” other persons, who are themselves engaged in recreational activities, is a “recreational activity” within the meaning of sub. (1) (g). Such supervision involves actively overseeing or directing the performance of the recreational activity of another. Thus, “supervision” is akin to, and subsumed within, “practice” and “in-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.52
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
struction” in a recreational activity, which the legislature specifically identified as giving rise to immunity. Wilmet v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 2017 WI App 16, 374 Wis. 2d 413, 893 N.W.2d 251, 15-2259. Each recreational immunity case poses an intensely fact-driven inquiry. The court applies a multi-factor test to ascertain whether a particular activity is “substantially similar” to those enumerated in the statute, including: 1) the activity’s intrinsic nature; 2) the purpose of the activity; 3) the activity’s consequences; 4) the property user’s intent and reason for being on the property; 5) the nature of the property; and 6) the property owner’s intent. Wilmet v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 2017 WI App 16, 374 Wis. 2d 413, 893 N.W.2d 251, 15-2259. This section does not define the term “agent.” An agent is one who acts on behalf of and is subject to reasonably precise control by the principal for the tasks the person performs within the scope of the agency. An agent may be either an employee or an independent contractor. An independent contractor may or may not be an agent. Whether an independent contractor is an agent is a fact-specific inquiry. In this case, there was no evidence that the property owner either controlled the details of the contractor’s work or formulated any reasonably precise specifications for that work. The contractor was not the owner’s agent for purposes of this section. Westmas v. Creekside Tree Service, Inc., 2018 WI 12, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68, 151039. But see Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc., 2020 WI 25, 390 Wis. 2d 627, 939 N.W.2d 582, 17-2510. The definition of “occupy” in the context of this section is “to take and hold possession.” A tree trimming company that moved from temporary location to temporary location for the limited purpose of trimming trees that did not have authority to open up the land to the public and that could not be said to have taken and held possession of the property was not an occupier and thus not a statutory owner of the property for purposes of this section. Westmas v. Creekside Tree Service, Inc., 2018 WI 12, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68, 15-1039. Discussing what constitutes an agency relationship for purposes of recreational immunity under sub. (2). Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc., 2020 WI 25, 390 Wis. 2d 627, 939 N.W.2d 582, 17-2510. The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy. Anzivino. 102 MLR 747 (2019). Wisconsin’s Recreational Use Statute: Towards Sharpening the Picture at the Edges. Ford. 1991 WLR 491. Minnesota Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Paper Recycling of La Crosse: Why Property Owners Should Fear the Mischief of Boys at Play and Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices at Work. Salvo. 2002 WLR 999. Wisconsin’s Recreational Use Statute. Pendleton. Wis. Law. May 1993. Recreational Liability: Plaintiff-friendly Standards Remain. Pendleton. Wis. Law. Oct. 2017. As I See It: Trouble by Design: Recreational Immunity Statute a Barrier to Justice. Rogers. Wis. Law. Nov. 2017.
895.523 Recreational activities in a school building or on school grounds; limitation of liability. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (a) “Governing body of a charter school” means the person that operates a charter school established under s. 118.40 (2) or (2m) or the entity that operates a charter school established under s. 118.40 (2r) or (2x). (b) “Injury” means an injury to a person or to property. (c) 1. Except as provided in subd. 2., “recreational activity” means all of the following: a. Any indoor physical activity, sport, team sport, or game, whether organized or unorganized, undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation, diversion, education, or pleasure. b. Any outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation, or pleasure, including practice or instruction in any such activity. In this subd. 1. b., “outdoor activity” includes hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, horseback riding, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an all-terrain vehicle, ballooning, hang gliding, hiking, tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, skating, water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training, harvesting the products of nature, sport shooting, and any other outdoor sport, game, or educational activity. 2. “Recreational activity” does not include any indoor or outdoor organized team sport or activity organized and held by a school district, school board, or governing body of a charter school. (d) “Recreational agreement” means a written authorization granted by a school board or the governing body of a charter school to a person that permits public access to all or a specified part of the school grounds for the purpose of any recreational activity and that satisfies the requirements under sub. (5).
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
38
(e) “School board” means the school board or board of school directors in charge of the public schools of a school district. (f) “School building” means a building designed for and used as a school by a school district, by a school board, or by the governing body of a charter school. (g) “School grounds” means real property, and any school buildings, accessory buildings, structures, and improvements thereon, owned, leased, or rented by a school district, by a school board, or by the governing body of a charter school and used primarily for public school purposes. (gm) “Spectator” means a person who attends or watches a recreational activity but does not engage or participate in or intend to engage or participate in the recreational activity. (h) “Sport” means an activity requiring physical exertion and skill and which, by its nature and organization, is competitive and includes a set of rules for play. (2) NO DUTY; IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. (a) Except as provided in sub. (3), no school district, no school board, no governing body of a charter school, and no officer, employee, or agent of a school board or of a governing body of a charter school, owes to any person who enters the school grounds of the school board or of the governing body of a charter school to engage or participate in a recreational activity held pursuant to a recreational agreement any of the following: 1. A duty to keep the school grounds safe for the recreational activity. 2. A duty to inspect the school grounds. 3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use, or activity on the school grounds. (b) Except as provided in sub. (3), no school district, no school board, no governing body of a charter school, and no officer, employee, or agent of a school board or of a governing body of a charter school, is liable for the death of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging or participating in a recreational activity held pursuant to a recreational agreement and taking place on the school grounds of the school board or of the governing body of a charter school. (3) LIABILITY. Subsection (2) does not limit the liability of a school district, a school board, a governing body of a charter school, or an officer, employee, or agent of the school board or of the governing body of a charter school for any of the following: (a) A death or injury caused by a malicious act or by a malicious failure to warn against an unsafe condition of which an officer, employee, or agent of the school board or of the governing body of a charter school knew, which occurs on the school grounds of the school board or of the governing body of a charter school designated for use in a recreational agreement and being used by a person for a recreational activity held pursuant to the recreational agreement. (b) The death of or injury to a spectator that occurs on the school grounds of the school board or of the governing body of a charter school designated for use in a recreational agreement during the recreational activity. (c) The death of or injury to a person participating in a recreational activity involving any of the following pursuant to a recreational agreement: 1. A weight room. 2. A swimming pool. 3. Gymnastic equipment. (4) NO DUTY OR LIABILITY CREATED. Except as expressly provided in this section, nothing in this section or s. 101.11 nor the common law attractive nuisance doctrine creates any duty of care or ground of liability toward any person who uses school
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
39
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
grounds to engage or participate in a recreational activity held pursuant to a recreational agreement. (5) RECREATIONAL AGREEMENT. Each recreational agreement shall include all of the following: (a) A description of the recreational activity or activities to be held on the school grounds pursuant to the agreement. (b) The time and place of the recreational activity or activities. (c) Any eligibility requirements for participation in the recreational activity or activities. (d) Whether and, if so, to what extent participants who are minors will be supervised. (e) A clear statement describing a participant’s assumption of risk. History: 2011 a. 162; 2015 a. 55.
895.524 Participation in an agricultural tourism activity; limitations on civil liability, assumption of risk. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (a) “Agricultural tourism activity” means an educational or recreational activity that takes place on a farm, ranch, grove, or other place where agricultural, horticultural, or silvicultural crops are grown or farm animals or farmed fish are raised, and that allows members of the general public, whether or not for a fee, to tour, explore, observe, learn about, participate in, or be entertained by an aspect of agricultural production, harvesting, or husbandry that occurs on the farm, ranch, grove, or other place. (b) “Agricultural tourism provider” means a person who operates, provides, or demonstrates an agricultural tourism activity. (c) “Participant” means an individual, other than an agricultural tourism provider, who observes or participates in an agricultural tourism activity. (d) “Property” means the real property where an agricultural tourism activity takes place and the buildings, structures, and improvements on that real property. (e) “Risk inherent in an agricultural tourism activity” means a danger or condition that is an integral part of an agricultural tourism activity, including all of the following: 1. The surface and subsurface conditions of land and the natural condition of vegetation and water on the property. 2. The unpredictable behavior of wild, domestic, or farm animals on the property. 3. The ordinary dangers of structures or equipment ordinarily used where agricultural, horticultural, or silvicultural crops are grown or farm animals or farmed fish are raised. 4. The possibility that a participant in an agricultural tourism activity may act in a negligent manner, including by failing to follow instructions given by the agricultural tourism operator or by failing to exercise reasonable caution while engaging in the agricultural tourism activity, that may contribute to the injury to that participant or to another participant. (2) IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. (a) Subject to par. (b), an agricultural tourism provider is immune from civil liability for injury to or the death of an individual who is participating in an agricultural tourism activity on property owned, leased, or managed by the agricultural tourism provider if all of the following apply: 1. The participant is injured or killed as a result of a risk inherent in an agricultural tourism activity. 2. The agricultural tourism provider posts and maintains, in a clearly visible location at each entrance to the property where the agricultural tourism activity takes place or at the location of each agricultural tourism activity, a sign that contains the following notice in black lettering, each letter a minimum of one inch in
895.525
height, on a white background: “NOTICE: A person who observes or participates in an agricultural tourism activity on this property assumes the risks inherent in the agricultural tourism activity. Risks inherent in the agricultural tourism activity may include conditions on the land, the unpredictable behavior of farm animals, the ordinary dangers associated with equipment used in farming operations, and the potential that a participant in the agricultural tourism activity may act in a negligent way that may contribute to injury or death. The agricultural tourism provider is not liable for the injury or death of a person involved in an agricultural tourism activity resulting from those inherent risks.” (b) 1. Subject to subd. 2., an agricultural tourism provider is not immune from civil liability for injury to or the death of a participant if any of the following applies: a. The agricultural tourism provider acts with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant. In this subd. 1. a., “willful or wanton disregard” means conduct committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for the safety of others, such as by failing to exercise ordinary care to prevent a known danger or to discover a danger. b. The agricultural tourism provider intentionally causes the participant’s injury or death. 2. Any person who asserts that the acts or omissions of an agricultural tourism provider satisfy the elements under subd. 1. a. or b. has the burden of proving that assertion by clear and convincing evidence. (3) APPRECIATION OF CONDITIONS AND RISK OF PARTICIPATION IN AN AGRICULTURAL TOURISM ACTIVITY. A participant in an agricultural tourism activity engaged in on property owned or leased by an agricultural tourism provider who offers facilities to the general public for participation in agricultural tourism activities accepts the risks inherent in the agricultural tourism activity of which the ordinary prudent person is or should be aware. (4) EFFECT ON RELATED PROVISION. Nothing in this section affects the limitation of a property owner’s liability under s. 895.52. History: 2013 a. 269. The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy. Anzivino. 102 MLR 747 (2019).
895.525 Participation in recreational activities; restrictions on civil liability, assumption of risk. (1) LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. The legislature intends by this section to establish the responsibilities of participants in recreational activities in order to decrease uncertainty regarding the legal responsibility for deaths or injuries that result from participation in recreational activities and thereby to help assure the continued availability in this state of enterprises that offer recreational activities to the public. (2) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (a) “Agricultural tourism activity” means an educational or recreational activity that takes place on a farm, ranch, grove, or other place where agricultural, horticultural, or silvicultural crops are grown or farm animals or farmed fish are raised, and that allows visitors to tour, explore, observe, learn about, participate in, or be entertained by an aspect of agricultural production, harvesting, or husbandry that occurs on the farm, ranch, grove, or other place. (b) “Recreational activity” means any activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure, including practice or instruction in any such activity. “Recreational activity” does not include participating in an alpine sport at a ski area, as those terms are defined in s. 167.33, but includes hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, bowling, billiards, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, dancing, bicycling that is not biking, as defined in s. 167.33 (1) (ar), horseback riding, horseshoe-pitching, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an all-terrain vehicle or utility ter-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.525
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
rain vehicle, recreational aviation, as defined in s. 895.52 (1) (hm), ballooning, curling, throwing darts, hang gliding, hiking, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skating, participation in water sports, weight and fitness training, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training, harvesting the products of nature, participating in an agricultural tourism activity, sport shooting, and participating in an alpine sport outside a ski area, as those terms are defined in s. 167.33, and any other sport, game or educational activity. (3) APPRECIATION OF RISK. A participant in a recreational activity engaged in on premises owned or leased by a person who offers facilities to the general public for participation in recreational activities accepts the risks inherent in the recreational activity of which the ordinary prudent person is or should be aware. In a negligence action for recovery of damages for death, personal injury or property damage, conduct by a participant who accepts the risks under this subsection is contributory negligence, to which the comparative negligence provisions of s. 895.045 shall apply. (4) RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTICIPANTS. (a) A participant in a recreational activity engaged in on premises owned or leased by a person who offers facilities to the general public for participation in recreational activities is responsible to do all of the following: 1. Act within the limits of his or her ability. 2. Heed all warnings regarding participation in the recreational activity. 3. Maintain control of his or her person and the equipment, devices or animals the person is using while participating in the recreational activity. 4. Refrain from acting in any manner that may cause or contribute to the death or injury to himself or herself or to other persons while participating in the recreational activity. (b) A violation of this subsection constitutes negligence. The comparative negligence provisions of s. 895.045 apply to negligence under this subsection. (4m) LIABILITY OF CONTACT SPORTS PARTICIPANTS. (a) A participant in a recreational activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams, including teams in recreational, municipal, high school and college leagues, may be liable for an injury inflicted on another participant during and as part of that sport in a tort action only if the participant who caused the injury acted recklessly or with intent to cause injury. (b) Unless the professional league establishes a clear policy with a different standard, a participant in an athletic activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving professional teams in a professional league may be liable for an injury inflicted on another participant during and as part of that sport in a tort action only if the participant who caused the injury acted recklessly or with intent to cause injury. (5) EFFECT ON RELATED PROVISIONS. Nothing in this section affects the limitation of property owners’ liability under s. 895.52 or the limitation of school districts’ liability, of school boards’ liability, and of liability of governing bodies of charter schools under s. 895.523. History: 1987 a. 377; 1995 a. 223, 447; 1997 a. 242; 2005 a. 155; 2011 a. 162, 199, 208; 2013 a. 165, 269, 318; 2015 a. 168, 195. NOTE: 1987 Wis. Act 377 contains a prefatory note explaining the act. This section codifies common law. It does not impose a greater duty of care on individuals than exists at common law. Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995), 93-1130. Sub. (3) does not mean that all who ski are negligent under all circumstances. Subs. (3) and (4) when read together impose an obligation of ordinary care on a skier to avoid foreseeable harms, including adherence to the conditions enumerated in sub. (4). Ansani v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 39, 588 N.W.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3514. Cheerleaders are immune from negligence actions because they participate in a recreational activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams. Cheerleading is a sport because a sport is an activity involving
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
40
physical exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules or customs. Cheerleaders are on amateur teams because a team is a group organized to work together and cheerleaders are a group dedicated to leading fan participation and taking part in competitions. Cheerleading involves a significant amount of contact among the participants that at times can produce a forceful interaction between the cheerleaders when one person is tossed high into the air and then caught by those same tossers. Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156, 06-1886. The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy. Anzivino. 102 MLR 747 (2019). Go Team! Wisconsin’s Latest Recreational Immunity Controversy. Condon. Wis. Law. June 2009.
895.526 Participation in an alpine sport; restrictions on civil liability, assumption of risk. (1) DEFINITIONS. All definitions in s. 167.33 apply to this section unless the context otherwise requires. (2) APPRECIATION OF CONDITIONS AND RISK OF PARTICIPATION IN AN ALPINE SPORT. (a) Every participant in an alpine sport at a ski area accepts the conditions and risks of the alpine sport as set forth in s. 167.33 (2). (b) Every participant in an alpine sport at a ski area is presumed to have seen and understood signage provided by the ski area operator pursuant to s. 167.33 (3). (c) Every participant in an alpine sport at a ski area accepts that failure to wear a helmet or wearing a helmet that is improperly sized, fitted, or secured increases the risk of injury or death or the risk of a more severe injury. Every participant in an alpine sport at a ski area accepts that a helmet may not be available for purchase or for rent at a ski area. (d) Every participant in an alpine sport at a ski area accepts that natural or man-made items or obstacles within a ski area, including ski area infrastructure and ski area vehicles, may be unpadded or not heavily padded and accepts that there may be a higher risk of injury or death or of a more severe injury associated with a collision with an item or obstacle that is unpadded or not heavily padded. (3) RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTICIPANT IN AN ALPINE SPORT. Every participant in an alpine sport is responsible to do all of the following: (a) Fulfill his or her duties set forth in s. 167.33 (5). (b) Choose whether to wear a helmet while participating in the alpine sport. If the participant chooses to wear a helmet, he or she has the responsibility to ensure the helmet is of the correct size and fit and to ensure that it is properly secured while he or she participates in the alpine sport. (4) LIMITS ON LIABILITY FOR A SKI AREA OPERATOR; RELEASE AND LIABILITY OF A PARTICIPANT. (a) A ski operator who fulfills all of his or her duties under s. 167.33 (3) and (4) owes no further duty of care to a participant in an alpine sport and is not liable for an injury or death that occurs as a result of any condition or risk accepted by the participant under sub. (2). (b) A participant involved in a collision with any other participant or with a nonparticipant may be liable for an injury or death that occurs as a result of the collision. (c) This subsection shall be construed broadly. (5) EFFECT ON RELATED PROVISION. Nothing in this section affects the limitation of a property owner’s liability under s. 895.52. History: 2011 a. 199; 2015 a. 168. Codify This: Exculpatory Contracts in Wisconsin Recreational Businesses. Nold. 101 MLR 573 (2017). The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy. Anzivino. 102 MLR 747 (2019).
895.5265 Civil liability exemption; placement of certain structures in waterways. (1) In this section, “department” means the department of natural resources. (2) A person is immune from civil liability for damage to personal property, injury to a person, or death caused by placing a structure on the bed of a navigable water or in a wetland if the structure is placed for the purpose of fish and wildlife habitat cre-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
41
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
ation, protection, or improvement or if the structure is a net pen that meets the requirements under s. 30.12 (3) (b) 1. a., b., and c., and if any of the following applies: (a) The department authorized the person to place the structure under a permit or other approval issued under subch. II of ch. 30 or under s. 281.36 and the person placed the structure in accordance with the permit or other approval. (b) The person is exempt from any permit requirement under subch. II of ch. 30 or under s. 281.36 and the structure is placed in a manner that meets the exemption requirements. (c) The person is acting under the direction of a person described under par. (a) or (b). (2m) A person is immune from civil liability for damage to personal property, injury to a person, or death caused by a structure described under sub. (2) if the structure was placed on the bed of a navigable water or in a wetland on or adjacent to the person’s property by a predecessor in title to the property. (3) No person authorized under sub. (2) (a), (b), or (c) to place a structure in a navigable water or wetland and no person described under sub. (2m) owe to any person a duty to do any of the following: (a) Inspect or maintain the structure. (b) Give warning of the existence of the structure unless specifically required by law. (c) Give warning of an unsafe condition caused by the structure. History: 2015 a. 220.
895.527 Sport shooting range activities; limitations on liability and restrictions on operation. (1) In this section, “sport shooting range” means an area designed and operated for the use and discharge of firearms. (2) A person who owns or operates a sport shooting range is immune from civil liability related to noise resulting from the operation of the sport shooting range. (3) A person who owns or operates a sport shooting range is not subject to an action for nuisance or to state or local zoning conditions related to noise. If a sport shooting range, on the date it was established, was a lawful or legal nonconforming use under any state law or local ordinance related to its use that was in effect on that date, the sport shooting range continues to be subject to the state laws and local ordinances related to its use that were in effect on the date it was established. No court may enjoin or restrain the operation or use of a sport shooting range on the basis of noise or on the basis of noncompliance with a state law or local ordinance related to its operation or use that was enacted after the date that the sport shooting range was established if the sport shooting range, on the date it was established, was a lawful or legal nonconforming operation or use under any state law or local ordinance related to its operation or use that was in effect on that date. (4) Any sport shooting range that exists on July 16, 2013, may continue to operate as a sport shooting range at that location notwithstanding any zoning ordinance enacted under s. 59.69, 59.692, 60.61, 60.62, 61.35 or 62.23 (7), if the sport shooting range is a lawful use or a legal nonconforming use under any zoning ordinance enacted under s. 59.69, 59.692, 60.61, 60.62, 61.35 or 62.23 (7) that is in effect on July 16, 2013. The operation of the sport shooting range continues to be a lawful use or legal nonconforming use notwithstanding any expansion of, or enhancement or improvement to, the sport shooting range. (5) Any sport shooting range that exists on June 18, 1998, may continue to operate as a sport shooting range at that location notwithstanding all of the following: (a) Section 167.30 (1), 941.20 (1) (d) or 948.605 or any rule
895.529
promulgated under those sections regulating or prohibiting the discharge of firearms. (b) Section 66.0409 (3) (b) or any ordinance or resolution. (c) Any zoning ordinance that is enacted, or resolution that is adopted, under s. 59.69, 60.61, 60.62, 61.35 or 62.23 (7) that is related to noise. (6) A city, village town or county may regulate the hours between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. that an outdoor sport shooting range may operate, except that such a regulation may not apply to a law enforcement officer as defined in s. 165.85 (2) (c), a member of the U.S. armed forces or a private security person as defined in s. 440.26 (1m) who meets all of the requirements under s. 167.31 (4) (a) 4. (7) A person who is shooting in the customary or a generally acceptable manner at a sport shooting range between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. is presumed to not be engaging in disorderly conduct merely because of the noise caused by the shooting. (8) An owner or operator of a sport shooting range, or an employee, agent, contractor, customer, or insurer of the owner or operator of a sport shooting range, and any user of a sport shooting range is immune from civil liability in any action commenced by the state or its political subdivisions, or by a special purpose district, related to the use, release, placement, deposition, or accumulation of any projectiles on or under the sport shooting range or other contiguous real property over which the owner or operator of a sport shooting range has an easement, leasehold, or other legal right to use. (9) An owner, operator, officer, or board member of a sport shooting range, and any employee or volunteer acting on behalf of the owner or operator who provided recommendations regarding the operation of a sport shooting range, are immune from any civil action based solely on the negligent action of a user of the sport shooting range. (10) This section does not impair or diminish the private property rights of owners of property adjoining a sport shooting range. History: 1997 a. 242; 2001 a. 30; 2005 a. 155; 2009 a. 371; 2011 a. 35; 2013 a. 35, 202; 2021 a. 238 s. 44. This section does not prohibit the application of a zoning ordinance to a sport shooting range unless the range was a lawful use under the ordinance as of June 18, 1998. Town of Avon v. Oliver, 2002 WI App 97, 253 Wis. 2d 647, 644 N.W.2d 260, 01-1851. The Exculpatory Contract and Public Policy. Anzivino. 102 MLR 747 (2019).
895.528 Civil liability exemption; placement of markers in waterways. (1) Except as provided in sub. (2), a person is immune from civil liability for damage or injury caused by placing, or failing to place, buoys or other markers in a waterway if all of the following apply: (a) The person holds, or acts under the direction of a person who holds, a permit or other approval from the department of natural resources that authorizes the placement of the buoys or markers in the waterway. (b) The permit or other approval described under par. (a) authorizes placement of buoys or markers for the purpose of identifying or marking hazards in the waterway. (2) A person is not immune from civil liability under sub. (1) for damage or injury caused by placing, or failing to place, buoys or other markers in a waterway if the person intentionally causes the damage or injury. History: 2015 a. 91.
895.529 Civil liability limitation; duty of care owed to trespassers. (1) In this section: (a) “Possessor of real property” means an owner, lessee, tenant, or other lawful occupant of real property. (b) “Trespasser” means a natural person who enters or re-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.529
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
mains upon property in possession of another without express or implied consent. (2) Except as provided in sub. (3), a possessor of real property owes no duty of care to a trespasser. (3) A possessor of real property may be liable for injury or death to a trespasser under the following circumstances: (a) The possessor of real property willfully, wantonly, or recklessly caused the injury or death. This paragraph does not apply if the possessor used reasonable and necessary force for the purpose of self-defense or the defense of others under s. 939.48 or used reasonable and necessary force for the protection of property under s. 939.49. (b) The person injured or killed was a child and all of the following apply: 1. The possessor of real property maintained, or allowed to exist, an artificial condition on the property that was inherently dangerous to children. 2. The possessor of real property knew or should have known that children trespassed on the property. 3. The possessor of real property knew or should have known that the artificial condition he or she maintained or allowed to exist was inherently dangerous to children and involved an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm or death to children. 4. The injured or killed child, because of his or her youth or tender age, did not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in entering onto the property, or in playing in close proximity to the inherently dangerous artificial condition. 5. The possessor of real property could have reasonably provided safeguards that would have obviated the inherent danger without interfering with the purpose for which the artificial condition was maintained or allowed to exist. (4) This section does not create or increase any liability on the part of a possessor of real property for circumstances not specified under this section and does not affect any immunity from or defenses to liability available to a possessor of real property under common law or another statute. History: 2011 a. 93. Reading the phrase “other lawful occupant of real property” under sub. (1) (a) in context demonstrates that such a person must have some degree of possession or control over the property and the ability to give and withdraw consent to enter or remain on the property. Stroede v. Society Insurance, 2021 WI 43, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305, 18-1880.
895.53 Civil and criminal liability exemption; tests for intoxication. (1) In this section: (a) “Conservation warden” means a person appointed as a conservation warden by the department of natural resources under s. 23.10 (1). (b) “Traffic officer” has the meaning specified in s. 340.01 (70). (2) Any person withdrawing blood at the request of a traffic officer, law enforcement officer or conservation warden for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity of alcohol, controlled substances, controlled substance analogs or any combination of alcohol, controlled substances and controlled substance analogs is immune from any civil or criminal liability for the act, except for civil liability for negligence in the performance of the act. (3) Any employer of the person under sub. (2) or any hospital where blood is withdrawn by that person has the same immunity from liability under sub. (2). History: 1983 a. 535; 1983 a. 538 s. 256; Stats. 1983 s. 895.53; 1985 a. 331; 1995 a. 448; 2005 a. 155.
895.532 Civil and criminal liability exemption; xylazine testing products. (1) In this section, “xylazine testing product” means any materials used or intended for use in test-
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
42
ing for the presence of xylazine or a xylazine analog in a substance. (2) Any person who distributes a xylazine testing product is immune from civil or criminal liability for the death of or injury to an individual caused by the administration of the xylazine testing product. (3) Any person who administers a xylazine testing product according to manufacturer instructions provided with the xylazine testing product is immune from civil or criminal liability for the act, except for civil liability for negligence in the performance of the act. History: 2023 a. 217.
895.535 Civil and criminal liability exemption; body cavity search. (1) Any physician, physician assistant, or registered nurse licensed to practice in this state conducting a body cavity search pursuant to s. 968.255 is immune from any civil or criminal liability for the act, except for civil liability for negligence in the performance of the act. (2) Any employer of the person under sub. (1) or any health care facility where the search is conducted by that person has the same immunity from liability under sub. (1). History: 2015 a. 238.
895.537 Liability exemption; sexual assault evidence collection. (1) In this section: (a) “Health care professional” has the meaning given in s. 154.01 (3). (b) “Sexual assault forensic examination” has the meaning given in s. 165.775 (1) (d). (2) Any health care professional conducting a sexual assault forensic examination pursuant to informed consent or a court order is immune from any civil or criminal liability for the act, except for civil liability for negligence in the performance of the act. (3) Any employer of the person under sub. (2) or any health care facility where the sexual assault forensic examination is conducted by that person has the same immunity from liability under sub. (2). History: 2021 a. 116.
895.54 Liability exemption; notification of release. A person is immune from any liability regarding any act or omission regarding the notification of any applicable office or person under s. 51.37 (10), 304.06 (1), 971.17 (4m) or (6m) or 980.11. This section does not apply to willful or wanton acts or omissions. History: 1991 a. 269; 1993 a. 479.
895.55 Liability exemption; oil discharge control. (1) In this section: (a) “Damages” means those damages specified in 33 USC 2702 (b) (2) and includes the cost of assessing those damages. (b) “Discharge” means, but is not limited to, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping. (c) “Federal on-scene coordinator” means the federal official designated by the federal environmental protection agency or the U.S. coast guard to coordinate and direct responses under the national contingency plan. (d) “National contingency plan” means the plan prepared and published under 33 USC 1321 (d). (e) “Oil” means petroleum, hydrocarbon, vegetable or mineral oil of any kind or in any form and includes oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil. (f) “Person” means an individual, owner, operator, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, association, municipality, interstate agency, state agency or federal agency.
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
43
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
(g) “Removal” means the containment and elimination of oil from water, shorelines and beaches or the taking of other actions, including disposal, as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damages to public health and welfare, including to fish, shellfish, wildlife and public or private property, shorelines and beaches. (h) “Removal costs” means the costs of removal that are incurred after an oil discharge occurs or, if there is a substantial threat of an oil discharge, the costs to prevent, minimize or mitigate an oil discharge. (i) “State contingency plan” means the plan prepared and published under s. 292.11 (5). (2) Notwithstanding any provision of s. 93.57, 299.11, 299.13, 299.31, 299.43, 299.45, 299.51, 299.53 or 299.55, subchs. II and IV of ch. 30, ch. 29, 281, 283, 289, 291, 292, or 323 or subch. II of ch. 295, or any other provision of this chapter, a person is immune from liability for damages resulting from the person’s acts or omissions and for the removal costs resulting from the person’s acts or omissions if all of the following conditions are met: (a) Those acts or omissions were taken while rendering assistance, advice or care related to the threat of an oil discharge into the navigable waters of this state or related to the removal of oil resulting from an oil discharge into the navigable waters of this state. (b) The assistance, advice or care was consistent with the national contingency plan or the state contingency plan or was otherwise directed by the federal on-scene coordinator or the secretary of natural resources. (3) The immunity under sub. (2) does not extend to any person: (a) Who is required to act under s. 292.11 (3) because the person possessed or controlled the oil that was initially discharged into the navigable waters of this state or caused the initial discharge or initial threat of discharge of the oil into the navigable waters of this state. (b) Whose act or omission involves gross negligence or reckless, wanton or intentional misconduct. (c) Who causes personal injury or wrongful death. (4) A person under sub. (3) (a) is liable for any damages or removal costs that another person is immune from under sub. (2). (5) Nothing in this section affects the responsibility of a person under sub. (3) (a) to fulfill that person’s requirements under s. 292.11. History: 1995 a. 192; 1997 a. 35, 252; 2003 a. 33; 2009 a. 42.
895.555 Civil liability exemption; anhydrous ammonia. (1) LIABILITY EXEMPTION. Except as provided under sub. (2), any person who owns, maintains, or installs anhydrous ammonia equipment, as defined in s. 101.10 (1) (b), or who uses anhydrous ammonia for any legal purpose is immune from any civil liability for acts or omissions relating to the anhydrous ammonia equipment or to anhydrous ammonia that cause damage or injury to an individual, if that damage or injury occurs during the individual’s violation of s. 101.10 (3) (c), (d), (e), or (f). (2) EXCEPTION. A person is not immune from civil liability under sub. (1) if the damage or injury is caused by the person’s reckless or wanton acts or omissions or by acts or omissions intended by the person to cause damage or injury. History: 2001 a. 3; 2005 a. 14, 155.
895.56 Liability exemption; handling of petroleumcontaminated soil under contract with the department of transportation. (1) In this section: (a) “Person” means an individual, owner, operator, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, association, munici-
895.57
pality, interstate agency, state agency, as defined in s. 1.12 (1) (b), or federal agency. (b) “Petroleum-contaminated soil” means soil contaminated with material derived from petroleum, natural gas or asphalt deposits, including gasoline, diesel and heating fuels, liquified petroleum gases, lubricants, waxes, greases and petrochemicals. (2) A person is immune from liability arising under s. 292.11 and from any liability for the removal or remedying of petroleumcontaminated soil or for damages resulting from the person’s actions or omissions relating to petroleum-contaminated soil if all of the following apply: (a) The acts or omissions by the person occurred while performing a contract entered into under s. 84.06 (2), including acts or omissions by any person who has a direct contractual relationship with the prime contractor, as defined in s. 779.01 (2) (d), under a contract entered into under s. 84.06 (2) to perform labor or furnish materials. (b) In the course of performing a contract described in par. (a), petroleum-contaminated soil was encountered on the property on which the contracted activity is taking place, and the petroleum-contaminated soil cannot be avoided in performing the contract. (c) The acts or omissions involving petroleum-contaminated soil on the property were required by reasonably precise specifications in the contract entered into under s. 84.06 (2), and the acts or omissions conformed to those specifications, or were otherwise directed by the department of transportation or by the department of natural resources. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to any person to whom any of the following applies: (a) The person brought petroleum-contaminated soil onto the property or otherwise caused the initial contamination of the property with a hazardous substance, as defined in s. 292.01 (5). (b) The person’s act or omission constitutes gross negligence or involves reckless, wanton or intentional misconduct. (c) The person fails to warn the department of transportation or the department of natural resources about the presence of petroleum-contaminated soil encountered at the site, if the petroleum-contaminated soil was reasonably known to the person but not to the department of transportation or to the department of natural resources. (d) The person is under a previous or separate contract with a state agency, as defined in s. 1.12 (1) (b), solely to remove or remedy petroleum-contaminated soil or hazardous substances on the property. (e) The person causes personal injury or wrongful death. History: 1997 a. 237.
895.57 Damages and immunity; unauthorized release of animals. (1) In this section: (ag) “Animal” means all vertebrate and invertebrate species, including mammals, birds, fish and shellfish but excluding humans. (am) “Humane officer” means an officer appointed under s. 173.03. (b) “Local health officer” has the meaning given in s. 250.01 (5). (c) “Peace officer” has the meaning given in s. 939.22 (22). (2) A person who intentionally releases an animal that is lawfully confined for scientific, farming, companionship or protection of persons or property, recreation, restocking, research, exhibition, commercial or educational purposes, acting without the consent of the owner or custodian of the animal, is liable to the owner or custodian of the animal for damages, punitive damages, attorney fees and interest on the amount of the damages incurred
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.57
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
at the rate of 12 percent per year from the date of the intentional release. The damages awarded shall include the costs of restoring the animal to confinement. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to any humane officer, local health officer, peace officer, employee of the department of natural resources while on any land licensed under s. 169.15, 169.18, or 169.19, subject to certification under s. 90.21, or designated as a wildlife refuge under s. 29.621 (1) or employee of the department of agriculture, trade and consumer protection if the officer’s or employee’s acts are in good faith and in an apparently authorized and reasonable fulfillment of his or her duties. (4) (a) In this subsection, “security device” includes any of the following: 1. Any fence enumerated under s. 90.02. 2. A theft alarm signal device, a burglar alarm or any other security alarm system or device. 3. A dog. (b) Subject to par. (d), an owner or custodian of a confined animal is immune from civil liability for any damages to a person who suffers the damages while violating or attempting to violate s. 943.75 (2) or (2m). (c) An owner or custodian of an animal that is released in violation of s. 943.75 (2) or (2m) is immune from liability for any damages caused by that released animal. (d) The immunity provided to an owner or custodian of a confined animal under par. (b) does not apply if the injury was caused by a security device that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm, as defined in s. 939.22 (14). History: 1991 a. 20, 269; 1993 a. 27; 1995 a. 79; 1997 a. 27, 192, 248; 1999 a. 45; 2001 a. 56.
895.58 Liability exemption; use of special waste under public works contracts. (1) In this section: (a) “Department” means the department of natural resources. (b) “Local governmental unit” means a political subdivision of this state, a special purpose district in this state, an agency or corporation of such a political subdivision or special purpose district, or a combination or subunit of any of the foregoing. (c) “Public works project” means any work done under contract to a state agency or local governmental unit. (cr) “Solid waste” has the meaning given in s. 289.01 (33). (d) “Special waste” means any type of solid waste for which the department has granted a waiver or an exemption under s. 289.43 (3), (4), (7), or (8) or that is exempt by rule promulgated under s. 289.05 (4). (2) The department may characterize a special waste as suitable for beneficial use in public works projects. The department shall compile and maintain a list of special wastes that are suitable for use in specified types of public works projects in a format readily available to the general public and only those special wastes may be required by contracting agencies to be used in a public works project. The list may include conditions under which the special waste may be used in the public works project in order for subs. (3) and (4) to be applicable. The list under this subsection is not a rule under s. 227.01 (13). (3) Special waste, when used in a public works project, is exempt from regulation as solid waste under ch. 289 if all of the applicable conditions included in the list compiled under sub. (2) are met. (4) A person is immune from liability for the use of special waste on a public works project or for damages resulting from the person’s actions or omissions relating to the use of the special waste on a public works project if all of the following apply: (a) The acts or omissions by the person occurred while per-
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
44
forming work under a contract for a public works project including acts or omissions by any person who has a direct contractual relationship with the prime contractor, as defined in s. 779.01 (2) (d), under a contract for a public works project to perform labor or furnish materials. (b) The acts or omissions involving the special wastes were required or permitted in a contract for a public works project and the acts or omissions conformed to the provisions of the contract. (5) Subsection (4) does not apply to any person to whom either of the following applies: (a) The person’s act or omission involved reckless, wanton or intentional misconduct. (b) The person’s act or omission resulted in injury or death to an individual. History: 1999 a. 9, 185; 2003 a. 88; 2005 a. 253.
895.61 Asbestos successor corporation; limitation on liability. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (a) “Asbestos claim” means a claim for damages, losses, indemnification, contribution, or other relief arising out of or related in any way to asbestos, including all of the following: 1. A claim related to the health effects of exposure to asbestos, including a claim related to any of the following: a. Personal injury or death. b. Mental or emotional injury. c. Increased risk of disease or other injury. d. Costs of medical monitoring or surveillance. 2. A claim made by or on behalf of any person exposed to asbestos, or by a spouse, parent, child, or other relative of the person. 3. A claim related to the installation, presence, or removal of asbestos. (b) “Corporation” means a domestic corporation for profit organized under the laws of this state or a foreign corporation for profit organized under laws other than the laws of this state. (c) 1. “Successor asbestos-related liability” means any liability that is related to an asbestos claim and that was assumed or incurred by a corporation as a result of or in connection with any of the following: a. A merger or consolidation with a transferor. b. The plan of merger or consolidation with a transferor related to the merger or consolidation with or into another corporation. c. An asbestos claim based on the exercise of control or ownership of stock or a corporation before the merger or consolidation with a transferor. 2. “Successor asbestos-related liability” includes liability that, after the time of the merger or consolidation with a transferor for which the fair market value of the total gross assets of the successor corporation was determined under sub. (4), was paid, discharged, or committed to be paid or discharged by or on behalf of the corporation, successor corporation, or transferor in connection with a settlement, judgment, or discharge in this state or in another jurisdiction. (d) “Successor corporation” means a corporation that has assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liabilities before January 1, 1972, or that is any of that successor corporation’s successors. (e) “Total gross assets” includes intangible assets. (f) “Transferor” means a corporation from which a successor asbestos-related liability is or was assumed or incurred. (2) APPLICABILITY. (a) The limitations in sub. (3) apply to any successor corporation, except as provided in par. (b).
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
45
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
(b) The limitations in sub. (3) do not apply to any of the following: 1. Worker’s compensation benefits paid under ch. 102 or a comparable worker’s compensation law of another jurisdiction. 2. Any claim against a successor corporation that does not constitute a successor asbestos-related liability. 3. Any obligation under 29 USC 151, et seq., or under any collective bargaining agreement. 4. A successor corporation that, after a merger or consolidation with a transferor, continued in the business of mining asbestos, selling or distributing asbestos fibers, or manufacturing, distributing, removing, or installing asbestos-containing products that were the same or substantially the same as those products that were previously manufactured, distributed, removed, or installed by the transferor. (3) MEASURE OF LIABILITY. (a) Except as provided in par. (b), the cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities of a successor corporation are limited to the fair market value of the total gross assets of the transferor determined as of the time of the merger or consolidation with the successor corporation. Subject to par. (b), the successor corporation does not have responsibility for any successor asbestos-related liabilities in excess of this limitation. (b) If the transferor to the successor corporation had assumed or incurred successor asbestos-related liability in connection with a prior merger or consolidation with a prior transferor, then the fair market value of the total assets of the prior transferor determined as of the time of the earlier merger or consolidation is substituted for the limitation under par. (a) for purposes of determining the limitation on liability of the successor corporation. (4) ESTABLISHING THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF TOTAL GROSS ASSETS. (a) A successor corporation may establish the fair market value of total gross assets for purposes of the limitations under sub. (3) by any reasonable method, including any of the following: 1. By reference to the going concern value of the assets. 2. By reference to the purchase price attributable to or paid for the assets in an arms-length transaction. 3. In the absence of other readily available information from which the fair market value can be determined, by reference to the value of the assets recorded on a balance sheet. (b) To the extent that total gross assets include liability insurance that was issued to the transferor whose assets are being valued under this subsection, the applicability, terms, conditions, and limits of the insurance are not affected by this section. This section does not affect the rights and obligations of an insurer, transferor, or successor corporation under any insurance contract or related agreement, including all of the following: 1. A preenactment settlement resolving a coverage-related dispute. 2. The right of an insurer to seek payment for applicable deductibles, retrospective premiums, or self-insured retentions. 3. The right of an insurer to seek contribution from a successor corporation for an uninsured or self-insured period or for a period when insurance is uncollectible or unavailable. (c) Subject to par. (b), to the extent that total gross assets include any liability insurance, a settlement of a dispute concerning the liability insurance coverage entered into by the transferor or successor corporation with the insurer of the transferor before August 1, 2009, shall be determinative of the total coverage of the liability insurance for inclusion in the calculation of the transferor’s total gross assets. (5) ADJUSTMENT OF FAIR MARKET VALUE. (a) Except as provided in pars. (b) to (d), the fair market value of the total gross as-
895.62
sets at the time of the merger or consolidation with the transferor shall increase annually at a rate equal to the sum of the following: 1. The weekly prime rate for the first week of each calendar year since the merger or consolidation, as reported by the federal reserve board in federal reserve statistical release H. 15. 2. One percent. (b) The rate under par. (a) may not be compounded. (c) The adjustment of the fair market value of the total gross assets shall continue as provided in par. (a) until the date that the adjusted fair market value of the total gross assets is first exceeded by the cumulative amounts of successor asbestos-related liabilities paid or committed to be paid by or on behalf of the successor corporation or a predecessor of the successor corporation or by or on behalf of a transferor after the time of the merger or consolidation for which the fair market value of the total gross assets is determined. (d) No adjustment of the fair market value of total gross assets may be applied to any liability insurance that is included in the definition of total gross assets under sub. (4) (b). (6) LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION INTENDED. This section shall be liberally construed to effect its purposes with regard to successor corporations. History: 2009 a. 28; 2013 a. 173 s. 33.
895.62 Use of force in response to unlawful and forcible entry into a dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business; civil liability immunity. (1) In this section: (a) “Actor” means a person who uses force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another person. (b) “Dwelling” has the meaning given in s. 895.07 (1) (h). (c) “Place of business” means a business that the actor owns or operates. (2) Except as provided in sub. (4), an actor is immune from civil liability arising out of his or her use of force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm if the actor reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person and either of the following applies: (a) The person against whom the force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering the actor’s dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, the actor was on his or her property or present in the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and the actor knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring. (b) The person against whom the force was used was in the actor’s dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business after unlawfully and forcibly entering it, the actor was present in the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business, and the actor knew or had reason to believe that the person had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business. (3) If sub. (2) (a) or (b) applies, the finder of fact may not consider whether the actor had an opportunity to flee or retreat before he or she used force and the actor is presumed to have reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to another person. (4) The presumption described in sub. (3) does not apply if any of the following are true: (a) The actor was engaged in a criminal activity or was using his or her dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business to further a criminal activity at the time he or she used the force described in sub. (2). (b) The person against whom the force was used was a public safety worker, as defined in s. 941.375 (1) (b), who entered or at-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.62
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
tempted to enter the actor’s dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business in the performance of his or her official duties. This paragraph applies only if at least one of the following applies: 1. The public safety worker identified himself or herself to the actor before the force described in sub. (2) was used by the actor. 2. The actor knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter his or her dwelling, motor vehicle, or place of business was a public safety worker. (5) In any civil action, if a court finds that a person is immune from civil liability under sub. (2), the court shall award the person reasonable attorney fees, costs, compensation for loss of income, and other costs of the litigation reasonably incurred by the person. (6) Nothing in this section may be construed to limit or impair any defense to civil or criminal liability otherwise available. History: 2011 a. 94.
SUBCHAPTER III STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT TRANSFERS 895.65 Definitions. In this subchapter: (1) “Annuity issuer” means an insurer that has issued a contract to fund periodic payments under a structured settlement. (2) “Business day” has the meaning given in s. 421.301 (6). (3) “Dependents” means a payee’s spouse and minor children and all other persons for whom the payee is legally obligated to provide support, maintenance, or alimony. (4) “Discounted present value” means the present value of future payments determined by discounting the payments to the present using the applicable federal rate for determining the present value of an annuity, as most recently issued by the federal Internal Revenue Service. (5) “Gross advance amount” means the sum payable to the payee or for the payee’s account as consideration for a transfer of structured settlement payment rights before any reductions for transfer expenses or other deductions to be made from such consideration. (6) “Independent professional advice” means advice of an attorney, certified public accountant, actuary, or other licensed professional adviser. (7) “Interested parties” means the payee, any beneficiary irrevocably designated under the annuity contract to receive payments following the payee’s death, the annuity issuer, the structured settlement obligor, and any other party that has continuing rights or obligations under a structured settlement. If the payee is a trust that names the state as a remainder beneficiary, or the payee is a trustee of such a trust, the secretary of health services is an interested party. (8) “Net advance amount” means the gross advance amount less the aggregate amount of the actual and estimated transfer expenses required to be disclosed under s. 895.66 (5). (9) “Payee” means an individual who is receiving tax-free payments under a structured settlement and proposes to make a transfer of the payment rights. (10) “Periodic payments” includes both recurring payments and scheduled future lump sum payments. (11) “Qualified assignment agreement” means an agreement providing for a qualified assignment within the meaning of section 130 of the federal Internal Revenue Code, Title 26, USC. (12) “Settled claim” means the original tort claim resolved by a structured settlement.
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
46
(13) “Structured settlement” means an arrangement for periodic payment of damages for personal injuries or sickness established by settlement or judgment in resolution of a tort claim. (14) “Structured settlement agreement” means the agreement, judgment, stipulation, or release embodying the terms of a structured settlement. (15) “Structured settlement obligor” means the party that has the continuing obligation to make periodic payments to the payee under a structured settlement agreement or a qualified assignment agreement. (16) “Structured settlement payment rights” means rights to receive periodic payments under a structured settlement if any of the following applies: (a) The payee is domiciled in, or the domicile or principal place of business of the structured settlement obligor or the annuity issuer is located in, this state. (b) The structured settlement agreement was approved by a court in this state. (c) The structured settlement agreement is expressly governed by the laws of this state. (17) “Terms of the structured settlement” means the terms or conditions of the structured settlement agreement, the annuity contract, any qualified assignment agreement, and any order or other approval of any court that authorized or approved the structured settlement. (18) (a) “Transfer” means any sale, assignment, pledge, hypothecation, or other alienation or encumbrance of structured settlement payment rights made by a payee for consideration. Except as provided in par. (b), transfer does not include the creation or perfection of a security interest in structured settlement payment rights under a blanket security agreement entered into with an insured depository institution. (b) “Transfer” includes the creation or perfection, by an insured depository institution, of a security interest in structured settlement payment rights if there is an action to redirect the structured settlement payments to the insured depository institution, or an agent or successor in interest thereof, or otherwise to enforce a blanket security interest against the structured settlement payment rights. (19) “Transfer agreement” means the agreement providing for a transfer of structured settlement payment rights. (20) “Transfer expenses” means all expenses of a transfer that are required under the transfer agreement to be paid by the payee or deducted from the gross advance amount, including court filing fees, attorney fees, escrow fees, lien recordation fees, judgment and lien search fees, finders’ fees, commissions, and other payments to a broker or other intermediary. Transfer expenses do not include preexisting obligations of the payee payable for the payee’s account from the proceeds of a transfer. (21) “Transferee” means a party acquiring or proposing to acquire structured settlement payment rights through a transfer. History: 2015 a. 94; 2017 a. 366.
895.66 Mandatory disclosures. Not less than 5 business days before a payee signs a transfer agreement, the transferee shall provide to the payee a separate disclosure statement, in bold type no smaller than 14 points, that contains all of the following: (1) The amounts and due dates of the structured settlement payments to be transferred. (2) The aggregate amount of the payments. (3) The discounted present value of the payments to be transferred and the amount of the applicable federal rate used in calculating the discounted present value. (4) The gross advance amount.
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
47
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats. DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
(5) An itemized listing of all applicable transfer expenses, other than attorney fees and related disbursements payable in connection with the transferee’s petition for approval of the transfer, and the transferee’s best estimate of the amount of any such fees and disbursements. (6) The net advance amount. (7) The amount of any penalties or liquidated damages payable by the payee in the event of any breach of the transfer agreement by the payee. (8) A statement that the payee has the right to cancel the transfer agreement, without penalty or further obligation, not later than the 3rd business day after the date the agreement is signed by the payee. (9) The effective annualized rate of interest on the net advance amount, calculated by treating the transferred structured settlement payments as if they were installment payments on a loan, with each payment applied first to accrued unpaid interest and then to principal, and written in the following format: “YOU WILL BE PAYING THE EQUIVALENT OF AN INTEREST RATE OF __% PER YEAR.”. (10) A statement that the transferee’s attorney does not represent the payee in connection with the proposed transfer. (11) A statement informing the payee that structured settlement transfers have financial consequences and advising the payee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer agreement. History: 2015 a. 94; 2017 a. 365 s. 111.
895.67 Approval of transfers of structured settlement payment rights. (1) No direct or indirect transfer of structured settlement payment rights may take effect and no structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer may be required to make any payment directly or indirectly to any transferee of structured settlement payment rights unless, after the hearing required under s. 895.69 (2), the transfer has been approved in advance in a final court order based on express findings by the court that all of the following are true: (a) The transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee’s dependents. (b) The payee has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received such advice or knowingly waived in writing the opportunity to seek and receive such advice. (c) The transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court or other government authority. (2) A court may consider any of the following when making a determination under sub. (1) (a): (a) Whether the payee understands the financial ramifications of the transfer agreement and is entering into the agreement voluntarily. (b) The financial terms of the transfer agreement. (c) Whether the payee is delinquent in the payment of taxes in this state or in any payments required to be made pursuant to a restitution order in a criminal or juvenile delinquency proceeding, or pursuant to a child support order. (d) Any other considerations the court deems appropriate. (3) In addition to the considerations in sub. (2), if the payee is a minor or has been adjudicated incompetent, the court shall consider all of the following when making a determination under sub. (1) (a): (a) The physical and mental health of the payee. (b) The payee’s overall financial situation. History: 2015 a. 94.
895.69
895.68 Effects of transfer of structured settlement payment rights. A transfer of structured settlement payment rights under this subchapter includes the following effects: (1) The structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer shall, as to all parties except the transferee, be discharged and released from any and all liability for the transferred payments. (2) The transferee shall be liable to the structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer for all of the following: (a) Any taxes incurred by such parties as a consequence of the transfer, if the transfer contravenes the terms of the structured settlement. (b) Any other liabilities or costs, including reasonable costs and attorney fees, arising from compliance by the parties with the order of the court or arising as a consequence of the transferee’s failure to comply with this subchapter. (3) Neither the annuity issuer nor the structured settlement obligor may be required to divide any periodic payment between the payee and any transferee or assignee or between multiple transferees or assignees. History: 2015 a. 94.
895.69 Procedure. (1) A petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall be brought by the transferee in the county in which the payee is domiciled at the time the transfer agreement is signed by the payee or, if the payee is not domiciled in this state, then in the county in this state in which the structured settlement obligor or the annuity issuer maintains its principal place of business, or in any court that approved the structured settlement agreement. (2) A hearing must be held on a petition for approval of a transfer agreement. The payee must attend the hearing in person unless the court determines that appearance via audiovisual technology is appropriate or that good cause exists for the payee not to appear. (3) Not less than 20 days prior to the hearing required under sub. (2), the transferee shall file with the court and serve on all interested parties a notice of the proposed transfer and the petition for its authorization, including with the notice all of the following: (a) A copy of the transferee’s petition. (b) A copy of the transfer agreement. (c) A copy of the disclosure statement required under s. 895.66. (d) A listing of each of the payee’s dependents, together with each dependent’s age. (e) Notification that any interested party is entitled to support, oppose, or otherwise respond to the transferee’s petition, either in person or by counsel, by submitting written comments to the court or by participating in the hearing. (f) Notification of the time and place of the hearing and notification of the manner in which and the time by which written responses to the petition must be filed in order to be considered by the court. Written responses may not be due less than 15 days after service of the notice. (g) An affidavit from the payee stating whether the payee is delinquent in the payment of taxes in this state or in any payments required to be made pursuant to a restitution order in a criminal or juvenile delinquency proceeding, or pursuant to a child support order. (4) Notwithstanding the general service of process requirements under s. 801.11, service by overnight mail with proof of delivery or its equivalent constitutes adequate service of process for purposes of the notice requirement under sub. (3). History: 2015 a. 94.
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
895.70
DAMAGES, LIABILITY, MISCELLANEOUS COURT PROVISIONS
895.70 General provisions. (1) The provisions of this subchapter may not be waived by any payee. (2) Any transfer agreement entered into by a payee who resides in this state shall provide that disputes under such transfer agreement, including any claim that the payee has breached the agreement, may be determined in and under the laws of this state. No transfer agreement may authorize the transferee or any other party to confess judgment or consent to entry of judgment against the payee. (3) No transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall extend to any payments that are life contingent unless, prior to the date on which the payee signs the transfer agreement, the transferee has established and has agreed to maintain procedures reasonably satisfactory to the annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor for periodically confirming the payee’s survival, and giving the annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor prompt written notice in the event of the payee’s death. (4) No payee who proposes to make a transfer of structured
Updated 23-24 Wis. Stats.
48
settlement payment rights shall incur any penalty, forfeit any application fee or other payment, or otherwise incur any liability to the proposed transferee or any assignee based on any failure of such transfer to satisfy the conditions of this subchapter. (5) This subchapter may not be construed to authorize any transfer of structured settlement payment rights in contravention of any law. (6) Compliance with the requirements set forth in ss. 895.66 and 895.67 shall be solely the responsibility of the transferee in any transfer of structured settlement payment rights, and neither the structured settlement obligor nor the annuity issuer shall bear any responsibility for, or any liability arising from, noncompliance with such requirements or failure to fulfill such conditions. (7) Following any transfer of structured settlement payment rights under this subchapter, any further transfer of structured settlement payment rights by the payee may be made only after compliance with all of the requirements of this subchapter, at the time of such further transfer. History: 2015 a. 94.
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)