974.06 and the manner for proceeding and the appeal times from a judgment of conviction, order denying a postconviction motion or both. Reference in sub. (1) to s. 809.30 is changed to s. 809.50 because the latter statute prescribes appropriate procedures for discretionary appeals while the former does not. [Bill 151-S] Recantation by an accomplice who had testified for the state, stating that the testimony had been perjurious, did not constitute grounds for a new trial when it was uncorroborated by any other newly discovered evidence, and especially had no legal significance in light of positive identification of the defendant by the victim, as well as another eyewitness. Nicholas v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 683, 183 N.W.2d 11 (1971). A motion for a new trial is a motion for the retrial of issues and is not an appropriate remedy for one convicted on a guilty plea. However, the motion may be considered a motion for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty and for a trial. The trial court has inherent power to hear the motion. State v. Stuart, 50 Wis. 2d 66, 183 N.W.2d 155 (1971). Acceptance of the guilty plea could not be validated by the argument that the defendant’s acts were within the proscriptions of the charged statute or that the defendant did in fact understand the charge, for the court has a duty to fulfill the Ernst, 43 Wis. 2d 661 (1969), requirements on the record. Such knowledge cannot be imputed to the defendant from the defendant’s other statements or by recourse to the preliminary transcript when the defendant never testified as to the defendant’s knowledge of the charge or understanding of the crime. McAllister v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 224, 194 N.W.2d 639 (1972). A motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence was properly not granted when the evidence consisted of the affidavits of two girls, one of whom said that the crime was committed by someone else in their presence, and the other stated that both girls were frequently intoxicated and that the affiant had no recollection of the alleged facts. Swonger v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 468, 195 N.W.2d 598 (1972). A motion for a new trial is directed to the discretion of the trial court and an order granting the motion will be affirmed unless there is an abuse of discretion. If the court has proceeded on an erroneous view of the law, that amounts to an abuse of discretion. State v. Mills, 62 Wis. 2d 186, 214 N.W.2d 456 (1974). A claim of a constitutional right is waived unless timely raised in the trial court. Maclin v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 323, 284 N.W.2d 661 (1979). A prerequisite to a claim on appeal of ineffective trial representation is preservation of trial counsel’s testimony at a postconviction hearing in which the representation is challenged. State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).
974.06 974.07
Postconviction procedure. Motion for postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid testing of certain evidence.
A defendant’s escape during the pendency of postconviction motions constituted a forfeiture of the relief sought, and dismissal of the motion with prejudice was appropriate. State v. Braun, 185 Wis. 2d 152, 516 N.W.2d 740 (1994). But see Braun v. Powell, 77 F. Supp. 2d 973 (1999). When new evidence is a recantation by a witness, the recantation must be sufficiently corroborated by other newly discovered evidence. State v. Terrance J.W., 202 Wis. 2d 496, 550 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-3511. The requirement of corroboration of a recantation as the basis of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea by other newly-found evidence is met if there is a feasible motive for the initial false statement when the motive was previously unknown and there are circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of the recantation. State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), 95-1518. If a court decision entered after the appellant’s conviction constitutes a new rule of substantive law, the appellant has not waived the right to seek postconviction relief based on the newly announced rule. State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), 95-0770. A motion for a new trial based on new evidence that after sentencing a codefendant claimed full responsibility for a murder, recanting her trial testimony that neither codefendant was involved, required corroboration of the newly discovered evidence and a finding that there was a reasonable probability that a jury considering the original trial testimony and later statements would have a reasonable doubt about the defendants’ guilt. State v. Mayo, 217 Wis. 2d 217, 579 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1998), 96-3656. Plea withdrawal motions made prior to sentencing impose a lesser burden on the defendant than those made after. A motion based on new evidence requires showing by a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) the evidence was discovered after entry of the plea; 2) the defendant was not negligent in seeking the evidence; 3) the evidence is material to an issue in the case; and 4) the evidence is not merely cumulative. If the evidence is a witness recantation, the court must in addition determine that the recantation has reasonable indicia of reliability. State v. Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d 271, 592 N.W.2d 220 (1999), 97-2932. Newly discovered evidence does not include the new appreciation of the importance of evidence previously known but not used. A new expert opinion, based on facts available to the trial experts, falls within evidence that was previously known but not used. State v. Fosnow, 2001 WI App 2, 240 Wis. 2d 699, 624 N.W.2d 883, 00-0122. A defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a fair and just reason for allowing the withdrawal of a plea. An assertion of innocence is important but not dispositive. State v. Leitner, 2001 WI App 172, 247 Wis. 2d 195, 633 N.W.2d 207, 00-1718. Affirmed on other grounds. 2002 WI 77, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341, 001718. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is different from other types of challenges not previously raised during trial, which justifies allowing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to be raised on appeal as a matter of right despite the fact that the challenge was not raised in the circuit court. State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203, 02-1542. For a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: 1) the evidence was discovered after conviction; 2) the defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence; 3) the evidence is material to an issue in the case; and 4) the evidence is not merely cumulative. If the defendant meets this burden, the circuit court must determine whether a reasonable probability exists that a different result would be reached in a trial. State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98, 01-2789. After determining that both parties presented credible evidence in a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, it is not the court’s role to weigh the evidence. Instead, once the circuit court finds that newly discovered evidence is credible, it is required to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that a jury, hearing all evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. This question is not answered by a determination that the state’s evidence is stronger. State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, 308 Wis. 2d 374, 746 N.W.2d 590, 07-0933. Wisconsin affords a convicted person the right to postconviction counsel. It would be absurd to suggest that a person has a right to counsel at trial and on appeal, but no right to counsel at a postconviction proceeding in the circuit court, which is often the precursor to an appeal. However, a defendant does not have the right to be represented by: 1) an attorney the defendant cannot afford; 2) an attorney who is not willing to represent the defendant; 3) an attorney with a conflict of interest; or 4) an advocate who is not a member of the bar. State v. Peterson, 2008 WI App 140, 314 Wis. 2d 192, 757 N.W.2d 834, 07-1867. In order to set aside a judgment of conviction based on newly discovered evidence, the newly discovered evidence must be material to an issue in the case. If evidence of third-party culpability would not be admissible at trial, then it could not be material to the issue of guilt or innocence. In order to present evidence and make argument suggesting that a third party may have committed the charged crime, a defendant must show that the third party had: 1) opportunity; 2) motive; and 3) a direct connection to the crime that is not remote in time, place, or circumstances. State v. Vollbrecht, 2012 WI App 90, 344 Wis. 2d 69, 820 N.W.2d 443, 11-0425. In order to set aside a judgment of conviction based on newly discovered evidence, the newly discovered evidence must be sufficient to establish that a defen-
May 22, 2026, are designated by NOTES. (Published 5-22-26)
974.02
APPEALS, NEW TRIALS AND WRITS OF ERROR
dant’s conviction was a “manifest injustice.” When the defendant has proven the first four criteria of the newly discovered evidence analysis, it must then be determined whether a reasonable probability exists that had the jury heard the newly discovered evidence, it would have had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. State v. Vollbrecht, 2012 WI App 90, 344 Wis. 2d 69, 820 N.W.2d 443, 11-0425. Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d 271 (1999), did not change the law controlling post-sentence plea-withdrawal motions. It modified the McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463 (1997), rubric only for pre-sentence motions. State v. Ferguson, 2014 WI App 48, 354 Wis. 2d 253, 847 N.W.2d 900, 13-0099. Because a transcript is crucial to the right to an appeal, courts provide additional protection for appellants when they do not have a complete transcript. Under Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92 (1987), and DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d 74 (1985), when a trial transcript is incomplete, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial, but only after the defendant makes a facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error. The Perry/DeLeon procedure applies even when the entire trial transcript is unavailable. The court does not presume prejudice when the trial transcript is unavailable. State v. Pope, 2019 WI 106, 389 Wis. 2d 390, 936 N.W.2d 606, 17-1720. But see Pope v. Kemper, 689 F. Supp. 3d 657 (2023). Affirmed. Pope v. Taylor, 100 F.4th 918 (2024). Newly-discovered evidence must generally be of a fact that is true at the time of trial. State v. Watkins, 2021 WI App 37, 398 Wis. 2d 558, 961 N.W.2d 884, 191996. A defendant is entitled to a Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 (1979), hearing only when the defendant’s motion alleges sufficient facts, which if true, would entitle the defendant to relief. However, if the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the defendant to relief, or if it presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing. In this case, the defendant’s counsel did not perform deficiently by withdrawing a request for a self-defense instruction, and the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432, 19-1046. See also State v. Spencer, 2022 WI 56, 403 Wis. 2d 86, 976 N.W.2d 383, 18-0942; State v. Jackson, 2023 WI 3, 405 Wis. 2d 458, 983 N.W.2d 608, 20-2119. When the court granted the defendant’s timely motion to file a successive postconviction motion and voluntarily dismiss the defendant’s first appeal, the defendant’s subsequent appeal of the denial of the defendant’s postconviction motion was not barred by Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168 (1994). State v. McReynolds, 2022 WI App 25, 402 Wis. 2d 175, 975 N.W.2d 265, 21-0943. By moving for a new trial, a defendant does not waive the right to acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). When postconviction counsel failed to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a postconviction motion under this section, the defendant’s opportunity to argue that claim on direct appeal was foreclosed. The appropriate forum for asserting ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel was in a collateral motion under s. 974.06. Page v. Frank, 343 F.3d 901 (2003). After a conviction and sentencing in a Wisconsin criminal case, a defendant’s first avenue of relief is a postconviction motion under this section. In contrast to the practice in many other jurisdictions, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may—and usually must—be raised at this postjudgment, preappeal stage of the proceedings. Garcia v. Cromwell, 28 F.4th 764 (2022). Failure to petition the state supreme court for review precluded federal habeas corpus relief. Carter v. Gagnon, 495 F. Supp. 878 (1980). Criminal defendants have the right to a “meaningful” direct appeal from their convictions. This right is not one of mere form. At bare minimum, the 6th and 14th amendments require the state to provide indigent defendants with copies of their trial transcripts or some equivalent and effective, appointed counsel on direct appeal. In this case, the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel when, two decades ago, trial counsel failed to file the notice of intent necessary to initiate an appeal, which led not only to the loss of direct appeal rights but also to the loss of the trial transcripts. Although the state eventually reinstated the defendant’s right to appeal, that remedy—a direct appeal without transcripts—left the defendant without a “meaningful appeal” in violation of 6th and 14th amendment rights. The proper remedy was to award the maximum relief that the defendant could have obtained if the appeal had been properly perfected and the defendant had been successful in prosecuting it. In this case, by necessity, that meant awarding the defendant a new trial. Pope v. Kemper, 689 F. Supp. 3d 657 (2023). Affirmed. Pope v. Taylor, 100 F.4th 918 (2024). Post-Conviction Remedies in the 1970’s. Eisenberg. 56 MLR 69 (1972). Confusion in the Court—Wisconsin’s Harmless Error Rule in Criminal Appeals. Tess-Mattner. 63 MLR 643 (1980). The Duties of Trial Counsel After Conviction. Eisenberg. WBB Apr. 1975.