Title 15, Commerce and TradeRelease 119-110

§37b Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical Resident Matching Programs

Title 15 › CHAPTER 1 — MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE › § 37b

Last updated Sep 22, 2026|Official source

Summary

Confirms that antitrust laws do not make it illegal to run, sponsor, join, or agree to take part in a graduate medical residency matching program. It also says courts cannot use participation in such a matching program as evidence to prove an antitrust violation in federal court. The law explains that for more than 50 years most U.S. medical seniors and most residency programs have used matching systems (like the National Resident Matching Program). Those systems use a computer algorithm to match students and programs by their listed preferences. About 85 percent of participating students get a spot in one of their top three choices. The law says matches helped fix earlier problems when students and programs had to make early, often poor, choices. Defines a few key terms in one line each: antitrust laws — federal laws (and similar state laws) about unfair competition; graduate medical education program — residency or fellowship training and the organizations that run them; graduate medical education residency matching program — any program that uses matching rules and an algorithm to place students (for example, the NRMP); student — someone seeking admission to such training. The law does not protect agreements by two or more programs to set student pay or benefits. It took effect on April 10, 2004, and applies to conduct and cases before, on, or after that date.

Full Legal Text

Title 15, §37b

Commerce and Trade, Source: USLM XML via OLRC

(a)Findings and purposes

(1)Findings

Congress makes the following findings:

(A)For over 50 years, most United States medical school seniors and the large majority of graduate medical education programs (popularly known as “residency programs”) have chosen to use a matching program to match medical students with residency programs to which they have applied. These matching programs have been an integral part of an educational system that has produced the finest physicians and medical researchers in the world.

(B)Before such matching programs were instituted, medical students often felt pressure, at an unreasonably early stage of their medical education, to seek admission to, and accept offers from, residency programs. As a result, medical students often made binding commitments before they were in a position to make an informed decision about a medical specialty or a residency program and before residency programs could make an informed assessment of students’ qualifications. This situation was inefficient, chaotic, and unfair and it often led to placements that did not serve the interests of either medical students or residency programs.

(C)The original matching program, now operated by the independent non-profit National Resident Matching Program and popularly known as “the Match”, was developed and implemented more than 50 years ago in response to widespread student complaints about the prior process. This Program includes on its board of directors individuals nominated by medical student organizations as well as by major medical education and hospital associations.

(D)The Match uses a computerized mathematical algorithm, as students had recommended, to analyze the preferences of students and residency programs and match students with their highest preferences from among the available positions in residency programs that listed them. Students thus obtain a residency position in the most highly ranked program on their list that has ranked them sufficiently high among its preferences. Each year, about 85 percent of participating United States medical students secure a place in one of their top 3 residency program choices.

(E)Antitrust lawsuits challenging the matching process, regardless of their merit or lack thereof, have the potential to undermine this highly efficient, pro-competitive, and long-standing process. The costs of defending such litigation would divert the scarce resources of our country’s teaching hospitals and medical schools from their crucial missions of patient care, physician training, and medical research. In addition, such costs may lead to abandonment of the matching process, which has effectively served the interests of medical students, teaching hospitals, and patients for over half a century.

(2)Purposes

It is the purpose of this section to—

(A)confirm that the antitrust laws do not prohibit sponsoring, conducting, or participating in a graduate medical education residency matching program, or agreeing to do so; and

(B)ensure that those who sponsor, conduct or participate in such matching programs are not subjected to the burden and expense of defending against litigation that challenges such matching programs under the antitrust laws.

(b)Application of antitrust laws to graduate medical education residency matching programs

(1)Definitions

In this subsection: (A) Antitrust laws

(B)Graduate medical education program

The term “graduate medical education program” means—

(i)a residency program for the medical education and training of individuals following graduation from medical school;

(ii)a program, known as a specialty or subspecialty fellowship program, that provides more advanced training; and

(iii)an institution or organization that operates, sponsors or participates in such a program.

(C)Graduate medical education residency matching program

The term “graduate medical education residency matching program” means a program (such as those conducted by the National Resident Matching Program) that, in connection with the admission of students to graduate medical education programs, uses an algorithm and matching rules to match students in accordance with the preferences of students and the preferences of graduate medical education programs.

(D)Student

The term “student” means any individual who seeks to be admitted to a graduate medical education program.

(2)Confirmation of antitrust status

It shall not be unlawful under the antitrust laws to sponsor, conduct, or participate in a graduate medical education residency matching program, or to agree to sponsor, conduct, or participate in such a program. Evidence of any of the conduct described in the preceding sentence shall not be admissible in Federal court to support any claim or action alleging a violation of the antitrust laws.

(3)Applicability

Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt from the antitrust laws any agreement on the part of 2 or more graduate medical education programs to fix the amount of the stipend or other benefits received by students participating in such programs.

(c)Effective date

This section shall take effect on April 10, 2004, shall apply to conduct whether it occurs prior to, on, or after April 10, 2004, and shall apply to all judicial and administrative actions or other proceedings pending on April 10, 2004.

Reference

Citations & Metadata

Citation

15 U.S.C. § 37b

Title 15, Commerce and Trade

Last Updated

Sep 22, 2026

Release point: 119-110