PRIA, Government Policy, Made Personal

Summary

The United States should work with other countries and groups (like the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group) to make sure nuclear trade only goes to countries that accept full international safeguards. It should ask nuclear-weapon states to review how they declassify bomb-related information and find ways to keep that information from helping others build weapons. It should push countries to delay making weapons-grade material for commercial use until safeguards can reliably detect diversion, and it should get more money for IAEA safeguards from major nuclear countries and make sure all IAEA members pay their yearly dues on time. The U.S. should also push to stop selling highly enriched uranium for research reactors and promote low-enriched alternatives, oppose unsafeguarded naval nuclear fuel in non-weapon states, support an open-skies plan so the IAEA can use surveillance planes and satellite data, create a secure way for countries to share intelligence with the IAEA, require exporters to notify the IAEA and apply safeguards for sensitive facilities or technology sent to non-weapon states, and seek agreement that IAEA safeguards remain in force forever and that rules on leaving the Treaty be tightened.

Title 22, §6321

Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Source: USLM XML via OLRC

It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and enhance international confidence in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and in other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to—

(1)build international support for the principle that nuclear supply relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to full-scope international safeguards;

(2)encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures for declassifying information relating to the design or production of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation;

(3)encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weapons-grade nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for nuclear explosive purposes;

(4)pursue greater financial support for the implementation and improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that are currently using or planning to use weapons-grade nuclear material for commercial purposes;

(5)arrange for the timely payment of annual financial contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United States;

(6)pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging multilateral cooperation to develop and to use low-enriched alternative nuclear fuels;

(7)oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion;

(8)pursue an international open skies arrangement that would authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards verification purposes;

(9)develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without compromising national security or intelligence sources or methods;

(10)require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and

(11)seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Promotion of Discussions on Nuclear and Radiological Security and Safety Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXVI, § 3631, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1825, provided that: “(a) Sense of Congress Regarding Initiation of Dialogue Between the IAEA and the OECD.—It is the sense of Congress that—“(1) the United States should seek to initiate discussions between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for the purpose of exploring issues of nuclear and radiological security and safety, including the creation of new sources of revenue (including debt reduction) for states to provide nuclear security; and “(2) the discussions referred to in paragraph (1) should also provide a forum to explore possible sources of funds in support of the G–8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. “(b) Contingent Report.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the President shall, not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 24, 2003], submit to Congress a report on—“(A) the efforts made by the United States to initiate the discussions described in subsection (a); “(B) the results of those efforts; and “(C) any plans for further discussions and the purposes of such discussions. “(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply if no efforts referred to in paragraph (1)(A) have been made.”

§6321 Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives

Summary

Title 22, §6321

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Citations & Metadata