§8002 — Title 22 Foreign Relations and Intercourse | U.S. Code

Summary

Require the United States to stop any non-nuclear country from gaining the ability to make nuclear weapons. Encourage countries in the NPT to treat the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as limited by the goal of stopping weapons spread, and to avoid nuclear cooperation with any state the IAEA finds not following its rules. Follow and strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group rules on transfers, push for quick, coordinated responses to violations (including stopping transfers), and limit exports of especially sensitive technologies like uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water, including to India. Try to prevent other countries or sources from supplying nuclear items to any country if the United States suspends or ends its own nuclear transfers under U.S. law. Work to get India, Pakistan, and China to stop making fissile material for weapons as soon as possible and to reach a treaty banning such production that the U.S. and India join. Secure India’s full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and related export-control steps, including ratifying the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Vienna, September 12, 1997). Push India to help pressure Iran, seek to halt and reduce South Asian nuclear arsenals, protect U.S. review rights over Indian spent fuel, and ensure safeguards and any cooperation agreements reliably protect exported nuclear materials and meet legal requirements. Any fuel reserve for India should match real reactor needs.

Title 22, §8002

Foreign Relations and Intercourse — Source: USLM XML via OLRC

(a)The following shall be the policies of the United States:

(1)Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the NPT.

(2)Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, as being a right that applies only to the extent that it is consistent with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities, including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any State Party that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determines is not in full compliance with its NPT obligations, including its safeguards obligations.

(3)Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the those 11 So in original. guidelines, and the rules and practices regarding NSG decisionmaking.

(4)Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.

(5)Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.

(6)Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to this chapter, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law.

(b)The following shall be the policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:

(1)Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China.

(2)Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India become parties.

(3)Secure India’s—

(A)full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative;

(B)formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles of such Initiative;

(C)public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(D)demonstration of satisfactory progress toward implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and

(E)ratification of or accession to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997.

(4)Secure India’s full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

(5)Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.

(6)Ensure that spent fuel generated in India’s civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160(f)).

(7)Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph (2), encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

(8)Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment.

(9)Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such section [42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1), (3)–(9)].

(10)Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Editorial Notes

References in Text

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a)(6), was in the original “this title”, meaning title I of Pub. L. 109–401, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2726, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of title I to the Code, see

Short Title

note set out under section 8001 of this title and Tables. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, referred to in subsec. (a)(6), is act Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, as added by act Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 919, which is classified principally to chapter 23 (§ 2011 et seq.) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see

Short Title

note set out under section 2011 of Title 42 and Tables.

§8002 Statements of Policy

Summary

Title 22, §8002

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Editorial Notes

References in Text

Short Title

Short Title

Citations & Metadata