§8101 — Title 22 Foreign Relations and Intercourse | U.S. Code

Summary

Congress says the spread of nuclear weapons is a serious threat to U.S. security and that the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is important to stop it. Each non‑nuclear country party must make and follow a full safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Recent events show those safeguards must be stronger and work faster. That means giving IAEA inspectors more information and wider access. IAEA members created a Model Additional Protocol to expand info and access, and getting non‑nuclear states to accept these protocols is essential. The United States signed an Additional Protocol on June 12, 1998, based on that Model but keeping the right to exclude locations or activities of direct national security importance. U.S. implementation is voluntary and could encourage other countries to join. Under the Article 1.b national security exclusion, the U.S. will not allow inspections or report information about locations, activities, or information of direct national security importance. Implementation will follow the principles in the April 30, 2002 letter from the U.S. Representative to the IAEA.

Title 22, §8101

Foreign Relations and Intercourse — Source: USLM XML via OLRC

Congress makes the following findings:

(1)The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national security of the United States and its vital national interests.

(2)The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven critical to limiting such proliferation.

(3)For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and such agreements must be honored and enforced.

(4)Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. This can best be accomplished by providing IAEA inspectors with more information about, and broader access to, nuclear activities within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon State Parties.

(5)The proposed scope of such expanded information and access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA in the form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing safeguards agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional Protocols by non-nuclear weapons states is essential to enhancing the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(6)On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-weapon State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is based on the Model Additional Protocol, but which also contains measures, consistent with its existing safeguards agreements with its members, that protect the right of the United States to exclude the application of IAEA safeguards to locations and activities with direct national security significance or to locations or information associated with such activities.

(7)Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United States in a manner consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage other parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially non-nuclear-weapon State Parties, to conclude Additional Protocols and thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards system and help reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of direct and substantial benefit to the United States.

(8)Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United States is not required and is completely voluntary given its status as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States has acceded to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to make United States civil nuclear activities available to the same IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-nuclear-weapon State Parties.

(9)In accordance with the national security exclusion contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the United States will not allow any inspection activities, nor make any declaration of any information with respect to, locations, information, and activities of direct national security significance to the United States.

(10)Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the United States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Short Title

Pub. L. 109–401, title II, § 201, Dec. 18, 2006, 120 Stat. 2741, provided that: “This title [enacting this chapter] may be cited as the ‘United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act’.”

Executive Documents

Ex. Ord. No. 13458. Implementation of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America Ex. Ord. No. 13458, Feb. 4, 2008, 73 F.R. 7181, provided: By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act (the “Act”) (Public Law 109–401[, title II]) and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in order to facilitate implementation of the Act and the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America (the “Additional Protocol”), it is hereby ordered as follows: section 1. The Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy, the Attorney General, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and heads of such other agencies as appropriate, each shall issue, amend, or revise, and enforce such

Regulations

, orders, directives, instructions, or procedures as are necessary to implement the Act and United States obligations under the Additional Protocol. Sec. 2. The Secretary of Commerce, with the assistance, as necessary, of the Attorney General, is authorized to obtain and to execute warrants pursuant to section 223 of the Act for the purpose of gaining complementary access to locations subject to

Regulations

issued by the Department of Commerce pursuant to section 1 of this order. Sec. 3. The Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy, the Attorney General, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and heads of such other departments and agencies as appropriate, are authorized to carry out, consistent with the Act and in accordance with subsequent directives, appropriate functions that are not otherwise assigned in the Act and are necessary to implement the Act and United States obligations under the Additional Protocol. The Secretary of State shall perform the function of providing notifications or information to the Congress when required by the Act. Sec. 4. This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. Sec. 5. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. George W. Bush.

§8101 Findings

Summary

Title 22, §8101

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Short Title

Executive Documents

Regulations

Regulations

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