Title 42 › CHAPTER 23 — DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY › SUBCHAPTER VIII — UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION PRIVATIZATION › § 2297h–10a
Limits how much low-enriched uranium made in Russia may come into the United States and creates limits, exceptions, and rewards to encourage Russia to keep turning weapon-grade uranium into lower-enriched fuel. Definitions used here include: completion of the Russian HEU Agreement (imports from at least 500 metric tons of downblended weapons HEU), downblending (making HEU into uranium with less than 20% U-235), highly enriched uranium, highly enriched uranium of weapons origin (90% or more U-235 and verified by the Secretary of Energy), low-enriched uranium (under 20% U-235 in any form), the Russian HEU Agreement, the Suspension Agreement, and uranium-235 (the isotope 235U). The United States policy is to keep encouraging downblending in Russia, cut reliance on foreign uranium, rebuild U.S. nuclear fuel supply chains, and grow U.S. fuel production. Before the Russian HEU Agreement is finished, imports of Russian-produced low-enriched uranium are capped: 16,559 kilograms in the four-year period starting 2008; 24,839 kilograms in 2012; and 41,398 kilograms in 2013 and each year after until the Agreement is completed. After completion, annual import limits are set for 2014–2023 as follows: 2014, 485,279 kg; 2015, 455,142 kg; 2016, 480,146 kg; 2017, 490,710 kg; 2018, 492,731 kg; 2019, 509,058 kg; 2020, 514,754 kg; 2021, 596,682 kg; 2022, 489,617 kg; 2023, 578,877 kg. If Russia agrees to downblend an extra 300 metric tons of HEU after the Agreement is complete, the United States may allow more imports: for each 1 kg of Russian weapons HEU downblended in the prior year, 4 kg of low-enriched uranium may be imported that year, up to 120,000 kg per year, after the Secretary of Energy verifies the work. The Commerce Department must run and enforce the import limits under the Suspension Agreement rules and keep doing so even if that Agreement ends. Imports for processing and reexport (not for U.S. use) are not counted. The Secretary of Energy must verify origin, amount, and U-235 content and may use the same monitoring methods as the Russian HEU Agreement. The law counts different enrichments by converting them to an equivalent amount at 4.4% U-235 with a 0.3% tails assay. The Commerce Secretary may raise limits for a year if U.S. supply is too low, after consulting Energy and notifying Congress 45 days before. Special rules allow counting some non-weapons HEU downblending if Energy finds a U.S. security risk. Starting 90 days after May 13, 2024, imports of unirradiated Russian-produced LEU or LEU from Russian entities meant to evade the rules are banned, subject to limited waivers by the Secretary of Energy (with State and Commerce consulted) if no other source exists or if it is in the national interest. Waivers may allow limited imports in 2024–2027: 2024, 476,536 kg; 2025, 470,376 kg; 2026, 464,183 kg; 2027, 459,083 kg, and must end by January 1, 2028. Waivers must be reported to specified congressional committees. Exceptions apply for Department of Energy national security or nonproliferation work and for non-uranium isotopes. The prohibition rules end on December 31, 2040. A “Russian entity” means an organization under Russian law or subject to its government.
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42 U.S.C. § 2297h–10a
Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare
Last Updated
Sep 22, 2026
Release point: 119-110