§2525 — Title 50 War and National Defense | U.S. Code

Summary

Each year, for every type of U.S. nuclear weapon, the head of each national security laboratory and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command must check the safety, reliability, performance, or military usefulness of that weapon when they are responsible for those things. The Administrator may set up "dual validation teams" to give independent checks of warheads. Those teams must be made of experts from a different lab than the one that leads the warhead, have access to all surveillance and test data, run independent calculations, and do experiments if needed. Each lab head must also have one or more "red teams" that include experts from the other labs to review and challenge the lab’s assessments and the dual validation results, and then give their findings and recommendations to the lab head. By December 1 each year, each official must send a report to the appropriate Secretary and to the Nuclear Weapons Council. Reports must show the assessment results; say whether underground nuclear tests are needed or might be helpful (naming which tests and why other options would not work); and say if the U.S. is ready to carry out those tests if the President orders them. Lab reports must also talk about whether the science-based tools (including cyber assurance) and manufacturing tools are good enough, summarize red team and dual validation findings, and list major investigations. The Strategic Command report must discuss alternatives or fixes if a weapon is deficient, summarize major assembly releases for active and inactive stockpiles, and give views on the stockpile responsiveness program. Reports must note any problems that hurt the official’s ability to assess the weapons. By February 1, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy must send all these reports, their comments, and their conclusions to the President. The President must send them to Congress by March 15. If the President does not, the officials must brief the congressional defense committees by March 30. All submissions must be classified appropriately. "Secretary concerned" means the Secretary of Energy for Energy matters and the Secretary of Defense for Defense matters.

Title 50, §2525

War and National Defense — Source: USLM XML via OLRC

(a)For each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile of the United States, each official specified in subsection (b) on an annual basis shall, to the extent such official is directly responsible for the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness of that nuclear weapon type, complete an assessment of the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness (as the case may be) of that nuclear weapon type.

(b)The officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

(1)The head of each national security laboratory.

(2)The Commander of the United States Strategic Command.

(c)In support of the assessments required by subsection (a), the Administrator may establish teams, known as “dual validation teams”, to provide each national security laboratory responsible for weapons design with independent evaluations of the condition of each warhead for which such laboratory has lead responsibility. A dual validation team established by the Administrator shall—

(1)be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsibility for fielding the warhead being evaluated;

(2)have access to all surveillance and underground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations;

(3)use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and

(4)pursue independent experiments to support the independent evaluations.

(d)The head of each national security laboratory shall establish and use one or more teams of experts, known as “red teams”, to assist in the assessments required by subsection (a). Each such team shall include experts from both of the other national security laboratories. Each such team for a national security laboratory shall—

(1)review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c);

(2)subject such matters to challenge; and

(3)submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory.

(e)Not later than December 1 of each year, each official specified in subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary concerned, and to the Nuclear Weapons Council, a report on the assessments that such official was required by subsection (a) to complete. The report shall include the following:

(1)The results of each such assessment.

(2)(A)Such official’s determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so—

(i)an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and

(ii)a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues.

(B)An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests.

(C)Such official’s determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so.

(3)In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory—

(A)a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods, including with respect to cyber assurance, being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments;

(B)a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 2532 of this title to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments, and the confidence of the head in such tools and methods;

(C)a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations;

(D)a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); and

(E)a concise summary of any significant finding investigations initiated or active during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial responsibility.

(4)In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command—

(A)a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types;

(B)a summary of all major assembly releases in place as of the date of the report for the active and inactive nuclear weapon stockpiles; and

(C)the views of the Commander on the stockpile responsiveness program under section 2538b of this title, the activities conducted under such program, and any suggestions to improve such program.

(5)An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments.

(f)(1)Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the President—

(A)each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (e) during the preceding year;

(B)any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report;

(C)the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and

(D)any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate.

(2)Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate.

(3)If the President does not forward to Congress the matters required under paragraph (2) by the date required by such paragraph, the officials specified in subsection (b) shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than March 30 on the report such officials submitted to the Secretary concerned under subsection (e).

(g)Each submittal under subsection (f) shall be in classified form only, with the classification level required for each portion of such submittal marked appropriately.

(h)In this section, the term “Secretary concerned” means—

(1)the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and

(2)the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Editorial Notes

Codification Section was formerly classified to section 7274s of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to renumbering by Pub. L. 108–136.

Amendments

2021—Subsec. (e)(3)(A). Pub. L. 117–81, § 3133(1), inserted “, including with respect to cyber assurance,” after “methods”. Subsec. (e)(3)(B). Pub. L. 117–81, § 3133(2), inserted “, and the confidence of the head in such tools and methods” after “the assessments”. 2015—Subsec. (e)(4)(C). Pub. L. 114–92 added subpar. (C). 2014—Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 113–291 substituted “Commander” for “commander”. 2013—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(c)(3)(A), struck out “for Nuclear Security” before “may establish teams,” in introductory provisions. Subsec. (e)(3)(E). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3122(a)(1), added subpar. (E). Subsec. (e)(4). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3122(a)(2), amended par. (4) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (4) read as follows: “In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types.” Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3122(b)(1), substituted “February 1” for “March 1” in introductory provisions. Subsec. (f)(3). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3122(b)(2), added par. (3). Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(c)(3)(B), in heading, substituted “Definition” for “Definitions” and, in text, substituted “section, the term” for “section:”, struck out par. (1) which defined “national security laboratory”, struck out par. (2) designation and “The term” before “ ‘Secretary concerned’ ”, redesignated subpars. (A) and (B) of former par. (2) as pars. (1) and (2), respectively, and realigned margins. Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 112–239 struck out subsec. (i) which related to first submissions under subsecs. (e) and (f). 2009—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(a)(2)(B), added subsec. (c). Former subsec. (c) redesignated (d). Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(a)(2)(A), redesignated subsec. (c) as (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e). Subsec. (d)(1). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(b), inserted “both” after “review” and “and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c)” after “that laboratory”. Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(a)(2)(A), redesignated subsec. (d) as (e). Former subsec. (e) redesignated (f). Subsec. (e)(3)(C). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(d)(1), substituted “subsection (d)” for “subsection (c)”. Subsec. (e)(3)(D). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(c), added subpar. (D). Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(a)(2)(A), redesignated subsec. (e) as (f). Former subsec. (f) redesignated (g). Subsec. (f)(1)(A). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(d)(2), substituted “subsection (e)” for “subsection (d)”. Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(d)(3), substituted “subsection (f)” for “subsection (e)”. Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(a)(2)(A), redesignated subsec. (f) as (g). Former subsec. (g) redesignated (h). Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(a)(2)(A), redesignated subsec. (g) as (h). Former subsec. (h) redesignated (i). Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(a)(2)(A), redesignated subsec. (h) as (i). Subsec. (i)(1). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(d)(4)(A), substituted “subsection (e)” for “subsection (d)”. Subsec. (i)(2). Pub. L. 111–84, § 3114(d)(4)(B), substituted “subsection (f)” for “subsection (e)”. 2003—Subsec. (d)(3)(B). Pub. L. 108–136, § 3141(e)(6)(D), substituted “section 2532 of this title” for “section 3137 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (42 U.S.C. 2121 note)”.

§2525 Annual Assessments and Reports to the President and Congress Regarding the Condition of the United States Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

Summary

Title 50, §2525

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Editorial Notes

Amendments

Citations & Metadata