50 U.S.C. § 3334e–1: Ensuring intelligence…

Summary

The Director of National Intelligence must, no later than 90 days after December 18, 2025, create a policy to stop parts of the intelligence community from buying products made with synthetic DNA or RNA from Chinese biotechnology firms or from U.S. suppliers controlled by China if the Director says they pose a security or supply-chain risk. Such products can only be bought if the final assembly and all major processing happen in the United States, and almost all parts or ingredients are made and sourced in the United States or an allied country. The Director may set up a waiver process so agency heads can allow exceptions if they meet the Director’s conditions. Definitions (one line each): Biotechnology—use of living systems for manufacturing or research; Chinese biotechnology supplier—a supplier under the laws or control of the People’s Republic of China; Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediary—a U.S. supplier controlled by the People’s Republic of China; Synthetic DNA or RNA—nucleic acid sequences made brand new by chemical or enzymatic synthesis.

Title 50, §3334e–1

War and National Defense, Source: USLM XML via OLRC

(a)In general

Not later than 90 days after December 18, 2025, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a policy to ensure that elements of the intelligence community that procure products made using synthetic DNA or RNA from domestic sources do not contract with Chinese biotechnology suppliers or Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediaries that are determined by the Director to pose a security or supply chain threat to the United States.

(b)Elements

The policy required by subsection (a) shall provide that an element of the intelligence community may not—

(1)procure or obtain any product made using synthetic DNA or RNA unless—

(A)the final assembly or processing of the product occurs in the United States;

(B)all significant processing of the product occurs in the United States; and

(C)all or nearly all ingredients or components of the product are made and sourced in the United States or an allied nation; or

(2)contract with any Chinese biotechnology supplier or Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediary that is determined by the Director to pose a security or supply chain threat to the United States.

(c)Waiver

As part of the policy required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence may establish a waiver process for the heads of the elements of the intelligence community under which the head of the relevant element may waive the prohibition under subsection (b). A waiver may be made under the process only if the head of the relevant element complies with any conditions the Director may establish for the waiver process.

(d)Definitions

In this section: (1) Biotechnology

(2)Chinese biotechnology supplier

The term “Chinese biotechnology supplier” means a supplier of biotechnology that is organized under the laws of, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, the People’s Republic of China.

(3)Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediary

The term “Chinese biotechnology supply chain intermediary” means a United States domestic supplier of biotechnology where a controlling interest in the United States domestic supplier is owned by the People’s Republic of China.

(4)Synthetic DNA or RNA

The term “synthetic DNA or RNA” means any nucleic acid sequence that is produced de novo through chemical or enzymatic synthesis.

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Definitions For definition of “intelligence community” as used in this section, see section 6002 of Pub. L. 119–60, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title.

§3334e–1 Ensuring Intelligence Community Procurement of Domestic United States Production of Synthetic Dna and Rna

Summary

Title 50, §3334e–1

Notes & Related Subsidiaries

Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries

Citations & Metadata