Arms Export Control Act (AECA) & ITAR

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is the primary federal law governing the export of defense articles, defense services, and related technical data from the United States. The AECA authorizes the President to control arms exports and imports, establishes the U.S. Munitions List of controlled items, creates the framework for Foreign Military Sales (government-to-government) and Direct Commercial Sales (company-to-foreign-buyer), and requires congressional notification of major arms transfers. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), promulgated under the AECA, are the detailed regulatory framework that defense companies must comply with.

Current Law (2026)

Legal Authority

• 22 U.S.C. § 2751 — Policy and controls (arms sales should strengthen U.S. security and promote world peace; the President controls imports and exports of defense articles and services)
• 22 U.S.C. § 2753 — Eligibility for defense articles (countries may receive defense articles only through FMS, DCS, or other authorized channels; end-use restrictions and retransfer controls apply)
• 22 U.S.C. § 2761 — Sales from stocks (the President may sell defense articles from DOD stocks to eligible foreign governments; requires fair pricing including nonrecurring costs)
• 22 U.S.C. § 2776 — Reports and certifications to Congress (major sales require advance congressional notification; Congress has 30 days to block sales by joint resolution)
• 22 U.S.C. § 2778 — Control of arms exports and imports (the President designates defense articles and services on the U.S. Munitions List; the Secretary of State promulgates ITAR regulations; licenses required for export of USML items)
• 22 U.S.C. § 2780 — Transactions with terrorism-supporting countries (prohibits all defense sales, exports, and related transactions with countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism)

How It Works

The AECA establishes two channels for arms transfers. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are government-to-government transactions: a foreign government requests defense articles or services, the U.S. government procures them (often from U.S. defense contractors), and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency manages the sale. FMS provides the foreign buyer with U.S. government quality assurance and support, and gives the U.S. government direct control over the transaction — see Foreign Military Sales Program for the operational mechanics. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) allow U.S. companies to sell directly to foreign buyers with a license from the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).

The U.S. Munitions List (USML) is the controlled items list — 21 categories covering everything from firearms and ammunition to aircraft, spacecraft, military electronics, and classified defense services. If an item is on the USML, exporting it (or providing related technical data or defense services to foreign persons) requires a license from DDTC under ITAR. The distinction between USML-controlled items and Commerce Control List (CCL) items under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) is a fundamental jurisdictional question in export compliance.

ITAR (22 CFR Parts 120-130) is the regulatory framework implementing the AECA. ITAR requires U.S. persons (companies and individuals) to register with DDTC if they manufacture or export defense articles, obtain licenses before exporting USML items, control access to ITAR-controlled technical data (including restricting access by foreign nationals in the U.S. — the "deemed export" rule), and maintain records and submit reports. ITAR compliance is a significant operational requirement for defense companies.

Congressional oversight is built into major arms sales. The executive branch must formally notify Congress before executing FMS agreements above threshold amounts. For major defense equipment (MDE), the thresholds are $25 million (NATO/Australia/Japan/New Zealand and certain major allies) and $14 million (other recipients); for defense articles or services, $100 million (NATO/major allies) and $50 million (others); for design and construction services, $300 million (NATO/major allies) and $200 million (others). Congress has 15 days (NATO/major allies) or 30 days (other recipients) to review and potentially block the sale through a joint resolution. While Congress rarely blocks sales outright, the notification process creates political accountability and sometimes leads to modifications.

The terrorism prohibition (§ 2780) is absolute: no defense articles, services, or related financing may be provided to countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. This provision interacts with broader sanctions law and country-specific programs like the Iran sanctions regime and the broader architecture of federal sanctions programs. The Defense Production Act supplies complementary authorities for ensuring the defense industrial base can meet FMS commitments.

How It Affects You

If you're a defense contractor, manufacturer, or exporter of defense articles: ITAR compliance is not optional and the consequences of violations are severe — civil penalties up to approximately $1.3 million per violation (inflation-adjusted) and criminal penalties up to $1 million and 20 years per violation under 22 U.S.C. § 2778. Your obligations begin with DDTC registration (required for any manufacturer or exporter of USML items, with a Tier 1 annual fee of $3,000 effective Jan. 9, 2025 — up from $2,250; higher tiers apply based on prior-year license volume), followed by export licenses or applicable exemptions for each transfer. A Technology Control Plan (TCP) is typically required if foreign nationals have access to ITAR-controlled technical data at your facilities — the "deemed export" rule treats disclosing controlled technology to a foreign national in the U.S. as an export to their home country. For HR and hiring: you must verify the citizenship/immigration status of employees who will access ITAR-controlled data and limit access to "U.S. persons" (citizens, LPRs, asylees) or obtain a license. Voluntary Self-Disclosures (VSDs) to DDTC for discovered violations can significantly mitigate penalties — prompt reporting and remediation are essential elements of a compliance program.

If you're an aerospace, satellite, cybersecurity, or dual-use technology company: You may be subject to ITAR even if you don't think of yourself as a "defense company." The United States Munitions List (USML) covers not just traditional weapons but also spacecraft and satellites (Category XV), military electronics (Category XI), and certain night-vision, cryptographic, and directed-energy technologies. Since the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and the resulting movement of many items from the USML to the Commerce Control List (EAR/CCL), the boundary between ITAR and EAR has shifted — many formerly ITAR-controlled items now fall under Commerce's less restrictive EAR framework. Conduct a commodity jurisdiction determination (CJ request to DDTC) if you're uncertain which regime applies to a specific item or technology. Getting it wrong in either direction creates compliance risk: over-controlling under ITAR adds unnecessary cost; under-controlling creates liability.

If you're a university researcher, lab director, or research compliance officer: ITAR's "deemed export" rule and the fundamental research exclusion exist in tension. Research that is "fundamental" — published or intended to be published, not subject to access or publication controls — is generally excluded from ITAR's technical data controls under 22 C.F.R. § 120.34. But if your research involves controlled hardware, is subject to sponsor-imposed publication restrictions, or involves collaboration with foreign nationals on USML-adjacent technologies, the exclusion may not protect you. Work with your institution's export compliance office before beginning projects involving USML-adjacent areas (satellites, directed energy, cryptography, certain sensors), assess whether foreign national co-investigators trigger deemed export concerns, and document your compliance analysis. DOD-sponsored research with foreign national involvement is the highest-risk area — ITAR violations in research contexts have resulted in multi-million-dollar settlements.

If you're a member of Congress or congressional staffer working on foreign affairs or defense: The AECA gives Congress the ability to block proposed arms sales through joint resolutions of disapproval (22 U.S.C. § 2776) — a role that has become more actively used in recent years, particularly for sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states amid concerns about civilian casualties. Major defense equipment sales (over $14 million for most countries, or $25 million for NATO/major allies), defense articles/services sales (over $50M / $100M), and design and construction services (over $200M / $300M) trigger mandatory Congressional notification, giving committees 30 days (15 for NATO/major allies) to review before the sale proceeds. While a joint resolution of disapproval requires overriding a presidential veto, the notification process creates political space to negotiate conditions, press for human rights assurances, or impose end-use monitoring requirements. Congressional holds on foreign military sales — informal holds placed by individual senators or committees — have become a significant tool for attaching conditions to arms sales without formal disapproval votes.

State Variations

Arms export control is exclusively federal law under the AECA. States have no role in regulating defense exports, though state-level economic development agencies may assist defense companies with compliance resources.

Implementing Regulations

• 22 CFR Part 120 — International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Purpose and Definitions (defines "defense article," "defense service," "technical data," "U.S. person," "foreign person"; jurisdiction over defense articles; 54 sections — the foundational ITAR definitions)

• 22 CFR Part 121 — The United States Munitions List. Key provisions:

  • § 121.0 — Definitions: the "Commerce Control List" (CCL) under EAR is distinct from the USML; items on the USML require DDTC licenses, not BIS licenses; asterisked items and items marked "(MT)" (Missile Technology) have additional multilateral control obligations
  • § 121.1 — The 21 USML categories: Cat. I — Firearms and related (fully automatic firearms, caseless ammunition firearms, precision-guided firearms); Cat. II — Artillery and projectiles (guns >0.50 caliber, grenades, propellants); Cat. III — Ammunition and ordnance; Cat. IV — Launch vehicles, guided missiles, ballistic missiles, rockets, torpedoes, bombs, and mines; Cat. V — Explosives and energetic materials, propellants, incendiary agents; Cat. VI — Vessels of war and special naval equipment; Cat. VII — Tanks and military vehicles; Cat. VIII — Aircraft and related articles (military aircraft, UAVs, aircraft engines); Cat. IX — Military training equipment (flight simulators, military training device components); Cat. X — Personal protective equipment (military helmets, body armor, NBC protective suits); Cat. XI — Military electronics (electronic warfare, satellite ground control, military fire control systems); Cat. XII — Fire control, laser, imaging, and guidance equipment; Cat. XIII — Materials and miscellaneous articles (classified military technical manuals, military cryptographic equipment, military nuclear materials); Cat. XIV — Toxicological agents, including chemical agents, biological agents (incl. select agents and toxins); Cat. XV — Spacecraft systems and related articles (satellites, spacecraft components with specific military capabilities); Cat. XVI — Nuclear weapons, special nuclear material and associated equipment; Cat. XVII — Classified articles, technical data and defense services; Cat. XVIII — Directed energy weapons; Cat. XIX — Gas turbine engines and associated equipment (military jet and turboprop engines); Cat. XX — Submersible vessels and related articles; Cat. XXI — Miscellaneous articles (catch-all for articles that provide equivalent military capability to USML-controlled items and are designated by DDTC)

  The USML categories were substantially revised through Export Control Reform between 2012 and 2020 — many items moved from the USML to the Commerce Control List under the EAR, reflecting the judgment that items commercially available globally need only BIS regulation. Items that moved from the USML to the CCL are designated with the "600 series" ECCN numbers (e.g., 0A606 for military vehicles not on the USML). Items that stayed on the USML are the most militarily significant — those with genuine national security sensitivity where unilateral U.S. control (rather than multilateral BIS/EAR control) is warranted. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) imposes additional obligations on "(MT)" items, including presumption of denial for export to countries of concern.

• 22 CFR Part 122 — Registration of Manufacturers and Exporters: the ITAR's mandatory registration regime — a prerequisite to any lawful export of defense articles or provision of defense services. No license application can be approved for an unregistered person. Key provisions:

  • § 122.1 — Who must register: any person who engages in the United States in the business of manufacturing defense articles (even if no export is currently contemplated), exporting defense articles, temporarily importing defense articles, or furnishing defense services, must register with DDTC; "in the business of" means engaging in these activities as a regular course of business — casual or incidental activities may be exempt; U.S. government agencies are exempt; foreign governments and their agencies are exempt; the requirement applies to U.S. persons regardless of whether any actual export has occurred — manufacturing USML-controlled items triggers registration
  • § 122.2 — Registration procedure and renewal: registrants submit Form DS-2032 (Statement of Registration) to DDTC's Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance; registration must be renewed annually; a lapsed registration is a violation — a person who allows their registration to expire while still manufacturing or exporting is noncompliant even if no export occurs during the lapse period; a new registrant must receive DDTC confirmation before commencing activities
  • § 122.3 — Registration fees: DDTC charges tiered registration fees based on the number of licenses filed in the prior year (Tier 1 through Tier 4+); fees range from a few hundred to several thousand dollars annually; companies that manufacture but do not export may qualify for a lower-tier fee based on anticipated activity; the fee schedule is published on the DDTC website (pmddtc.state.gov)
  • § 122.4 — Change notification: a registrant must notify DDTC in writing, signed by a senior officer, within five business days of: any change in ownership, control, or corporate structure (including merger, acquisition, or change of key officers); addition or deletion of business activities covered by registration; significant change in export activities; this 5-day notification requirement is stricter than most corporate-change reporting obligations and is a frequent source of inadvertent ITAR violations during M&A transactions
  • § 122.5 — Recordkeeping: registrants must maintain records of all defense article manufacturing, acquisition, disposition, and export — including copies of all license applications, licenses, exemption documentation, and shipping records — for 5 years from the date of the export or the expiration of the license; records must be available for inspection by DDTC, Customs, and other authorized agencies; failure to maintain adequate records is an independent ITAR violation separate from any substantive export violation

  Registration is the foundation of DDTC's jurisdiction over defense exporters. A company that is not registered cannot receive an export license and cannot legally use ITAR exemptions (which typically require the exporter to be registered). DDTC actively audits registrant compliance, and registration records enable DDTC to conduct industry-wide surveys and catch companies manufacturing USML items without registration. The 5-day change notification in § 122.4 is particularly trap-prone in private equity and M&A contexts — acquirers who fail to notify DDTC of a change in control of a registered defense contractor may face voluntary disclosure obligations and civil penalties. Recent rulemakings: ITAR registration fees are updated periodically through Federal Register notices; 85 FR 4192 (2020) — most recent fee update.

• 22 CFR Part 123 — Licenses for the Export and Temporary Import of Defense Articles: the operational ITAR rules governing when licenses are required, what types of licenses are available, and what conditions and assurances must accompany defense article exports. Key provisions:

  • § 123.1 — License requirement: any U.S. person who intends to export or temporarily import a defense article must obtain DDTC approval before doing so, unless a specific ITAR exemption applies; unlicensed exports of USML items are criminal violations; the requirement applies to physical exports, shipments, hand-carries, and temporary imports for exhibitions or test programs
  • § 123.4 — License types: the primary ITAR licenses are: (a) DSP-5 — Permanent Export License, authorizing one or more shipments of defense articles to a specific foreign end-user(s); (b) DSP-73 — Temporary Export License, for defense articles exported temporarily (demonstrations, repairs, trade shows) that will return to the U.S.; (c) DSP-61 — Temporary Import License for foreign defense articles brought into the U.S. temporarily; licenses are item-specific, quantity-specific, and end-user-specific
  • § 123.10 — Nontransfer and use assurances (Form DSP-83): for exports of significant military equipment (items on the USML designated as SME, including combat aircraft, warships, missiles, and armored vehicles) and for classified defense articles, the foreign government or end-user must sign a DSP-83 nontransfer and use certificate stating that the item will not be retransferred to a third country or used other than for the stated purpose without prior U.S. government approval; this "end-use assurance" is the foundational control mechanism for preventing onward proliferation
  • § 123.14 — Import certificate/delivery verification: for many transactions, the importing country provides an import certificate confirming the item will enter their territory; after delivery, a delivery verification document confirms receipt; this IC/DV process is standard for major defense article transfers to allied governments
  • § 123.15 — Congressional notification (Section 36(c) of AECA): before DDTC can approve certain large DCS transactions, it must submit a certification to Congress; congressional review triggers apply at specific dollar thresholds — for major defense equipment, $14 million to most recipients or $25 million to NATO/Australia/Japan/New Zealand/major allies; for defense articles or services, $50 million (most recipients) or $100 million (NATO/major allies); for design and construction services, $200 million / $300 million; no threshold for proscribed destinations; Congress has 15 days (NATO/major allies) or 30 days (other recipients) to block the transaction by joint resolution; the notification process reflects congressional oversight authority over major arms sales — one of the few legislative controls on executive branch arms export decisions
  • § 123.16 — General exemptions: specific exports don't require a license, including: personal protective gear for individual use (§ 123.17); shipments between U.S. territories; Canadian/Mexican border transits through the U.S.; and certain government-to-government transactions covered by other programs; these exemptions are narrow and should be applied only after confirming the specific statutory and regulatory requirements — an incorrect exemption claim creates the same criminal exposure as an unlicensed export

  Part 123 is where the ITAR obligation becomes concrete for exporters. The DSP-5 license is the workhorse — an application to DDTC at dtrade.state.gov, specifying the USML category and sub-paragraph, the quantity, the value, the foreign end-user, and the ultimate destination country; supporting documents including an end-user statement and import certificate from the foreign government are typically required. DDTC review times average 30–90 days for routine DCS licenses and longer for SME or classified exports. For companies with frequent, predictable exports to the same allies, Technical Assistance Agreements (TAAs) and Manufacturing License Agreements (MLAs) — authorized under 22 CFR Part 124 rather than Part 123 — are the preferred mechanism, providing multi-year authorization for ongoing defense cooperation rather than transaction-by-transaction licensing.

• 22 CFR Part 124 — Agreements, off-shore procurement, and other defense services (§§ 124.2, 124.11, 124.15 — training exemptions, congressional certification under AECA §36(d), space systems controls)

• 22 CFR Part 125 — Licenses for the Export of Technical Data and Classified Defense Articles: the ITAR's specific controls on the export of defense-related knowledge — technical data, software, and classified defense articles — distinct from the physical hardware controls in Part 123. Technical data exports are among the most legally complex ITAR compliance areas because the "export" can occur without any physical shipment. Key provisions:

  • § 125.1 — What is covered: Part 125 controls apply to the export of technical data (information required for design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance, or modification of defense articles, including blueprints, drawings, photographs, software, and technical specifications) and classified defense articles; information that is in the public domain (§ 120.34 of ITAR) is not subject to Part 125 controls — the public domain exemption is the key boundary between controlled technical data and freely shareable information; information that appears in publicly available textbooks, open-source code repositories, or is releasable under export license exemptions is generally not controlled
  • § 125.2 — Licenses for unclassified technical data: a DSP-5 license is required to export unclassified technical data unless an ITAR exemption applies; for plant visits (where foreign nationals visit a U.S. facility for business discussions), the proposed discussion topics must be described and approved; the license applies to the transmission of data by any means — electronic transfer, email, oral disclosure, visual display — to a foreign person; this means technical discussions with foreign engineers (even in the U.S. if they are foreign persons) may require a license or fall under a "deemed export" analysis under EAR (which controls less sensitive dual-use technology)
  • § 125.3 — Classified technical data and classified defense articles: export of classified technical data requires authorization from DDTC and compliance with the security classification procedures of the originating agency; classified visits and classified transmissions must be handled through the Defense Security Service (now DCSA) and the agency that classified the information; the classification level (Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) determines the handling requirements
  • § 125.4 — General exemptions: specific exemptions from the technical data license requirement include: (1) data in the public domain; (2) data released by the U.S. government to a foreign government under a government-to-government agreement; (3) data exchanged between U.S. government agencies; (4) data exported to U.S. government employees abroad for official use; (5) data approved for unlimited distribution by the agency that classified or controlled it; note that exemptions do not apply to exports to the ITAR's "proscribed countries" (26 CFR 126.1 countries — arms embargo destinations) regardless of the nature of the data
  • § 125.5 — Plant visit exemption: a license is not required for oral and visual disclosure of unclassified technical data during a classified plant visit that has itself been properly authorized — the classified visit authorization covers the technical discussions; unclassified plant visits with foreign nationals discussing controlled technical data may still require separate authorization

  Technical data controls under Part 125 are where the "deemed export" concept becomes critical. A U.S. company that hires a foreign engineer and shares controlled technical data with that person in the U.S. has "exported" the data to the foreign national's country of citizenship — and may need an export license for that disclosure. The public domain exemption in § 125.1 is frequently litigated: data published on a company's website, in academic papers, or in open-source software may or may not qualify depending on whether it was specifically authorized for public release. DDTC has issued commodity jurisdiction determinations and advisory opinions on specific technical data questions. Recent rulemakings: ongoing USML reform (Export Control Reform Act of 2018 — 83 FR 24166) has progressively moved less sensitive defense technology to the Commerce Department's EAR/CCL, narrowing Part 125's scope.

• 22 CFR Part 126 — General Policies and Provisions (14 sections — the ITAR's policy tier governing which countries are categorically ineligible for arms exports, what blanket exemptions exist for trusted allies, and the procedures governing DDTC's discretionary authority; authority: 22 U.S.C. § 287c, 22 U.S.C. § 2778):

  • § 126.1 — Prohibited exports, imports, and sales to proscribed countries: the foundational embargo list — exports to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria are prohibited regardless of the nature of the defense article or service; countries under U.N. Security Council arms embargoes are also included; Belarus was added following the forced diversion of a Ryanair flight in 2021; Russia and China are subject to comprehensive restrictions reflecting defense and security concerns; exports that could contribute to destabilizing military buildups are also subject to case-by-case denial policy; the § 126.1 list is the first question in any ITAR compliance analysis
  • § 126.2 — Temporary suspension or modification: the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls may order temporary suspension or modification of any ITAR provision in emergency national security situations; this authority has been used to impose temporary embargoes and to rapidly grant emergency exemptions in crisis situations (e.g., wartime ally support)
  • § 126.3 — Exceptions for unusual cases: the Deputy Assistant Secretary may grant exceptions to ITAR requirements when refusal would create "exceptional or undue hardship" or when it is otherwise in U.S. government interests; exceptions are discretionary, narrow, and not precedential
  • § 126.4 — Transfers by or for the U.S. government: a license is not required for exports, reexports, or retransfers of defense articles by or for a U.S. government agency; this exemption covers Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transfers from DOD to foreign governments, law enforcement agency-to-agency transfers, and direct U.S. military use abroad; it does not exempt contractors implementing government contracts in overseas locations — those require standard export licenses unless specifically authorized under FMS documentation
  • § 126.5 — Canadian exemptions: a separate, broad bilateral exemption for most defense trade between the U.S. and Canada — licenses are generally not required for exports of defense articles (other than classified items and certain sensitive categories) to Canada, reflecting the integrated defense industrial base under NORAD and NATO; Canada commits to equivalent re-export controls, preventing § 126.5 from becoming a backdoor to third countries
  • § 126.14 — Special comprehensive export authorizations for NATO, Australia, Japan, and Sweden: eligible companies in NATO countries, Australia, Japan, and Sweden may apply for a Blanket Order License or similar umbrella authorization covering multiple export transactions; these authorizations reflect the deepened defense cooperation and intelligence-sharing relationships with those allies and reduce the transaction-by-transaction licensing burden for routine defense trade with the most trusted partners
  • § 126.15 — Expedited processing for Australia, UK, and Canada: license applications for defense articles and services to Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada receive expedited processing; DDTC aims to complete reviews within 15 days of receiving a complete application; this provision reflects the AUKUS and Five Eyes alliance relationships
  • §§ 126.16–126.17 — Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties (Australia and UK): treaty-level exemptions from individual licensing requirements for defense trade between the U.S. and Australia (§ 126.16) and the U.S. and the United Kingdom (§ 126.17); qualifying defense articles and services can be exported, transferred, and retransferred between treaty partners and authorized users without individual licenses; authorized users must be vetted and listed in a government-to-government registry; the AUKUS enhanced defense cooperation framework builds on these treaties
  • § 126.18 — Dual national and third-country national transfers: employers may transfer defense articles and technical data to dual nationals and third-country national employees without individual licenses, provided the employer conducts a risk assessment, implements access controls, and maintains records; this provision addresses the compliance challenge of multinational workforces in defense companies — a British engineer holding dual Canadian-UK citizenship working for a U.S. defense contractor is covered by § 126.18 procedures

  Part 126 is where the ITAR's policy choices are concentrated — the embargo list, the ally exemptions, and the discretionary relief mechanisms. The § 126.1 proscribed country list interacts with all other ITAR provisions: no exemption, license, or approval can authorize exports to a § 126.1 country (the comprehensive prohibition overrides any other provision). Conversely, the § 126.14–126.17 ally frameworks create a stratified system of partner privilege — some allies (Australia, UK, Canada) receive very broad license-free access; others (NATO members generally) receive broad access; and all others require transaction-specific licenses. Recent rulemakings: ongoing USML reform under ECRA (2018) has progressively refined the proscribed country determination criteria; § 126.1 was amended to reflect Russia's changed status following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

• 22 CFR Part 130 — Political contributions, fees, and commissions (§ 130.4 — defense articles and services reporting)

Pending Legislation

• HR 6302 — Would create a whistleblower award program for defense export control violations, offering 10–30% awards to individuals who report AECA and ITAR breaches. Status: Introduced.
• HR 4502 (Rep. Lieu, D-CA) — Would establish a State Department program to track the end-use of U.S.-exported weapons and flag instances of civilian harm. Status: Introduced.
• HR 4413 (Rep. Kuster, D-NH) — Would authorize defense exports to the Republic of Cyprus subject to human-rights conditions. Status: Introduced.
• HR 3998 (Rep. McCaul, R-TX) — Would raise the congressional notification threshold for defense export licenses from $1 million to $4 million. Status: Introduced.

Recent Developments

Arms export controls have been a major focus of U.S.-China policy, with increasing restrictions on technology transfers and heightened CFIUS scrutiny of transactions involving Chinese companies. The State Department has continued efforts to modernize the USML, moving less sensitive items to the Commerce Control List while maintaining tight controls on critical military technologies. Ukraine-related arms transfers have significantly increased FMS and DCS volumes and accelerated congressional review processes. ITAR compliance enforcement has intensified, with major settlements for violations involving unauthorized exports and failure to report. The intersection of arms export controls with emerging technologies — artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, quantum computing — continues to challenge the regulatory framework.

• In February 2026, the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls submitted notifications to Congress of proposed commercial export licenses for defense articles, as required under the Arms Export Control Act.
• In February 2026, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency published arms sales notifications in the Federal Register, continuing the congressional notification process for proposed foreign military sales.
• In February 2026, President Trump established the America First Arms Transfer Strategy, directing the U.S. government to streamline and prioritize arms transfers to allies while ensuring American defense industrial base interests are protected — replacing the prior administration's Conventional Arms Transfer policy.