Article IV Privileges and Immunities — Interstate Equality and Out-of-State Citizens

The short version: When you cross state lines to work, practice your profession, or do business, you don't lose your constitutional rights. Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution — the Privileges and Immunities Clause — prohibits states from treating citizens of other states as second-class when it comes to earning a living. A state can charge out-of-state tourists more to hunt elk. It cannot charge out-of-state lawyers more to get a law license, or refuse to hire out-of-state workers on public construction projects, without a very good reason.

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 reads: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Also called the Comity Clause, it is one of the Constitution's original tools for holding the nation together economically. The Framers transplanted it almost verbatim from the Articles of Confederation, having seen what happened when states treated each other's citizens as foreigners. The clause's core distinction separates fundamental economic activities — pursuing a livelihood, practicing a profession, accessing courts — from local benefits and recreational resources. States cannot discriminate against nonresidents in the first category without substantial justification. In the second, they have considerable latitude.

The clause applies only to natural persons, not corporations. It is also distinct from the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, which addresses different rights and has a different (and much narrower) doctrine. The two are frequently confused — they are covered separately here and at Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Current Law (2026)

Legal Authority

• U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 — "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States" — the Privileges and Immunities Clause
• Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) — Justice Washington's circuit court opinion defining the privileges and immunities that the clause protects: fundamental rights including the right to travel, pursue a livelihood, and be protected by government; the foundational articulation of the clause's scope
• Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869) — Corporations are not "citizens" for purposes of Article IV, § 2; only natural persons may invoke the Privileges and Immunities Clause; still good law
• Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) — South Carolina's statute requiring nonresident commercial shrimp fishers to pay 100 times more than residents for licenses violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause; commercial fishing was a protected livelihood, and there was no substantial reason to discriminate based on residence
• Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) — Montana's substantially higher elk hunting license fees for nonresidents did not violate the clause; recreational elk hunting is not a fundamental economic activity — it is a luxury rather than a livelihood necessity; states may charge nonresidents more for access to recreational wildlife resources
• Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) — Alaska's "Alaska Hire" law requiring that Alaskans be preferred in hiring for oil and gas pipeline work violated the clause; the right to pursue a livelihood — employment — is a protected privilege and immunity; out-of-staters are not responsible for Alaska's unemployment problem in a way that would justify discrimination against them
• United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) — New Jersey's ordinance requiring 40% of workers on city-funded projects be Camden residents raised Privileges and Immunities concerns; the clause protects residents of other states, not just residents of other states than New Jersey; municipal residency preferences are subject to the same analysis as state residency preferences
• Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988) — Virginia's bar admission rule requiring full bar examination for out-of-state attorneys while allowing in-state attorneys to waive the examination violated the clause; admission to the bar is a fundamental economic activity

Key Mechanics

The Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause operates through a two-step doctrinal test applied by courts when a nonresident challenges state discrimination:

Step 1 — Is the activity a protected privilege or immunity? Courts ask whether the activity at issue is "fundamental" to national citizenship — typically economic livelihood (employment, commercial activity, professional practice), access to courts, or essential civil rights. Purely recreational or non-commercial activities (recreational hunting, sport fishing, access to local subsidies) generally fall outside the clause's protection. The seminal list is Justice Washington's Corfield v. Coryell (1823): travel, pursuit of livelihood, property ownership, court access, and fundamental rights.

Step 2 — Does the state have a substantial justification? Even when a protected activity is at stake, a state may discriminate if it can show: (1) a substantial reason for the differential treatment; and (2) that nonresidents are a "peculiar source" of the problem the state seeks to address — i.e., the discrimination is substantially related to the justification. Economic protectionism alone (favoring local workers or businesses) is never a sufficient justification.

Who can invoke the clause: Only natural persons who are citizens of a U.S. state. Corporations cannot invoke Article IV (Paul v. Virginia, 1869); they use the dormant Commerce Clause instead.

Municipal reach: The clause applies to municipal residency preferences as well as state-level ones. A city cannot require local residency for public-works employment if the state itself could not impose statewide residency (United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Camden, 1984).

Relationship to dormant Commerce Clause: For commercial discrimination, both Article IV and the dormant Commerce Clause often apply simultaneously. Individual plaintiffs use Article IV; corporations use the Commerce Clause. Both claims are frequently joined in the same litigation.

Origins: Justice Washington and Corfield v. Coryell

The Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause traces to the Articles of Confederation, which contained a similar provision: "the free inhabitants of each of these states … shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states." The Framers carried this principle into the Constitution to ensure national unity — citizens of the republic should be able to move freely among states and participate in the economic and civic life of each state without being treated as foreigners.

The foundational judicial elaboration of the clause's scope is Justice Bushrod Washington's circuit court opinion in Corfield v. Coryell (1823). Washington (George Washington's nephew) held that New Jersey could restrict nonresidents from harvesting oysters in state waters — but used the occasion to define the "privileges and immunities" the clause protects. These include: traveling through or sojourning in other states; accessing state courts; purchasing and holding real property; transacting business; taking, holding, and disposing of property; and generally enjoying "those privileges which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments."

Washington's list was not exhaustive, but it established the framework: the clause protects fundamental rights of national citizenship — the rights that make the national polity a coherent whole. It does not protect every preference or advantage that a state might offer its own residents.

The Two-Part Test: What Activities Are Protected?

Modern Privileges and Immunities Clause doctrine asks two questions:

First: Is the activity at issue a "privilege or immunity" — a fundamental right or economic opportunity that the clause protects? The clause is most clearly implicated when the state restricts out-of-staters from (1) pursuing a livelihood or engaging in commercial activity, (2) accessing state courts, or (3) exercising fundamental civil rights. It is least implicated for access to recreational resources, purely local benefits, and activities that are more luxury than necessity.

Toomer v. Witsell (1948) established that commercial fishing is a protected livelihood — a South Carolina law charging out-of-state commercial shrimpers 100 times the in-state license fee violated the clause. Hicklin v. Orbeck (1978) established that employment on public works projects is a protected livelihood — Alaska's preference for Alaska residents in pipeline jobs violated the clause. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman (1988) established that practice of a licensed profession is a protected livelihood — Virginia's bar examination waiver for in-state but not out-of-state attorneys violated the clause.

Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana (1978) established the non-protected category for recreational resources. Montana charged nonresidents $225 for an elk hunting license and residents $9 for the same license — a 25-to-1 ratio. The Supreme Court held this did not violate the clause because recreational elk hunting is not a fundamental economic activity. "The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not preclude discrimination against nonresidents where the activity discriminated against is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union." Elk hunting, unlike commercial fishing or employment, is a "recreation" and "sport" — not a basic right of national citizenship.

Second: Even if the activity is protected, does the state have a substantial justification for the discrimination that is substantially related to the discriminatory measure? States may treat nonresidents differently from residents if nonresidents are themselves a peculiar source of the problem the state is addressing, and if the discrimination is closely tailored to that relationship.

The justification requirement is a meaningful check: states cannot simply assert that residency preferences benefit local economies, since virtually any preference for local residents would have that justification. The state must show that nonresidents cause the specific problem being addressed in a way that residents do not.

Municipal Residency Preferences and Camden

United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden (1984) extended the clause's reach to municipal (not just state) residency requirements and clarified an important structural point. Camden, New Jersey — a financially distressed city — required that 40% of workers on city construction projects be Camden residents. Camden residents were also New Jersey residents, so the preference disadvantaged both nonresidents of New Jersey and residents of New Jersey who did not live in Camden.

The Supreme Court held that the clause applies to municipal preferences even though it refers to "citizens of each State." A state cannot do indirectly through its municipalities what it could not do directly — if New Jersey could not mandate state-resident preferences for public works jobs, Camden could not mandate Camden-resident preferences. The clause protects out-of-state citizens against any government-created preference that disfavors them, whether the preference is statewide or local.

The Court also held that municipal preferences discriminate against out-of-state citizens (not just other New Jerseyans), since a preference for Camden residents necessarily disfavors everyone who doesn't live in Camden, including citizens of other states. The clause was triggered; on remand, Camden would need to show a substantial justification for the preference that nonresidents could not satisfy.

Article IV vs. Fourteenth Amendment: Keeping Two Clauses Straight

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is frequently confused with the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Privileges or Immunities Clause). They are distinct in several important ways:

Article IV: Protects citizens of one state when they are in another state. The discrimination prohibited is discrimination between citizens of different states — an in-state/out-of-state distinction. A citizen of Georgia in South Carolina is protected against discrimination based on her Georgia citizenship.

Fourteenth Amendment: Protects "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" against state infringement. This clause addresses what rights belong to national citizenship — rights the states cannot abridge. After the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) severely limited the clause, it has been interpreted primarily to protect access to the federal government, peaceful assembly to petition Congress, and a narrow set of nationally specific rights.

Key differences: Article IV requires a comparison class — discrimination between in-state and out-of-state citizens. Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities do not require a comparison class; they protect against state action regardless of whether the state treats in-staters the same. Article IV applies only when a citizen is being discriminated against in a state other than their own; Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities apply to a citizen's home state as well.

The Corporations Gap and the Dormant Commerce Clause

Paul v. Virginia (1869) established that corporations are not "citizens" for purposes of Article IV — they cannot invoke the Privileges and Immunities Clause. This limitation channeled commercial discrimination claims by corporations to the dormant Commerce Clause, which does apply to corporations. The practical effect is that when a corporation complains about state discrimination against interstate commerce, the constitutional argument runs through the Commerce Clause rather than Article IV.

Individual practitioners — doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers — can invoke Article IV when states discriminate against their professional practice. Corporations employing those practitioners must rely on the dormant Commerce Clause instead. In many cases, both individual and corporate plaintiffs will bring both Article IV and dormant Commerce Clause claims, since the same discriminatory regulation may violate both.

How It Affects You

If you're a licensed professional seeking to practice across state lines (attorney, physician, contractor, engineer): This clause is your constitutional backstop. States cannot impose licensing requirements or exam hurdles that apply to out-of-state practitioners but not in-state ones without substantial justification. The landmark case is Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman (1988): Virginia offered a bar exam waiver for attorneys who had practiced in another state for 5+ years — but only if they moved to Virginia first. The Supreme Court struck it down. If a state offers expedited admission to its own licensees but puts you through the full gauntlet as an out-of-stater, you may have an Article IV claim. Check whether the state's own attorneys have a faster path to admission than you do — that asymmetry is the constitutional trigger.

If you're a tradesperson or construction worker bidding on public projects in another state: "Hire local" ordinances on government contracts are constitutionally suspect when they discriminate against out-of-state workers. Hicklin v. Orbeck (1978) voided Alaska's requirement that Alaskans get priority for pipeline jobs. Camden (1984) extended that to city-level preferences. If a public contract you're being passed over for requires local residency — and you're from out of state — that ordinance may violate Article IV. The threshold question is whether you were competing for work, not recreation: economic livelihood is protected, elk hunting licenses are not.

If you're a state or local government attorney drafting residency preferences: The doctrinal checklist is two steps — (1) is the activity being restricted economically fundamental (livelihood, profession, court access)? If yes, (2) are nonresidents themselves the source of the problem you're trying to solve, not just convenient targets for local economic favoritism? Pure "buy local" protectionism fails step 2 every time. Recreational licensing (hunting, fishing for sport) is your safer territory under Baldwin. Get constitutional counsel before any ordinance that conditions government contracts, professional licenses, or commercial permits on in-state or in-city residency.

If you're a constitutional litigator: An Article IV P&I claim needs three things: (1) your client is a citizen of one state being discriminated against in another state — the clause doesn't protect a state's own citizens against their own state; (2) the activity is a "privilege or immunity" — economic livelihood, profession, or court access, not recreation; and (3) the state's justification fails the substantial-reason-plus-peculiar-source test. Corporations can't bring this claim — they go to the dormant Commerce Clause. Individuals can bring both and often should, since the standards differ but frequently reach the same result.

State Variations

Article IV, Section 2 is a federal constitutional provision that constrains all states. State variations arise from how states structure their licensing and residency requirements:

Professional licensing: Many states have historically required residency or state-specific examination for professional licensing (law, medicine, engineering). Post-Friedman, discriminatory examination requirements are constitutionally suspect. The Interstate Medical Licensure Compact and the Uniform Bar Exam adoption by many states have addressed some of these issues through mutual recognition rather than constitutional compulsion.

Recreational vs. commercial fishing and hunting: States charge nonresidents significantly higher fees for recreational hunting and fishing licenses — clearly permissible under Baldwin. For commercial fishing, Toomer established the limit: substantial fee differentials for commercial operations in state waters require justification that nonresidents cause special burdens.

Government employment: Some states and localities have enacted "buy local" or "hire local" requirements for government contracts. These must satisfy Article IV scrutiny if they discriminate against out-of-state workers.

Tuition and public benefits: State university systems charging out-of-state tuition higher than in-state tuition does not violate the clause because access to subsidized education at a particular university is not a fundamental privilege covered by Article IV. Similarly, residency waiting periods for certain welfare benefits have been analyzed under the right-to-travel doctrine rather than Article IV.

Pending Legislation

No federal legislation directly addresses the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause framework — it is a self-executing constitutional provision. However:

• Interstate Compact legislation: Interstate compacts for professional license recognition (nursing, medical, legal) address one major practical problem the clause addresses — out-of-state professionals being required to re-examine and re-license when practicing across state lines. These compacts achieve by agreement what the clause requires by constitutional right in discriminatory licensing contexts.
• Local hiring requirements: "Buy American" and "hire local" provisions in federal infrastructure spending legislation have generated debate about whether federal encouragement of local hiring preferences conflicts with Article IV when applied to interstate workers; federal legislation requiring local hiring as a condition of federal grants raises separate constitutional questions.

Recent Developments

• 2019 — Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504: The Supreme Court struck down Tennessee's requirement that alcohol retailer license applicants live in-state for two years before applying. Decided under the dormant Commerce Clause and Twenty-First Amendment framework, but the underlying logic — that naked residency preferences protecting incumbents from out-of-state competition are constitutionally disfavored — directly parallels Article IV doctrine.
• 2022–2025 — Abortion travel restrictions: Idaho, Texas, and Missouri enacted statutes that either criminalized helping a resident travel to another state for abortion or allowed civil lawsuits against those who did. Federal district courts in multiple circuits have enjoined or partially struck down these laws on various constitutional grounds. Article IV — specifically, the right to seek medical services as a livelihood-adjacent activity in another state — is one of several constitutional theories being actively litigated. No Supreme Court ruling on the Article IV question as of May 2026.
• 2024–2025 — Interstate compact expansion: As of 2025, the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact covers 39 states and territories; the Nurse Licensure Compact covers 41 states; and 42 jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Bar Exam. These compacts have defused many Article IV tensions in professional licensing by creating voluntary mutual recognition — what the Constitution compels by right, these compacts achieve by agreement. States that remain outside compacts face elevated Article IV exposure for discriminatory licensing rules.
• 2025 — IIJA local hiring debates: Implementing rules for the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) infrastructure grants have raised recurring questions about whether federal "hire local" conditions on state grantees conflict with Article IV when applied to interstate workers. DOL has not issued formal guidance resolving this tension as of May 2026.