Federal money laundering law makes it a serious crime to move, conceal, or use the financial proceeds of crime — regardless of whether you committed the underlying crime yourself. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, simply conducting a financial transaction with money you know came from a felony, intending to promote the crime or hide the money's origin, carries up to 20 years in federal prison. The companion statute, § 1957, imposes criminal liability on anyone who engages in a financial transaction exceeding $10,000 in criminally derived funds — even without any intent to launder. Together with civil asset forfeiture and the Bank Secrecy Act reporting regime, these statutes give federal prosecutors enormous leverage over defendants in virtually every major criminal enterprise.
Current Law (2026)
| Statute | Key Prohibition | Maximum Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| 18 U.S.C. § 1956 | Laundering financial proceeds of specified unlawful activity (SUA) with concealment, promotion, or tax evasion intent | 20 years per count |
| 18 U.S.C. § 1957 | Financial transaction >$10,000 in criminally derived property | 10 years per count |
| 18 U.S.C. § 1960 | Operating an unlicensed money transmitting business | 5 years |
| Civil penalty (§ 1956) | Greater of the value of the funds or $10,000 | Per violation |
| Conspiracy | Same penalty as the substantive offense | 20 or 10 years |
| Statute of limitations | 5 years (general federal); 7 years for certain foreign bank violations | — |
Legal Authority
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18 U.S.C. § 1956 — Laundering of Monetary Instruments: The core money laundering statute. Prohibits conducting or attempting to conduct a financial transaction involving proceeds of "specified unlawful activity" (SUA) with four possible culpable intents: (1) to promote the SUA; (2) to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds; (3) to avoid a reporting requirement under federal or state law; or (4) to evade tax obligations (IRC §§ 7201, 7206). Also covers international transfers — bringing money into or out of the United States for these purposes. Courts may freeze assets worldwide, appoint receivers, and enter civil forfeiture orders.
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18 U.S.C. § 1957 — Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Criminally Derived Property: A lower-intent, higher-breadth statute. No concealment or promotion purpose is required — the government need only prove the defendant knowingly engaged in a financial transaction exceeding $10,000 using money derived from any SUA. Critically, the government does not have to prove the defendant knew which specific SUA generated the funds. The alternative fine can equal twice the value of the criminal property.
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18 U.S.C. § 1960 — Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses: Targets informal money transfer operations (hawala networks, unlicensed cryptocurrency exchanges, check cashing without state licensure). An "unlicensed money transmitting business" is any operation that (a) lacks required state licensing where state law makes unlicensed operation a misdemeanor or felony, (b) fails to register with FinCEN under 31 U.S.C. § 5330, or (c) knowingly handles funds from criminal activity or intended for criminal use.
What "Specified Unlawful Activity" Covers
The term "specified unlawful activity" (SUA) is defined in § 1956(c)(7) and cross-references § 1961(1) (the RICO predicate list). It covers an enormous range of crimes, including:
- Drug trafficking (any controlled substance felony)
- Federal fraud offenses — wire fraud, mail fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, healthcare fraud
- Murder, kidnapping, and violent crimes
- Robbery and extortion (see Hobbs Act)
- Bribery of public officials (see Federal Bribery and Public Corruption)
- Human trafficking and sexual exploitation
- Foreign corruption offenses (FCPA violations, certain foreign financial crimes)
- Terrorism (any federal terrorism offense)
- Environmental crimes (Clean Water Act, RCRA)
- Import-export crimes and sanctions violations
- Computer fraud
This breadth means that virtually any federal felony generating proceeds can become the predicate for a money laundering charge — turning every financial step after the underlying crime into an additional count.
The Concealment Theory vs. the Promotion Theory
Prosecutors use two main theories under § 1956:
Concealment laundering (§ 1956(a)(1)(B)): The defendant conducted a financial transaction knowing the funds were proceeds of SUA and intending to conceal the source, ownership, or control of those proceeds. Classic examples include depositing drug proceeds in a business account, purchasing real estate through shell companies, or wiring funds through layered offshore accounts. This theory requires the concealment intent — it is not enough that the transaction happened to move dirty money.
Promotion laundering (§ 1956(a)(1)(A)): The transaction was designed to promote the carrying on of the underlying SUA. Classic examples include using drug sale proceeds to purchase more drugs, using fraud proceeds to fund additional fraud operations, or paying co-conspirators. This theory captures the reinvestment loop at the heart of criminal enterprises.
Courts have held that the financial transaction must involve proceeds (not just the SUA assets themselves), requiring completion of at least one exchange before the laundering charge attaches.
Section 1957: The Low-Threshold Companion
Unlike § 1956, which requires specific intent to launder, § 1957 requires only that the defendant:
- Knowingly engaged in a monetary transaction
- In the United States (or as a U.S. person abroad)
- Of more than $10,000
- Using property derived from SUA
No concealment motive is needed. If a drug dealer buys a $25,000 car in cash, that is a § 1957 violation regardless of whether the dealer tried to hide the car's true source. The statute explicitly states the government does not need to prove the defendant knew the specific offense that generated the funds.
This makes § 1957 a powerful tool for enhancing charges in any case involving significant cash flows. A single drug distribution conspiracy generates hundreds of § 1957 violations every time proceeds are moved.
Asset Forfeiture and Freezing
Money laundering convictions trigger mandatory criminal forfeiture of the laundered property plus substitute assets. Courts can issue pre-trial restraining orders freezing any property traceable to the offense, including bank accounts, real estate, and vehicles. The government may appoint a federal receiver to locate and preserve assets worldwide.
The civil penalty provision allows the government to pursue civil money laundering actions — imposing fines up to the greater of the transaction value or $10,000 — without requiring a criminal conviction.
Unlicensed Money Transmitters (§ 1960)
Section 1960 targets informal value transfer systems. A money service business (MSB) must register with FinCEN and obtain applicable state licenses before operating. Hawala operations, cryptocurrency exchanges that move value without licensure, and informal remittance services that serve immigrant communities have all been prosecuted under § 1960.
The statute does not require knowledge that a license was needed — operating without a license when one is required triggers liability even if the operator believed the business was legal. However, the government must prove the defendant knew they were running a money transmitting business.
How It Affects You
If you receive cash or payments from someone whose finances are questionable: The § 1957 "spending" statute (not § 1956's concealment theory) is the practical risk for non-criminals. § 1957 requires only that you knowingly engaged in a monetary transaction over $10,000 using property derived from any specified unlawful activity — no concealment intent required. If someone pays you $15,000 cash for goods or services and you have reason to believe the funds came from criminal activity, accepting the payment can technically create exposure. "Knowingly" is the key word — the government must prove you had actual knowledge (or were willfully blind) about the funds' source. A genuine arms-length transaction where you had no red flags is not money laundering. But if you ignored obvious signs — a buyer insisting on cash for unusual amounts, claiming implausible business explanations — willful blindness won't protect you.
If you're an attorney, accountant, or financial professional: Receiving legal fees or professional payment from clients you know are using crime proceeds can constitute money laundering under § 1957. The statute has a narrow exception for "transactions necessary to preserve a person's right to representation" — but the exception covers only what is truly necessary for counsel, not general fee arrangements. In practice, the risk isn't from unknowing receipt of tainted fees; it's from situations where a professional continues a relationship with a client after they clearly know proceeds are criminal. The professional's due diligence obligations also include Bank Secrecy Act compliance (attorneys are partially exempt; accountants and financial professionals generally are not). If a client's financial activity triggers suspicion, consult your firm's compliance program before proceeding — the risk is both legal and reputational.
If you operate a cash-intensive business — car dealerships, jewelers, pawn shops, real estate, money services: Your BSA obligations intersect directly with money laundering exposure. You must file Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) for cash transactions over $10,000, and Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) when you suspect transactions involve proceeds of crime (threshold varies by institution type; generally $5,000 for money service businesses). Structuring transactions to avoid CTR filing — deliberately breaking them up under $10,000 — is itself a federal crime (31 U.S.C. § 5324). If a customer insists on cash, pays unusual amounts, provides inconsistent explanations, or behaves in ways inconsistent with normal business, document the red flags and evaluate whether a SAR is appropriate. Knowingly facilitating money laundering through your business — even if you didn't commit the underlying crime — can result in both criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture of your business assets.
If you operate a money service business or cryptocurrency exchange: Section 1960 targets informal value transfer without proper licensing. A money service business — defined broadly to include money transmitters, currency exchangers, and certain cryptocurrency exchanges — must register with FinCEN and obtain applicable state licenses. Operating without registration when registration is required is a federal crime, and the statute does not require knowledge that a license was needed. Before launching any service that moves value between people — even a small fintech app, crypto exchange, or peer-to-peer payment facilitator — get a legal opinion on MSB status and FinCEN registration requirements. Enforcement is real: hawala networks, unlicensed remittance services, and cryptocurrency businesses operating without licenses have all been prosecuted under § 1960.
Investigative Agencies
Investigation authority is shared across multiple agencies under an inter-agency agreement:
- FBI — primary investigator for financial institution money laundering, organized crime, and public corruption
- DEA — drug trafficking proceeds
- IRS Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI) — tax-motivated laundering, offshore evasion
- Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) — trafficking proceeds, trade-based laundering, bulk cash smuggling
- U.S. Postal Inspection Service — mail-based transactions
- FinCEN — regulatory enforcement, SAR analysis, unlicensed MSB coordination
Prosecutors are typically from DOJ's Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (MLARS) or U.S. Attorneys' offices.
State Variations
All states have money laundering statutes, but federal jurisdiction is nearly always available when any interstate transaction, wire transfer, or bank is involved — which covers almost every significant financial crime. Federal charges are typically preferred given their broader forfeiture authority and higher maximum penalties.
Pending Legislation
Anti-money laundering reform is an active area of policy. The Corporate Transparency Act's beneficial ownership reporting database (overseen by FinCEN) was subject to significant litigation and temporary injunctions in 2024-2025; FinCEN issued an interim rule temporarily exempting domestic entities while foreign entity reporting remained in place. Legislative proposals to codify or modify CTA's requirements continue in Congress.
Recent Developments
- 2020: Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (part of the National Defense Authorization Act) significantly updated the Bank Secrecy Act framework, adding new categories of SUA, whistleblower protections for AML reports, and enhanced FinCEN authorities
- 2024–2025: Corporate Transparency Act litigation — federal courts issued and then stayed injunctions against FinCEN's beneficial ownership registry, with domestic reporting requirements temporarily suspended
- Cryptocurrency enforcement: DOJ and FinCEN have pursued major actions against crypto exchanges operating without FinCEN registration (§ 1960), culminating in billion-dollar settlements with Binance (2023) and enforcement actions against other platforms
In December 2025, FinCEN announced a multi-tiered, data-driven border operation targeting more than 100 money services businesses (MSBs) operating along the U.S. southwest border, examining them for potential non-compliance with anti-money laundering regulations. The operation resulted in six notices of investigation, dozens of examination referrals to the IRS, and over 50 compliance outreach letters to MSBs. Treasury Secretary Bessent's push for technology modernization was cited as enabling the operation. FinCEN Press Release, Dec. 22, 2025
In October 2025, FinCEN issued a Financial Trend Analysis identifying approximately $9 billion in potential Iranian shadow banking activity flowing through U.S. correspondent accounts in 2024, based on Bank Secrecy Act filings from U.S. financial institutions. The analysis found that foreign shell companies accounted for roughly $5 billion of that activity, Iran-linked oil companies (primarily based in the UAE and Singapore) transacted approximately $4 billion, and entities potentially facilitating Iranian procurement of export-controlled technology engaged in around $413 million in transactions. FinCEN identified the UAE, Hong Kong, and Singapore as the most prominent nodes in these networks, which it said are used to evade sanctions, launder money, and fund Iran's military and regional proxies. The report was issued in support of the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign on Iran and is intended to help financial institutions identify and counter Iranian shadow banking threats. FinCEN Financial Trend Analysis, Oct. 23, 2025
In October 2025, FinCEN issued a final rule severing Cambodia-based Huione Group from the U.S. financial system under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, prohibiting covered U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for Huione Group and requiring them to take reasonable steps to block indirect access through foreign correspondent accounts. FinCEN identified Huione Group as a primary money laundering concern due to its role as a critical node for laundering proceeds of North Korean (DPRK) cyber heists and for transnational criminal organizations running virtual currency investment fraud schemes, commonly known as 'pig butchering' scams. The action finalized a proposed rulemaking FinCEN had issued in May 2025 and was coordinated with complementary sanctions actions by Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office. FinCEN Press Release, Oct. 14, 2025
In October 2025, FinCEN renewed its Geographic Targeting Orders (GTOs) requiring U.S. title insurance companies to identify the natural persons behind shell companies used in non-financed residential real estate purchases of $300,000 or more (with a lower $50,000 threshold for Baltimore) across covered counties in fourteen states and the District of Columbia. The renewed GTOs took effect October 10, 2025, and are set to expire February 28, 2026, at which point the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations for Residential Real Estate Transfers Rule (RRE Rule) — whose reporting requirements FinCEN postponed until March 1, 2026 — is expected to take over. The GTOs continue to cover the same jurisdictions as the prior issuance, with no changes to geographic scope or purchase price thresholds. FinCEN Press Release, Oct. 9, 2025
In October 2025, FinCEN — jointly with the Federal Reserve, FDIC, NCUA, and OCC — issued four Frequently Asked Questions clarifying Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) filing requirements, addressing structuring SARs, continuing activity reviews, and a financial institution's decision not to file a SAR. The guidance is intended to help financial institutions focus compliance resources on high-value reporting rather than generating low-value filings that burden the system without meaningfully aiding law enforcement. Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley stated that the FAQs reflect Treasury's broader effort to de-prioritize low-value AML activity and direct resources toward the most significant threats. FinCEN SAR FAQs, Oct. 9, 2025
In February 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced that it is accepting whistleblower tips related to fraud, money laundering, and sanctions violations. The program invites members of the public to submit information to Treasury about potential violations in these areas. Treasury Press Release, Feb. 13, 2026
In February 2026, FinCEN proposed a rule under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to sever Switzerland-based MBaer Merchant Bank AG from the U.S. financial system, identifying it as a primary money laundering concern. The proposed rule would prohibit covered U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for MBaer and require them to take reasonable steps to prevent indirect access through foreign correspondent accounts. The action follows the same Section 311 mechanism used in the October 2025 final rule against Cambodia's Huione Group. Treasury Press Release, Feb. 26, 2026
In March 2026, FinCEN assessed an $80 million civil money penalty against Canaccord Genuity LLC, a registered broker-dealer, for willful Bank Secrecy Act violations related to securities fraud. FinCEN found that Canaccord Genuity failed to maintain an adequate anti-money laundering program, including deficiencies in customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, and suspicious activity reporting. The action is described as a historic penalty in the broker-dealer sector and signals continued FinCEN enforcement focus on AML compliance failures at non-bank financial institutions. FinCEN Press Release, Mar. 6, 2026
In February 2026, FinCEN launched a dedicated whistleblower webpage through its Office of the Whistleblower to confidentially accept tips on fraud, money laundering, and sanctions violations, including violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and U.S. sanctions programs. Individuals who submit tips may be eligible for monetary awards if their information leads to a successful enforcement action. The webpage supplements the broader Treasury whistleblower program announced the same month. FinCEN Press Release, Feb. 13, 2026
In February 2026, FinCEN issued an order granting exceptive relief to covered financial institutions from a requirement under the 2016 Customer Due Diligence (CDD) Rule, eliminating the obligation to re-identify and re-verify beneficial owners of legal entity customers each time the customer opens a new account. Under the order, beneficial ownership identification and verification is now required only at first account opening, when the institution gains knowledge that calls into question the reliability of previously obtained beneficial ownership information, or as otherwise required by the institution's risk-based ongoing due diligence procedures. All other BSA/AML obligations — including ongoing transaction monitoring and suspicious activity reporting — remain in effect. FinCEN Press Release, Feb. 13, 2026
In March 2026, FinCEN announced updated Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listings of jurisdictions with anti-money laundering, countering the financing of terrorism, and counter-proliferation finance deficiencies, and reminded U.S. financial institutions to consider those listings in their compliance programs. Kuwait and Papua New Guinea were added to FATF's increased monitoring list, while Iran, North Korea (DPRK), and Burma remain designated as high-risk jurisdictions subject to enhanced countermeasures. U.S. financial institutions are expected to apply enhanced due diligence, correspondent account scrutiny, and MSB monitoring obligations consistent with the updated listings. FinCEN Press Release, Mar. 6, 2026
In March 2026, FinCEN issued an expanded Southwest Border Geographic Targeting Order requiring certain money services businesses in specified counties and ZIP codes along the southwest border to report cash transactions between $1,000 and $10,000. The order is effective March 7, 2026, through September 2, 2026, with newly covered MSBs required to begin filing by April 6, 2026. This expands on the December 2025 border operation targeting MSB compliance and represents a lower reporting threshold than the standard $10,000 CTR requirement under the Bank Secrecy Act. FinCEN Press Release, Mar. 10, 2026
In March 2026, FinCEN issued an advisory urging financial institutions to identify and report suspicious activity related to fraud schemes targeting government health care benefit programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, highlighting money laundering typologies used by transnational criminal organizations that exploit these programs through false claims, shell companies, straw owners, and layered wire transfers and digital asset movements. The advisory was coordinated with the FBI and HHS Office of Inspector General and noted that financial institutions filed 20% more health-care-related SARs in 2025 than in 2024. Separately on the same date, FinCEN issued a proposed rule to fully implement its whistleblower award program, establishing procedures for tip submission, eligibility criteria, and award adjudication; eligible whistleblowers would receive 10 to 30 percent of monetary penalties resulting from qualifying enforcement actions, funded by penalties collected under the Bank Secrecy Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Treasury Press Release, Mar. 30, 2026
In April 2026, federal banking regulators — including the FDIC and other agencies — issued a proposed rule on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), opening a public comment period. The proposal represents a joint interagency effort to update AML/CFT compliance program requirements for covered financial institutions. Further details on the rule's specific requirements are subject to the comment process. FDIC Press Release, Apr. 7, 2026
In April 2026, the FDIC, OCC, NCUA, and FinCEN jointly proposed a rule to update AML/CFT program requirements for banks and credit unions, implementing mandates from the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. Key proposed changes include an explicit risk-based program standard directing institutions to focus resources on higher-risk customers and activities, incorporation of FinCEN's existing customer due diligence requirements, a requirement that a bank's designated AML/CFT officer be located in the U.S. and accessible to regulators, and a new FinCEN consultation framework for certain supervisory and enforcement actions. The proposal also clarifies that only significant or systemic program failures would warrant formal AML/CFT enforcement or supervisory actions. Public comments are due 60 days after Federal Register publication. NCUA Press Release, Apr. 7, 2026
In April 2026, FinCEN issued a proposed rule to fundamentally reform AML/CFT program requirements for financial institutions under the Bank Secrecy Act, implementing mandates from the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 and explicitly superseding and withdrawing a prior proposed rule published July 3, 2024. The proposal introduces a risk-based effectiveness standard, empowers institutions to concentrate resources on higher-risk activity, clarifies expectations for independent testing and audit functions, and establishes a notice-and-consultation framework between FinCEN and federal banking supervisors for significant AML/CFT supervisory actions. The rule was issued jointly with the FDIC, OCC, and NCUA; public comments are due June 9, 2026. FinCEN Press Release, Apr. 7, 2026
In April 2026, FinCEN announced that its Rapid Response Program (RRP) has helped stop and recover nearly $2 billion in cyber-enabled fraud losses for U.S. victims since the program's inception, covering schemes including business email compromise, investment fraud, and phone scams. The RRP operates by coordinating with foreign financial intelligence units and law enforcement authorities to freeze and repatriate stolen funds after victims report losses. FinCEN advised victims to file complaints promptly with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) or the U.S. Secret Service to enable timely RRP intervention. FinCEN Press Release, Apr. 15, 2026
In April 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Cambodian Senator Kok An and a network of entities associated with scam centers that defraud Americans, as part of ongoing efforts to disrupt transnational criminal organizations engaged in cyber-enabled fraud and money laundering. The action targets infrastructure used to facilitate fraud schemes — including so-called 'pig butchering' investment scams — whose proceeds flow through money laundering networks. The sanctions complement FinCEN's earlier Section 311 action against Cambodia-based Huione Group and reflect a coordinated Treasury approach to disrupting Southeast Asian scam and laundering networks. Treasury Press Release, Apr. 23, 2026
In April 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department issued a warning about sanctions risks associated with China-based independent "teapot" oil refineries, which have been identified as facilitating the purchase of sanctioned oil — including from Iran and Russia — through networks that may involve money laundering and sanctions evasion. The advisory is intended to alert financial institutions and other businesses to the risks of transacting with entities connected to these refineries. The action reflects Treasury's continued use of sanctions and AML tools in tandem to target illicit oil trade and related financial flows. Treasury Press Release, Apr. 28, 2026
On May 11, 2026, FinCEN issued a Notice urging financial institutions in and around cities hosting the 2026 FIFA World Cup to increase vigilance for human trafficking and to file Suspicious Activity Reports on potentially related activity regardless of threshold. The Notice identifies transactional and behavioral red flags for sex and labor trafficking during major events, including cash deposits, peer-to-peer transfers, and withheld or diverted wages. It also encourages voluntary information sharing and reporting to the National Human Trafficking Hotline. FinCEN Notice, May 11, 2026
On May 11, 2026, FinCEN issued an Alert to help financial institutions identify and stop funding streams and procurement networks supporting Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Alert describes how the IRGC launders proceeds of illicit oil sales through networks of shell companies and financial facilitators, and it provides red flags related to oil smuggling, front company abuse, and digital assets. FinCEN Alert, May 11, 2026
On June 5, 2026, FinCEN issued a joint advisory urging financial institutions to be vigilant against risks presented by the unlawful employment of illegal aliens, framing these as risks to the integrity of the U.S. financial system. The advisory addresses non-work-authorized populations and their employers. FinCEN Joint Advisory, June 5, 2026
On June 12, 2026, FinCEN issued updated guidance clarifying how financial institutions can share information with each other about suspected fraud under section 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act. The source also links a fact sheet on section 314(b) and a registration page for financial institutions that want to share fraud information. FinCEN Press Release, June 12, 2026
On June 18, 2026, FinCEN, together with the OCC, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the NCUA, issued a joint proposed rule implementing provisions of the GENIUS Act. The proposal would treat permitted payment stablecoin issuers as financial institutions under the Bank Secrecy Act and require them to maintain effective customer identification programs. FinCEN also stated that it proposed a separate rule to apply other anti-money laundering obligations to permitted payment stablecoin issuers. FinCEN, Agencies Propose Rule to Implement GENIUS Act Customer Identification Program Requirement
On June 23, 2026, FinCEN proposed amending its Huione Group anti-money-laundering rule to cover Cambodia-based H-Pay Service PLC and other Huione Group successor entities. The proposal aims to block efforts to evade exclusion from the U.S. financial system and to reduce laundering tied to cyber theft and virtual currency investment scams. FinCEN Proposes to Sever H-Pay Service PLC and Other Huione Group Successor Entities from the U.S. Financial System, June 23, 2026
On June 30, 2026, FinCEN issued a supplemental Alert advising financial institutions to detect, identify, and report suspicious activity connected to CJNG and other Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations smuggling fuel from the United States into Mexico in fiscal fuel theft schemes. The Alert describes related methodologies and financial typologies, provides red flag indicators, and reminds institutions of their Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements. FinCEN issued it alongside an OFAC sanctions action against two Mexican nationals and nine entities tied to CJNG's fuel smuggling schemes, in partnership with the South Texas Homeland Security Task Force. FinCEN Supplemental Alert, June 30, 2026