Murphy v. NCAA — Anti-Commandeering & Sports Betting

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 584 U.S. 453 (2018), is the Supreme Court decision that opened the door to legal sports betting across the United States — and in doing so, delivered the Court's most significant statement of the anti-commandeering doctrine in a generation. New Jersey wanted to legalize sports gambling at its casinos and racetracks to revitalize its gaming economy. Federal law — the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA, 1992) — prohibited states from "authorizing" sports gambling, effectively freezing sports betting's legal landscape as of the date of enactment. The Supreme Court held 6-3 that PASPA's prohibition on state authorization of sports gambling violated the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment: the federal government may not direct state legislatures to leave a particular regulatory field to federal control, nor may it prohibit states from modifying or repealing their own laws. Congress can regulate sports gambling directly under its Commerce Clause power, but it cannot use the mechanism of telling states what to do — or more precisely, telling states what not to do in their own regulatory sphere. Murphy is significant both practically (it unleashed a wave of state sports betting legalization that has made sports gambling a multi-hundred-billion-dollar legal industry) and doctrinally (it clarified that the anti-commandeering principle applies to congressional prohibitions on state deregulation, not just affirmative orders to states to enforce federal policy).

Current Law (2026)

Legal Authority

• U.S. Const. amend. X — Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" — the constitutional basis for the anti-commandeering doctrine
• U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 — Congress's enumerated powers, including the Commerce Clause; Murphy confirmed Congress has Commerce Clause power to directly regulate sports gambling — it just cannot exercise that power by commandeering state regulatory authority
• 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. — Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA): the struck-down statute; prohibited states from "sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], promot[ing], licens[ing], or authoriz[ing] by law or compact" sports gambling; contained a grandfather clause for Nevada and a limited exemption for New Jersey (which New Jersey failed to use)
• New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) — First major anti-commandeering case; federal law requiring states to take title to radioactive waste or regulate it according to federal standards violated the Tenth Amendment; Congress may not "commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program"
• Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) — Federal law requiring state chief law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers violated anti-commandeering; Congress cannot direct state executive officials to administer federal programs
• Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) — Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act prohibiting states from disclosing personal information from motor vehicle records did NOT violate anti-commandeering; the Act regulated states as data holders (akin to any other regulated entity), not as sovereign regulators being commandeered; Murphy distinguished Reno

Key Mechanics

Murphy v. NCAA (2018) struck down the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA, 1992), which barred states from "authorizing" sports gambling, under the anti-commandeering doctrine. New Jersey had partially repealed its own ban on sports gambling at certain venues; the NCAA and sports leagues sued, arguing PASPA prohibited New Jersey from doing so. Justice Alito's majority held that PASPA violated the Tenth Amendment because it directed state legislatures to maintain a particular regulatory posture — a form of commandeering. The anti-commandeering doctrine, established in New York v. United States (1992) (affirmative legislative mandates) and Printz v. United States (1997) (executive enforcement commands), bars Congress from directing state officials or legislatures to implement federal policy. Murphy extended the doctrine to prohibitions on state deregulation: Congress cannot tell a state it must keep a prohibition in place. The distinction between Murphy (unconstitutional) and Reno v. Condon (constitutional) is critical — Congress can regulate states when it governs them as subjects of a generally applicable law (like any other regulated party), but cannot use state governments as instruments to implement federal regulatory choices. The practical effect was immediate: with PASPA struck down, states could legalize and regulate sports gambling, triggering one of the fastest expansions of gambling law in U.S. history. Congress retains the power to regulate sports gambling directly under the Commerce Clause; it simply cannot do so by ordering states to prohibit it.

How It Works

The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act

Congress enacted PASPA in 1992 to preserve the status quo of sports gambling regulation: Nevada was grandfathered in as the only state where single-game sports betting was legal; a few other states had narrow exemptions for existing pari-mutuel wagering; everyone else was prohibited from "authorizing" sports gambling. Congress's purpose was to prevent the spread of sports gambling, which the four major sports leagues and the NCAA argued would threaten the integrity of athletic competition by creating financial incentives to fix games.

New Jersey was one of the losers under PASPA. Its voters approved a constitutional amendment in 2011 permitting sports betting at Atlantic City casinos and racetracks; its legislature enacted enabling legislation in 2012. The sports leagues sued to enjoin the New Jersey law as a violation of PASPA. New Jersey argued PASPA itself was unconstitutional.

New Jersey's first round of litigation failed in the Third Circuit, which upheld PASPA. Then New Jersey tried a different tack: instead of authorizing sports gambling, it partially repealed its laws prohibiting it. If the state simply stopped prohibiting sports betting at casinos and racetracks, it wasn't "authorizing" it — it was just stepping back and letting the private market operate. The leagues and the NCAA sued again.

The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Before Murphy

The Tenth Amendment provides that powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states. The anti-commandeering doctrine — derived from the Tenth Amendment and the structural principles of federalism — holds that the federal government cannot compel state governments to enact or administer federal regulatory programs.

New York v. United States (1992) established the doctrine for state legislatures: Congress cannot tell state legislatures to enact laws that implement federal regulatory policy. Even if Congress has the power to regulate a field directly (under the Commerce Clause, for example), it cannot achieve the same regulatory goal by ordering states to regulate. The Constitution gives the federal government power to regulate private conduct, not power to regulate state governments as regulatory agents.

Printz v. United States (1997) extended the doctrine to state executive officials: Congress cannot direct state sheriffs to implement the federal Brady Act's background check requirements. State executives are not instruments of federal administration.

Before Murphy, the anti-commandeering doctrine had one important limit: Reno v. Condon (2000) held that a federal law prohibiting states from disclosing personal data from motor vehicle records was not commandeering because it regulated states as owners of data — like any private entity that holds data — not as sovereigns exercising regulatory power. The distinction is between regulating state conduct (permissible) and directing state regulatory choices (impermissible).

Murphy: Commandeering Through Prohibition

New Jersey's argument was novel: PASPA didn't tell New Jersey to do anything; it told New Jersey it couldn't undo its prohibition on sports betting. Was a prohibition on state deregulation — ordering states to keep their laws in place — commandeering?

Justice Alito's majority held that it was. The anti-commandeering principle is not merely about federal laws that affirmatively order states to enact or administer programs; it applies equally to federal laws that dictate the content of state law by prohibiting states from repealing or modifying existing state regulations.

The Court's reasoning was grounded in the structural purpose of the anti-commandeering doctrine: Congress should have to take direct regulatory action for which it is politically accountable, rather than using state governments as intermediaries that get blamed for the resulting regulation while federal officials escape responsibility. When Congress tells New Jersey it must keep its gambling prohibition in place, Congress benefits from the regulatory effect (sports betting is suppressed in New Jersey) without bearing political accountability for the state policy (New Jersey's legislature and governor take the heat for the prohibition). This "dual sovereignty" problem — federal benefits from state regulatory action without federal accountability — is what the anti-commandeering doctrine is designed to prevent.

The majority rejected the argument that PASPA merely preempted New Jersey law rather than commandeering it. Ordinary preemption — where federal law supersedes conflicting state law — is permissible because federal law directly regulates the conduct at issue. But PASPA did not regulate sports gambling directly; it left regulation entirely to states while dictating that states could not choose to deregulate. That is commandeering, not preemption.

What Congress Can Do

Murphy does not prevent Congress from regulating sports gambling. Congress has Commerce Clause power over interstate sports betting markets. What it cannot do is regulate by proxy — by ordering states to maintain their own prohibitions. Congress can:

• Directly prohibit sports gambling under federal criminal law
• Impose federal licensing requirements on sports gambling operators
• Regulate the integrity of sports competitions
• Create a federal framework that displaces state law (preemption through direct federal regulation)

What Congress cannot do is tell states they must keep sports gambling illegal. After Murphy, Congress must choose: regulate directly (which means federal officials are politically accountable) or step back and let states decide.

The Sports Betting Revolution

The practical consequence of Murphy has been enormous. Within seven years of the decision:

• Over 38 states and the District of Columbia legalized sports betting
• Annual legal sports wagering in the United States grew from essentially zero (outside Nevada) to over $100 billion per year by 2024
• Major sports leagues — which had lobbied for PASPA's enactment — reversed course and negotiated "official data" deals, sponsorships, and partnerships with sports betting operators
• State tax revenues from sports betting exceeded $1.5 billion annually by 2024
• The federal government has not enacted any comprehensive direct regulation of sports betting, leaving the field to the states

The Murphy decision illustrates federalism's practical effects: returning regulatory authority to states produces a diverse landscape of regulatory approaches, with different states choosing different tax rates, permissible bet types, responsible gambling requirements, and advertising restrictions.

The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine After Murphy

Murphy's contribution to anti-commandeering doctrine is the extension of the principle to prohibitions on state deregulation. The doctrine now covers three types of federal-to-state commands:

1. Affirmative legislative commandeering (New York): Congress cannot order state legislatures to enact laws implementing federal regulatory programs.
2. Executive commandeering (Printz): Congress cannot direct state executive officials to administer federal programs.
3. Prohibitory commandeering (Murphy): Congress cannot prohibit states from modifying or repealing their own laws as a means of preserving federal regulatory policy.

The outer boundary of the doctrine — where permissible preemption ends and impermissible commandeering begins — is drawn by Reno v. Condon: Congress may regulate states as participants in regulated markets or as owners of regulated data without commandeering them. The line between regulating state conduct and directing state regulatory choices remains contested in post-Murphy lower court litigation.

How It Affects You

If you are a sports bettor or consumer of legal sports gambling services: Murphy is the reason legal sports betting exists in your state (if it does). Before 2018, only Nevada offered single-game legal sports betting; after Murphy, states rapidly legalized. You can now bet legally in most states, with consumer protections, regulated operators, and tax-funded problem gambling resources that did not exist in the illegal market. If your state has not yet legalized sports betting, Murphy means your state legislature has the constitutional authority to do so — there is no federal prohibition. If you have concerns about gambling addiction, state-run responsible gambling programs (funded in part by sports betting tax revenue) are available.

If you are a state legislator or regulator: Murphy returned sports betting regulation to you. You have the constitutional authority to legalize, regulate, tax, or continue prohibiting sports betting as your constituents and legislature see fit — free from any federal commandeering prohibition. Sports betting legalization decisions involve complex policy trade-offs: tax revenue, problem gambling social costs, integrity risks, advertising impacts on youth, and the design of a competitive regulatory framework. The experience of early-adopter states (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Michigan) provides extensive empirical data on different regulatory models. Murphy's broader principle also protects your state from future federal prohibitions that would order you to maintain specific regulatory regimes in other policy areas — marijuana legalization, gun regulations, environmental rules — as long as the federal prohibition is framed as commandeering rather than direct federal regulation.

If you are a federal legislator considering national sports betting regulation: Murphy tells you what you cannot do (tell states to keep sports betting illegal) and what you can do (directly regulate sports gambling under the Commerce Clause). If you want a national regulatory framework — perhaps for consumer protection, integrity standards, or problem gambling prevention — you must enact it as direct federal regulation with federal enforcement, not as a mandate to states. A federal sports betting integrity law, a federal licensing framework, or a federal advertising standards regime are all constitutionally available tools; a federal law requiring states to prohibit sports betting is not.

If you are a constitutional litigant or state attorney general challenging federal mandates: Murphy's anti-commandeering rule has implications far beyond sports betting. Federal laws that tell states they must maintain specific regulations — rather than directly regulating the underlying activity — may be vulnerable to anti-commandeering challenges. This has been argued in contexts including: federal law requiring states to keep marijuana illegal (though direct federal scheduling is direct regulation, not commandeering), federal mandates related to immigration enforcement (Printz and New York apply to state officers being ordered to enforce federal immigration law), and federal requirements that states maintain specific data-sharing or reporting regimes. Analyze whether a challenged federal requirement imposes an affirmative legislative mandate, directs state executive officers, or prohibits state regulatory change — each triggers the anti-commandeering doctrine.

State Variations

Murphy returned sports betting regulation entirely to the states. The resulting variation is substantial:

States with legal sports betting (38+ as of 2026): New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, New York, Virginia, Indiana, Iowa, Tennessee, West Virginia, New Hampshire, Montana, Oregon, Maryland, Connecticut, Arizona, Louisiana, Wyoming, South Dakota, Arkansas, Kansas, Ohio, Massachusetts, Maine, Kentucky, Vermont, North Carolina, and others. Each state has designed its own regulatory framework, with variations in tax rates (6.75% Nevada to 51% New York on mobile), permissible sports, in-person vs. online-only options, advertising restrictions, and problem gambling program requirements.

States without legal sports betting: Utah (constitutional prohibition on gambling generally), Hawaii, and several others. These states are free to legalize under Murphy but have chosen not to.

Tribal gaming compacts: Federal Indian gaming law (the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act) interacts with state sports betting frameworks; tribal compacts must be renegotiated in many states to include sports betting, and some states have complex disputes with tribes about whether sports betting falls within existing compact authority.

Federal territories: Murphy's ruling applies to territories subject to Congressional authority differently; sports betting in Puerto Rico, Guam, and other territories is governed by territorial law.

Integrity agreements: Major sports leagues lobbied states to include "official league data" requirements and integrity fee provisions in sports betting legislation; some states (Illinois, Tennessee) enacted such requirements while most did not. These commercial negotiations between leagues and states reflect the regulatory flexibility Murphy restored.

Pending Legislation

• No federal framework enacted: Congress has not enacted comprehensive direct regulation of sports betting post-Murphy. Various bills addressing sports betting integrity, problem gambling, and advertising standards have been introduced but not passed.
• Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act: Periodically introduced legislation would create federal minimum standards for sports betting markets. These bills are designed to be direct federal regulation (permissible) rather than state mandates (commandeering), but face lobbying opposition from states that prefer full autonomy and from operators who favor lighter federal oversight.
• Problem Gambling Funding: The Gambling Addiction Recovery, Investment, and Treatment (GRIT) Act and similar bills would create federal funding for problem gambling treatment funded by sports betting operators or taxes; these proposals address the social costs that have accompanied legalization.

Recent Developments

• 2018 — Murphy v. NCAA decided: PASPA struck down; sports betting returned to states. Within 12 months, New Jersey, Delaware, Mississippi, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and New Mexico had all authorized sports betting.
• 2019–2023 — Rapid state legalization: The majority of states legalized sports betting within five years of Murphy; the legal U.S. sports betting market grew to more than $100 billion in annual wagers by 2023.
• 2021–2026 — Anti-commandeering doctrine applications: Lower courts have applied Murphy's anti-commandeering extension (prohibitions on state deregulation are also commandeering) in cases involving federal mandates related to immigration enforcement (challenging sanctuary city policies), marijuana scheduling, and state data privacy laws. The doctrine's reach continues to be tested.
• 2024 — Sports betting integrity concerns: Several high-profile sports betting scandals (athletes wagering on their own sports, referee gambling) prompted calls for federal regulation of sports gambling integrity. Congress held hearings; no comprehensive legislation passed.
• 2025 — State market maturation: Early-adopter states are revising their regulatory frameworks based on experience — adjusting tax rates, advertising restrictions (particularly to children), and problem gambling programs. New York's 51% mobile sports betting tax rate and its revenue implications are actively being studied by other states as a cautionary example.