Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the independent federal agency responsible for regulating the civilian use of nuclear materials in the United States. The NRC licenses and inspects nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and radioactive material users; sets safety standards; and oversees nuclear waste management. Created in 1974 when the Atomic Energy Commission was split into the NRC (regulation) and what became the Department of Energy (promotion), the NRC's mandate is protecting public health and safety, the environment (alongside the EPA for radiation standards), and national security. For the broader statutory and policy framework, see Nuclear Energy Regulation.

Current Law (2026)

Legal Authority

• 42 U.S.C. § 2011–2014 — Atomic Energy Act findings and purpose (declares that development of nuclear energy is vital to national defense and general welfare; establishes policy framework for federal regulation of nuclear materials)
• 42 U.S.C. § 2133 — Commercial licenses (authorizes the NRC to issue licenses for utilization and production facilities for commercial and industrial purposes)
• 42 U.S.C. § 2134 — Medical, research, and development licenses (authorizes licenses for medical therapy, research, and development purposes)
• 42 U.S.C. § 2201 — General NRC authority (broad authority to establish regulations, conduct inspections, issue orders, and take enforcement action to protect public health and safety)
• 42 U.S.C. § 2210 — Price-Anderson nuclear indemnification (establishes the liability and insurance framework for nuclear incidents — operators must maintain insurance; federal indemnity covers damages beyond insurance limits)
• 42 U.S.C. § 5841 — Establishment of NRC (creates the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an independent agency; 5 commissioners, bipartisan requirements)
• 42 U.S.C. § 5842 — Licensing and regulation of nuclear energy (transfers all licensing and regulatory functions of the former Atomic Energy Commission to the NRC)
• 42 U.S.C. § 10131 — Nuclear Waste Policy Act findings (declares federal responsibility for providing permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel)
• 42 U.S.C. § 10153 — Interim reactor storage (authorizes NRC licensing of interim storage technologies at reactor sites)

How It Works

The NRC's regulatory framework covers the complete lifecycle of nuclear technology: siting, construction, operation, and decommissioning of facilities, plus transportation and disposal of radioactive materials.

Reactor licensing is the NRC's most visible function. Any entity wishing to build and operate a nuclear power plant must obtain NRC approval through a rigorous multi-year process that evaluates reactor design, site suitability, environmental impact, emergency preparedness, and security. The NRC offers several licensing pathways: traditional two-step (construction permit + operating license), combined licenses (one-step approval), early site permits (banking a site for future use), and design certifications (pre-approving a reactor design for use at any site).

Safety regulation is ongoing throughout a reactor's operating life. NRC resident inspectors are stationed at every operating nuclear plant, conducting continuous oversight. The NRC evaluates reactor performance through its Reactor Oversight Process, taking enforcement action — from notices of violation to shutdown orders — when safety standards aren't met. Operating licenses are issued for 40 years and can be renewed for additional 20-year terms after safety review.

The Price-Anderson Act addresses the unique liability challenge of nuclear power. Because a severe nuclear accident could cause billions in damages, the law requires operators to maintain the maximum amount of private insurance available and participate in a retroactive premium pool among all operators. If damages exceed private insurance, each reactor operator contributes to a shared pool. Federal indemnity covers any remaining gap. This framework makes nuclear power economically viable while ensuring victims of a nuclear incident can be compensated.

Nuclear waste management is the NRC's most unresolved challenge. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 declared federal responsibility for permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. The NRC has authority to license waste storage and disposal facilities, but the proposed Yucca Mountain repository — the designated national repository — has been in political limbo for decades. In the interim, the NRC licenses on-site storage of spent fuel at reactor sites.

Radioactive materials regulation extends beyond reactors to thousands of licensees who use nuclear materials in medicine, industry, and research — hospitals using radioactive isotopes for cancer treatment, industrial radiography companies, and university research labs.

How It Affects You

Implementing Regulations

• 10 CFR Part 81 — Standard Specifications for the Granting of Patent Licenses (18 sections — the NRC's rules for licensing its government-owned patent rights to private entities): like NASA (14 CFR Part 1245) and DOE, the NRC holds patents on inventions made by its employees and under its sponsored research — nuclear measurement instruments, radiation detection technologies, reactor monitoring methods, and related innovations. Part 81 establishes the standard terms under which the NRC licenses those patents to commercial applicants. Authority: 42 U.S.C. § 2186 (AEA § 156, authorizing NRC to license and assign patents to promote private commercial use of nuclear technology). Key provisions:

  • § 81.11 — Policy: NRC inventions are made available for licensing on a nonexclusive basis to any responsible applicant who will use them; the policy preference for nonexclusive licensing reflects Congress's intent that nuclear technology be widely available for commercial application — exclusive licenses are disfavored because they would concentrate the benefits of publicly funded nuclear research
  • § 81.13 — Publication: the NRC periodically publishes in the Federal Register a list of NRC inventions available for licensing; this notice mechanism ensures that potential applicants are aware of the available patent portfolio without requiring direct solicitation
  • § 81.20 — Nonexclusive licenses: NRC will grant nonexclusive licenses to any responsible applicant who will practice the invention and make its benefits available to the public; the application requires a $10 fee and a description of the applicant's plans to use the invention; NRC may grant the license unless it would be contrary to the public interest
  • § 81.30–81.32 — Limited exclusive licenses: NRC may grant a limited exclusive license for a defined period and field of use if (a) the invention has been published as available for exclusive licensing, (b) the applicant commits to bring the invention to the point of practical application within a specified time, and (c) granting exclusivity would not foreclose other persons from practicing the invention in nonexclusive areas; exclusive licenses are "limited" — they can be limited to a field of use, a specific country, or a time period
  • § 81.40 — Application contents: applications must describe the invention to be licensed, the applicant's technical capability to practice it, the applicant's development plan and commercialization timeline, and (for exclusive licenses) the grounds for believing that exclusive licensing is necessary to bring the invention to practical application
  • §§ 81.51–81.53 — Appeals: applicants denied a license may appeal to an NRC Invention Licensing Appeal Board — a three-person panel convened by the NRC's Executive Director for Operations; the Board reviews whether the denial was consistent with the Part 81 policy framework; Board decisions are the final administrative remedy within NRC

  The NRC's patent portfolio arises from decades of AEC and NRC-sponsored nuclear safety and regulatory research. Notable categories include radiation measurement instruments (dosimetry and contamination detection), reactor safety analysis codes, and nuclear material processing methods. The program is small compared to DOE's technology transfer operation (which manages thousands of patents from national laboratories), but Part 81 ensures that NRC-funded innovations reach commercial application rather than sitting unused in the government patent portfolio.

State Variations

Nuclear regulation involves a federal-state division:

Implementing Regulations

The NRC's nuclear power plant licensing regulations live at 10 CFR Part 52 — Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. Key provisions and licensing pathways:

• § 52.0 — Scope: Part 52 governs five distinct license types for nuclear power facilities licensed under Atomic Energy Act § 103 (commercial licenses): (1) early site permits, (2) standard design certifications, (3) standard design approvals, (4) combined licenses, and (5) manufacturing licenses. Each pathway addresses a different stage of the planning-to-operation process.

• Subpart A — Early Site Permits (§§ 52.12–52.39): an entity may "bank" NRC approval of a site for one or more nuclear power facilities before committing to a specific reactor design or filing a combined license application. An early site permit is valid for 10–20 years and resolves site suitability, environmental impact, emergency preparedness, and offsite radiological consequence issues in advance. Any later combined license referencing an approved early site permit may not re-litigate the resolved site issues.

• Subpart B — Standard Design Certifications (§§ 52.41–52.63): a reactor vendor may petition the NRC Commission (not just staff) to certify a standardized reactor design for use at any approved site. The certification requires full safety review, environmental analysis, public hearings, and Commission rulemaking — the resulting design certification is itself codified as a rule (the AP1000, ESBWR, and US-APWR each have certified appendices in Part 52). A utility building a plant using a certified design may not re-litigate issues resolved in the certification.

• Subpart C — Combined Licenses (§§ 52.71–52.110): a combined license is a single NRC authorization that both permits construction and contains conditions for operation — the key reform that replaced the prior two-step process (construction permit + separate operating license) responsible for decade-long delays at plants like Seabrook and Shoreham. Process: application (referencing site permit and design certification if applicable) → NRC safety and environmental reviews → mandatory public hearing → ACRS review → Commission action → construction → pre-operation inspection.

  • § 52.103 — Operation under a combined license: the licensee must notify NRC 270 days before the scheduled fuel loading date and every 30 days thereafter. Not less than 180 days before fuel loading, the NRC makes a safety finding that the facility was built in accordance with the license and that acceptance criteria are met — if the finding is made, the license authorizes fuel loading and low-power testing without additional hearings.
  • § 52.104 — Duration: the combined license is issued for a period not to exceed 40 years from the date of first operation. Renewal for 20-year terms is governed by 10 CFR Part 54.

• Subpart E — Standard Design Approvals (§§ 52.131–52.145): NRC staff-level (not Commission-level) approval of a reactor design or major design portions — less formal than a design certification but useful for early-stage technical verification before a full application.

• Subpart F — Manufacturing Licenses (§§ 52.151–52.171): authorizes factory manufacture and assembly of nuclear power reactors at a location other than the intended final site — the regulatory pathway for small modular reactors (SMRs) and other factory-built nuclear technologies. A manufacturing license holder may produce multiple reactor units without a site-specific combined license for each, provided each deployed unit is ultimately covered by a site-specific authorization. This pathway was designed in anticipation of modular designs like NuScale's VOYGR.

• 10 CFR Part 50 — Domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities: the foundational reactor licensing rule (applies to all existing operating plants under construction permits + operating licenses; also applies to research reactors); sets minimum safety requirements, technical specification content, reactor design standards, quality assurance programs, emergency planning zones, operator license requirements, and the 40-year initial license duration; also governs license renewal coordination with Part 54

• 10 CFR Part 40 — Domestic licensing of source material (uranium/thorium licensing, mill tailings, decommissioning)

• 10 CFR Part 72 — Licensing requirements for independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs)

• 10 CFR Part 2 — Agency rules of practice and procedure (NRC hearing procedures, adjudicatory proceedings)

• 10 CFR Part 20 — Standards for Protection Against Radiation (70 sections across 15 subparts — the foundational radiation protection rule for all NRC licensees):

  • § 20.1101 — Radiation protection programs: every NRC licensee must develop, document, and implement a written radiation protection program commensurate with the scope of licensed activities; the program must be designed to achieve doses as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) — not just compliance with the numerical limits, but active minimization of dose consistent with practical constraints; programs must be periodically reviewed for adequacy
  • § 20.1201 — Occupational dose limits for adults: the annual dose limits that every NRC licensee must ensure its radiation workers do not exceed — (1) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE): 5 rem (50 mSv)/year — the primary whole-body limit; (2) dose equivalent to lens of eye: 15 rem (150 mSv)/year; (3) shallow-dose equivalent to skin or any extremity: 50 rem (500 mSv)/year; these limits apply to the sum of external and internal doses from all sources at the licensed facility
  • § 20.1206 — Planned special exposures: licensees may authorize radiation workers to receive doses above the annual limits in rare, pre-approved situations involving emergency operations or unusual activities; lifetime cumulative planned special exposure may not exceed 5 times the annual dose limit; each planned special exposure must be authorized in advance, documented, and reported to NRC
  • § 20.1207 — Occupational dose limits for minors: annual occupational dose limits for workers under 18 are 10 percent of the adult limits — 0.5 rem (5 mSv) TEDE per year
  • § 20.1208 — Dose to embryo/fetus: for declared pregnant workers (workers who voluntarily inform their employer of their pregnancy in writing), the total dose equivalent to the embryo/fetus must not exceed 0.5 rem (5 mSv) during the entire pregnancy; the licensee must make efforts to avoid a sharp variation in monthly dose that could cause the limit to be exceeded early in pregnancy
  • § 20.1301 — Dose limits for individual members of the public: each licensee must ensure that radiation doses to members of the public from its licensed operations do not exceed 100 mrem (1 mSv) per year total effective dose equivalent; the annual air dose must not exceed 10 mrem for unrestricted areas from licensed operations (separate from natural background and medical exposure)
  • §§ 20.1501–20.1502 — Surveys and individual monitoring: licensees must perform radiation surveys whenever conditions warrant or when required to demonstrate compliance; individual occupational exposure monitoring (dosimetry) is required for any worker likely to receive doses exceeding 10% of the annual occupational limits, or any minors or declared pregnant workers in controlled areas
  • §§ 20.2001–20.2108 — Waste disposal: licensed material may be disposed of only in NRC-approved ways — transfer to authorized recipients (§20.2001), release into sanitary sewerage within concentration limits (§20.2003), decay-in-storage for short-lived isotopes (§20.2001(a)(2)); incineration only with NRC approval; no abandonment of licensed material in place

  10 CFR Part 20 applies to every NRC licensee — nuclear power plants, medical facilities using radioactive isotopes, fuel fabricators, industrial radiographers, and research institutions. The numerical limits align with international standards from the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Agreement States (38 states as of 2026 that have assumed NRC's licensing authority for certain radioactive materials) must adopt radiation protection standards at least as stringent as Part 20. A March 2026 amendment (91 FR 15772) updated scope provisions and certain definitions. The Part interacts with 10 CFR Part 35 (medical use) and Part 40 (uranium milling) for specific licensee categories.

• 10 CFR Part 30 — Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct Material — the master licensing framework that applies to all domestic uses of byproduct material (radioactive isotopes produced in nuclear reactors, such as Cobalt-60, Iridium-192, Technetium-99m, Cesium-137, Strontium-90) other than nuclear fuel or source material. Part 30 governs who must hold a license, what kinds of licenses exist, what exemptions apply, and what conduct requirements apply to all licensees — it operates as the general authority that Parts 31–39 (covering specific byproduct material uses) build on. Key provisions:

  • § 30.3 — License requirement: no person may manufacture, produce, transfer, receive, acquire, own, possess, or use byproduct material except as authorized by an NRC license (or Agreement State equivalent); this licensing obligation is the gateway to the entire radioactive materials program — a hospital using I-131 for thyroid cancer treatment, an oil well services company using Cs-137 density gauges, and a university laboratory using C-14 for metabolic research all hold licenses under this authority
  • § 30.10 — Deliberate misconduct: any licensee, applicant, or employee of a licensee or applicant (not just the license holder) who deliberately provides false information to NRC or who deliberately causes a violation of NRC requirements is subject to enforcement action — including civil penalties (up to $100,000 per violation per day) and criminal referral; the deliberate misconduct rule closes the gap that might otherwise allow an employee to shield a company from liability by acting without authorization
  • §§ 30.14–30.22 — Exemptions from licensing: Part 30 contains several categories of general exemptions that allow possession of small or encapsulated quantities of byproduct material without a specific license:
    • § 30.14 — Exempt concentrations: materials containing byproduct material below NRC-specified concentrations (set in Appendix C) are exempt — this covers most consumer products and incidental exposures
    • § 30.15 — Exempt products containing byproduct material: manufacturers and distributors who incorporate byproduct material into specific types of products (timepieces, static-elimination devices, certain ionizing radiation-producing equipment) may do so under a general license; once incorporated, recipients can possess the products without a specific license; the list includes tritium-illuminated exit signs (which hospitals, offices, and factories can possess without a license) and smoke detectors containing trace quantities of Am-241
    • § 30.18 — Exempt quantities: possession of byproduct material in quantities below specified limits (listed by isotope in Appendix B) is automatically licensed under a general license; these quantities are small enough that the radiation hazard is negligible; most research laboratories that use small quantities of radiotracers (H-3, C-14, P-32, S-35) qualify for exemption under this or the general license framework
    • § 30.19 — Self-luminous products: tritium gas light sources (exit signs, compasses, watch dials) and promethium-147 luminous products may be manufactured and distributed under a specific NRC license, and received and possessed by end users under a general license (§ 31.8) — no specific license required to hang a tritium exit sign in your building
    • § 30.20 — Gas and aerosol detectors: smoke detectors containing Am-241 (ionization-type) may be manufactured and distributed under specific license and possessed by end users (building owners, fire protection companies) under a general license — the general license covers the ~75 million ionization smoke detectors in U.S. homes and commercial buildings
  • § 30.31 — Types of specific licenses: NRC issues two types of specific licenses — general licenses (automatically conferred by rule for certain low-risk activities without individual application) and specific licenses (individual authorizations issued after review to named applicants); specific licenses are required for hospitals using therapeutic quantities of radiopharmaceuticals, industrial radiography operations, irradiators, and other significant byproduct material users; specific license applications must include a description of equipment and facilities, qualifications of radiation safety personnel, and procedures for handling, storing, and disposing of material
  • § 30.36 — License terms and renewal: specific licenses are issued for a term the NRC staff deems appropriate, generally not to exceed 5–10 years; licensees must renew before expiration; licenses that lapse during renewal create a legal gap — possessing byproduct material on an expired license is a violation
  • § 30.50–30.51 — Reporting and notification: licensees must immediately notify NRC of any event involving byproduct material that causes or threatens to cause: a radiation dose exceeding occupational exposure limits; release of radioactive material exceeding reportable quantities; damage to a sealed source; or loss or theft of licensed material; 30-day written reports for certain events; annual inventory reports for significant sealed source users

  Part 30 is the administrative foundation for the entire NRC radioactive materials program. Unlike the power reactor program (governed by Parts 50 and 52), which covers approximately 100 operating plants, Part 30 and its subsidiary Parts 31–39 cover approximately 20,000 specific licenses held by hospitals, research institutions, industrial companies, and government agencies. The Agreement State program — under which 38 states have assumed NRC authority over most byproduct material uses — means that in most states, hospitals and industrial users actually hold state licenses regulated by state radiation control programs operating under NRC oversight, not NRC licenses directly. Agreement States must adopt regulatory requirements at least as stringent as Part 30; in practice, state regulations are nearly identical.

• 10 CFR Part 34 — Licenses for Industrial Radiography and Radiation Safety Requirements for Industrial Radiographic Operations (42 sections — NRC's regulations for companies and workers who use sealed sources of radioactive material to take industrial X-rays of welds, pipes, castings, and structural components; industrial radiography is the most common cause of radiation overexposures in the U.S. radioactive materials industry because sources are taken to job sites and used in uncontrolled environments):

  • § 34.13 — Specific license requirements: NRC (or Agreement State) will approve a specific license for industrial radiography only if the applicant demonstrates: (1) trained and qualified radiographers and radiographer assistants; (2) appropriate equipment meeting NRC performance standards; (3) an adequate radiation safety program including survey instrument calibration, leak testing procedures, and emergency procedures; (4) personnel monitoring for all workers; and (5) a quality control program
  • § 34.20 — Equipment performance requirements: every radiographic exposure device (the shielded container holding the radioactive source) must include a source guide tube and control cable assembly; the device must be designed so that the source can be retracted to its fully shielded position without requiring any part of the human body to enter a radiation field; the device must have a mechanical lock preventing accidental source exposure; exposure rate must not exceed 2 millisieverts/hr (200 mrem/hr) at 5 cm from the device surface when the source is in the shielded position
  • § 34.25 — Survey instruments: each field team must have at least one calibrated radiation survey instrument capable of measuring dose rates in the expected range; instruments must be calibrated at intervals not to exceed 6 months; calibration records must be maintained for 3 years; the requirement for a calibrated survey instrument at every radiographic site is the single most critical safety practice — most industrial radiography accidents involve workers who enter a radiation field without detecting elevated dose rates because their survey meter was unavailable or inoperable
  • § 34.27 — Leak testing: sealed sources must be leak-tested at intervals not to exceed 6 months to verify the source has not fractured or corroded; the leak test sample must be analyzed for radioactivity by a person specifically authorized for that purpose; sources failing the leak test (≥185 Bq / 5 nanocuries) must immediately be removed from service
  • §§ 34.43–34.45 — Controlled area and personnel monitoring: before initiating a radiographic exposure at a temporary job site, the radiographer must establish a controlled area around the radiation source large enough to maintain dose rates below 1 millisievert/hr (100 mrem/hr) at the controlled area boundary; all radiography workers must wear direct-reading dosimeters and assigned individual monitoring badges; personal radiation monitors must be checked before each shift; radiographers must wear alarming dosimeters when performing field work
  • §§ 34.51–34.63 — Emergency and operating procedures: written emergency procedures for radiation incidents (source stuck in exposed position, personnel overexposure) must be posted at every job site; each incident requiring emergency procedures must be reported to NRC within 4 hours of discovery; source changes and transfer of devices must be documented
  • § 34.101 — Notifications: licensees must notify NRC and the Agreement State regulator within 24 hours of any lost, missing, or stolen radioactive source; must notify within 4 hours of any overexposure or equipment failure that required emergency procedures; lost industrial radiography sources are treated as Category 2 radiation security events under the NRC's national security framework

  Industrial radiography employs tens of thousands of workers — in shipyards, oil refineries, pipeline construction, bridge inspection, and aerospace manufacturing — using sources primarily of Iridium-192 (the most common), Cobalt-60, and Selenium-75. The license requirements for individual radiographers (training, written examination, hands-on demonstration of competency) are separate from the facility license. Many states have assumed Agreement State authority over industrial radiography; those operating across state lines must comply with both NRC/Agreement State requirements and any applicable state regulations in states where they work.

• 10 CFR Part 55 — Operators' Licenses (33 sections — NRC's licensing requirements for individuals who manipulate the controls of nuclear power reactors; one of the most safety-critical personnel licensing programs in the federal government because a reactor operator's actions directly affect public safety):

  • § 55.3 — License requirement: no person may manipulate the controls of a utilization facility (nuclear power reactor) licensed under Parts 50, 52, or 54 without a valid NRC operator or senior operator license; this is a personal federal license, not just employer training certification — it is the nuclear equivalent of a pilot's license
  • § 55.21 / § 55.23 — Medical examination: every applicant must undergo a physical examination by a physician; the facility licensee must certify on NRC Form 396 that the applicant meets the medical standards; licensed operators must have a medical examination every 2 years; if an operator develops a permanent physical or mental condition causing failure to meet medical standards, the license must be immediately reported to NRC (§ 55.25)
  • §§ 55.41–55.43 — Written examinations: the written examination for an operator tests knowledge of reactor theory and principles of reactor operation, applicable NRC regulations, operating procedures, emergency procedures, and the specific reactor facility's design; the examination for a senior operator (who has supervisory authority over operators) additionally covers advanced facility characteristics, emergency operating procedures, and the senior operator's responsibilities; NRC uses NUREG-1021 ("Operator Licensing Examination Standards") as the examination development standard
  • § 55.45 — Operating tests: in addition to the written exam, applicants must pass an operating test on the facility's licensed simulator — demonstrating the ability to perform normal and emergency operating procedures safely; the simulator must be an NRC-approved plant-referenced simulator (§ 55.46) that accurately replicates the facility's control panel and plant response to operator actions; operating tests are conducted by NRC examiners or, under an NRC-approved program, by facility examiners witnessed by NRC
  • § 55.51 — License issuance: NRC issues an operator license authorizing the operator to manipulate the controls of a specific reactor facility; the license specifies any medical conditions or conditions on the licensee's scope of authority (e.g., a hearing impairment that requires a modified watch procedure)
  • § 55.53 — Conditions of license: all operator licenses are subject to conditions — the operator must notify NRC of any change in medical condition, must maintain active status by performing reactor control operations, and must pass requalification examinations; operators may not perform control manipulations while using any medication that impairs mental or physical function
  • § 55.55 / § 55.57 — Expiration and renewal: licenses expire 6 years after issuance; renewal requires completion of the facility's NRC-approved requalification program and an examination by NRC or facility examiners; operators who have not actively performed reactor operations within the preceding 2 years must meet requalification standards before resuming licensed duties
  • § 55.59 — Requalification: each year, operators must complete the facility's requalification program — typically including simulator training, written examinations, operating tests, and attendance at annual training sessions covering plant modifications, event lessons learned, and regulatory updates; requalification programs must be approved by NRC and are subject to NRC inspection

  The United States has approximately 3,500 currently licensed reactor operators and senior operators at commercial nuclear power plants, plus operators at research and test reactors. The exam pass rates run approximately 80–85% for initial applications. The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident focused significant attention on whether operator training adequately prepares crews for prolonged multi-unit emergencies with severe station blackout conditions — NRC's post-Fukushima orders and orders required facilities to update simulator scenarios and emergency procedures to reflect beyond-design-basis events.

• 10 CFR Part 40 — Domestic Licensing of Source Material (53 sections — the NRC licensing framework for uranium and thorium: who must hold a license, how licenses are obtained and maintained, financial assurance for decommissioning, and the special requirements for uranium mills that produce radioactive mill tailings):

  • § 40.3 — License requirement: no person may receive title to, own, receive, possess, use, transfer, or dispose of source material — defined as uranium or thorium in any physical or chemical form, or ores containing 0.05% or more by weight of uranium or thorium — except as authorized by an NRC license; this licensing requirement is the entry point for the entire domestic uranium supply chain
  • § 40.20 — License types: general licenses (automatically available for specified low-risk activities such as receipt of small quantities by research institutions, transport of natural uranium by carriers, or possession of consumer products containing source material) vs. specific licenses (individually issued after application and NRC review, required for uranium mills, conversion facilities, enrichment plants, and significant processing operations)
  • § 40.22 — Small quantities general license: automatically authorizes commercial and industrial firms, research institutions, and government agencies to receive, possess, and use up to 15 pounds of source material at any one time without a specific license; this exempts most lab and industrial users who work with small quantities of uranium as a reference material or in metal alloys
  • § 40.31–40.32 — Specific license issuance: an application for a specific license must include the purpose, facility description, procedures for handling source material, qualifications of personnel, waste management plan, and financial assurance information; NRC approves if the applicant is legally qualified, activities are lawful, and the proposed activity is not inimical to public health and safety or the common defense and security
  • § 40.36 — Financial assurance for decommissioning: specific licensees authorized to possess significant quantities of source material must maintain financial assurance sufficient to cover estimated decommissioning costs; acceptable instruments include surety bonds, letters of credit, parent guarantees, trust funds, and government guarantees; uranium mill licensees' financial assurance is governed by Appendix A criteria and must cover long-term stabilization and monitoring of tailings impoundments
  • § 40.42 — License expiration and decommissioning: specific licenses terminate on the expiration date stated in the license; before termination, the licensee must decommission all structures and areas where source material was used or stored to meet NRC's decommissioning criteria (typically 25 mrem/year for residual radioactive material); for uranium mills, decommissioning requires meeting the mill tailings stability and performance objectives in Appendix A
  • § 40.60–40.62 — Reporting and inspections: licensees must notify NRC within 4 hours of any event (fire, explosion, chemical release) involving source material that could cause unplanned exposure; annual inventory reports of uranium and thorium holdings are required for significant licensees; NRC inspectors may enter licensed premises at reasonable times; refusal to allow inspection is grounds for license suspension
  • Appendix A — Criteria Relating to the Operation of Uranium Mills and the Disposition of Tailings or Wastes Produced by the Extraction or Concentration of Source Material: this appendix contains the performance objectives for uranium mill tailings — the primary environmental legacy of uranium milling; tailings impoundments must be designed to control radioactive releases (radon-222 flux limit of 20 pCi/m²/s), prevent groundwater contamination, and remain stable for 1,000 years (or up to 10,000 years if reasonably achievable) after closure; final disposal cells must use cover designs that prevent erosion and limit radon flux; financial assurance for tailings closure must be in place before operations begin

  Part 40 licenses cover both the "front end" of the nuclear fuel cycle — uranium mining and milling — and a wide range of other commercial uses: depleted uranium in radiation shielding, thorium in specialty alloys and ceramics, and naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) in industrial processes. The Appendix A requirements for mill tailings reflect the recognition, after years of uncontrolled uranium milling in the Western U.S., that tailings impoundments containing hundreds of millions of tons of radioactive residue require engineered closure and perpetual care. Title II of UMTRCA (42 U.S.C. § 7914) assigned NRC responsibility for licensing Title II (post-1978) tailings sites — these continue to be the dominant Part 40 licensing activity as mills close and enter the decommissioning and long-term care phase.

• 10 CFR Part 70 — Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material (59 sections — the regulatory framework for any person who receives, owns, possesses, uses, or transfers "special nuclear material" (SNM): plutonium, uranium enriched in U-233 or U-235, and any other material designated by the Commission). Key provisions:

  • § 70.3 — License requirement: no person may receive, own, possess, use, or transfer SNM except under an NRC license; the breadth of this prohibition means that even a contractor who temporarily possesses enriched uranium fuel on behalf of a licensed utility must be independently licensed or covered by the licensee's possession authorization
  • § 70.18 — License types: licenses are either general (automatically effective for specified activities without application, such as owning SNM for non-use, or possessing small quantities for instrument calibration) or specific (requiring individual application, review, and issuance); all fuel fabrication facilities, enrichment plants, and research facilities holding more than trace quantities operate on specific licenses
  • § 70.22 — Application contents: a specific license application must include: (1) the purpose and general use of the SNM; (2) the location and description of the facility; (3) a description of proposed equipment and procedures for handling SNM; (4) the qualifications of personnel who will handle SNM; (5) the nature and extent of proposed safeguards and physical security plans; (6) a waste management plan; and (7) for large facilities, an Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA)
  • § 70.23 — Approval standards: the Commission will issue a specific license only after finding that: the applicant is legally qualified; SNM will be used only for lawful purposes in the U.S.; the proposed activities are not inimical to common defense and security or public health and safety; and required safeguards (physical security, material accounting) are adequate; for uranium enrichment facilities the Commission must hold a public hearing before issuing a license (§ 70.23a)
  • § 70.24 — Criticality accident requirements: any licensee authorized to possess SNM exceeding 700 grams of contained U-235 (or the equivalent in other fissile material) must have an operational criticality safety program, maintain approved emergency procedures for responding to criticality accidents, and post emergency procedures at each location where SNM is handled or stored; the 700-gram threshold corresponds roughly to the amount of enriched uranium that can theoretically achieve a sustained chain reaction under certain geometric conditions — the threshold designed to catch fuel fabrication and research facilities while exempting most medical and industrial users
  • § 70.25 — Financial assurance for decommissioning: applicants for specific licenses must submit a decommissioning funding plan demonstrating that they have (or will have) financial resources sufficient to decommission the facility; acceptable instruments include surety bonds, letters of credit, parent company guarantees (for subsidiaries of sufficiently capitalized corporations), trust funds, and NRC-approved insurance; the amount must be sufficient to cover estimated decommissioning costs assuming contamination consistent with the authorized SNM quantities
  • § 70.32 — License conditions: all specific licenses incorporate as conditions the requirement to maintain material control and accounting records (SNM inventory), to allow NRC inspection of records and facilities, to report to the NRC any SNM that cannot be accounted for (a "Material Unaccounted For" or MUF event), and to comply with physical security plans; the NRC may revoke a license for failure to maintain adequate material control
  • § 70.42 — Transfer restrictions: a licensee may transfer SNM only to another licensed person or to the federal government; transfers must be documented with written records; the receiving licensee must acknowledge receipt; unauthorized transfer of SNM — especially enriched uranium or plutonium — can constitute a federal criminal violation

  Part 70 is the domestic non-reactor SNM licensing regime. It covers the fuel cycle activities between the uranium mine (licensed under Part 40) and the operating reactor (licensed under Part 50/52): conversion facilities, enrichment plants, and fuel fabrication facilities. It also covers medical isotope manufacturers, research labs using enriched materials, and industrial users of plutonium in specialty applications. The NRC's material control and accounting (MC&A) requirements under Part 70 are the domestic implementation of international IAEA safeguards obligations — the U.S. tracks SNM quantities to confirm that no material has been diverted to weapons programs, as required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2026, renewed interest in uranium enrichment for both conventional nuclear plants and advanced reactor fuel (including HALEU — High Assay Low Enriched Uranium for many advanced reactor designs) has increased Part 70 licensing activity after years of relatively static domestic enrichment capacity.

• 10 CFR Part 71 — Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material: the NRC's comprehensive regulations for how licensed radioactive material may be packaged, shipped, and transported in interstate commerce. The rules align with international standards (IAEA Safety Series No. TS-R-1) and interlock with DOT's hazmat transportation rules (49 CFR Parts 107 and 171–180). Key provisions:

  • § 71.3 — License requirement: no NRC licensee may deliver radioactive material to a carrier for transport except in compliance with this Part and DOT regulations; general or specific NRC approval of the package design is required
  • § 71.5 — DOT coordination: licensees must also comply with applicable DOT regulations in 49 CFR Parts 107, 171–180; Part 71 governs the package design (NRC jurisdiction); DOT governs the transport (carrier labeling, placarding, routing, emergency response)
  • Subpart C — General Licenses (§§ 71.17–71.23): NRC automatically grants a general license to any NRC licensee to transport material in an NRC-approved package design — the approved package design is the authorization. Separate general licenses exist for: (a) previously approved packages (§ 71.19), (b) foreign-approved packages revalidated by DOT (§ 71.21), and (c) small quantities of fissile material meeting specific activity and mass limits (§ 71.22)
  • Subpart E — Package Approval Standards (§§ 71.41–71.65): the four package type hierarchy, from least to most restrictive:
    • Excepted packages: very small amounts of limited radioactive material; basic container integrity only
    • Type A packages: the most common category — designed to retain contents under normal transportation conditions; must pass performance tests at 9 meters drop, compression, penetration, and water spray. Activity limits are material-specific (A1 for special form; A2 for normal form)
    • Type B packages: required for large quantities, spent nuclear fuel, or high-level waste; must withstand hypothetical accident conditions — 9 meter drop onto unyielding surface, 1 meter puncture drop, 30-minute fully-engulfing fire at 800°C, and 8-hour immersion (§ 71.73); must retain contents with no more than A2 release over 1 week
    • Fissile material packages: must maintain subcriticality under all normal and accident conditions; tested as a package array under flooded conditions
  • § 71.47 — External radiation limits for all packages: maximum dose rate of 2 mSv/hr (200 mrem/hr) at any external surface; 0.1 mSv/hr (10 mrem/hr) at 2 meters (the "transport index"); exclusive-use shipments may use higher surface limits up to 10 mSv/hr
  • § 71.100 — Criminal penalties under Atomic Energy Act § 223 for willful violations; employee whistleblower protection under § 71.9
  • Subpart H — Quality Assurance (§§ 71.101–71.137): comprehensive QA program required for package design, fabrication, and use — covers procurement, fabrication, inspection, testing, and documentation; the QA program must be approved by NRC before a package design certificate of compliance (CoC) is issued

  The most significant practical application: transportation of spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors to dry cask storage or (eventually) a permanent repository. Spent fuel casks must be Type B packages certified to withstand both normal transport and severe accidents, including train derailments and bridge collapses. The NRC maintains a publicly available database of all approved package designs (CoCs) and their status.

• 10 CFR Part 100 — Reactor Site Criteria (siting requirements for nuclear power reactors: seismic, geological, meteorological, and population density factors; 10 sections)

• 10 CFR Part 51 — Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions: NRC's implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for all nuclear licensing actions. Key provisions:

  • § 51.10 — Purpose and scope: NRC interprets and implements NEPA § 102(2) for its domestic licensing authority under the Atomic Energy Act, Energy Reorganization Act, and Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act; NRC's NEPA implementation is coordinated with CEQ regulations
  • § 51.20 — Requirement for environmental impact statement (EIS): major licensing actions requiring a full EIS include construction of nuclear power reactors, reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, and high-level waste repositories; renewals of reactor operating licenses also require NEPA review
  • §§ 51.45–51.55 — Environmental reports: applicants for certain licenses must submit an environmental report with their application, covering direct and indirect environmental impacts, alternatives considered, the no-action alternative, and cumulative impacts. For new reactors, the environmental report must address the full lifecycle including decommissioning and waste disposal
  • §§ 51.70–51.80 — Draft and final environmental impact statements: NRC prepares draft EISs based on applicant reports and public comment, circulates them to cooperating agencies and the public, then issues final EISs prior to licensing decisions; public comment periods are typically 45–60 days
  • § 51.95 — Environmental impact statements for license renewals: NRC applies a "generic environmental impact statement" (GEIS) baseline for nuclear power plant license renewals, supplemented by site-specific environmental analyses; issues identified in the GEIS as "Category 1" (consistent impacts across all plants) are resolved generically; "Category 2" issues require site-specific analysis in each renewal proceeding
  • § 51.100–51.110 — Timing of Commission action: NRC may not issue a license or permit that authorizes construction or operation of a nuclear facility until the final EIS (or finding of no significant impact, if applicable) has been prepared and circulated

  NEPA review is one of the most litigated aspects of NRC licensing. Intervenors in licensing proceedings routinely challenge the adequacy of EISs on issues such as severe accident mitigation, spent fuel pool risks, and cumulative impacts from multiple nearby facilities. NRC's Part 51 process incorporates a mandatory hearing right for entities near proposed nuclear facilities, making environmental review both a legal safeguard and a forum for public opposition to nuclear projects.

• 10 CFR Part 61 — Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste: the regulatory framework for low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facilities — near-surface burial sites for radioactive waste that does not qualify as high-level waste, transuranic waste, or spent fuel. Low-level waste includes contaminated materials from nuclear power plants, medical facilities, research reactors, and industrial uses. Part 61 establishes who may operate a LLRW disposal facility, what technical requirements the facility must meet, and how the site must be stabilized after closure. Key provisions:

  • § 61.3 — License required: no person may receive, possess, and dispose of radioactive waste at a land disposal facility without an NRC license; this requirement is what makes LLRW disposal one of the most heavily regulated activities in the United States — only a handful of facilities are licensed to operate
  • § 61.41 — Protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity: concentrations of radioactive material released to groundwater, surface water, air, soil, plants, or animals must not result in an annual dose exceeding 25 millirem to the whole body, 75 millirem to the thyroid, or 25 millirem to any other organ of any member of the public — the same limits that apply to nuclear power plants
  • § 61.42 — Protection of individuals from inadvertent intrusion: the facility must be designed and closed so that any person who inadvertently intrudes into the disposal site and occupies or contacts the site is protected; this "inadvertent intruder" standard drives the depth and containment requirements for different waste classes
  • § 61.44 — Stability after closure: the site must be sited, designed, and operated to achieve long-term stability and eliminate the need for active maintenance after closure — a requirement that imposes stringent geotechnical and hydrogeological site selection standards
  • § 61.55 — Waste classification (Class A, B, C): NRC divides LLRW into three classes based on radionuclide concentration; Class A (lowest activity) requires the least stringent disposal controls; Class B requires greater stability; Class C (highest activity short of high-level) requires greater isolation from the surface and institutional controls; waste exceeding Class C concentrations generally cannot be disposed of in near-surface facilities at all and must await a permanent repository
  • § 61.56 — Waste characteristics: all LLRW classes must meet minimum physical and chemical requirements — waste must be solidified or placed in rigid containers, free liquids must be reduced to less than 1% of the waste volume, and pyrophoric, explosive, or corrosive wastes are prohibited; these requirements protect disposal site workers and prevent operational incidents
  • § 61.59 — Institutional requirements: LLRW disposal may occur only on land owned by the federal government or a state — private land ownership is prohibited; after closure, the land owner must maintain institutional controls for at least 100 years (for Class C waste) to prevent inadvertent intrusion during the hazardous period
  • § 61.62–61.63 — Financial assurances: before a license is issued, the applicant must provide assurance of sufficient funds to cover site closure, stabilization, post-closure monitoring, and institutional control; these financial assurance requirements (typically trust funds or surety bonds) ensure that future generations are not left with an uncontrolled hazardous waste site

  The LLRW disposal landscape in the United States is severely limited by political and regulatory barriers — a direct result of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (1980, amended 1985), which made states responsible for disposing of waste generated within their borders through regional compacts. Despite this mandate, the development of new LLRW disposal sites has been extremely difficult: only four facilities operate nationally (Barnwell, SC; Hanford, WA; Envirocare/US Ecology, UT; Andrews, TX), and access is often restricted to compact member states. The regulatory rigor of Part 61 means the licensing process takes 10-15 years and requires extraordinary site characterization; as a result, the existing facilities operate as bottlenecks, and healthcare providers, nuclear plants, and research institutions face significant logistical challenges managing their LLRW.

  Recent rulemakings: NRC completed a significant update to Part 61 in 2015 (80 FR 35512) — the first major revision since the original 1982 rule — adding a site-specific performance assessment framework for disposal facilities receiving large quantities of Class B and C waste from reactor decommissioning, requiring groundwater monitoring during operations, and strengthening the inadvertent intruder analysis requirements.

• 10 CFR Part 62 — Criteria and Procedures for Emergency Access to Non-Federal and Regional Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities: because only a handful of LLRW disposal sites operate in the United States and access is often restricted to regional compact member states, generators in states without disposal capacity can find themselves unable to legally dispose of their low-level waste — creating a public health emergency if that waste is accumulating at a nuclear power plant, hospital, or research reactor with no outlet. Part 62 implements § 6 of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (42 U.S.C. § 2021b et seq.), which authorizes NRC to grant emergency access to a non-federal or regional LLRW disposal facility when a generator cannot otherwise dispose of its waste and the failure to dispose creates a threat to public health and safety or the common defense and security. Key provisions:

  • § 62.21 — Criteria for granting emergency access: NRC must determine that: (1) the generator cannot dispose of the LLRW through any available alternative (storage, volume reduction, decay-in-storage, alternative disposal) within a reasonable period; (2) the waste poses an immediate and serious threat to the public health and safety or the common defense and security if not disposed of; NRC must make this determination within 45 days of receiving a complete request; emergency access may be granted for an initial period up to 180 days, with possible extensions of up to 180 days each
  • §§ 62.12–62.13 — Request content — general and alternatives: a request for emergency access must include: the identity of the generator and the specific waste requiring disposal; the estimated volume and radionuclide content; a detailed discussion of all alternatives to emergency access that were considered and why each was found inadequate — the requirement to exhaust alternatives is mandatory; common alternatives NRC considers: extended on-site storage, volume reduction by compaction or incineration, transfer to another licensed facility for storage, and delay in production of the waste-generating activity; NRC will deny requests if alternatives are technically feasible and have not been adequately explored
  • § 62.13 — Alternative disposal options: petitioners must demonstrate that they evaluated and exhausted: (a) storage at the generator's site; (b) decay-in-storage (waiting for short-lived isotopes to fall below regulatory concern); (c) volume reduction to minimize the disposal footprint; (d) use of any available non-federal disposal option; (e) any Agreement State or compact option that might be available; the alternatives analysis is the most demanding part of a Part 62 petition — NRC has historically denied requests where on-site storage was feasible
  • § 62.21(c) — Designation of disposal facility: upon granting emergency access, NRC designates a specific non-federal or regional LLRW disposal facility that must accept the waste; the designated facility may be in a state or compact that has otherwise excluded the generator's state — emergency access overrides compact restrictions; NRC coordinates with the compact commission and the designated facility before designation
  • § 62.22 — Notice and distribution: upon granting or denying a request, NRC notifies the requesting generator, the Governor of the generator's state, the Governor of the state where the disposal facility is located, the compact commission with jurisdiction, and any other materially interested person; the emergency access determination is a final agency action subject to judicial review

  Emergency access under Part 62 is an exceptional remedy used rarely in practice — the LLRW disposal crisis that Congress anticipated when it passed the 1985 Amendments has been managed primarily through extended on-site storage at generators' facilities, rather than emergency access petitions. Medical and research facilities generating small volumes of short-lived LLRW typically use decay-in-storage (holding waste until radioactivity falls to background levels), which avoids the need for formal disposal entirely. Nuclear power plant decommissioning projects, however, generate large volumes of LLRW that cannot wait indefinitely — the limited capacity of the Barnwell, Andrews, and Hanford facilities makes Part 62 emergency access a real contingency for decommissioning projects in states without compact access. No major amendments since original promulgation — the 1985 LLRWPAA framework has remained the governing statute without significant revision, though state compact politics have continued to evolve.

• 10 CFR Part 11 — Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Special Nuclear Material: the NRC's personnel security program governing who may have unescorted access to or control over formula quantities of special nuclear material (SNM — highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and U-233 in quantities large enough to be weapons-relevant). Key provisions:

  • § 11.11 — General requirements: any licensee who possesses, stores, transports, or uses formula quantities of SNM must establish and maintain an access authorization program; unauthorized access to formula quantities of SNM is one of the most severe security failures in the NRC regulatory framework — SNM in weapons-usable quantities could be diverted to produce a nuclear device
  • § 11.15 — Application: individuals requiring access must apply through the licensee, which submits the request to NRC; the access authorization determination involves a comprehensive background investigation including criminal history, credit, employment, and where warranted, a psychological assessment
  • § 11.21 — Criteria: NRC applies a "common sense judgment" totality-of-circumstances standard; adverse factors include criminal history, illegal drug use, foreign contacts or allegiances, or psychological conditions affecting reliability; the standard is similar to security clearance adjudicative guidelines but implemented by NRC rather than DOD/IC; access authorization is not a security clearance in the traditional sense but has similar national security purpose
  • § 11.13 — Transportation: personnel transporting SNM in formula quantities must complete access authorization requirements; this links to the physical protection transportation rules in 10 CFR Part 73

  Part 11 access authorization is distinct from the broader security plans required under 10 CFR Part 73 (physical protection of plants and materials) — Part 11 governs individual personnel eligibility while Part 73 governs facility-level security measures. Fewer than 20 NRC-licensed facilities currently handle formula quantities of SNM; those facilities include fuel fabrication plants (Westinghouse Columbia, Global Nuclear Fuel), enrichment facilities (Urenco USA, Centrus), and specialized research facilities.

• 10 CFR Part 26 — Fitness-for-Duty Programs (104 sections across 11 subparts — NRC's comprehensive drug, alcohol, and fatigue management program for nuclear power plant workers with unescorted access to protected areas; one of the most rigorous workplace fitness-for-duty programs in federal regulation, applied to workers at commercial nuclear power reactors and their contractors):

  • Applicability (§ 26.3–26.4): Part 26 applies to all commercial nuclear power reactor licensees (operating under 10 CFR 50.57 or combined licenses under Part 52); the program must cover all individuals with unescorted access to a nuclear power reactor's protected area, including contractor and vendor personnel — not just the licensee's own employees. Emergency response and security personnel are also covered. The breadth is intentional: an unescorted individual anywhere inside the protected area perimeter has access to safety-critical systems and reactor structures.
  • Program performance objectives (§ 26.23): FFD programs must provide reasonable assurance that (a) individuals are trustworthy and reliable as demonstrated by avoiding substance abuse; (b) individuals are not under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal, that could adversely affect their ability to safely perform their duties; and (c) personnel are not fatigued to a degree that could adversely affect safety performance.
  • Drug and alcohol testing (§ 26.31): licensees must implement mandatory testing in five categories: (1) pre-access testing — before granting unescorted access to a protected area; (2) random testing — unannounced, unpredictable selection from all covered workers on a rolling basis; (3) for-cause testing — triggered by observed behavior, accident involvement, or law enforcement information; (4) post-event testing — following accidents, unusual incidents, or errors; and (5) follow-up testing — for individuals returning after a confirmed positive result. The random testing rate must ensure statistically meaningful deterrence — NRC requires a minimum 50% annual testing rate for covered workers (meaning on average each worker is tested every two years, randomly).
  • Drug testing standards (Subpart G): urine specimens must be analyzed at a HHS-certified laboratory (the same standard as DOT drug testing); the panel covers marijuana (THC), cocaine, opioids, phencyclidine (PCP), and amphetamines; confirmatory testing by GC/MS or LC-MS/MS is required for all non-negative results; a Medical Review Officer (MRO) — a licensed physician with specialized training — must review all non-negative laboratory results before they are reported to the employer; the MRO may reverse a positive result if there is a legitimate medical explanation (e.g., a prescribed medication)
  • Alcohol testing (§§ 26.101–26.103): initial screening uses a breathalyzer or blood test; a screening result of ≥ 0.02 blood alcohol concentration (BAC) requires the worker to be removed from safety-sensitive duties pending a confirmatory evidentiary breath test; a confirmed result of ≥ 0.04 BAC is a positive alcohol test triggering FFD policy violation procedures; the 0.02 threshold for removal from duty is more conservative than the DOT transportation standard
  • Fatigue management (Subpart I — Managing Fatigue): nuclear power plant operations require 24/7 staffing, making fatigue a systemic safety concern; Part 26 Subpart I establishes mandatory work-hour controls: 16-hour maximum shift in any 24-hour period, 26-hour maximum in any 48-hour period, minimum 10-hour rest periods between work shifts, and a 6-week rolling lookback to prevent chronic fatigue accumulation; supervisors must make fitness-for-duty assessments before permitting fatigued workers to perform safety-sensitive duties; self-declarations of fatigue are protected — a worker who identifies themselves as too fatigued to work safely may not be retaliated against
  • Behavioral observation (§ 26.33): workers' immediate supervisors and co-workers are required to observe for behaviors indicating possible unfitness — substance impairment, unusual behavior changes, law enforcement notifications; all covered workers receive annual training on recognizing and reporting such indicators; behavioral observation is a continuous supplement to the testing program
  • Employee Assistance Programs (§ 26.35): licensees must maintain an EAP providing confidential assessment, counseling, and referral services; workers who self-refer to the EAP before being tested or before an incident are treated more favorably than those whose substance use is detected through testing; the EAP creates an incentive for voluntary treatment over concealment

  10 CFR Part 26 applies to approximately 60 operating nuclear power plants (about 95 reactors) in the United States. A March 2026 amendment (91 FR 15775) updated definitions and certain scope provisions. The program's comprehensiveness — extending to short-term contractors with unescorted access — creates significant administrative burden for outage work, when hundreds of outside craft workers enter a plant for scheduled maintenance; nuclear outage contractors must maintain their own Part 26-compliant programs or certify that individuals have current negative test results. Part 26's rigor reflects the stakes: in the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, worker fatigue and human performance were contributing factors; in the decades since, NRC has progressively tightened performance-based requirements to reduce human error in nuclear operations.

• 10 CFR Part 21 — Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance: requires any individual or organization that supplies "basic components" to NRC-licensed facilities to evaluate potential defects and report to NRC when a defect exists that could create a substantial safety hazard. The defect-reporting framework extends nuclear quality assurance obligations up the supply chain to vendors, fabricators, and contractors — not just licensees. Key provisions:

  • § 21.3 — Definitions: a "basic component" is any structure, system, or component (or service affecting a basic component) that is safety-related; the definition is broad and covers not just nuclear components (fuel assemblies, reactor coolant pumps, safety valves) but any item or service that could affect safety if defective; software used in safety systems is a "basic component" subject to Part 21
  • § 21.21 — Notification requirements: upon discovering a defect, the supplier or licensee has 60 days to evaluate whether it could create a substantial safety hazard; if the evaluation concludes a substantial hazard exists, the supplier must notify NRC within 2 days of completing the evaluation and notify each purchaser who received the affected component; the 60-day evaluation clock can be extended if the evaluation requires more time, but the extension must itself be reported to NRC within 60 days
  • § 21.31 — Procurement documents: any entity subject to Part 21 that procures basic components must include in procurement documents the requirements to be imposed on suppliers, including the obligation to notify the procuring entity if a defect is discovered; this "flow-down" requirement means that first-tier contractors must impose Part 21 obligations on sub-tier suppliers — creating a chain of quality assurance accountability throughout the nuclear supply chain
  • § 21.6 — Posting requirements: facilities subject to Part 21 must post a notice informing employees that NRC regulations require reporting of defects; this serves as a formal whistleblower mechanism — employees who identify a potential defect have a right and obligation to raise it, and the notice informs them how
  • § 21.61 — Failure to notify: criminal penalties under Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act for willful failure to notify NRC of a defect in a basic component that could create a substantial safety hazard; civil enforcement authority allows NRC to issue civil monetary penalties per day of violation

  Part 21 is the nuclear supply chain's safety reporting requirement. It applies broadly — a valve manufacturer, a concrete company supplying safety-related structures, a software developer writing control system code for a nuclear plant, or a testing laboratory certifying component specifications can all be "basic component" suppliers subject to Part 21. NRC has used Part 21 to detect safety-significant defects across all categories of basic components, and enforcement actions for Part 21 violations are a regular feature of NRC enforcement.

• 10 CFR Part 170 — Fees for Facilities, Materials, Import and Export Licenses, and Other Regulatory Services: the NRC fee schedule charging applicants and licensees for the cost of regulatory services, implementing the Independent Offices Appropriation Act (IOAA):

  • § 170.2 — Scope: applies to all holders of or applicants for NRC-specific licenses (nuclear power plants, fuel cycle facilities, industrial radiographers, medical material users, import/export licenses); general licenses (which take effect without an application) are not subject to application fees; federal agencies are exempt
  • § 170.11 — Exemptions from fees: certain categories may receive fee waivers — non-profit entities providing information to the public, small byproduct material users meeting specific criteria, and activities directly supporting nuclear nonproliferation goals; Agreement State licensees (where the state has taken over NRC's regulatory role for byproduct material) may have different fee arrangements
  • § 170.12 — Payment: application and license fees must accompany the filing; late or unpaid fees accrue interest; invoices for inspection fees and special project fees are issued after the service is rendered with a 30-day payment deadline
  • § 170.20 — Average cost per professional staff-hour: most NRC service fees are calculated at an annual hourly rate based on NRC's average professional staff cost; this rate is updated annually through the Part 170/171 fee rulemaking; the rate-based calculation makes NRC licensing costs depend on the actual staff time required — complex license applications requiring extensive NRC review cost far more than routine amendments
  • § 170.21 — Fee schedule for production and utilization facilities (reactors): establishes application fees and annual base charges for commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities; annual fees for a single large commercial power reactor can exceed $5 million, reflecting the cost of resident inspectors, technical oversight, and licensing support activities; operating license holders pay annual fees; construction permit holders pay fees tied to construction oversight
  • § 170.31 — Fee schedule for materials licenses: specifies application fees and annual charges for byproduct material licenses (medical uses, industrial gauges, radiography), source material licenses (uranium mills, in-situ recovery), special nuclear material licenses, and import/export licenses; materials license fees range from hundreds to hundreds of thousands of dollars depending on the scope and complexity of the licensed activity

  The NRC is unusual among federal regulatory agencies in that it recovers nearly all of its operating costs from fees assessed on the entities it regulates — roughly $900 million annually. This fee recovery model means the nuclear industry directly funds the cost of its own federal oversight. Annual fee assessments are published each spring in a final rule updating Parts 170 and 171 (annual fees for existing licensees), and licensees closely track proposed fee changes since they represent a significant recurring operating cost. Recent rulemaking: 91 FR 15879 (March 30, 2026) — updated the average professional staff-hour rate and the fee schedules for FY2026.

• 10 CFR Part 76 — Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants: the NRC's unique regulatory framework for the two Cold War-era uranium enrichment facilities — the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (Piketon, Ohio) and the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (Paducah, Kentucky) — that were operated by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC, now Centrus Energy Corp.) under a lease from the Department of Energy. Unlike conventional NRC licensing (where an applicant holds an NRC license), Part 76 uses a certificate of compliance framework — USEC/Centrus cannot operate the leased portions of the plants without an NRC-issued certificate, which must be periodically renewed. The Part implements the Energy Policy Act of 1992's mandate (42 U.S.C. § 2243) that NRC regulate gaseous diffusion plants for safety, safeguards, and security.

  Key provisions:

  • § 76.1 / § 76.2 — Scope and purpose: Part 76 governs the portions of Portsmouth and Paducah leased by the Corporation (USEC/Centrus); the regulations are promulgated to protect public health and safety from radiological hazards and provide for common defense and security; the Corporation may not expand operations to non-leased areas without separate NRC action; importantly, the regulations expire January 8, 2027 (unless NRC extends — it will publish public notice) — a statutory sunset tied to the specific facility context
  • § 76.21 — Certificate required: the Corporation may not operate either gaseous diffusion plant without an appropriate NRC certificate of compliance (or approved compliance plan); operating without a certificate is a criminal violation under the Atomic Energy Act
  • §§ 76.31–76.37 — Application procedures: the Corporation must file periodic renewal applications by April 15 of the designated year (§ 76.31); the application must include a safety analysis report covering SNM activities, facility safety systems, radiation protection, and emergency preparedness (§ 76.35); NRC must issue a decision within 6 months of receiving a complete application (§ 76.43); while a timely renewal application is pending, the existing certificate continues in effect (§ 76.55)
  • § 76.60 — Regulatory requirements: NRC uses existing Parts 20, 30, 40, 70, 73, 74, 95, and 110 for certification; the Corporation must provide for adequate protection of public health and safety and implement the Commission's applicable regulations as conditions of its certificate — referencing the existing NRC regulatory framework rather than creating plant-specific standalone rules
  • §§ 76.111–76.119 — Safeguards and security: physical security and material control and accounting (MC&A) apply based on the category of special nuclear material present at the plants; Category I (formula quantities — § 76.113): the highest safeguards level, requiring the full Part 74 MC&A and Part 73 physical protection program; Category II (moderate strategic significance — § 76.115): intermediate MC&A under §§ 74.41–74.45; Category III (low strategic significance — § 76.117): minimum MC&A under §§ 74.33 and 74.81–74.82; security facility approval for National Security Information and Restricted Data under Part 95 (§ 76.119)
  • § 76.10 — Deliberate misconduct: any employee of the Corporation, or any contractor/subcontractor and their employees, who knowingly provides false or incomplete information to NRC, or who deliberately causes a violation of any certificate condition or NRC regulation, is subject to civil or criminal enforcement — not just the corporate entity; this provision closes the gap that might otherwise allow a contractor to shield the license holder from liability
  • § 76.7 — Employee protection: discrimination against an employee for reporting potential NRC violations, raising safety concerns, or participating in NRC proceedings is prohibited; applies to the Corporation, its contractors, and subcontractors; employees who believe they have been retaliated against may file complaints with the NRC; this whistleblower protection operates independently of the Atomic Energy Act criminal provisions
  • § 76.68 — Plant changes: the Corporation may make facility modifications without prior NRC approval only if a written safety analysis demonstrates that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question (no increase in probability or consequences of an accident, no new type of accident, no margin of safety reduction); changes involving unreviewed safety questions require prior NRC approval — a mechanism similar to the 10 CFR 50.59 plant change process for reactor licensees
  • § 76.76 — Backfitting: NRC may not impose new requirements on the certificate holder through backfitting unless NRC determines that the change is necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, or that there are substantial benefits over the costs; the backfit rule protects the Corporation from unlimited retroactive regulatory changes and requires NRC to justify new requirements against the existing safety baseline

  The gaseous diffusion plants are among the largest industrial nuclear facilities ever operated in the United States — the Paducah plant alone covers more than 750 acres and consumed roughly 3,000 megawatts of electricity to operate its thousands of diffusion stages. Both plants are now fully shut down (Paducah's enrichment operations ceased in 2013; Portsmouth's in 2001) and are in various stages of decommissioning, making the primary ongoing NRC regulatory role one of oversight during cleanup of the extensive radiological contamination from decades of enrichment operations rather than active enrichment oversight. The U.S. has shifted its enrichment capacity to the Urenco USA centrifuge facility in Eunice, New Mexico, licensed under 10 CFR Part 70 (special nuclear material), not Part 76 — a reflection of the centrifuge technology's fundamentally different regulatory footprint.

• 10 CFR Part 37 — Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material: NRC's security regulations for licensees possessing high-activity radioactive sources that could be used to construct a radiological dispersal device (a "dirty bomb") or that pose direct radiation hazards. Implemented in 2013 following the discovery that Category 1 and 2 sources were inadequately tracked and secured at many licensed facilities:

  • Category definitions: Category 1 sources have activity levels at or above the threshold that could cause death within hours of unprotected contact (based on IAEA Dangerous Goods categories); examples include high-activity cobalt-60 teletherapy sources, high-dose-rate brachytherapy afterloader sources, certain industrial radiography sources, and large blood irradiator sources; Category 2 sources have lower but still significant activity levels that could cause death within days to weeks and could be weaponized in a dirty bomb; the specific activity thresholds are listed in Appendix A to Part 37 for each isotope
  • § 37.21 — Personnel access authorization: any individual who requires unescorted access to Category 1 or 2 quantities of radioactive material must receive an access authorization — a background investigation and criminal history check confirming the individual is not a security risk; access authorizations must be reviewed periodically; licensees must maintain a list of individuals with unescorted access and audit the list regularly; individuals who terminate employment must have their access authorization immediately suspended
  • § 37.23 — Access authorization program requirements: licensees must implement a documented access authorization program specifying how they evaluate candidates for unescorted access; the program must include: a criminal history records check (fingerprinting required for access to Category 1 sources); a review of prior employer references (going back 7 years); verification of claimed education and credentials; evaluation of behavioral indicators of trustworthiness and reliability; the licensee must document the basis for each access authorization grant
  • § 37.25 — Background investigations: for Category 1 sources specifically, background investigations must include direct contact with prior employers and references; the investigation must cover the past 7 years of employment history; any gaps in employment history must be explained; individuals who refuse to cooperate with the background investigation cannot be granted access authorization; for temporary access (escorted work by outside contractors), the licensee must ensure the individual is escorted at all times by an individual with unescorted access authorization
  • § 37.27 — Criminal history records checks: for Category 1 source access, fingerprint-based criminal history checks through the FBI are required; this is the most stringent background check requirement for non-nuclear power plant NRC licensees; NRC processes the fingerprint requests and receives the FBI results on behalf of licensees; a prior criminal conviction is not an automatic bar to access, but is a factor the licensee must evaluate; convictions involving dishonesty, violence, or weapons offenses require especially careful evaluation
  • Physical protection plan (§§ 37.41–37.49): each licensee must develop, implement, and maintain a physical protection plan (PPP) describing how they secure Category 1/2 material — access controls, alarm systems, cameras, response procedures, and coordination with local law enforcement; the PPP is a protected document (not publicly available); NRC inspectors review PPPs during inspections; security upgrades may be required based on inspection findings
  • § 37.43 — Security systems: licensees must maintain intrusion detection and alarm systems capable of detecting unauthorized access to secured areas where Category 1/2 material is stored; alarms must be continuously monitored (either by on-site personnel or by a 24/7 central monitoring station); response to alarms must be documented; alarm system test records must be maintained

  Part 37 was directly motivated by the theft of high-activity radiological sources in Mexico (2013 — a cobalt-60 source stolen from a medical waste transport vehicle), the discovery of abandoned or orphaned sources at scrap metal facilities, and post-9/11 concern about dirty bomb construction. The physical protection framework for sealed sources in non-power-reactor settings was historically much weaker than for nuclear power plants, creating a security gap that Part 37 addressed. Agreement States implement equivalent requirements for byproduct material licensees within their jurisdictions.

• 10 CFR Part 39 — Licenses and Radiation Safety Requirements for Well Logging (33 sections across 7 subparts — NRC's licensing and safety framework for companies that use radioactive material during oil and gas exploration and production):

  Well logging is the practice of inserting tools into a drilled borehole to measure subsurface geological properties — porosity, fluid saturation, formation density, and element composition. Radiological well logging tools contain sealed radioactive sources (typically Californium-252, Americium-241/Beryllium, or Cesium-137) and use detectors to measure how the formation responds. Radioactive tracers, radioactive markers, and uranium sinker bars are also used. Because well logging takes sealed sources out of controlled facilities into remote, uncontrolled field environments — often deep in oil fields, farms, or wilderness — Part 39 imposes additional safeguards beyond the baseline Part 30 licensing requirements.

  • § 39.13 — Specific license requirements: applicants must demonstrate an adequate radiation protection program, proper training of personnel (minimum training hours, supervised experience), appropriate equipment (calibrated survey instruments at every field station and temporary job site), and facilities for source storage and maintenance; well loggers must also demonstrate capability to handle a source stuck in a well — the most frequent radiological emergency in the industry
  • § 39.15 — Agreement with well owner/operator: before using a sealed source in a well, the licensee must have a written agreement with the well owner specifying who is responsible for source retrieval if the source becomes stuck or lost in the borehole; the agreement must address contingency plans including source retrieval procedures and reporting if the source cannot be recovered
  • § 39.35 — Leak testing: each sealed source must be tested for leakage every 6 months (semi-annual); test results must be retained for 3 years; a leaking source must be removed from service and appropriately disposed
  • § 39.37 — Physical inventory: licensees must conduct a semi-annual physical inventory of all licensed material received and possessed; records must reconcile inventory changes and account for any apparent discrepancies
  • § 39.45 — Subsurface tracer studies: radioactive tracers (materials injected into a well formation to track fluid movement) require protective gloves and protective clothing; the licensee must survey for contamination after use; the activity injected per well must be within license-specified limits
  • § 39.51 — Use in wells without surface casing: in wells without protective casing covering fresh water aquifers, additional controls apply — the licensee must determine that the well penetrates no fresh water aquifers, that there is no practical danger to water resources, and that the appropriate regulatory authority concurs; this provision protects drinking water sources from radioactive contamination

  Well logging with radioactive sources is performed by oilfield service companies (Halliburton, Schlumberger/SLB, Baker Hughes) and smaller independent well logging companies at tens of thousands of wells annually across producing states. NRC and Agreement States jointly regulate the industry — about 40 states have Agreement State programs that include well logging licensing. The highest-risk scenario in the industry is a sealed source becoming stuck and unrecoverable in a well — in that case the well must be plugged with the source in place, creating a permanent radioactive anomaly in the formation that must be documented and reported.

• 10 CFR Part 95 — Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data (37 sections — NRC's security clearance and classified information protection rules for nuclear licensees and certificate holders that need access to classified nuclear information):

  Unlike Part 73 (physical security of nuclear facilities) and Part 11 (access to special nuclear material), Part 95 governs a narrower category: NRC-regulated entities that need access to classified information — National Security Information (NSI, the standard government classification system) or Restricted Data (RD) (a special category of nuclear weapons information under the Atomic Energy Act that has its own protection regime). A nuclear facility operator might need access to the classified Design Basis Threat (DBT) — the specification of the adversary characteristics the plant must be able to defeat — or to classified vulnerability assessments; in those cases, the facility needs a Facility Security Clearance (FCL) under Part 95.

  • § 95.15 — Obtaining a facility clearance: a licensee who needs access to classified matter must request clearance processing from NRC; NRC coordinates with the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA — typically a DOE or DoD security office) to conduct the facility eligibility determination; the CSA reviews the facility's ownership structure, key personnel, and security infrastructure before recommending clearance
  • § 95.18 — Key personnel requirements: the senior management official and the designated Facility Security Officer (FSO) must hold personal security clearances at a level commensurate with the Facility Clearance; the FSO is responsible for implementing the facility's classified information protection program
  • § 95.25 — Storage of classified matter: Secret matter unattended or not in use must be stored in a GSA-approved security container (steel file cabinet with combination lock, or a vault); Top Secret matter requires a vault or closed area with additional controls; the storage requirements align with standards in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM)
  • § 95.27 — Protection while in use: classified matter being actively used must be under the direct control of an authorized individual who can prevent physical, audio, or visual access by unauthorized persons; classified discussions may only occur in spaces that have been certified as Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) or equivalent controlled areas
  • § 95.33 — Security education: all cleared employees must receive initial security briefings and annual security refreshers covering classification guidance, reporting requirements, foreign contact reporting, and insider threat awareness; the FSO maintains briefing records
  • § 95.35 — Access controls: access to classified matter is limited to individuals with a valid security clearance at the appropriate level and a documented need-to-know; the licensee must maintain access logs; visitors who are foreign nationals or who do not hold current clearances must be continuously escorted in areas where classified material is accessible

  Part 95 facilities are relatively few in number — primarily the handful of major nuclear power plant operating companies, reactor designers, and fuel cycle licensees that need access to classified elements of the regulatory framework (primarily classified sections of the DBT). NRC's Division of Security Operations manages the clearance process and conducts oversight inspections.

• 10 CFR Part 19 — Notices, Instructions and Reports to Workers: Inspection and Investigations (19 sections — the NRC regulation establishing worker rights in licensed nuclear facilities; authority: 42 U.S.C. § 2073, 42 U.S.C. § 5841; applies to all persons licensed or regulated by NRC and their employees): Part 19 is NRC's occupational transparency regulation — it requires nuclear employers to tell workers what radiation they're receiving, to post required notices of worker rights, and to allow workers to request inspections and speak privately with NRC inspectors. The March 2026 amendments (91 FR 15772) updated scope and definitional provisions:

  • § 19.11 — Posting of notices to workers: every NRC licensee must post in a conspicuous location where workers congregate (break rooms, locker rooms) the current version of NRC Form 3 — "Notice to Employees" — which advises workers of their rights under Part 19 (right to request inspections, right to be free from discrimination for raising safety concerns, right to receive radiation exposure data); the licensee must also post any NRC citations or enforcement orders for violations found at the facility; the posting requirement is self-executing — an inspector who finds Form 3 missing or outdated can cite the violation without any evidence of harm
  • § 19.12 — Instruction to workers: all individuals who are likely to receive in a year an occupational dose exceeding 1 mSv (100 mrem) must receive instruction commensurate with potential radiological hazards — covering the risks of radiation exposure, NRC regulatory limits (from 10 CFR Part 20), the purpose and function of dosimeters and monitoring equipment, the worker's right to receive exposure data, and procedures to follow if a worker believes a violation exists; the instruction must be documented and refreshed annually or when significant changes in procedures or potential exposure levels occur
  • § 19.13 — Notifications and reports to individuals: radiation exposure data for each worker, and results of bioassays or surveys revealing contamination, must be reported to the worker upon request and automatically whenever the worker's annual occupational dose approaches the applicable limit; a written annual report of each worker's total occupational dose must be provided by the employer within 30 days of the worker's request or annually upon termination; exposure data follows the worker — licensees must provide exposure history to workers who move to other licensee facilities
  • § 19.14 — Presence of representatives during inspections: workers and their representatives (union representatives, personal attorneys) have the right to accompany NRC inspectors during facility inspections; the inspector may limit accompaniment to qualified individuals but may not categorically exclude worker representatives; the right to accompany creates a practical check on the inspection process — workers who observe an inspection may flag hazards that management has minimized in its disclosures
  • § 19.15 — Consultation with workers during inspections: NRC inspectors may consult privately and confidentially with workers concerning radiation safety matters; workers may initiate private consultation without the employer's knowledge; the inspector must maintain confidentiality about the identity of workers who raise safety concerns unless the worker consents to disclosure — protecting against retaliation
  • § 19.16 — Worker requests for inspections: any worker who believes a violation of the Atomic Energy Act, NRC regulations, or license conditions exists may request in writing that NRC conduct an inspection; NRC must investigate and must notify the worker of its determination; if NRC decides no inspection is warranted, the worker may seek informal review (§ 19.17); the inspection request process is the formal mechanism through which whistleblower concerns become inspection events
  • § 19.20 — Employee protection / whistleblower prohibition: employment discrimination against a worker because the worker notified NRC of a potential violation, initiated an NRC proceeding, testified in an NRC proceeding, or refused to engage in activities believed to constitute a violation is prohibited; "employment discrimination" includes discharge, demotion, loss of pay, loss of privileges, harassment, and any other adverse action taken because of protected activity; workers who believe they have been discriminated against may file a complaint with the Department of Labor under the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) § 211 whistleblower provision — DOL has primary jurisdiction over nuclear worker discrimination claims, with NRC coordination; the ERA § 211 procedure provides back pay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages; a parallel NRC enforcement action may also result in civil penalties against the licensee

  Part 19 operates as the occupational safety "bill of rights" for nuclear workers — covering roughly 100,000 workers at NRC-licensed facilities including power plants, fuel fabricators, hospitals, research reactors, and industrial radiography companies. The worker-inspection-request provision (§ 19.16) is practically significant because NRC inspectors treat formal worker requests with heightened scrutiny — they generate a paper trail and a mandatory response. In Agreement States (38 states that have assumed NRC's radioactive materials authority), state radiation programs must adopt requirements at least as stringent as Part 19 for workers at Agreement State-licensed facilities. March 2026 amendments (91 FR 15772) clarified scope and updated definitions to align with Part 20 radiation protection standards and Part 30 byproduct material licensing changes.

• 10 CFR Part 150 — Exemptions and Continued Regulatory Authority in Agreement States (22 sections — the boundary-definition regulation for the Agreement State program, specifying which activities states can regulate and which the NRC retains; authority: 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2111, 2113, 2282; 39 states hold Agreement State status as of 2026):

  Under Atomic Energy Act § 274, NRC may relinquish regulatory authority over byproduct material, source material, and small quantities of special nuclear material (SNM) to states that maintain adequate radiation control programs. Part 150 defines the exemption (what Agreement State licensees are relieved from) and the retained NRC authority (what stays federal regardless):

  • § 150.10 — Persons exempt: any person in an Agreement State holding a valid Agreement State license is exempt from NRC licensing for the covered categories of radioactive material; a Texas hospital using I-131 for thyroid treatment holds a Texas license under the Texas Radiation Control Program (an NRC Agreement State), not an NRC license
  • § 150.11 — Critical mass thresholds: the exemption does not apply to SNM quantities that could form a critical mass — uranium enriched in U-235 exceeding 350 grams of contained U-235, or other SNM above gram-equivalent thresholds for other isotopes; quantities capable of criticality remain under NRC authority regardless of Agreement State status
  • § 150.14 — Physical protection retained authority: NRC retains physical protection authority over SNM of low strategic significance (SNMSS) in Agreement States when quantities exceed 15 grams of plutonium equivalent — because nuclear security is a national responsibility NRC did not devolve; this covers security at fuel fabrication facilities and research reactors in Agreement States
  • § 150.15 — Persons NOT exempt: Agreement State exemption does not apply to: nuclear power and research reactors (states cannot license reactors); commercial uranium enrichment; import/export of radioactive materials; materials producing 50+ curies of tritium per year; certain DOE facility activities; and other categories reserved for federal jurisdiction; a March 2026 amendment (91 FR 15879) updated the non-exempt categories
  • § 150.16 — Nuclear material transaction reports: Agreement State licensees transferring or receiving 1 gram or more of U-235, U-233, or plutonium must report transactions to NRC's nuclear material safeguards program within 30 days, feeding the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) for IAEA safeguards purposes — retained NRC reporting even where state licensing applies
  • § 150.17 — Nuclear material status reports: Agreement State licensees above minimum SNM thresholds file semi-annual inventory reports with NRC under the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement; this Materials Control and Accounting (MC&A) reporting maintains the international safeguards tracking chain through the domestic nuclear fuel cycle
  • § 150.19 — Tritium reports: Agreement State tritium licensees submit quarterly or annual tritium production and inventory reports to NRC; tritium's weapons-boosting application means NRC retains reporting authority even in Agreement States

  Part 150's retained-authority categories — reactors, critical-mass SNM, physical protection, international safeguards reporting — identify the nuclear activities with national or international security significance that cannot be safely devolved to state regulators. The devolved categories — medical isotope use, industrial gauges, academic research, NORM processing — represent the lower-consequence routine uses of radioactive materials where state radiation programs can effectively regulate. With 39 Agreement States, the majority of U.S. radioactive material licensees are state-regulated, making Agreement State oversight the dominant regulatory model for non-reactor nuclear activities.

• 10 CFR Part 25 — Access Authorization for Restricted Data (21 sections — the NRC security clearance framework for licensee personnel who need access to Restricted Data (RD) or National Security Information (NSI) generated or held by NRC; authority: 42 U.S.C. §§ 2165, 5841; separate from power plant worker insider-threat programs under Part 73):

  Most NRC licensees handle no classified information; Part 25 applies to the subset of licensees whose work involves access to RD (nuclear weapon design and materials information classified under the Atomic Energy Act) or NSI (executive-order classified national security information). Key provisions:

  • § 25.15 — Q and L access authorizations: NRC uses two clearance levels: Q (equivalent to DOE Top Secret) — authorizes access to Secret and Confidential RD and Top Secret NSI; L (equivalent to DOE Secret) — authorizes access to Confidential RD and Secret NSI; the Q/L framework mirrors DOE's clearance system, reflecting the AEA's origins in the Manhattan Project security apparatus
  • § 25.17 — Application process: access authorization requests are submitted to NRC as the Cognizant Security Agency (CSA); the applicant completes OPM Form SF-86 (Questionnaire for National Security Positions); NRC submits to OPM for a personnel security investigation; a March 2026 amendment (91 FR 15775) updated coordination procedures between NRC and other CSAs for licensees with access to multiple agencies' classified information
  • § 25.19 — Processing: after OPM completes the background investigation, NRC reviews the record against the governmentwide adjudicative guidelines (the "whole person" standard covering loyalty, financial responsibility, foreign contacts, criminal history, and other factors) and determines eligibility
  • § 25.21 — Eligibility determination: NRC grants, conditionally grants, or denies the access authorization; denials must state reasons tied to the adjudicative guidelines and provide the individual an opportunity to respond; conditional grants may require additional mitigation measures (polygraphs, limited access scope, additional reporting obligations)
  • § 25.13 — Recordkeeping: licensees must maintain records of all current and terminated access authorization holders; records must be available for NRC security audits; terminated employees' access must be promptly revoked and documented

  Part 25 access authorizations are required at NRC-licensed facilities that touch Restricted Data: uranium enrichment facilities, certain fuel fabrication plants, research organizations performing classified nuclear security work, and contractors supporting NRC's own classified activities. Most routine NRC licensees — hospitals, universities, industrial radiography companies — have no Part 25 obligations because their work involves no classified information. The Q/L clearance structure connects NRC's civilian nuclear program to the broader federal classified information ecosystem, enabling collaboration between cleared licensee staff and DOE/DOD/NRC classified programs. Recent rulemakings: 91 FR 15775 (March 2026) — updated processing coordination between NRC and other CSAs.

10 CFR Part 171 — Annual Fees for Reactor Licenses and Fuel Cycle Licenses and Materials Licenses: the NRC's mechanism for recovering its operating budget through annual fees assessed to all licensees. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA-90) amended the Atomic Energy Act to require NRC to recover approximately 100% of its annual congressional appropriation through fees — the principle being that those who benefit from nuclear licensing bear the full cost of the licensing agency's operations rather than general taxpayers.

• § 171.3 — Scope: every holder of an NRC operating license, fuel cycle license, materials license, certificate of compliance, sealed source or device registration, quality assurance program approval, or government agency license is subject to annual fees; the obligation attaches to the license, not to the licensee's commercial activity — a reactor in extended shutdown still owes annual fees until the license is terminated
• § 171.15 — Annual fees for reactor licensees: operating nuclear power plant licensees pay the largest annual fees; a typical operating reactor site pays several million dollars per year under the Part 171 schedule (the precise amounts are recalculated annually in NRC's fee rulemaking and published in the Federal Register); the fees defray the cost of NRC's reactor oversight program — inspections, license amendment reviews, enforcement, and generic safety research; non-power reactor licensees (research and test reactors) pay substantially lower fees reflecting the reduced oversight cost
• § 171.16 — Annual fees for materials licensees: hospitals holding Part 35 medical use licenses pay fees scaled to the complexity of their licensed activities; industrial radiography companies, irradiator licensees, fuel fabrication facilities, and independent spent fuel storage installation licensees each pay category-specific annual fees; uranium recovery licensees pay fees covering NRC's oversight of those facilities; holders of sealed source and device registrations also pay annual fees; the fee schedule differentiates dozens of license categories with distinct fee levels
• § 171.17 — Proration: annual fees are prorated for licensees who receive or terminate their license mid-fiscal year; a new materials license issued in the seventh month of the NRC fiscal year owes approximately five-twelfths of the annual fee; a license terminated early generates only a partial-year charge; the proration formula prevents full-year charges for regulatory services not rendered
• § 171.19 — Payment: NRC invoices licensees annually; payment is due within 30 days of the invoice date; electronic funds transfer is available; licensees who cannot pay on time may request payment plans, but unpaid fees beyond 90 days accrue interest and administrative charges under § 171.25
• § 171.11 — Exemptions: federal government agencies holding NRC licenses are exempt from annual fees; certain nonprofit educational institutions may qualify for fee reductions; exemption requests must be filed within 90 days of the effective date of the annual fee rule
• § 171.23 — Enforcement: failure to pay annual fees is grounds for NRC license suspension or revocation; civil money penalties may be assessed for continued non-payment; the combination of license suspension threat and debt collection authority makes Part 171 fee compliance effectively mandatory

NRC publishes an annual fee rulemaking each fiscal year updating the specific dollar amounts charged to each license category to match the current NRC budget appropriation. Most recent rulemaking: 91 FR 15880 (March 30, 2026) — updated annual fee schedules for FY 2026.

• 10 CFR Part 150 (NRC — Exemptions and Continued Regulatory Authority in Agreement States) — the regulation that implements Atomic Energy Act § 274 (42 U.S.C. § 2021), which authorized NRC to cede licensing authority over certain radioactive materials to states that demonstrate adequate regulatory programs. As of 2026, 39 Agreement States regulate most radioactive materials within their borders under state licenses rather than NRC licenses — but Part 150 defines the boundary between state and federal authority. Key provisions:

  • § 150.3 — Definitions: "Agreement State" means a state that has entered into an agreement under AEA § 274b with the Commission to assume NRC authority; the agreement must specify which categories of byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials are being assumed; not all AEA radioactive materials can be delegated — states cannot assume authority over nuclear reactors, reprocessing facilities, or weapons-grade special nuclear material
  • § 150.10 — NRC license exemptions in Agreement States: NRC licensees who possess byproduct material, source material, or small quantities of SNM only in Agreement States need not hold an NRC license for those materials — the Agreement State license is the operative authorization; this exemption is the functional mechanism through which the Agreement State program works: Agreement State licenses substitute for NRC licenses for covered materials
  • § 150.14 — Reciprocity for Agreement State licensees: an Agreement State licensee may conduct activities in non-Agreement States (and in NRC jurisdiction) for up to 180 days per year without obtaining an NRC license, provided the activities are authorized by the Agreement State license; this reciprocity provision allows portable equipment operators (industrial radiographers, well logging companies) to work across state lines without multiple licenses; activities exceeding 180 days in non-Agreement States require an NRC license or a separate Agreement State reciprocal agreement
  • § 150.15 — Activities retained by NRC (non-delegable): even in Agreement States, NRC retains exclusive regulatory authority over: (1) production, possession, use, export, and import of nuclear reactor facilities (including research reactors); (2) large quantities of special nuclear material (enriched uranium above certain thresholds, plutonium); (3) reprocessing plants and uranium enrichment facilities; (4) transporting nuclear materials in interstate commerce when destined for or originating from non-Agreement States; (5) atomic energy defense activities; Agreement States may not issue licenses that would overlap with these reserved categories
  • § 150.20 — Nuclear power plants: the non-delegable nature of reactor licensing means that nuclear power plants in Agreement States are regulated by NRC under Parts 50 and 52 — not by the state, regardless of Agreement State status; this is why Tennessee (a prominent Agreement State) has NRC-regulated nuclear power plants but a state-regulated radiopharmacy industry
  • § 150.31 — Standards for Agreement State programs: Agreement States must maintain regulatory programs that are "adequate to protect public health and safety" and "compatible with" NRC's program; NRC evaluates Agreement State programs through the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program (IMPEP) — an NRC-led review that assesses the state's technical staffing, inspection frequency, enforcement, and incident response capabilities; a state with an inadequate IMPEP rating risks losing its Agreement State status (which would revert licensing authority to NRC)

  The Agreement State program is the dominant model for radioactive materials regulation in the United States — approximately 85% of all radioactive materials licensees (hospitals, universities, industrial companies, medical device manufacturers) hold Agreement State licenses rather than NRC licenses. The program reflects Congress's intent in AEA § 274 to encourage state regulatory capacity rather than centralizing all radiation control at the federal level. For patients at hospitals in Agreement States, this means radiation safety oversight comes from a state radiation control program (e.g., the Texas Department of State Health Services or the New York State Department of Health) that NRC oversees but doesn't directly operate. From a public access perspective, Agreement State license information and inspection records are maintained by each state's radiation control program — the NRC's public document room does not include Agreement State licensee files. Most recent rulemaking: 79 FR 75742 (December 19, 2014) — amended exemptions for certain industrial uses of NORM (naturally occurring radioactive material) in Agreement States.

• 10 CFR Part 110 — Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material (90 sections across 7 subparts — NRC's licensing, enforcement, and rulemaking procedures for the export and import of nuclear equipment and material under the Atomic Energy Act; authority: 42 U.S.C. § 2139a (Exports and Agreements for Cooperation), 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (NRC Organic Act), and related AEA provisions; Part 110 is the operational mechanism through which U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy — established in statute and implemented through bilateral Agreements for Cooperation under AEA § 123 — is enforced at the level of individual export transactions):

  • § 110.1 — Purpose and scope: covers the export of nuclear equipment and material under the Atomic Energy Act — including nuclear reactors and their components, special nuclear material (enriched uranium, plutonium), source material (uranium, thorium), and byproduct material; also covers imports in certain circumstances; the rules implement AEA §§ 57b, 109, and 111b which require NRC authorization for nuclear exports and mandate compliance with U.S. nonproliferation requirements
  • § 110.2 — Definitions: defines key concepts — "Agreement for Cooperation" (a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and another country meeting the AEA § 123 criteria for peaceful nuclear cooperation), "nuclear equipment" (reactors, fuel reprocessing equipment, enrichment equipment, heavy water production plants), "special nuclear material" (plutonium and highly enriched uranium — the direct weapons materials), "source material" (uranium and thorium in any form)
  • §§ 110.19–110.26 — General licenses: a general license (automatically granted, without a specific application) authorizes exports of small quantities of specified materials — § 110.21 general license for SNM exports up to specified thresholds; § 110.22 for source material exports to countries with an Agreement for Cooperation; § 110.23 for byproduct material exports; § 110.24 for deuterium for nuclear end use; § 110.26 for nuclear reactor components to countries on the approved list; general licenses are available only if the destination country has adequate safeguards and the U.S. has a current Agreement for Cooperation with that country
  • §§ 110.30–110.55 — Specific licenses: significant exports — reactors, large quantities of SNM, enrichment equipment, reprocessing technology — require a specific license from NRC; the specific license application triggers a mandatory interagency review with State Department (ACDA/T) and DOE concurrence requirements; NRC evaluates whether the export is for peaceful purposes, whether adequate safeguards are in place (typically IAEA safeguards), and whether the export is consistent with the terms of the applicable Agreement for Cooperation; § 110.44 — specific licenses are valid up to 4 years (renewable); license conditions may include end-use reporting requirements
  • §§ 110.40–110.43 — Criteria for NRC approval: the Commission must find that the export will not be inimical to the common defense and security, will not be used for atomic weapons production, and (for sensitive nuclear technology) that the recipient country has made adequate assurances against further transfer without U.S. consent; the sensitive nuclear technology (SNT) controls prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities — the technologies that allow civilian nuclear programs to produce weapons-grade material
  • §§ 110.45–110.50 — Export approval process: NRC coordinates with the Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; for exports to countries without full-scope IAEA safeguards, NRC must notify Congress and wait 60 days before issuing a license; the interagency process reflects the national security dimensions of nuclear commerce
  • §§ 110.100–110.113 — Public hearings: any person may request a public hearing on an NRC export license application if the person shows his interest may be affected; hearings are conducted before the full Commission (or a designated presiding officer); classified information procedures allow closed sessions where national security requires

  Nuclear export licensing is one of the NRC's highest-stakes regulatory functions. Every export of significant nuclear equipment or material — a research reactor to a developing country, fuel for a foreign power plant, heavy water equipment — requires NRC approval that incorporates the State Department's assessment of the recipient country's nonproliferation commitments. The U.S. maintains § 123 Agreements for Cooperation with approximately 50 countries and international organizations (IAEA, EURATOM); exports to countries without agreements are prohibited unless a new agreement is in effect. Recent policy: the Trump administration (2025–) announced intent to negotiate new § 123 agreements with several Gulf states and to streamline NRC licensing procedures to enable U.S. nuclear exporters to compete with Russian and Chinese state-owned enterprises that offer reactor sales bundled with fuel supply and financing. The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act of 2018 (NEIMA) directed NRC to revise export licensing procedures to reduce review timelines for low-risk exports.

• 10 CFR Part 9 — NRC Public Records (61 sections across 3 subparts — the NRC's comprehensive transparency and public access framework implementing three separate federal transparency statutes):

  • Subpart A — Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): NRC FOIA procedures covering NRC's unique regulatory records — licensing records for nuclear power plants, spent fuel storage facilities, material licensees, and fuel cycle facilities; inspection reports; enforcement records; and adjudicatory records from contested licensing proceedings. The NRC's FOIA Reading Room (§ 9.26) is one of the federal government's most comprehensive online FOIA reading rooms — NRC's ADAMS (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System) contains more than 6 million publicly accessible documents. The breadth of public access reflects NRC's transparency commitment: most plant technical specifications, safety analysis reports, and inspection reports are publicly available without a FOIA request. Sensitive information protected from disclosure under § 9.17 includes: Safeguards Information (security-sensitive information about nuclear facility vulnerabilities — 10 CFR Part 73), classified Restricted Data and National Security Information, and security-sensitive unclassified information about radioactive material transportation. Requesters seeking NRC records typically find ADAMS faster than submitting a formal FOIA request.
  • Subpart B — Government in the Sunshine Act: NRC open meeting requirements under 5 U.S.C. § 552b. NRC Commission meetings (deliberations and votes by the five-member Commission) are presumptively public — the Commission must publish advance notice in the Federal Register and hold meetings accessible to the public. Closed sessions are permitted only for the specified exemptions (§ 9.104): classified Restricted Data, information involving premature disclosure of Commission decisions that would harm a competitor, internal personnel rules, and information specifically exempted by statute. The NRC Commission's voting sessions — where it decides to approve or deny major licensing actions, issue significant interpretations, or adopt rulemaking — are live-streamed and archived. Closed sessions occur most commonly for deliberations involving classified reactor design information or enforcement strategy.
  • Subpart C — Privacy Act: NRC Privacy Act procedures for access to and amendment of NRC records about individuals; fee waivers; exempted systems of records (primarily law enforcement-related systems); NRC maintains few Privacy Act systems because most of its records are about licensed facilities and organizations, not individuals

  The NRC's Part 9 framework is distinctive because of ADAMS — most major nuclear documents are available online without any FOIA request, making the NRC one of the most transparent regulatory agencies by practice. However, Safeguards Information (security vulnerability details for nuclear plants) is a significant protection category that creates a meaningful line between public and protected records; mishandling Safeguards Information is a federal violation under 10 CFR 73.21. NRC FOIA requesters primarily seek records not in ADAMS — internal correspondence, deliberative documents, and enforcement records during active cases. Recent rulemaking: 88 FR 84274 (December 2023) — Part 9 update aligning fee schedules with OMB guidance and implementing FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 requirements.

• 48 CFR Part 2009 — NRCAR Contractor Qualifications (24 sections — the NRC Acquisition Regulation (NRCAR) supplement governing who may hold NRC contracts; more stringent than standard FAR requirements because of the structural conflicts of interest that arise when the same technical firms who advise the NRC on nuclear safety simultaneously consult for the industry the NRC regulates; authority: 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (AEA) and 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (NRC Organic Act)):

  • § 2009.100 — Revolving-door restriction: NRC policy bars competitively awarding contracts to individuals who left NRC employment within the prior two years; this extends to organizations where former NRC employees hold dominant ownership or management interests, and to sole-source task orders where a former employee is named as key personnel or principal investigator; the prohibition is broader than standard post-employment restrictions and reflects the NRC's concern about regulatory capture — recently-departed technical reviewers who have inside knowledge of ongoing licensing proceedings and agency deliberations provide an unfair advantage when immediately employed by licensees or contractors serving licensees
  • § 2009.105-70 — Mandatory disclosure: NRC inserts the "Current/Former Agency Employee Involvement" clause in all solicitations, requiring all offerors to certify compliance with the revolving-door policy and to disclose any current or former NRC employment of individuals who will perform work under the contract
  • Subpart 2009.4 — Debarment and Suspension: the NRC's Senior Procurement Executive serves as both the debarring official and the suspending official; decisions are coordinated with the SAM.gov exclusions database; an NRC suspension or debarment bars participation in all federal procurement programs, not just NRC contracts
  • Subpart 2009.5 — Organizational Conflicts of Interest (OCI): NRC's most complex contractor qualification framework, addressing the structural reality that the nuclear industry's small contractor pool means the same firms advise both reactor operators and the NRC; an OCI exists when a firm's (a) prior work for a licensee creates a bias risk in reviewing that licensee; (b) access to NRC proprietary information could give it a competitive advantage; or (c) simultaneous work for a licensee and for NRC reviewing that licensee creates impaired objectivity; NRC contracting officers must screen all procurements for OCI, require detailed OCI disclosure in proposals, and impose mitigation plans (internal firewall requirements, personnel separation, data handling restrictions) before award; unmitigable OCIs disqualify the offeror

  The NRC OCI framework is critical for any engineering firm or national laboratory that serves both the commercial nuclear industry and NRC. The nuclear safety consulting market is dominated by a handful of large engineering firms (ENERCON, ARCADIS, BWXT, Enercon subsidiary firms) that work for both plant operators and NRC — NRC's OCI requirements impose meaningful structural constraints on how these firms organize their nuclear regulatory and commercial practices. Failure to disclose a known OCI is grounds for contract termination, cost disallowance, and debarment proceedings.

Pending Legislation

• HR 1636 (Rep. Tonko, D-NY) — Require NRC to factor socioeconomic effects into security rules, track Category 3 radioactive materials. Status: Introduced.

Recent Developments

The NRC is adapting its regulatory framework for a new generation of nuclear technology. Advanced reactor designs — small modular reactors (SMRs), molten salt reactors, high-temperature gas reactors — require updated licensing approaches. NuScale Power received the first SMR design certification. The NRC has also modernized its environmental review process and is developing risk-informed, performance-based regulations that focus resources on the highest safety priorities. The debate over nuclear waste disposal continues, with interim consolidated storage and alternative repository concepts receiving renewed attention.

In March 2026, the NRC proposed revisions to streamline contested adjudications in licensing proceedings, implementing provisions of the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act to expedite nuclear licensing.

In March 2026, the NRC issued an exemption to Constellation Energy for Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, allowing completion of decommissioning beyond 60 years of permanent cessation of operations.

In late February 2026, the NRC proposed a new regulatory framework for fusion machines, amending its regulations to augment the existing byproduct material framework to be inclusive of fusion energy technology. The NRC also proposed incorporating by reference the 2023 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. In February 2026, the NRC issued an exemption to Holtec Palisades, LLC for the Palisades Nuclear Plant, allowing Holtec to submit a subsequent license renewal application — supporting the potential restart of the decommissioned plant as part of broader efforts to expand nuclear power capacity.

In February 2026, the NRC published an Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for exemptions requested by Constellation Energy for Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3.

In February 2026, the NRC accepted and docketed Duke Energy Carolinas' application for an early site permit (ESP) at Belews Creek, representing a potential new nuclear power plant site in the Southeast.