What Adeia Inc. told the SEC could break it.

Adeia's IP-licensing revenue is concentrated in a small number of licensees. For 2025, one customer (Customer A) represented 20% of total revenue and another (Customer B) 16%, and five customers together represented 55.7% of aggregate revenue; at December 31, 2025 a single customer accounted for 63% of aggregate accounts receivable. Some of these agreements do not require any minimum license fees, and licenses come up for renewal, so non-renewal or renegotiation by one large licensee would materially reduce revenue. A high customer/licensee concentration (the specific named licensees — Micron, Samsung, SK Hynix, Sony, etc. — are captured as license edges).

“For the year ended December 31, 2025, five customers represented 55.7% of aggregate revenue.”

As a semiconductor and media IP licensor whose licensees include large Asian chipmakers and foundries, Adeia is exposed to U.S.–China trade and national-security policy. It states its business has been impacted by increased and ongoing trade conflicts and the imposition of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs between the U.S. and China, and that further deterioration of U.S.–China trade relations, economic sanctions, and national-security protection policies could limit or prevent existing or potential customers from doing business with it. Because licensing revenue depends on counterparties being legally able to transact with a U.S. licensor, export-control/sanctions escalation directly threatens its addressable licensee base. A specific, already-materialized trade-policy exposure.

“our business has been impacted due to increased and ongoing trade conflicts and the imposition of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs between the United States and China.”