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CLMT · CIK 0002013745

What Calumet, Inc. told the SEC could break it.

Calumet's economics ride on two things it doesn't fully control: commodity prices and renewable-fuels policy. Its cost to acquire crude oil and feedstocks and the prices it gets for refined products move with regional and global supply and demand, and its Montana Renewables segment adds vegetable-oil and tallow feedstock exposure. That segment is also its profit center — 83.6% of 2025 continuing-operations gross profit — and depends on renewable-fuel incentives like RINs, the 45Z credit and state low-carbon-fuel programs that could be scaled back, even as its refineries face uncertain, litigated Renewable Fuel Standard compliance after partial small-refinery relief. It further depends on certain third-party pipelines to move feedstocks and products, whose unavailability would force costlier transport.

3 self-disclosed vulnerabilities, pulled from its own filings — each in the company’s words, with the source. This is the risk register almost nobody reads.

In its own words

What could break it.

Commodity & input dependence

  • Crude oil and feedstock price/availability exposure (plus renewable feedstocks and natural gas/utility costs ~14% of COGS)medium

    Calumet's specialty products and fuels economics are tied to crude oil and feedstock prices: its cost to acquire crude oil and feedstocks and the prices at which it sells refined products depend on factors beyond its control — regional/global supply and demand for crude, feedstocks and specialty/fuel products. Its Montana Renewables segment (83.6% of 2025 continuing-ops gross profit) adds renewable-feedstock (e.g., vegetable oils/tallow) price exposure, and natural gas and utility costs were ~14.0% of cost of sales in 2025. While it passes some feedstock cost through in specialty products, crack/feedstock-spread and energy-cost swings materially affect margins. A core crude/feedstock/energy commodity dependence.

    Our cost to acquire crude oil and feedstocks and the prices for which we ultimately can sell refined products depend on a number of factors beyond our control, including regional and global supply of and demand for crude oil, other feedstocks and specialty and fuel products.

Regulatory & policy

  • Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) RIN/RVO obligations and small-refinery hardship-exemption (SRE) uncertainty/litigation; renewable-fuel incentives (RINs/credits/LCFS) underpin Montana Renewables (83.6% of gross profit)medium

    Calumet is heavily exposed to U.S. renewable-fuels policy on both sides. Its refineries are subject to the federal Renewable Fuel Standard: EPA granted small-refinery hardship relief for several years (full relief 2019-2021/2022 and 50% relief 2022/2023-2024), but Calumet must still retire RINs meeting 50% of its Renewable Volume Obligation for the 50%-relief years, EPA has not decided 2025, and Calumet has filed D.C. Circuit petitions — leaving its RIN/RVO compliance cost uncertain and litigated. Conversely, its Montana Renewables business (83.6% of 2025 continuing-ops gross profit) depends on renewable-fuel incentives (RINs, producer/blender tax credits such as 45Z, and state LCFS programs), which the company notes could be scaled back. A material, two-sided renewable-fuels regulatory/policy dependence.

    EPA determined that Calumet is not required to retire any RINs for the years for which Calumet received full relief and must retire RINs meeting 50 % of its RVO for years for which Calumet received 50 % relief.

    SEC filing →As of 2026

Supplier concentration

  • Dependence on certain third-party pipelines for transportation of feedstocks and products (e.g., Shreveport facility crude interconnect)medium

    Calumet depends on certain third-party pipelines to transport feedstocks and products — for example, its Shreveport facility is interconnected to a pipeline that supplies a portion of its crude. If these pipelines become unavailable (outage, capacity reallocation, force majeure, or commercial dispute), its revenues and cash available to service debt could decline, as it would have to find costlier alternative transport (rail/truck). A third-party logistics/pipeline infrastructure dependence (providers not individually named, so a risk rather than a named edge).

    We depend on certain third-party pipelines for transportation of feedstocks and products, and if these pipelines become unavailable to us, our revenues and cash available for payment of our debt obligations could decline.

    SEC filing →As of 2026

The hidden graph

Who it depends on, and who depends on it.

Relationships surfaced from filings — including ones disclosed by the other side, which is how the non-obvious ones come to light.

Its suppliers

  • BP Oil Supply Co. (BP p.l.c.)

    In 2025, BP Oil Supply Co. (“BP”) supplied us with approximately 39.3% of our total crude oil supply under term contracts and month-to-month evergreen crude oil supply contracts. In 2025, Macquarie Commodities Trading US, LLC. (“Macquarie”) supplied us with approximately 20.0% of our total crude oil supply under a crude oil supply agreement.

    Cited →
  • Macquarie Commodities Trading US, LLC (Macquarie Group)

    In 2025, BP Oil Supply Co. (“BP”) supplied us with approximately 39.3% of our total crude oil supply under term contracts and month-to-month evergreen crude oil supply contracts. In 2025, Macquarie Commodities Trading US, LLC. (“Macquarie”) supplied us with approximately 20.0% of our total crude oil supply under a crude oil supply agreement.

    Cited →

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