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PBF · CIK 1534504

What PBF Energy Inc. told the SEC could break it.

2 self-disclosed vulnerabilities, pulled from its own filings — each in the company’s words, with the source. This is the risk register almost nobody reads.

A limited set so far — we surface every cited disclosure we’ve extracted for PBF. More may follow as additional filings are processed.

In its own words

What could break it.

Commodity & input dependence

  • Refining margins driven by crude feedstock costs & crude differentials (WTI/WCS, Mars/Brent, light-heavy) and crack spreadsmedium

    As an independent refiner of six domestic refineries, PBF's profitability is a function of crude oil and refined-product commodity prices and the spreads between them. Revenues per barrel fell 9.3% to $82.02 in 2025 'directly related to lower hydrocarbon commodity prices.' Its margins hinge on crude differentials — it flags that Canadian crude export-capacity imbalances and reduced supply of heavy, sour grades (from production curtailments or sanctions) can narrow the WTI/WCS, Mars/Brent and other light-heavy differentials and compress refining margins. A core, high-volatility commodity-spread exposure (crude feedstock + crack spreads).

    imbalances between the production and capacity to export crude in Canada and reduced supply of heavy, sour grades of crude oil in general due to production curtailments or sanction restrictions may continue to result in price volatility and the narrowing of the WTI/WCS, Mars/Brent, and other light heavy differentials, and may reduce our refining margins and adversely affect our profitability and earnings.

Regulatory & policy

  • RFS/RINs compliance obligation (open-market RIN purchases) + biofuel-blending mandates + California ZEV/CARB demand erosionmedium

    PBF faces a refiner-specific regulatory cost-and-demand complex. Under the federal Renewable Fuel Standard it must satisfy a RINs obligation tied to its on-road fuel shipments; to the extent it can't blend enough biofuel, it must buy RINs on the open market to avoid penalties — an uncertain, volatile compliance cost. It is also exposed to rising biodiesel/ethanol blending mandates and, for its two California refineries (Torrance, Martinez), to California's Advanced Clean Cars II / ZEV and Low-Emission Vehicle regulations (2026-2035) that mandate growing zero-emission-vehicle sales and structurally erode gasoline demand. A policy concentration hitting both costs (RINs) and long-run product demand.

    To the degree the Company is unable to blend the required amount of biofuels to satisfy its RINs obligation, RINs must be purchased on the open market to avoid penalties and fines.

    SEC filing →As of 2026

The hidden graph

Who it depends on, and who depends on it.

Relationships surfaced from filings — including ones disclosed by the other side, which is how the non-obvious ones come to light.

Its customers

  • Shell plc

    For the years ended December 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024 only one customer, Shell plc (“Shell”), accounted for 10% or more of our revenues (approximately 13% and 13%, respectively).

    Cited →

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